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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Dana L. Rognlie 
Doctor of Philosophy 
Department of Philosophy 
June 2018 
Title: The Love of Nike: On the Denials of Racialized Patriarchy and the Philosophy of 
Courageous Overcoming 
 
Motivated by student survivors of sexual violence at the ‘University of Nike,’ this 
dissertation claims the denial of trauma is a central motor to the temporal operation of 
racialized patriarchy and its philonikian, or ‘victory-loving,’ notions of masculinity. I 
bear witness to this ‘temporality of denial’ in the institutional responses of the University 
of Oregon and UO-alum Phil Knight’s Nike corporation to the group sexual assault of 
Jane Doe by three university men’s basketball players. I also think through philosophies 
of overcoming this ancient operation of patriarchy in contemporary times. 
Simone de Beauvoir suggests that patriarchy provides tempting avenues to flee 
our freedom of becoming who we are by denying the ambiguity of our human 
subjectivity. Instead, human potential is funneled into hierarchical gendered destinies 
derived from ancient perceived binaries of natural, embodied sex difference prescribing 
masculine material, political, and ontological domination. Rape, war, and conquest are 
central to this logic, a logic racialized in the Modern era of European colonization. 
Recent trauma-informed feminist psychology suggests that denial is a psychological 
mechanism that has efficiently abetted patriarchal oppression throughout history. I 
suggest Plato, the ‘father’ of the contemporary Academy, may have recognized this in his 
philosophy. To overcome centuries of masculine bias in interpretation, I undertake a 
close feminist translation of the war veteran Socrates’ pursuit of the virtue ‘andreia’ 
(ἀνδρεία), both ‘manliness’ and ‘courage’ in the Greek, through several dialogues 
contextualized within their dramatic placement in the history of the Peloponnesian War. 
Socrates’ pursuit of ‘andreia’ includes a critique of the denials of philonikian ‘manliness’ 
and a hunt for an alternative philosophical understanding. I suggest this wisdom-loving 
‘andreia’ is articulated as a gender-critical vision of the strength and courage of love to 
 v 
recollect and rebirth oneself in the aftermath of trauma. Finally, I return to Beauvoir’s 
feminist philosophy of freedom and its temporality of repetition to further distinguish the 
‘forgetting’ of denial from the ‘forgetting’ involved in trauma’s overcoming. The latter 
requires we collectively sacrifice the destinies of patriarchal ontology as we continue to 
build a world in which victims of trauma might not only survive, but meaningfully live. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION:  
PHILONIKE AND PHILOSOPHY 
 
Now emulating these courageous men and deciding that good-spiritedness depends on 
freedom, and freedom depends on good souls, never overlook the perils of war. 
—Pericles 
 
The beauty of flowers and women’s charms can be appreciated for what they are worth; 
if these treasures are paid for with blood or misery, one must be willing to sacrifice them. 
—Simone de Beauvoir 
  
 
 One of the many traditions at the University of Oregon (UO) is a practice in 
which Duck fans collectively kick their heels up, throw their hands up, and throw their 
heads back in a chorus sing-along to the earworm, “Shout!” The song is regularly played 
before the fourth quarter of home football games at Autzen Stadium to pay homage to the 
campus’ history as a major filming location for the 1978 cult classic, National Lampoon’s 
Animal House. The song was written for the film’s infamous college-party toga scene and 
performed by the then-merely-fictional band, “Otis Day and the Knights.” Starring John 
Belushi, the film presents a satire of university fraternity culture, academia, and 
authoritarian administration.  
In the fall of 2015, the advertising arm of Phil Knight’s Nike corporation released 
an ad recreating the toga scene, which was also entitled “Shout!”1 Knight is an alum of 
the University of Oregon where he was a member of the Phi Gamma Delta (ΦΓΔ aka 
‘FIJI’) fraternity. He and his family are top donors to and, arguably, top beneficiaries of 
the UO. The Nike ad debuted at the University of Oregon’s homecoming football game 
in order to celebrate “the heritage of Oregon Athletics.”2 The homecoming football game 
                                                        
1 The advertisement can be viewed here: https://vimeo.com/148549870 (accessed March 2018). 
 
2 This quote came from an email to fans from the University of Oregon Athletics Department dated 9 Sept. 
2015. “Heritage” has long been considered a term celebrating the legacy of white supremacy. This common 
meaning is intensified not only by Nike’s racist business model, but also the historical setting of Nike and 
the University of Oregon’s location in the one state of the union explicitly founded as a racist utopia. See 
Matt Novak’s popular “Oregon was Founded as a Racist Utopia” in Gizmodo 21 January 2015 
(http://gizmodo.com/oregon-was-founded-as-a-racist-utopia-1539567040) where he discusses James J. 
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just so happened to coincide with the university’s ‘Parent’s Weekend.’ The enticing ad 
has since been incorporated into the regular home game spectacle for both football and 
basketball games, which are respectively played at UO’s Autzen Stadium and Matthew 
Knight Arena. The latter was constructed chiefly by means of Knight’s donation; its 
name commemorating his late son. 
The advertisement is a who’s-who of University of Oregon celebrity alumni and 
students. Produced by Nike’s long-time Portland-based advertising agency, 
Wieden+Kennedy, the advertisement short begins with the University of Oregon’s 
Donald Duck mascot, nicknamed ‘Puddles,’ gently serenading three fawning young 
women at the foot of the fraternity house staircase. 2014 Heisman trophy winner, number 
two 2015 NFL draft pick, and resident Duck hero, Marcus Mariota replaces John Belushi 
in his iconic descent down the staircase. Staying true to Belushi’s original form, Mariota 
grows annoyed with the scholastic romanticism in his path and violently smashes 
Puddles’ classical guitar before continuing to the party in the basement. There, we are 
introduced to a 48-year-old Ty Burrell (of Modern Family fame) whose character 
“Lawrence” aka “Pinto” is hailing a young woman to dance. In fact, he shouts at her over 
the party noise. With “Go Ducks!” as a stage back-drop, the “Otis Day and the Knights” 
band then strike up the famous earworm, “Shout!,” to the delight of the toga-clad aging 
alumni audience. Everyone dances—not only in the ad, but also the mimicking home 
stadium audience. Everyone shouts a little bit softer now. And a little bit louder now. By 
the end of the song, everyone is jumping up and shouting it now. The ad then concludes 
with the Nike swoosh and slogan, “Just Do It.”  
In its originally released version, the ad included stylized freeze-frame credits to 
inform the stadium’s audience of the identity of better and lesser known alumni-of-note.3 
                                                        
Kopps’ Eden within Eden: Oregon’s Utopian Heritage as well as the history of Article 1, Section 35 of 
Oregon’s Constitution “No free negro, mulatto, not residing in this State at the time of the adoption of this 
Constitution, shall come, reside, or be within this State, or hold any real estate, or make any contracts, or 
maintain any suit therein; and the Legislative Assembly shall provide by penal laws, for the removal, by 
public officers, of all such negroes, and mulattoes, and for their effectual exclusion from the State, and for 
the punishment of persons who shall bring them into the state, or employ, or harbor them.” 
3 The Vimeo video currently available and included in n.1 above no longer includes the freeze-frame 
credits, and the original version is now unavailable online. The 9 Sept. 2015 email to campus listed the 
following alumni in the ad: “actor Ty Burrell; ESPN anchor Neil Everett; pro-football legends and 
television personalities Ahmad Rashad and Dan Fouts; former pro-football players Joey Harrington, Kenny 
Wheaton and Anthony Newman, who became a Ducks football commentator; world-record decathlete 
 3 
While Knight, commonly known as ‘Uncle Phil’ to Duck fans, is conspicuously absent 
from the advertisement’s drinking party, his presence lies just behind the curtain. As I 
said, the ad concludes with his company’s slogan, “Just Do It.” Both versions of the ad—
named and nameless—elicit the frenzied fans of Autzen Stadium and Matthew Knight 
Arena to venerate not only the Duck heroes on screen but also their patron goddess and 
corporate sponsor, Nike. Nike’s birth is the stuff of campus legend, herself the brain-child 
of ‘Uncle Phil’ and his track coach, Bill Bowerman, in their time together at the 
University of Oregon’s world-renowned Hayward Field.4 She is modeled after the 
winged Greek goddess of victory, Nike, who was accomplice to Zeus and often a 
messenger from the gods to us mere mortals. Her loyal heroes “BECOME 
UNTOUCHABLE”5 by her grace. She is an angel of victory. An angel of domination. An 
angel of war. 
If the ad would have continued into the next scene, it may have been forced to 
give Nike’s name to the devil if not re-write the original script. In the original film, the 
plot continues from the first hailing “Shout!” of flirtation in the basement to “The 
Dilemma” in the bedroom. There, Mr. Burrell’s character “Pinto” contemplates sexually 
assaulting his dancing partner after she falls unconscious while in a state of sexual 
undress. (Later in the film while again in a state of undress, the young woman reveals to 
Pinto that she is merely thirteen years of age). In the notorious “Dilemma” scene, Pinto is 
flanked on his shoulder by the evil devil of his desire for domination—his ‘philonikia’—
urging him to “Fuck her! Fuck her brains out! Suck her tits. Squeeze her buns. You know 
she wants it.” When suddenly, the good angel of his conscience appears to admonish him, 
“For shame. Lawrence, I’m surprised at you.” The devil responds, “Ah, don’t listen to 
                                                        
Ashton Eaton; Oregon track star Galen Rupp; professional football athletes Marcus Mariota, Dennis Dixon, 
JJ Birden, LaMichael James, Kenjon Barner and Brandon Bair; former Oregon track stars English Gardener 
and Mandy White.” 
4 In April 2018, the University of Oregon unveiled plans to “renovate” the historic stadium and its 
grandstands through a donation by Phil Knight and his wife Penny Knight. The size of the donation 
remains undisclosed, but it is likely astronomical as the plans include razing current structures to rebuild a 
stadium with three times the capacity. The Eugene city council voted against seeking ‘historic status’ to 
protect the grandstands. See Chavez 2018 and Adams 2018. 
 
5 This was an actual tag-line to a series of Nike poster ads utilizing the likeness of quarterbacks Mariota and 
Winston for Nike’s ‘Vapor’ cleat. The ad descended onto campuses earlier that year alongside the 2015 
Rose Bowl Semifinal National Championship. 
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that jack off. Look at those gazongas! You’ll never get a better chance.” In the film, the 
good angel succeeds in persuading the character against raping her with the line “if you 
lay one finger on that poor, sweet, helpless girl you’ll despise yourself forever” (Landis 
1978).  
Would a Nike advertisement conclude this way? We know the answer. Nike 
advertisements always conclude with the deified, winged whisper: “Just Do It.”  
Nike released the ad for the University of Oregon and its Athletics Department 
shortly after the university institution had settled a highly publicized lawsuit with one of 
its students, Jane Doe. Jane Doe was enrolled as a freshman at the university when she 
was raped by three players of the university’s Nike-sponsored men’s basketball team. 
The players assaulted her during an evening of post-game victory celebrations just prior 
to the team’s participation in the 2014 March Madness tournament, a multi-billion-dollar 
annual national athletic spectacle. Her assailants were permitted to participate in the 
tournament despite her and her father’s reports to campus and city police. In her lawsuit, 
Jane Doe charged that the University of Oregon and basketball coach Dana Altman had 
violated Title IX, the Clery Act, and her medical privacy when they recruited a basketball 
player who had been suspended from his previous school for sexual misconduct, when 
they failed to meet campus crime reporting obligations, and when they seized her private 
campus counseling records with neither her nor her therapist’s consent.  
Jane Doe filed her legal claim exactly one week after the University of Oregon’s 
football team won the 2015 Rose Bowl Semifinal National Championship. The UO was 
led by Heisman-winning quarterback, Marcus Mariota, in their victory over the defending 
champions, Florida State University (FSU). FSU was led in their defeat by their own 
Heisman-winning quarterback and soon-to-be first overall draft pick over UO’s beloved 
Mariota, Jameis Winston. Winston was himself embroiled in legal battles for his alleged 
sexual assault of then-fellow FSU student, Erica Kinsman.6 Both Kinsman and Jane 
Doe’s treatment by their respective universities became central narratives in the then-
soon-to-be-released documentary on campus sexual violence and institutional betrayal, 
The Hunting Ground (2015).  
                                                        
6 In 2017, Winston was again accused of sexual assault by a woman whom had driven his Uber in 2016. 
See Gartland for Sports Illustrated 2017. 
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In the month after Jane Doe filed her lawsuit against the university and a month 
prior to the release of The Hunting Ground documentary, the University of Oregon filed a 
counter-lawsuit against Jane Doe charging her with defamation. The counter-claim was 
soon dropped after massive public outcry. Jane Doe’s own claim was settled out of court 
later that summer of 2015 after the university hiring of Michael Schill, an expert in 
property law, to the position of president of the University of Oregon. 
It seems clear to me that Nike’s motivation for releasing the ad was part of a 
concerted public relations campaign to regenerate lucrative excitement for the upcoming 
college athletics season, the University of Oregon, and the tuition and Nike revenue 
generated therein in the aftermath of growing public awareness of the high price of 
college sports, fraternity culture, and the toxic ‘hunting ground’ atmosphere of American 
college campuses. It was an act of denial. Albeit hushed and mystified in the celebratory 
celebrity spectacle of collegiate athletics and fraternity culture, the underlying message of 
the advertisement condoning, encouraging, if not deifying the act of rape is clear. 
Beloved Nike exhorts us beyond deliberation to “Just Do It.”  
This dissertation is about the denial inherent to the ‘love of Nike.’ This 
dissertation is also about the overcoming found in the pursuit of another love, another 
angel: the love of wise Sophia.  
It is also an imperfect discussion of a few of the many ambiguities in-between. 
Though unpaid high-profile black college athletes, such as Jane Doe and Erica 
Kinsman’s assailants, tend to be more visible in media discussions of campus sexual 
violence, recent studies have shown that sexual assaults on campus commonly cluster 
around white fraternity parties while also generally spiking by 41-percent on home-game 
weekends (Lindo, Siminski, and Swenson 2015; see also Rosenthal, Smith, and Freyd 
2014; and Dick and Ziering 2015). Under the guise of academic pursuit and ‘amateur’ 
athletic competition, it seems to me that the appealingly distracting advertisement, 
“Shout!,” was a piece of a broader culture of denial that must be maintained in order for 
contemporary parents, their children, and alumni to gleefully, voluntarily, and eagerly 
participate in a structure of racialized patriarchal domination that is an essential element 
of collegiate athletics today. 
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Jane Doe was sexually assaulted in the spring of my fourth year of doctoral study 
at the University of Oregon. The institutional response to her trauma sent shockwaves 
throughout the community, sparking widespread campus protests and heightening the 
urgency of desperately needed policy changes. Months prior to the public fervor, I 
became active in my graduate labor union and campus feminist groups on the issue of 
campus sexual harassment and violence. I was motivated by a kind of desire for justice, a 
desire for the good. This was fueled by receiving numerous disclosures of sexual violence 
from undergraduate students and peers, including revelations of a serial sexual harasser 
on the faculty of my department, in my first year of graduate school. One of the groups, 
the University of Oregon Coalition to End Sexual Violence began holding meetings in 
the January prior to the assault of Jane Doe. This was when I first met my mentor 
Jennifer Freyd. This would have also been around the time when Doe’s “most forceful” 
assailant was recruited to the UO’s men’s basketball team. The organizing of the UO 
Coalition to End Sexual Violence, university labor unions, and undergraduate student 
groups aided the groundswell of public outcry and activism internal and external to the 
University of Oregon in the aftermath of Jane Doe. In many ways, the #TimesUp and 
#MeToo movements have built on the intense student activism on the issue of sexual 
violence that emerged nationwide in the years 2014 and 2015. It is out this political 
activism that my own philosophical thinking on trauma has emerged. 
Groundbreaking feminist trauma theorist Judith Herman offers that nearly every 
breakthrough in the study of psychological trauma develops in relation to political 
change. She begins her own historical account of the study of trauma with the nineteenth-
century study of women and their ‘hysteria’ by Jean-Martin Charcot and his students 
Pierre Janet, Josef Breuer, and Sigmund Freud. She observes that their studies were 
enabled by the French Revolution and the zeal of Enlightenment science and democratic-
republican ideals that rejected the hierarchical religious ideology of the Catholic 
monarchy.7  
                                                        
7 Prior to this period, women labeled ‘hysterics’ had been thought of “as malingerers, and their treatment 
had been relegated to the domain of hypnotists and popular healers” such as exorcists and witches (Herman 
1992/1997/2015, 10 and 15). That is, traumatized ‘hysterical’ women were considered to be possessed by 
demons in the European Medieval and Renaissance period prior to the modern era of Enlightenment. 
Charcot’s student Freud is widely recognized as the first in his generation to empathetically listen to his 
female clients—seeing them as humans with rich inner lives rather than objects to be managed. Herman 
 7 
As you the reader have likely already surmised, I suggest pushing this history of 
the study of trauma back to ancient Greece. I do this not because of the Greek origins of 
the word ‘hysteria’ (hystera, ὑστέρα) but because I think the ancient philosopher Plato 
offers a critique of the denial inherent to philonikian conceptions of ‘manliness’ that is 
worth revisiting today. The interpretation of Plato that I offer is one of many, and it is one 
that I believe has been suppressed and denied by the masculine bias of scholars, 
translators, and interpreters throughout history. 
The ‘love of Nike’ goes beyond mere corporate semantics. I suggest herein that 
the ‘love of Nike’ represents the very ontology of patriarchy in its now-racialized and 
ancient forms. I understand patriarchy as an ancient material, political, and ontological 
system of domination that was maintained through history and explicitly racialized in the 
modern era of European global colonial conquest and the creation of so-called ‘Western’ 
civilization. Indeed, the ‘love of Nike’ has ancient roots. In ancient Greek, the ‘love of 
Nike’ is termed “philonike” (philonikia, φιλονικία), which is literally translated today as 
the “love of victory.” As the Greek language suggests, the ‘love of Nike’ is the love of 
victorious domination. And as my interpretation of Plato and others suggests, this ‘love 
of Nike’ depends on a static temporality of denial. 
                                                        
argues his early work, Aetiology of Hysteria, was the closest in his generation to recognizing the 
devastating and lasting effects of past child sexual abuse. In listening to ‘hysterical’ women, Freud began 
to realize that hysteria may not be a woman’s pathology, but rather a response to the profound sexual abuse 
often suffered early in childhood. Moreover, he began to approach an understanding that such abuse was 
far from sporadic or isolated by class-status; rather, many hysterical women were suffering from the abuse 
not simply from ‘degenerate perverts,’ but from their elite, respected, wealthy and powerful fathers, 
grandfathers, uncles, brothers, and husbands (Herman 1992/1997/2015, 14). Freud subsequently stopped 
listening to traumatized women and retreated into the heights of his now infamously abstract 
psychoanalytic theory. This, per Herman, marks the first instance of ‘episodic amnesia’ within the 
discipline.  
The reality of trauma resurfaced in psychiatry in the aftermath of World War I as male veterans 
returned home from the horrors of European trench and chemical warfare. Rather than displaying the 
‘manly honor’ of a soldier, young men instead exhibited symptoms of the supposedly female-malady, 
hysteria. Instead of investigating the similarities of these gendered experiences of trauma further, the new 
diagnostic category of ‘shell-shock’ was created and later adapted into ‘Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder’ in 
the aftermath of Vietnam and the anti-war movement. Important research in trauma has also been offered in 
light of the history of genocidal practices against the Jews in World War II as well as the legacies of 
colonization of indigenous, black, and Asian peoples. The concepts of transgenerational, epigenetic, and 
communal trauma emerged from these histories and study. And as Herman indicates, the study of trauma 
returned again to think through the abuse of women and children within the battered-women’s and feminist 
movements of the 70s and 80s, bringing her in 1997 to propose a new diagnosis of “Complex Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder” meant to encapsulate the range of traumatic experience and offer a diagnostic 
alternative to stigmatizing diagnoses, such as somatization disorder, borderline disorder, and multiple-
personality disorders (Herman 1992/1997/2015, 121-123). 
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In this dissertation, I bring to light a thoroughgoing criticism of patriarchal 
philonikian conceptions of ‘manliness’ and the denial inherent to it. From Plato and in 
conversation with the feminist existentialist philosophy of Simone de Beauvoir, 
decolonial feminism, and contemporary trauma theory psychology, I argue that the 
infliction and denial of traumatic harm associated with the love of victorious domination 
is a central motor to the operation of racialized patriarchy, especially masculinity. I 
suggest this criticism of patriarchy’s philonikian ‘manliness’ may be found within Plato’s 
dialogues by tracing Socrates’ lifelong pursuit of what it means to live a good human life, 
more specifically whether and how it is possible to become a good man. But this criticism 
of philonikian ‘manliness’ and denial by the genealogical father of the ‘Western’ 
academy has been lost to masculine bias in the hegemonic majority of subsequent 
interpretations (cf. Bluestone 1994 and Townsend 2017). That the contemporary academy 
and general society remains mired in the temporality of denial is part and parcel of a 
historical, patriarchal, silencing shift from the very foundation upon which contemporary 
Western education systems have actively been constructed: Plato’s Academy. To be 
blunt, this dissertation suggests that the racialized patriarchy of the contemporary 
academy, no less ‘Western’ civilization, rests on a foundation of trauma’s denial.  
As I’ve said, this dissertation is also about the overcoming related to the ‘love of 
Sophia,’ the ‘love of wisdom,’ or philosophy (philosophia, φιλοσοφία). Through my 
engagement with Plato, Beauvoir, decolonial feminism, and trauma theory psychology, I 
also interpret a philosophy of overcoming trauma and its denial at individual, social, and 
ontological levels. In contrast to philonike’s denial, the philosophy of overcoming offers 
that one must recollect the traumas of the past rather than deny them before one can truly 
forget them in the present process of rebirthing the self after traumatic rupture.  
I take an interdisciplinary approach to my philosophical analysis and 
reinterpretation of ancient and contemporary texts and phenomenon. I engage 
contemporary decolonial feminist literatures to understand and think through the structure 
of racialized patriarchal domination. Contemporary trauma theory psychology further 
guides my philosophical inquiry into the centrality of denial in perpetuating racialized 
patriarchal domination and thinking our collective overcoming. Philosophically, my 
approach is highly influenced by the Continental tradition of meaning excavation. 
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Namely, I follow Simone de Beauvoir’s feminist existentialist ethics of freedom and its 
repetitious temporality of being and becoming.  
Beauvoir claims in the “Introduction” to The Second Sex that the “perspective we 
have adopted is one of existentialist morality” (Beauvoir 2010, 16). Beauvoir 
distinguishes this existentialist morality from that of a calculative consequentialist, 
utilitarian, or liberal ethics focused on maximizing the happiness of individuals within a 
community. Instead, existentialist morality focuses on “What precise opportunities have 
been given us, and which ones have been denied?” (Beauvoir 2010, 16). Rather than 
center an ethics on happiness, Beauvoir centers her ethics on freedom. For Beauvoir, we 
accomplish our freedom through time in a constant process of converting our mere being 
into becoming who we are concretely through projects, that is, by what we do. The task 
of freedom is only accomplished “by perpetual surpassing toward other freedoms” 
(Beauvoir 2010, 16). Freedom is a “constant conversion” or a repeated repetition (Mann 
2014, 41; see Beauvoir 2010, 160). Beauvoir clearly states that “there is no other 
justification for present existence than its expansion toward an indefinitely open future” 
(Beauvoir 2010, 16).  
This existentialist ethics of freedom also provides a definition of evil. Beauvoir 
writes, “[e]very time transcendence lapses into immanence,” that is, every time our 
becoming is reduced to mere being or mere survival, “there is degradation of existence 
into ‘in-itself,’ of freedom into facticity” (Beauvoir 2010, 16). We are reduced to mere 
things, caged in a frozen present of mere survival by the foreclosure of future possibility. 
Conclusively, Beauvoir states “this fall is a moral fault if the subject consents to it; if this 
fall is inflicted on the subject, it takes the form of frustration and oppression; in both 
cases it is an absolute evil” (Beauvoir 2010, 16). And as a feminist, Beauvoir is 
particularly interested in utilizing this existentialist morality to understand the concrete 
opportunities that have been provided and denied to women and others subjugated in the 
history of patriarchy. It is this feminist existentialist morality in conversation with 
contemporary feminist ‘trauma-centered’ theories in psychology and decolonial 
feminisms that I bring to my interpretation of contemporary phenomena and ancient texts 
alike.  
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In my interpretation of Plato, I bear particular mind to the historical unfolding of 
trauma and its denial during the Peloponnesian War and its aftermath. This forms the 
historical setting to the dramas of Plato’s philosophical dialogues that feature Socrates’ 
voluntary, communal, and lifelong pursuit for the meaning of becoming a virtuous good 
man. In some ways, I track Plato’s own tracing of Socrates’ personal ‘ladder of love’ (cf. 
Symposium). This is a ‘hunt’ for excellence. I attend namely to Socrates’s chase of the 
meaning of ‘andreia’ (ἀνδρεία). Commonly, the virtue of ‘andreia’ meant ‘courageous 
manliness’ to the Greek ear, differentiating the rationality of men from their mere human 
biological being, or anthropos (ἄνθρωπος). In some ways, andreia was to anthropos as 
living (bios, βίος) was to mere life (zoe, ζωή) for the Greeks. The mythical Achilles along 
with his raging, vengeful desire for victory (nike, νίκη) was commonly thought to 
exemplify the pinnacle of this Greek virtue of ‘manliness’ (andreia, ἀνδρεία). But as my 
interpretation reveals, Plato’s Socrates seeks to overcome this philonikian notion of 
‘manliness’ and the denial central to its temporal operation. In this, I believe Plato offers 
a philosophy of the human. This is a philosophy that recognizes the strength and courage 
of the ‘love of Sophia’ in its capacity for supporting the soul’s process of recollection and 
rebirth. It is my hope that the new meaning revealed in my interpretation will prove 
useful to readers in the continued battle to overcome the traumatic betrayals and denials 
of racialized patriarchy that remain sedimented in the policies, practices, and culture of 
our contemporary institutions. 
The word ‘trauma’ derives from the Greek word for ‘wound’ (trauma, τραῦµα). 
Contemporary trauma theorists and practicing therapists understand psychological trauma 
to be an embodied reaction to a wounding of the embodied self at spiritual, emotional, 
cognitive, psychological, physiological, and neurobiological levels. This wounding 
almost always involves the terrorizing betrayal of trust in others, that often institutes a 
profound temporal rupture of the self (cf. Burstow 2003, 1304; Herman 1998 and 
1992/1997/2015, 33 and 51-52; and van der Kolk 2015). Traumatic rupture twists our 
temporal experience such that we subconsciously relive the terrors of the past in the 
present. Denial maintains this traumatic rupture and twisted folding of time. 
I find that in the aftermath of traumatic rupture, time is lived in two very distinct 
modes of repetition: the repetitions of trauma’s denial and the repetitions of trauma’s 
 11 
overcoming. The repetitions of the love of Nike (philonikia, φιλονικία) and the 
repetitions of the love of Sophia (philosophia, φιλοσοφία). These may and do often 
overlap, but conceptualizing their distinction is vital. Philonike’s repetitions of denial 
entail a temporality of crisis management, trapping subjectivity into a dull yet horrifying 
oscillation between the attempt to forget and the inevitable triggering and reliving of past 
traumatic memories and habits of survival. The present is lived as a repetition of the 
horrors of the past. This repetition of the past in the present often forecloses possibilities 
of both the present and the future. It is a living death. As Bessel A. van der Kolk’s 
important and so-titled book suggests, “the body keeps the score” of these terrorizing, 
self-rupturing events despite our desperate desire to forget or deny them, our desire to 
have a “Just Do It” attitude.8  
Traumatic experience and its denial is thus fatalistic in two senses. It is a kind of 
death of the soul, which must be reborn if it is to live again. And, having barred with 
denial the process of memorialization, the unintegrated imprint of past traumatic 
experience can dictate the possibilities of the present and future. Left untended, past 
traumatic experience repeats itself. Despite our best efforts to forget traumatizing past 
encounters, the memory and emotions of traumatic experience remain within our bodies. 
Denying traumatic memory only leaves us more susceptible to painfully reliving the 
trauma and inflicting its harm not only on ourselves but also onto others, including those 
we love. It is no secret that traumatized people may commit acts that traumatize others. 
As van der Kolk suggests, such acts can be understood or contextualized as repetitions of 
surviving traumatic experience. Transcendence lapses into immanence, freedom into 
facticity, living into survival. 
Survivors become better and worse crisis managers of the present triggering of 
their past memories and survival habits. The skills honed through these survival habits 
are often ambiguously beneficial or harmful depending on one’s social situation. For 
example, aggressive lash-outs triggered by traumatic memory have been historically 
                                                        
8 I must make clear here that the allegations against Bessel A. van der Kolk claiming he bullied employees 
of his Trauma Center along with his subsequent firing became public after the completion of this 
dissertation manuscript. My engagement with his writing herein is not an endorsement of his behavior. 
While theory cannot be solely judged on the basis of its author’s imperfect behavior, actions do matter. I 
believe the employees. And I hope that what I have to offer within this dissertation might contribute to the 
ongoing conversation as we continue to navigate the ambiguities of our collective overcoming. 
 12 
permitted or even demanded of white men, often serving them in the fields of business, 
politics, and war. Whereas similar behavior or other habits of trauma survival displayed 
by women, persons of color, and/or queer persons have historically landed them in 
psychological or criminal institutions (i.e., hysteria), if not raped, lynched, or killed.  
The pain of past traumas in present crises may be inflicted on others violently, as 
seen in victim-perpetrators of sexual assault or genocidal tyrannies. The pain of trauma 
may also be inflicted passively in its aftermath, such as the mis-attunement between a 
post-partum depressive mother and her infant. But as a result of the material and 
ontological function of racialized patriarchal masculinity, white men are generally 
afforded more latitude and opportunity to inflict violence against others in their 
repetitions of trauma denial than women, persons of color, and sexual minorities, whose 
survival habits may and all-too-often do make them more susceptible to future re-
victimization.  
In contrast to the “Just Do It” attitude of the temporal repetitions of philonikian 
denial, which ultimately maintain the ruptured, dissociated, and fatalistic state of the 
traumatized self, trauma’s overcoming entails repetitions akin to rebirth. Ideally, the 
overcoming of trauma is a constant recollection and caring for the sites of the original 
crisis to continuously give loving birth to a perpetually re-integrated, re-associated, and 
freely living self who may in turn be continuously better able to care for the pieces that 
remain traumatized. Our capacity to continuously overcome trauma stems from our 
human strength and courage for love, care, and regeneration. It is no mere accident that 
these virtues have been defensively derided as all-too ‘feminine’ within traditional, 
Western patriarchal society: they are the very capacities that have threatened patriarchy’s 
grip since ancient times. If I may be so bold, trauma’s overcoming is a temporality of 
living one’s freedom that resists or transcends the temporality of denial’s fatalism, a 
fatalism upon which racialized patriarchy materially and ontologically depends.  
Jane Doe’s is a case example among countless others for considering the 
centrality of denial to racialized patriarchy, joining similar accounts in the 2015 
documentary on campus sexual violence, The Hunting Ground, as well as Jessica 
Luther’s journalistic account in her 2016 book, Unsportsmanlike Conduct. The problem 
of sexual violence and other forms of trauma are not unique to institutions of higher 
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education. The contemporary #BlackLivesMatter, #MeToo, and #TimesUp movements 
are making this fact increasingly visible. However, I focus on this particular case of 
trauma and denial in the academy for several reasons.  
First, I focus on the academy because my interpretation of Plato suggests that the 
overcoming of the trauma and denial inherent to common philonikian ancient Greek 
conceptions of ‘manliness’ may have been the central mission of his Academy. By 
placing Plato, his dialogues, and his Socrates into historical context we can understand 
that Plato was writing from, to, and for a society that had been traumatized by the brutal 
devastation of the Peloponnesian War.  
The Peloponnesian War was, essentially, a six-decade-long civil war between the 
Greek city-states of Athens and Sparta emerging out of the last decade of the two states’ 
joint fifty-year conflict against the Persians.9 Indeed, the ancient Greeks were more often 
at war than not during the fifth and early-fourth centuries BCE. While Plato established 
his Academy approximately two decades after the conclusion of the Peloponnesian War, 
the society remained continuously at war. But in contrast to the philonikian ideals 
governing warring Greek society, Plato’s Academy was ideally governed by the “love of 
wisdom,” or philosophia. It was a ‘hunting ground’ where men and women could freely 
gather to jointly hunt not each other but the good life in the traumatic aftermath of the 
Peloponnesian War. An outdoor garden to recollect and overcome social and internalized 
traumas and denials. The pursuit of the ‘hunters’ consisted in the study or care (meletan, 
µελετᾶν) for their traumatic memories rather than denying them while supporting one 
another’s continual process of birthing, or repeatedly repeating, their good spirit 
(eudaimonia, εὐδαιµονία) to accompany them in the aftermath of their soul’s traumatic 
wounding. 
Derived from the ancient Greek goddess of victory, ‘Nike,’ our contemporary 
‘University of Nike’ model of academia reveals in its very name that it is governed by the 
“love of victory.” Explained above, this “love of victory” is “philonikia” (“φιλονικία”) in 
                                                        
9 The Peloponnesian War is commonly understood as the war between the Greek city states of Athens and 
Sparta that took place from 431-404BC as famously chronicled by the historian Thucydides. However, this 
war was a continuation of a previous civil war between the city states that had begun in 460BC in the last 
decade of their fifty-year joint military efforts against the Persian empire. The ‘first’ Peloponnesian War 
was resolved by a peace treaty meant to last thirty years, but only lasted fifteen. Its violation commenced 
the ‘Second’ Peloponnesian War, commonly understood as the Peloponnesian War. See Ste. Croix 1972. 
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the ancient Greek or what we might for our purposes term “philonike.” In chapter three, I 
explore Plato’s pun-filled literary critique of the historical General Nikias’ “philonikian” 
understanding of “courageous manliness” (andreia, ἀνδρεία). With Plato, I demonstrate 
“philonike” is a misguided linear, future-oriented temporality whose priority is to 
calculatively seek or maintain glory into the future. But this “Just Do It” attitude neglects 
the importance of presently recollecting past traumatic memory. This ‘Nikian neglect’ 
perpetuates the violence of traumatic repetition, such as the infliction of sexual violence 
on the contemporary ‘hunting ground’ of college campuses, while inhibiting the 
possibilities of the present and blindly ignoring the uncertain character of the future. As 
I’ve said, denial is a fatalistic temporality. It is a fatality of the soul. And this fatality, left 
untended, predetermines the course of the future by the inevitability of denial’s traumatic 
repetition alongside the all-too-assuring over-confidence of the linear, calculating 
orientation towards the future. The temporality of the ‘University of Nike’ is the 
temporality of denial, prioritizing false-assurances of glorified racialized patriarchal 
dominance now and into the future while undermining the human freedom of its 
dependents.  
I focus on the University of Oregon in particular as it happens to be the self-
identified ‘University of Nike’ par excellence, being proudly integral to the rise of 
billionaire alum and former-Duck track athlete Phil Knight’s global Nike empire and 
business model development. Rather than offering academic space and resources for the 
free pursuit of self-knowledge and self-growth, the ‘Nike model’ of education capitalizes 
on the economic desperation of schools and their athletic programs wrought by decades 
of public disinvestment from education. It does so to utilize the unpaid bodies of (mostly 
black male10) students to model and fuel desire for the brand clothing manufactured by 
the underpaid labor of (mostly brown female) workers in the global South. As Jessica 
Luther further notes, this business model of contemporary academia is dependent upon 
the accessible sexual (ab)use of women and “a society that minimizes and/or ignores 
rape” (Luther 2016, 80-81). Here, I add that this model is further dependent upon 
                                                        
10 According to a 2017 study by the Institute for Diversity and Ethics in Sport, black men comprise 53% of 
college basketball players and 44% (compared to 42% white) of college football players on Division I 
teams (Lapchick et al 2018, 19). Writing for Time magazine, Diane Roberts notes that “black men comprise 
57 percent of college football teams, on average. At some universities it’s over 70 percent” (Roberts 2015). 
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philonike’s temporality of denial. That is, the ‘Nike model’ is egregious not only because 
it takes advantage of racially and sexually vulnerable people on campus and throughout 
the globe under the auspices of academic and athletic excellence, but because it’s very 
power and logic relies on the temporality of denying their traumatization. 
Indeed, the University of Oregon’s particular history of denial and betrayal in the 
face of sexual harassment and violence informs the thinking of some of my mentors. 
Now widely used in the #MeToo movement, the concept of ‘institutional betrayal’ and 
‘institutional denial’ was developed by feminist psychologist Jennifer Freyd in the 
context of her own tenure at the University of Oregon. Indeed, the University of Oregon 
serves as a case example in the 2013 book co-authored by Freyd and her University of 
Oregon colleague, Pamela Birrell, Blind to Betrayal. Freyd defines ‘institutional betrayal’ 
as “the wrongdoings perpetrated by an institution upon individuals dependent on that 
institution, including failure to prevent or respond supportively to wrongdoings by 
individuals (e.g., sexual assault) committed within the context of the institution” (Freyd 
2016).11 That is, institutional betrayal is the failure of institutions to either prevent harm 
to individuals within the context of the institution (such as sexual assault or sexual 
harassment) or compassionately respond to individuals dependent upon the institution in 
the aftermath. Freyd further explains that ‘institutional denial’ is a form of ‘institutional 
betrayal’ and observes that denial is a common response of perpetrators and bystanders 
when accused of perpetrating or facilitating traumatic harm. And, as we will discuss, such 
institutional failures undermine trust between individuals and institutions and exacerbate 
the original harm. 
In chapter II, I engage with contemporary decolonial feminist literature and 
trauma theory psychology to discuss the centrality of denial to racialized patriarchy in the 
academy. As a case example, I discuss the institutional denial of the University of Oregon 
                                                        
11 See also see also Jennifer J. Freyd, “The Psychology of Betrayal Trauma: Memory, Health, and Gender,” 
Lecture at Thompson Hall Science and Mathematics Seminar, University of Puget Sound, Tacoma 
Washington, 6 March 2008; Jennifer J. Freyd, “Betrayal Trauma: Memory Health Gender,” Colloquium, 
Department of Psychology, New Mexico State University, Las Cruces, NM, 11 April 2008; Melissa Platt, 
Jocelyn Barton, and Jennifer J. Freyd, “A Betrayal Trauma Perspective on Domestic Violence,” Violence 
Against Women in Families and Relationships, ed. Evan Stark and Eve S. Buzawa, (Westport: Greenwood 
Press, 2009): 185-207; Carly Parnitzke Smith and Jennifer J. Freyd, “Dangerous Safe Havens: Institutional 
Betrayal Exacerbates Sexual Trauma,” Journal of Traumatic Stress, v. 26 (Feb 2013): 119-124; and 
Jennifer J. Freyd and Pamela J. Birrell, Blind to Betrayal: Why We Fool Ourselves We Aren’t Being 
Fooled, Hoboken: Wiley, 2013. 
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in its response to the sexual assault of Jane Doe. I further explain the concept of traumatic 
rupture and outline the temporality of the repetitions of denial and the repetitions of 
overcoming. Through this, I begin to demonstrate that in order to truly forget the past in 
order to become who we are we must do our best to lovingly recollect and care for the 
part of us that remains shackled by traumatic memory. 
In chapter III, I recollect the traumas and denials of philonikian masculinity at the 
genealogical origin of the history of ‘Western’ philosophy. Against traditional 
interpretations that remain clouded in masculine bias, I offer a feminist interpretation of 
Plato’s philosophy that pays particular attention to the veteran Socrates’ pursuit of the 
meaning of ‘manliness’ (andreia, ἀνδρεία). Plato provides a kind of philosophical, albeit 
ironic, account of Socrates’ hunt for the meaning of ‘manliness,’ strategically placing the 
development of the pursuit within the history of the Peloponnesian War. For the reader’s 
ease of reference, I’ve included a timeline of the ancient Greeks at war and the dramatic 
dating of Plato’s works in the Appendix to this dissertation. In my interpretation, I find 
Plato’s Socrates dissatisfied with the unjust war-mongering of philonikian ‘manliness’ 
and its inherent temporality of denial that wrought the devastation of Athens. I derive this 
interpretation through a close reading of Parmenides, Protagoras, Laches, and Cratylus. 
And through a close reading of Symposium’s “Speech of Diotima” and Republic’s “Myth 
of Er,” I find Plato to be suggesting a philosophical vision of ‘manliness’ that is the 
temporality of human overcoming in the aftermath of trauma. Namely, this is the strength 
and courage (or so-called ‘manliness’) of love to recollect and care for the past memories 
of the self and constantly give birth to a good-spirit (eudaimonia, εὐδαιµονία) to 
accompany us in our life after trauma. 
My interpretation suggests Plato’s ancient academy was a ‘hunting ground’ where 
men and women freely gathered to jointly pursue living the good life in the traumatic 
aftermath of the Peloponnesian War. The pursuit consisted in the study or care (meletan, 
µελετᾶν) for their traumatic memories rather than denying them while supporting one 
another’s process of giving birth to, or repeating, their best self after enduring the living 
death of traumatic wounding. Plausibly, Plato presented this temporality of overcoming 
as an alternative and solution to the violent repetitions of trauma’s denial central to 
ancient war-mongering masculinity. This rebirth may help individuals live well in the 
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aftermath of traumatic experience, ideally minimizing the repetition of trauma’s infliction 
at individual and social scales (i.e., war, rape, assault, neglect etc.). Plato’s Republic 
concludes with the Myth of Er’s suggestion that forgetting is part of the process of 
overcoming as much as it is part of denial. As the myth teaches, one would do best to 
recollect and hold onto the lessons of one’s life as best one can when one inevitably 
passes through the “Plain of Forgetfulness” and the “River of Uncaring.”  
In chapter IV, I return to the ambiguities of ‘forgetting’ with the feminist 
existentialist philosophy of Simone de Beauvoir to further delineate the ‘forgetting’ of 
fatalistic philonikian denial and the ‘forgetting’ of free philosophical overcoming. 
Beauvoir presents a feminist existential-phenomenological analysis of patriarchy as 
relying on the rupture and denial of the ambiguity of human subjectivity, bifurcating the 
ambiguity instead into ‘naturalized’ gendered destinies to tempt us to flee our freedom. 
Her analysis helps to distinguish the forgetting of denial and the ‘forgetting’ she believes 
to be involved in the repetitions of freedom. The ‘forgetting’ of freedom or overcoming 
requires having first found oneself, having first recollected oneself. To find oneself self-
assured. It also entails a collective sacrifice of the comforting, but disillusioned, certainty 
of the future offered by patriarchy’s gendered destinies.  
As I show throughout this dissertation, we must lovingly remember in order to 
forget. Recollecting our own selves, our own past, we become better able to set our past 
traumas aside as we constantly become who we are in the present towards an open future. 
But, this entails a sacrifice of our love for Nike and her tempting whispers to make room 
for, instead, a new albeit familiar love: the love of wise Sophia.  
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CHAPTER II 
COURAGE NOT CRISIS MANAGEMENT:  
THE REPETITIONS OF DENIAL AND OVERCOMING AT  
THE ‘UNIVERSITY OF NIKE’ 
 
I do not believe in ‘forgive and forget.’ To forgive in the truest sense, we must remember 
first and then forgive, even in regard to ourselves.  
—Jessica Stern 
 
Introduction 
This chapter suggests that trauma and its denial are central mechanisms 
establishing and perpetuating the ontological, political, and material systems of racialized 
patriarchal domination. Building on ancient systems of heteropatriarchy, what I and 
others call ‘racialized patriarchy’ is understood as a creation of the modern era of 
European colonization in order to justify, systematize, and naturalize the heinously 
traumatizing practices of genocide and slavery as well as rape and war (Omi and Winant 
1994; Smith 2006 and 2012; Kendi 2016; Burke 2019). Said simply, I understand 
racialized patriarchy as an ontological, political, and economic system that thrives on the 
denial, justification, and perpetuation of traumatizing terror.  
Most of us have been traumatized in some manner. While, some of us are 
rendered more vulnerable in the colonial and capitalistic systems of racialized patriarchy 
than others, no one of us are immune to its effects. Psychologists and psychiatrists in the 
newly emerging field of trauma theory emphasize suggest that while each experience of 
trauma is unique, there are observable commonalities. As influential trauma theorist 
Bessel A. van der Kolk suggests, trauma is an experience of either one’s own near-
annihilation or witnessing the near or completed annihilation of another (van der Kolk 
2015, 258). He further claims that there is an observable spectrum to trauma, varying in 
degrees of severity and chronicity of exposure (van der Kolk 1988). The feminist trauma 
thinker Bonnie Burstow argues that traumatic experiences are additionally nested in, 
layered between, and compounded by previous traumatic exposure (Burstow 2003). 
Trauma theory psychology suggests that experiences of trauma disrupt and fragment an 
individual’s complex, embodied connections that give rise to subjectivity.  
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As I mentioned in chapter I, the word trauma derives from the Greek word for 
‘wound’ (trauma, τραῦµα). On the view that I accept here, psychological trauma is 
defined as an embodied reaction to a wounding of the embodied self at spiritual, 
emotional, cognitive, psychological, physiological, and neurobiological levels that almost 
always involves the terrorizing betrayal of trust in others instituting a profound temporal 
rupture of the self (cf. Burstow 2003, 1304; Herman 1992/1997/2015, 33 and 51-52; and 
van der Kolk 2015). This wounding rupture twists our experience of time such that we 
subconsciously relive the terrors of the past in the present. Denial maintains this rupture 
and folding of time. 
On this view, the defense mechanism of denial perpetuates and exacerbates the 
fragmentation of trauma, leaving part of us consciously oblivious to the fact that another 
part of us remains stuck reliving the terrors of the past in the present. In denial, part of us 
is ‘in’ time, consciously integrated into the historical narrative arc of our unique human 
lives, while another part of us remains ‘out’ of time, an animal frozen by and in the 
immemorialized past terror. Because past traumas have not been memorialized and 
integrated into narrative time, our ‘out’ of time animalian self often perceives past threats 
as if they were happening in the present thus inducing a repeated state of survival mode. 
The past is repeated and relived in the present, greatly increasing the potential for self-
harm, re-victimization, or perpetration in the present and future.  
Decolonial feminist scholars observe that racialized patriarchy is a social system 
that determines which part of our collective human community is destined to be ‘in’ time 
and which part is destined to be ‘out’ of time (Lugones 2007; Mignolo 2002 and 2011; 
Burke 2019). Which of us is within human history? Who has a past that can be and is 
celebrated? Who has a bright future to be protected from disruption? And which of us is 
relegated to represent if not be forced to relive the terrors of our collective pre-historical 
‘primitive’ past? Whose past has been lost or degraded? Whose future has always already 
been disrupted and foreclosed?  
I suggest and further explore the manner that racialized patriarchy seizes on and 
depends upon trauma’s fragmentation of subjectivity and the temporality of denial. 
Traumatic experience bifurcates the connections and ambiguities of embodied 
subjectivity. Its denial perpetually repeats the harm into the present and future. Racialized 
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patriarchy systematizes and naturalizes this bifurcation and repetitious operation of denial 
into a socio-political ontology.  
My claim is that this temporal structure of racialized patriarchy’s denial is 
observable in contemporary institutional responses to sexual violence on our university 
and college campuses. While some recent efforts have been pragmatically commendable 
(at least to an extent), these efforts will ultimately fail in a social and institutional 
environment dedicated to trauma’s denial. As van der Kolk concludes, “as long as we 
continue to live in denial and treat only trauma while ignoring its origins, we are bound to 
fail” (van der Kolk 2015, 350). We can neither individually nor collectively overcome 
trauma and the system of racialized patriarchy trauma establishes, perpetuates, and 
enables until we stop denying it. While this concept seems to be a painfully simple truism 
(i.e., that one must recognize a problem in order to solve it), it is one that has yet to sink 
into our collective consciousness, let alone the consciousness of top decision-makers. The 
contemporary academy is not immune to the denial of racialized patriarchy. Despite its 
historical commitment to pursuing and speaking the truth, the contemporary academy 
both suffers and manufactures the denials of racialized patriarchal domination.  
 I first discuss the historical ontology of racialized patriarchy to contextualize the 
recent institutional failures regarding campus sexual violence. I then offer as an all-too-
familiar and important case example the institutional betrayals and denials of the 
University of Oregon as witnessed in the aftermath of the 2014 group sexual assault of 
‘Jane Doe,’ a young black woman then-enrolled as a freshman, by three black players on 
the UO’s Nike-sponsored men’s basketball team. I then discuss in detail the psychology 
of the temporality of denial to explain how denial repeats past traumas in the present thus 
undercutting ongoing ‘prevention’ efforts by rendering the repetition of traumatic harm 
of self or others in the present and future a fatalistic inevitability. Before hope is lost, I 
finally conclude with a discussion of the psychology of the temporality of trauma’s 
overcoming and the possibilities of its radical political potential. 
As I mentioned in the introduction and further explore in chapter III, I focus on 
the academy rather than other social institutions primarily because I believe Plato’s 
original ancient academy was precisely intended to confront the traumatic denials of 
ancient imperialist masculinity that plagued and ultimately destroyed ancient Athens. 
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This academy was governed by the ‘love of wisdom’ of philosophy (philosophia, 
φιλοσοφία) rather than the calculating, dominating, and characteristically masculine ‘love 
of victory’ of philonike (philonikia, φιλονικία). This is to say that the original academy 
was to be guided by a loving, constant process of careful recollection and rebirth in 
pursuit of the good life with others rather than by a desire to victoriously dominate others 
in argument or competition. This interpretation of Plato has been largely ignored and 
distorted through masculine bias throughout history, including during the nineteenth 
century construction of the contemporary American academy to ‘mirror’ and ‘progress’ 
from the ancient Greeks (see Winterer 2002; Syrett 2009; Bluestone 1994; and Townsend 
2017). I suspect that if our contemporary universities actually strove to mirror rather than 
distort the philosophy of Plato’s ancient academy, the institutional betrayals and denials 
observed in the case of Jane Doe may not have happened.  
Further, the particular case of Jane Doe put the logic of denial and its centrality to 
racialized patriarchy on public display in such a way that it punctuated and permeated my 
own feminist thinking, teaching, activism, and lived experience at the inception and 
writing of this dissertation while in graduate school at the University of Oregon. Though 
I was involved with feminist and labor organizing around the issue of campus sexual 
harassment and assault in the years prior to the group rape of Jane Doe, her case became 
the locus of a tidal wave of feminist activism and my own philosophical thinking in the 
months and years following. I walk through the case example of Jane Doe in detail, 
showing how denial operated in the institution’s logic in the aftermath of the assault as 
the institution neither admitted a rape had occurred nor that the institution was complicit 
(in fact, the rape had occurred, and the institution was complicit). I further suggest the 
denials of administrators operated to shore up and protect the racialized patriarchal 
material interests of the corporate academy, commonly and un-ironically known as the 
‘University of Nike.’  
The betrayals of the ‘University of Nike’ also informs the psychological theory of 
my mentor Jennifer Freyd. She developed her concept of ‘institutional betrayal,’ now 
widely used in the #MeToo and #TimesUp movements, during her tenure at the 
University of Oregon. As I mentioned in Chapter I, Freyd defines institutional betrayal as 
“the wrongdoings perpetrated by an institution upon individuals dependent on that 
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institution, including failure to prevent or respond supportively to wrongdoings by 
individuals (e.g., sexual assault) committed within the context of the institution” (Freyd 
2016).1 That is, institutional betrayal is the failure of institutions to either prevent harm to 
individuals within the context of the institution (such as sexual assault or sexual 
harassment) or compassionately respond to individuals dependent upon the institution in 
the aftermath. And, as we will discuss, such institutional failures undermine trust between 
individuals and institutions and exacerbate the original harm. Denial is a central feature to 
a particularly pernicious form of institutional betrayal, which Freyd terms institutional 
DARVO. DARVO stands for “Deny, Attack, and Reverse Victim and Offender.” It refers 
to the observable reactions displayed by individual and institutional perpetrators alike as 
well as complicit bystanders when being held accountable for wrongdoing, especially 
when the wrongdoing involves sexual violence. Offenders often “Deny the behavior, 
Attack the individual doing the confronting, and Reverse the roles of Victim and 
Offender such that the perpetrator assumes the victim role and turns the true victim—or 
the whistle blower—into an alleged offender” (Freyd 2017). This very behavior can be 
observed in the case of Jane Doe v. University of Oregon and Dana Dean Altman.2 
As we will see, denial is a dangerous defense mechanism and a powerful tool in 
upholding relations of domination as it feeds into the victim’s own “desire to forget” 
(Stern 2010, 144-145). To quote at length from Jessica Stern’s brave memoir: 
Denial helps the bystander. We don’t want to know what the boys we send to Iraq 
have done to others out of terror, or what others have done to them. We would 
rather not know about terror or be confronted with evil. This is as true about Abu 
Ghraib as it is about personal assaults and more private crimes, the crimes that 
occur inside families. […] To be raped or abused or threatened with violent death; 
                                               
1 See also see also Jennifer J. Freyd, “The Psychology of Betrayal Trauma: Memory, Health, and Gender,” 
Lecture at Thompson Hall Science and Mathematics Seminar, University of Puget Sound, Tacoma 
Washington, 6 March 2008; Jennifer J. Freyd, “Betrayal Trauma: Memory Health Gender,” Colloquium, 
Department of Psychology, New Mexico State University, Las Cruces, NM, 11 April 2008; Melissa Platt, 
Jocelyn Barton, and Jennifer J. Freyd, “A Betrayal Trauma Perspective on Domestic Violence,” Violence 
Against Women in Families and Relationships, ed. Evan Stark and Eve S. Buzawa, (Westport: Greenwood 
Press, 2009): 185-207; Carly Parnitzke Smith and Jennifer J. Freyd, “Dangerous Safe Havens: Institutional 
Betrayal Exacerbates Sexual Trauma,” Journal of Traumatic Stress, v. 26 (Feb 2013): 119-124; and 
Jennifer J. Freyd and Pamela J. Birrell, Blind to Betrayal: Why We Fool Ourselves We Aren’t Being 
Fooled, Hoboken: Wiley, 2013. 
 
2 Jane Doe v. University of Oregon, Dana Dean Altman, 6:15-cv-00042, (9 Feb. 2015), available at 
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/1658093/merged-72683-1-1423523139.pdf (accessed May 
2018). 
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to be treated as an object in a perpetrator’s dream, rather than the subject of your 
own—these are bad enough. But when observers become complicit in the victim’s 
desire to forget, they become perpetrators too. This is why traumatized groups 
sometimes fare better than traumatized individuals. When the feeling of terror is 
shared, victims have a harder time forgetting what occurred or denying their 
terror. In the camps, what mattered most, Anna Ornstein explains, was whether 
there were witnesses willing to share the burden of overwhelming emotion. 
Talking about what occurred with other survivors or witnesses was an essential 
part of recovery, Ornstein claims. […] This is the alchemy of denial: terror, rage, 
and pain are replaced with free-floating shame. The victim will begin to wonder: 
What did I do? She will begin to believe: I must have done something bad. But 
the sensation of shame is shameful itself, so we dissociate that, too. In the end, a 
victim who has suffered the denial of others will come to see herself as a liar. 
(Stern 2010, 144-45)  
 
Overwhelmed by the emotions of traumatic memory, the self often dissociates from itself 
desiring to leave the pain behind. But this further exacerbates traumatic rupture and 
fragmentation. Exhortations by bystanders or institutions to “forgive and forget”—or, in 
the case of Jane Doe, to simply “forget” without even acknowledging a harm to be 
forgiven—feed into survivors’ deep desire to forget the reality of their trauma and move 
on with their lives. As Stern suggests, victims may come to believe they are themselves 
liars, internalizing social disbelief. In the case of many rape victims, this dynamic feeds 
the social ‘women as liar’ trope and other common assumptions undermining survivors’ 
credibility (see Luther 2016; Herman 1992/1997/2015). This undermines individual and 
as well as communal wellbeing in the aftermath of traumatic rupture.  
The denial of bystanders, such as university administrators, makes them not only 
complicit with perpetrators but also reproduces them as very real perpetrators themselves. 
As we will see, institutional denial is a form of trauma perpetration that is often worse 
than the original traumatic harm as it inflames or festers the original wound. This only 
benefits the oppressors in racialized patriarchy. 
In contrast to the crisis management of denial, the view that I accept holds that the 
temporality of overcoming is a constant, courageous process of recollection and rebirth of 
the self ideally undertaken with the caring support of others. In order to fare best in the 
aftermath of trauma, it is important for victims to share the emotional burden of the 
traumatic memory with others so as to hold onto the truth of the reality of the encounter. 
The process of overcoming memorializes the past, placing it within the temporal 
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historical narrative of one’s life, reconnecting or rebirthing the ambiguous 
interconnections of subjectivity. Quoted in the epigraph to this chapter, Stern writes “I do 
not believe in ‘forgive and forget.’ To forgive in the truest sense, we must remember first 
and then forgive, even in regard to ourselves” (Stern 2010, 278). We must recollect the 
traumatic memory and the part of our self that remains terrorized by it, so we might 
forgive not only perpetrators of violence but our very own selves for the fear, shame, and 
ongoing habits of survival harbored within our traumatized bodies. It is the birth of a 
present self that is attuned to the terrors of our past self, as a ‘parent’ to a frightened 
‘child,’ such that past terrors do not override the possibilities of the present. With this, it 
is suggested that we are able to hold the present open to possibilities rather than succumb 
to the terror and tantrums of our traumatized ‘inner child.’ More attuned to ourselves, we 
are better able to become more attuned with and connected to others. We become better 
friends, colleagues, teachers, parents, and lovers. We may ourselves become midwives to 
the self-birth of others who have been traumatized. We become better members of our 
collective community.  
Said politically, the temporality of overcoming is prerequisite to and part-and-
parcel with solidarity building. That contemporary administrators of academia refuse to 
engage in re-collective endeavors demonstrates just how embroiled contemporary 
academe is in systems of racialized patriarchal domination. Trauma must be individually 
and collectively remembered, recollected, and memorialized rather than denied if trauma 
and the system of racialized patriarchal domination is to be overcome and a new world 
made possible. As I show throughout this dissertation, one must lovingly remember in 
order to forget.  
  
Campus Sexual Violence and Racialized Patriarchy 
In May 2014, the University of Oregon campus erupted into feminist protest 
alleging administrators had attempted to cover up the group sexual assault of a female 
university student, ‘Jane Doe,’ by three Nike-sponsored UO men’s basketball players, 
Brandon Austin, Damyean Dotson, and Dominic Artis, prior to and throughout the 2014 
March Madness tournament. As black students, Jane Doe and each of the three basketball 
players were exposed to a level of public consumption and scrutiny from which most 
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white victims and perpetrators alike are insulated.3 And specifically as a black woman, 
Jane Doe endured a staggering level of institutional betrayal, denial, and backlash. Before 
continuing to further detail the case of Jane Doe and the institutional betrayals and 
denials of the University of Oregon, it is important to first critically discuss the function 
of racialized patriarchy as contributing to a racialized visibility of sexual violence on 
college campuses wherein black men are overrepresented in media discussions of campus 
perpetration while black women are not visible as ‘proper’ victims but rather as objects 
for continued consumption (cf. Crenshaw 1991; Davis 1983; hooks 1992; Narayan 1997; 
and Phillips 2000 among others). 
Jessica Luther notes that “[b]ecause the majority of high-profile athletes are black 
and we tend to pay attention when athletes are involved, the issue of campus sexual 
assault repeatedly has a black face on it” (Luther 2016, 81). It must be underscored that 
more instances of sexual assault and harassment on campus are committed by privileged, 
white men—fraternity brothers and male faculty alike—who often remain untouched by 
university policy, the law, or public retribution. Brock Turner is, perhaps, a seeming 
exception. On January 18, 2015, two Swedish international students caught Brock Turner 
in the midst of raping an unconscious co-ed student, ‘Emily Doe,’ behind a campus 
dumpster. The international students intervened, and Turner fled the scene. Though he 
was charged, Brock Turner was treated as a human with a future. His comparatively 
lenient criminal sentencing by a judge convinced of fears that prison would destroy 
Turner’s future career in competitive swimming brought national attention and feminist 
furor. And Turner’s subsequent temerity to seek an appeal further exemplifies the point 
here (Kreps 2017). While the problem of accused black athletes reveals the structure’s 
attempt to protect them in a manner similar to its protection of white men, such as Brock 
Turner, I suggest that high-profile black athletes are protected for far different reasons 
than their white peers. Accused white men are understood and subsequently treated as 
                                               
3 For example, white female UO student Laura Hanson was able to publicly disclose her story of being 
drugged and raped at a 2013 fraternity party by a white male student, Wil Smith, and the institutional 
betrayals that followed on her own time and on her own terms in an exposé titled “Dragged through the 
Mud” written by Camilla Mortensen and published in the local Eugene Weekly in May 2015. Though this 
article published Smith’s name, it is the only article that associates him with his crime beyond a blog 
discussing said article; Google searches of his name do not render the article (perhaps due to the 
commonness of his name) but require additional search terms. 
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humans whose future must be protected from disruptive harm. Accused black athletes are 
protected insofar as they are the property or capital of a team owned by white men. The 
visibility of black athletes as perpetrators further serves to shield the ontological, 
material, if not sexual violence committed by white men, including the very white men 
who own them.4 
White men have historically had the privilege of denying their own sexual 
violence against women, either projecting it onto women themselves or onto the 
criminalized bodies of black and brown men. Women have long been pathologized as 
liars, hysterics, or, especially in the cases of black cis- and trans-gender women, 
subhuman beings. Media mythologies of racialized patriarchy discredits all victims of 
sexual violence by assuming an impossibly ‘virginally pure (white) victim’ (Phillips 
2000). Those who fall short are assumed to be liars, or what Jessica Luther calls the 
‘woman-as-liar’ trope (Luther 2016). It should be said here that while campus surveys 
estimate that one in five college women will be raped during her time on campus, general 
population surveys on sexual violence suggest rates are even higher among communities 
of color, the LGBTQ+ community, and otherwise economically marginalized 
populations. For example, colonized Native American women are twice as likely to 
experience sexual assault than any other race group despite comprising only 1.2 percent 
of the population; and fifty percent of transgender individuals have been or will be 
sexually assaulted in their lifetimes.5 
                                               
4 It is here that my analysis of sexual violence in the ‘hunting ground’ of college campuses importantly 
diverges from that of feminist philosopher Kelly Olive’s account in Hunting Girls (2016). In her 
discussion, Oliver elides over the differences between white fraternity members and black athletes who 
rape (see Oliver 2016, 7). Oliver thus ignores important visual and ontological asymmetries of racialized 
patriarchy. Black college athletes are hyper-visualized in the public imaginary regarding campus sexual 
assault, allowing white peers to perpetuate trauma in the shadows. The future of most black college athletes 
is far more restricted than the average white athlete or fraternity member. And, unlike the prospect of most 
white fraternity members, the professional dreams of most college athletes will never materialize even 
though the toll of the lucrative sport on their unpaid bodies may be devastating. 
 
5 On the one in five statistics see White House, Not Alone: The First Report of the White House Task 
Force to Protect Students from Sexual Assault, April 2014. On rates of sexual assault against women 
by race see Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, National 
Crime Victimization Survey, 2010-2014 (2015); Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, 
Bureau of Justice Statistics, American Indians and Crime, 1992-2002 (2004); and visit the Rape, 
Incest, and Abuse National Network, “Victims of Sexual Violence: Statistics” (2016) accessed 3 
January 2016, https://www.rainn.org/statistics/victims-sexual-violence; on violence against 
transgender individuals see Rebecca Stotzer, “Violence Against Transgender People: A Review of 
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Simultaneously, the mythos of imperial masculinity projects the aggression of 
white men onto black men through the hyper-sexualization and criminalization of their 
race, projecting a ‘black-face’ of sexual perpetration. Under the guise of protecting white 
femininity, this mythology has justified the ‘heroic’ vigilante justice of white men in the 
public lynching of black and brown men through history. All the while, white male 
perpetrators retain if not strengthen their own status and power (cf. Herman 
1992/1997/2015, van der Kolk 2015; Davis 1983; Mogul, Ritchie, and Whitlock 2011; 
Palacios 2016; Spivak 1988; Yancy 2008; Burke 2019; also, Mann 2012). One can see 
this at play in discussions of campus sexual violence. Though an overwhelming number 
of campus sexual violence cases occur within the Greek Life System of fraternities and 
sororities, most attention to the problem of campus sexual violence has focused on 
perpetration by black, male college athletes, thus presenting what Jessica Luther calls a 
‘black-face’ to campus perpetration (Luther 2016).  
Indeed, it is no accident that the “majority of high-profile athletes are black” 
(Luther 2016, 81). As autobiographies such as former NBA-player Caron Butler’s Tuff 
Juice attest, racist historical political-economic arrangements have left black men (and 
women) too few opportunities (Butler and Springer 2016). Black adolescents, especially 
those who remain impoverished by racist housing and economic policies, often see their 
future possibilities narrowed to a life of an athlete or a mortally dangerous recidivist life 
oscillating between the streets and behind bars (Alexander 2011; DuVernay 2016; Lipsitz 
2006; Kilgore 2015; Tonry 2012; Crenshaw, Ocen, and Nanda 2015). As van der Kolk 
writes: 
In today’s world your ZIP code, even more than your genetic code, determines 
whether you will lead a safe and healthy life. People’s income, family structure, 
housing, employment, and educational opportunities affect not only their risk of 
                                               
United States Data,” Aggression and Violent Behavior, v 14 (2009): 170-179. For statistical 
comparisons of rates of violence experienced by female students and non-students, see Callie Marie 
Rennison “Privilege, Among Rape Victims” New York Times, 21 Dec 2014; and Department of 
Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Rape and Sexual Victimization 
Among College-Aged Females, 1995-2013 (2014), which also compares rates of violence against 
male students and non-students. 
It is important to also recognize that men are also victims of sexual violence: 3% of men 
have experienced rape in their lifetimes, constituting 10% of the total population of rape survivors. 
One study has found that college attendance multiples the rate of male victimization by a factor of 
five, while the rate of sexual violence against women, though still much higher than men, slightly 
decreases upon college attendance. 
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developing traumatic stress but also their access to effective help to address it. 
Poverty, unemployment, inferior schools, social isolation, widespread availability 
of guns, and substandard housing all are breeding grounds for trauma. Trauma 
breeds further trauma; hurt people hurt other people. (van der Kolk 2015, 350) 
 
Socio-economic circumstance is a significant factor in an individual’s potential to live a 
healthy life. Poor socio-economic circumstances—which, make no doubt about it, are 
racialized—significantly exacerbate the risk of traumatic exposure, which only breeds 
further trauma, while undercutting access to resources in trauma’s aftermath.  
In the 1990s, the Nike corporation began to capitalize on the racialization and 
feminization of economic desperation and the attendant decline in public education 
funding. It began to offer schools irresistible contracts to receive Nike athletic apparel for 
student athletes at significantly discounted rates. As further incentive, lucrative ‘shoe 
contracts’ were offered to talented (black) basketball players—the Nike ‘Air Jordan’ 
being the first historical example (ESPN 30 for 30: Sole Man, 2013). Years later, we see 
that this business model is merely another historical example of rich, white, men utilizing 
the bodies of black and brown people to maximize their own private capital interests. 
Unpaid black male university football and basketball players sacrifice their bodies6 to 
model the latest Nike gear, gear manufactured by the sweatshop labor of mostly brown 
women in the global South. As D. Stanley Eitzen claims, the political-economic 
arrangements of the contemporary academy render it nothing less than a contemporary 
plantation (Eitzen 2015).7 Of course, the players are ‘compensated’ in the excesses of the 
                                               
6 Football players particularly sacrifice their embodied minds and, indeed, the future of their very own 
personality according to the latest chronic encephalopathy research. 
 
7 See especially D. Stanley Eitzen, “The Big-Time College Sports Plantation and the Slaves Who Drive It,” 
and David Macaray, “Nike’s Crimes,” in Sport in Contemporary Society: An Anthology. Ed. D. Stanley 
Eitzen. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015): 177-187 and 320-321 respectively; also, the memoir of 
Caron Butler in Caron Butler and Steve Springer, Tuff Juice: My Journey from the Streets to the NBA, 
Guilford: Lyons Press, 2015; see also Taylor Branch, “The Shame of College Sports,” Sport in 
Contemporary Society: An Anthology. Ed. D. Stanley Eitzen. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015): 
166-174; D. Stanley Eitzen, “Ethical Dilemmas in American Sport: The Dark Side of Competition.” Sport 
in Contemporary Society: An Anthology. Ed. D. Stanley Eitzen. (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2015):137-146. [originally in Vital Speeches of the Day 62 (January 1, 1996)]; Samantha King, “Nike U: 
Full-Program Athletics Contracts and the Corporate University,” Sport and Neoliberalism: Politics, 
Consumption, and Culture, ed. David L. Andrews and Michael L. Silk (Philadelphia: Temple University 
Press, 2012): 73-89; Naomi Klein, No Logo New York: Picador, 2000/2009; Dave Zirin, Game Over: How 
Politics has Turned the Sports World Upside Down, New York: The New Press, 2013;  
Also see the following documentaries: Kirby Dick, dir., and Amy Ziering, prod., The Hunting Ground, 
2015, New York, NY: The Weinstein Company, 2016, online film; Ross Finkle, Jonathan Paley, and 
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latest sweatshop-manufactured athletic gear as well as scholarships to cover artificially 
sky-rocketing tuition costs.8 However, NCAA rules prevent players from receiving any 
kind of salary—even the sale of their own uniforms may result in penalties—while white 
coaches, university presidents, and Nike-founder and University of Oregon-alum, Phil 
Knight, and their families cash in against a backdrop of public disinvestment from 
education.9  
Jessica Luther writes that this neoliberal system of exploiting the bodies of black 
male athletes depends upon the patriarchal sexual access and exploitation of women’s 
bodies. In her journalistic study, she finds that male college football and basketball 
players are often recruited with the promise that their athletic efforts will be “rewarded 
with access to women’s bodies […] whether it’s in the form of sex partners or as eye 
candy” (Luther 2011, 80). Luther goes on to conclude: 
The culture around (and therefore the economy of) football [and basketball] today 
is dependent on a society that minimizes and/or ignores rape. It is the same 
culture that tells these men they are only as valued by what they can do on a 
                                               
Trevor Martin, dirs., Schooled: The Price of College Sports, 2013, New York, NY: Epix, 2013, online film; 
Jon Weinbach and Dan Marks, dirs., ESPN 30-for-30: Sole Man, 2015, Bristol, CT: ESPN Films, 2015, 
online film. 
 
8 The reader will note Plato’s original academy was tuition-free. 
 
9 There’s a lot of money at stake in college athletics—in 2014, the University of Oregon Athletic 
Department’s projected revenues and expenses were “each around $93 million” (Mortensen 2014). Coach 
Dana Altman earned a $50,000 on top of his $1.8 million salary simply for his team’s participation in the 
March Madness tournament. Not to mention the billions generated by Nike in apparel sales. Meanwhile, 
public funding for education has radically dropped, leaving institutions dependent upon the private 
‘donations’ of wealthy alum, such as Nike-founder Phil Knight. See Thomas G. Mortenson, “State 
Funding: A Race to the Bottom,” American Council on Education, Winter 2012,  
http://www.acenet.edu/the-presidency/columns-and-features/Pages/state-funding-a-race-to-the-bottom.aspx 
(accessed 18 January 2017); and Elizabeth Baylor, “State Disinvestment in Higher Education has Led to an 
Explosion of Student Debt,”  Center for American Progress, 3 December 2014, 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/education/report/2014/12/03/102407/state-disinvestment-in-
higher-education-has-led-to-an-explosion-of-student-loan-debt/, (accessed 18 January 2017). The 
appropriations for higher education has been on the decline since 1980 and took a serious nose-dive in the 
Great Recession of 2008, thus leaving university administrators increasingly reliant on student tuition and 
the charity of private donors. The job of a university president has become that of fundraiser-in-chief: to 
maintain a university atmosphere that attracts investors, students and big business alike.; university multi-
million fundraising goals. Also see Samantha King, “Nike U: Full-Program Athletics Contracts and the 
Corporate University,” Sport and Neoliberalism: Politics, Consumption, and Culture, ed. David L. 
Andrews and Michael L. Silk (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2012): 73-89; Naomi Klein, No 
Logo, New York: Picador, 2000, 2002, 2009; Jessica Luther, Unsportsmanlike Conduct: College Football 
and the Politics of Rape, the third title in David Zirin’s Edge of Sports imprint, Akashic Books, 2016; Sole 
Man, Dir. Jon Weinbach and Dan Marks, ESPN 30-for-30 series, 2015, film; and David Zirin, Game Over: 
How Politics has Turned Sports Upside Down, New York: The New Press, 2013. 
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football field [or a basketball court]. Those are two dangerous messages being 
handed down from above, from coaches, athletic directors, university 
administrators, and the NCAA. (Luther 2011, 80-81) 
 
These two dangerous messages are the messages of racialized patriarchy. As I understand 
it, both messages have circulated since the patriarchal days of ancient Greece, where 
women were often blamed for their sexual mistreatment and too many men thought their 
highest glories were on the field of battle against a demonized enemy (I explore this 
further in chapter III; cf. Townsend 2017). Patriarchy is a fluid political and ontological 
system that has been the groundwork of masculine imperial consumption throughout 
history, becoming racialized in the modern era. In this era, just as the naturalized binary 
of biological sex has been utilized to derive social meaning and social roles of gender 
since time immemorial (at least in parts of the world), patriarchal European colonizers 
began deriving social meaning from phenotype to justify, codify, and naturalize practices 
of genocide and the enslavement of indigenous and African peoples while constructing its 
‘Western’ superiority and strength against the ‘Orient’ (Omi and Winant 1994; Smith 
2006; Said 1979; Lugones 2007; Beauvoir 2010). Luther’s identification of the 
dependency of the political-economic system upon these two messages that minimize the 
rape of women and tell young, black men that they are only valued for their athletic 
talents demonstrates the co-dependent relationship between the practices and justificatory 
ideology of racialized patriarchy in the contemporary academy (cf. Kendi 2016). 
This contemporary political-economic system of racialized patriarchy was 
insulated from legal scrutiny in the Supreme Court case of U.S. v. Morrison (2000). The 
case tested the economic impact of the federal civil remedy of the 1994 Violence Against 
Women Act (VAWA), which passed as an amendment to the objectionable Crime Bill 
that expanded and deepened the racially motivated War on Drugs (Alexander 2011; 
DuVernay 2016; Murakawa 2014; Tonry 2012). The case involved the 1994 group sexual 
assault of a white female student, Christy Brzonkala, while attending Virginia 
Polytechnic Institute by two of the university’s newly-Nike-sponsored football players, 
Antonio Morrison and James Crawford. (The reader might bear in mind that 1994 was a 
year in which racial division in America, especially between ‘white feminists’ and black 
‘womanists’ and civil rights activists, became hyper-visible with the televised criminal 
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trial and acquittal of Heisman winner and former-football darling, O.J. Simpson). In its 
2000 decision, the Supreme Court ruled the VAWA’s federal civil remedy 
unconstitutional along commerce clause lines, arguing that the criminal act of sexual 
assault is not economic in nature and thus out of the bounds of federal authority over 
intra-state economic activity.  
But in fact, the rapability of women and the usability of black and brown bodies 
are central pillars if not the very foundation of both the interstate commerce of NCAA 
Athletics and also the global commerce of the Nike corporation. Indeed, it is the political-
economic system of racialized patriarchy. The Supreme Court’s 2000 decision revealed 
not only its blindness to the centrality of rape to the global economy of racialized 
patriarchy, but also its ignorance of justice after traumatic harm. In deeming the federal 
civil remedy unconstitutional, the Supreme Court left victims pursuing federal 
accountability no other option than to abdicate their agency to the state in pursuing 
federal criminal charges. This further contributes to the slow, genocidal movement of the 
American criminal justice system and its disproportionate incarceration of people of color 
(Crenshaw Ocen, and Nanda 2015; Alexander 2011).10 Further, as Beth Ritchie observes, 
racialized patriarchy within state legal systems of criminal justice (as well as educational 
systems) magnify the vulnerability of black women by creating an unsafe and under-
resourced environment for them to seek help. Under a “trap of loyalty,” black women 
may feel obligated to protect black male abusers and others within the black community 
from the racial violence of the state. And if and when black women do come forward, 
they often face institutional violence rather than support (Ritchie 2012). Such was the 
experience of Jane Doe, which I detail in the next section. 
But beyond producing disproportionate, disruptive traumatic harm to 
communities of color, Herman notes that the court system does not succeed in providing 
the “kinds of accountability” survivors seek. Contemporary criminal and university legal 
paradigms of sexual violence have the state or academic institution usurp the locus of 
agency from survivors, deciding either heroically or dismally whether to prosecute or 
                                               
10 Catharine MacKinnon notes the exceptional character of the U.S. v. Morrison regarding race as it was a 
rare case in which black men were granted impunity for raping a white woman. See MacKinnon, 
“Disputing Male Sovereignty: On United States v. Morrison,” Women’s Lives, Men’s Laws (Cambridge: 
Harvard Press, 2005): 210 and 210n18-19.  
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punish on the abstracted behalf of survivors, citizens, and students (Herman 2005; 
Holland, Cortina, and Freyd 2018; also, Mann 2012). While VAWA’s federal civil 
remedy offered survivors the potential option of pursuing justice on their own terms 
rather than through or in addition to criminal procedure, Herman notes that both “the 
financial remedies and criminal punishments imposed by the courts often fit poorly with 
survivor’s visions of justice.” Rather, survivors seek both validation of the basic facts and 
harms of their trauma experience from their community of others. Without this “public 
acknowledgement and restitution,” Herman warns, “all social relationships remain 
contaminated by the corrupt dynamics of denial and secrecy” (Herman 1992/1997/2015, 
243). The power of racialized patriarchy is dependent upon this contamination. 
Decolonial feminist scholarship offers the perspective that the construction of the 
identity categories of racialized patriarchal domination is reliant on the bifurcation of the 
temporality of human lived experience. In her forthcoming book, Megan Burke brings 
María Lugones’ decolonial feminist theory into conversation with Walter Mignolo’s 
decolonial philosophy of temporality to offer a feminist phenomenological account of 
rape within racialized patriarchy. As I further discuss in the next chapter, racialized 
patriarchy builds off the Aristotelian conservative, patriarchal backlash to Plato’s human 
philosophy of overcoming. Burke’s account of racialized patriarchy helps to explain why 
and how the University of Oregon was able to settle its legal dispute with Jane Doe and 
suspend and expel the three black university basketball players without, as we will 
explore in detail in the next section, either admitting a rape had occurred or that the 
institution was complicit.  
Burke explains the temporality of racialized patriarchy by offering María Lugones 
as a feminist intervention into Mignolo’s decolonial philosophy of time. Walter Mignolo 
argues that linear time is a “colonizing device” that bifurcates human temporality along 
constructed phenotypical racial lines (Mignolo 2011, 152). By this logic, to be human is 
to be ‘white’ and within a linear, progressive narrative arc of history. ‘White’ people are 
considered human and therefore exist ‘in’ time: they have a future towards which to 
presently strive that proceeds in an upward, progressive arc from the past. Within this 
logic, ‘brown’ or ‘black’ people are constructed in the hegemonic white imaginary as pre- 
or sub-human animals and therefore exist ‘out’ of time. This ‘white’ construction of 
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‘blackness’ considers people of color representative of the ‘primitive’ animal prior to 
‘white’ human history. In the ‘white’ imaginary, ‘blackness’ comes to mark the 
‘backwards’ and ‘repetitious’ past from which ‘white’ humans have progressed or 
developed. Within racialized patriarchy, the colonized subjectivities of brown and black 
people are thus ontologically frozen in time without future, abandoned to represent and 
repeat the immemorial past in the present.  
But with the period of modern colonization, Lugones offers that the binary gender 
arrangements of Europe explicitly became racialized and further bifurcated. The ‘light’ 
side of the colonial/modern gender system maintained gendered marks for humans who 
were now considered ‘white.’ To be ‘white’ was to be intelligible as a human man or 
woman, the latter of whom remained subservient to the former. But to be ‘black’ or 
‘brown’ demarcated sub- or pre-human slave status. As Lugones insists, the de-
humanization of colonized people was not limited to the mark of phenotype but included 
the mark of sex. To be ‘black’ or ‘brown’ was to be sexed rather than gendered. One was 
marked as a pre- or sub-human sexed animal, intelligible only as a ‘male’ or ‘female’ of 
the human animal species but not yet fully gendered rational human men and women. 
‘White women’ may have been lesser humans to ‘white men’ in this system, but they 
were still considered human. In contrast, “‘[t]he slave system defined Black people as 
chattel. […] Since women, no less than men, were viewed as profitable labor-units, they 
might as well have been genderless as far as the slaveholders were concerned…Black 
women were practically anomalies’” as they were not ‘women’ but ‘female’ human 
chattel (Davis 1981, 5; Burke’s emphasis).  
As Burke explains, according to the ontological system of racialized patriarchy, 
‘white men’ and ‘white women’ are ‘in’ time while ‘black males’ and ‘black females’ are 
‘out’ of time. ‘White men’ and ‘white women’ both have a future in racialized patriarchy, 
though the future of white women is a destiny for ‘white men’ that is characterized by the 
experience of traumatic rupture. Colonized men and women, or black ‘males’ and 
‘females,’ are ‘out’ of time, doomed to repeat the past in the present. Both are cast to play 
the fantasy of what white men thought ‘primitive’ human behavior was like. The ‘black 
male’ is constructed to represent the ‘primitive’ danger to human females, thus a natural 
danger to present civilized ‘white women.’ While the ‘black female’ is constructed to 
 34 
represent the ‘primitive’ vessel of sex as either a ‘jezebel’ or ‘mammy,’ thus a ‘natural’ 
victim to the ‘natural’ urges of human males. Black women, or black ‘females,’ are 
considered ‘out’ of time and thus ‘naturally’ sexualized and ‘naturally’ vulnerable to the 
‘natural’ urges of primitive man: she is always already victim to not only ‘black males’ 
but also ‘white men.’ She is the ‘natural’ seductress, temptress of the species. How could 
a man, civilized or not, help himself? On this view, racialized patriarchy is revealed to be 
a victim-blaming ontology of denial shifting responsibility from the perpetration of 
‘white men’ onto his ontologically-subordinate victims. 
The future-oriented temporality of white male supremacy relies on this bifurcation 
of human temporality, freezing colonized subjectivities into a ‘backward’ repetitious 
temporality of the past in the present. Without a future to be ruptured, the ‘black female’ 
is always already violable. The crimes against her do not register as offenses in racialized 
patriarchy because they are not committed against a ‘human’ existing ‘in’ time. In 
contrast, the ‘white woman’ is always already in need of rescue, in a constant state of 
threat in the face of potential traumatic rupture. She is ‘in’ time and thus has a future that 
may (read: must) be ruptured, if not, under constant threat in racialized patriarchy. In 
other words, the ontological status of ‘white men’ and the impunity of their own violent 
perpetration relies on the simultaneous always already violability of ‘black females’ and 
the always already ‘white women’ damsels in need of rescue from the always already 
‘primitive’ urges of ‘black males.’ The ontological status of the ‘white man’ is that of a 
potential hero whose flaws are always already forgiven. He’s only human, after all. 
Might it be that as a black woman, Jane Doe was considered a ‘black female’ 
whose rape was not considered a crime because crimes are committed against humans? 
And might it be that as black men, the three basketball players were considered ‘black 
males’ whose aggression was due to their ‘primitive’ pre-human animal nature that 
threatened the civility of the white institution, outweighing the usability of their athletic 
bodies for institutional and Nike profits? The bodies of black ‘males’ and ‘females’ are 
constructed to represent the limit of Western civilization, the underside onto which the 
violence of Western civilization is always already projected. Our institutions are in 
denial—or knowingly complicit—regarding how central racialized patriarchy is to our 
cultural and economic arrangements. The violence continues while institutions, like the 
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self-identified ‘University of Nike,’ are allowed to deny and project their guilty 
complicity onto black and female students and laborers.  
 
Jane Doe and the Denials of the ‘University of Nike’ 
In the course of writing this dissertation, I have found myself constantly returning 
to the meaning of four statements made in the context of Jane Doe’s case. The first is 
Jane Doe’s claim that she wanted to report her assault to authorities, but on her “own 
time.” Second, is the public plea made by an alum imploring the University of Oregon to 
show “courage not crisis management” in the face of Jane Doe’s allegations. Third, is the 
exasperated admonishment by administrator Brad Shelton to “do the math, Dana” when I 
inquired into the institution’s rationality and likely use of tuition monies for the 
institution’s legal counter-suit against Jane Doe. And finally, I continuously return to the 
then-incoming university president Michael Schill’s exhortation to cease discussing the 
case of Jane Doe for fear that doing so may negatively affect or foreclose future 
university (financial) endeavors, saying “What we want to do is make this university the 
safest university we can and if we’re constantly talking about what happened in the past, 
we’re taking our eyes off the future” (interview in Jacoby 2015). These are the words of a 
lover of Nike. He may as well have said, “don’t think or talk about it, just do it.” In this 
section, I contextualize and critically discuss these statements within the system of 
racialized patriarchy. I do so through a detailed recollection of the case of Jane Doe and 
the University of Oregon to prepare our discussion of the role of the temporality of denial 
in upholding racialized patriarchy and the temporality of its overcoming in subsequent 
sections. 
The assault of Jane Doe occurred in the early hours of March 9, 2014 during an 
evening celebrating the University of Oregon basketball team’s upset-victory in their 
final regular season game, marking the team’s entry into the multi-billion-dollar NCAA 
PAC-12 and March Madness tournaments. Jane Doe’s father filed a report of the assault 
later that day with the campus University of Oregon Police Department. Jane Doe herself 
filed a report with the local Eugene Police Department days later, stating that “I was 
really mad at my dad. I wanted to report it, but on my own time.” Despite knowledge of 
these reports, the University of Oregon permitted Dotson and Artis to play and score 
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points in the post-season tournaments. It was also revealed that Doe’s third and “most 
forceful” rapist, Austin, had been recruited to the team in January by Coach Dana Altman 
despite Austin’s suspension for sexual assault from his previous school, Providence 
College. Coach Altman would later deny knowledge of either the reasons for Austin’s 
previous suspension or the report filed against his three players prior to and during the 
March Madness tournament.11  
Further, the University failed to enter either report of the assault into the campus 
crime log, a violation of the federal Clery Act. This federal statute was enacted in 1990 
precisely to bring transparency to reports of campus sexual violence (and other crimes) 
after the rape and murder of Jeanne Clery in her dorm room at Lehigh University in 1986. 
In 2013, federal policy expanded reportable areas to include those surrounding campus, 
such as the two separate locations of off-campus student housing where Jane Doe was 
repeatedly assaulted.12 Administrators and police would later explain that the failure to 
enter the reports into the crime log was a calculated decision to protect the then-ongoing 
police investigation. It should be noted that the investigation involved the standard 
though highly objectionable practice of pressuring Jane Doe to act as her own 
investigator.13 Within a week of her assault, police asked Jane Doe to contact her 
attackers to bait them in an attempt to record any admissions of guilt. While she bravely 
complied, the district attorney’s office decided the evidence gathered was not enough to 
prosecute the case despite having “no doubt the incidents occurred.” The university 
quietly suspended the three players upon receiving the police report (Greif 5 May 2014; 
                                               
11 See the report from The Oregonian, including a video of my response after attending the press 
conference, by Thomas Boyd, “Video: Dana Altman Talks in Wake of Ducks Basketball Rape 
Allegations,” The Oregonian, 9 May 2014, 
http://www.oregonlive.com/ducks/index.ssf/2014/05/video_dana_altman_talks_in_wak.html (accessed 
November 2016). See also see UO faculty member Bill Harbaugh’s timeline, “Gottgate Cover-Up 
Timeline, Editorials and Reports, Questions, Resources,” UOMatters, 13 May 2014 (last updated 1 April 
2015), http://uomatters.com/2014/05/gottgate-timeline-and-questions.html (accessed November 2016). 
 
12 See “Clery Act,” Know Your IX, https://www.knowyourix.org/college-resources/clery-act/ (accessed 19 
Jan. 2018). 
 
13 See the Eugene Police Department Report, Case 14-04131, released 29 April 2014, 
https://ia801505.us.archive.org/3/items/gov.uscourts.ord.124639/gov.uscourts.ord.124639.42.1.pdf; 
(accessed 18 January 2017); and see Jon Krakauer, Missoula: Rape and the Justice System in a College 
Town, New York: Doubleday, 2015 for further documentation of the police practice of requesting rape 
victims to contact their alleged attackers. 
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see also Edge 2014). Records of Jane Doe’s assault are still missing from the campus 
crime log.  
The case did not escape public notice, however. A thinly redacted police report 
graphically detailing the several assaults against Jane Doe was released for public 
consumption on April 28, 2014. I will not cite nor further detail the all-to-public police 
report. The story is not mine to share and too much has been shared and consumed in a 
kind of racialized pornography by the police, the media, the University of Oregon, and 
the public. As leading feminist trauma researcher Judith Herman emphasizes, the first 
principle of overcoming trauma is to center the agency of the survivor as traumatic harm 
is characterized by a fundamental, dehumanizing loss of agency (Herman 
1992/1997/2015). As we will continue to explore, part of overcoming of trauma requires 
the support of others to offer the reciprocity of space, time, and recognition for the 
traumatized individual to care for their own self after their self-rupture. Further 
consumption, usurpation of agency, betrayal, and denial hinders the temporality of this 
process of overcoming.  Remember, on the view adopted here, psychological trauma is a 
moment of self-rupture at communal, spiritual, emotional, cognitive, psychological, 
physiological, and neurobiological levels. It takes time to rebuild these connections, to 
reconstitute or ‘give birth’ to the agential self in trauma’s aftermath.  
Even seemingly benevolent heroic14 actions and decision-making by others, such 
as Jane Doe’s father’s report to UOPD, carry the potential to severely undermine if not 
short-circuit the vital and important process of overcoming in the aftermath of traumatic 
self-rupture. Jane Doe’s time and way of having a world, her ability to tell her own story 
to her own self and others on her own time and on her own terms, were colonized, or 
“annexed,” “preempted,” and “undermined” (see Mann 2012, 27 and 29), by her several 
rapists, by her father’s reporting, by the District Attorney’s decision not to move forward 
with the case after using Jane Doe to bait for evidence, by the Eugene Police 
Department’s release of the report, as well as by the actions of the University of Oregon 
preceding and following her assault.  
                                               
14 I use this term in the sense provided by ‘thesis three’ of Bonnie Mann’s “Creepers, Flirts, Heroes, and 
Allies: Four Theses on Sexual Harassment” (Mann 2012). 
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To be clear: the support victims of trauma most need is the empathetic care and 
reciprocity of others to enable them to make their own decisions and take their own 
actions on their own time.  
Public attention was drawn to Jane Doe’s police report when sports reporters 
began to note the three basketball players were not participating in post-season activities. 
Feminists and survivors on campus who were all-too-familiar with sexual trauma and the 
betrayals of the institution quickly organized and stormed the campus with protests 
chanting “survivors before sports.” Meanwhile, a local Men’s Rights Activist filed Title 
IX complaints on behalf of the players wherein he accused the protesting feminists of, 
essentially, being racist prudes all the while belying his own racist assumptions of the 
violability of the victimized black female student: despite her own report, he represented 
the gross and persisting social refusal to either believe a black woman or see her as 
someone who had been victimized. Through public records requests, this same man was 
also able to obtain the un-redacted police reports, publishing Jane Doe’s identity in 
online manifestos and thus exposing her to racist-misogynist vitriol (for obvious reasons, 
I also will not cite these documents). Feminist psychologist Jennifer Freyd soon filed 
Clery Act complaints (Edge 2014; see Duin 15 May 2014). She also prepared a series of 
campus climate surveys to better understand not only the prevalence of sexual violence 
and harassment on campus but also experiences of institutional betrayal. Despite her 
work and surveys being recommended by Senator Kristen Gillibrand and the Obama 
White House, the university would later refuse to fund these climate surveys for fear of 
“confirmation bias.” The university instead opted to fund an external ‘objective’ 
insurance firm to conduct risk-assessment studies while Freyd conducted her own 
independent survey (Woolington 11 June 2014). 
As the battles between feminists and Men’s Rights Activists ensued on and off-
line, UO-alum turned sports and culture critic Chris Feliciano summarized the thoughts 
of many in a May 19, 2014 op-ed in the Los Angeles Times: 
As an Oregon alum, I’m hoping for officials to be held accountable for the 
bungled response, which fuels concerns about the outsized power of the 
university’s athletic programs and, more critically, exposes serious weaknesses in 
the institution’s response to reports of rape. Right now, the uninspired leadership 
on display in Eugene is enough to make even the proudest alum want to mothball 
his Ducks gear. 
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Gottfredson, the school president, seems to believe that he can put these 
concerns to rest by dismissing the athletes and delivering ambitious rhetoric about 
this case being an opportunity ‘to become leaders in the nation in creating a 
campus that is safe from sexual violence.’ 
But that’s going to take courage, not crisis management. (Feliciano 2014; 
my emphasis).  
 
Feliciano’s implied prediction that the deeds of the university’s then-President Michael 
Gottfredson and other top university officials would not conform to their words was 
proven accurate precisely because the administration operated along a temporality of 
denial. As I discuss, the temporality of denial is a temporality of crisis management that 
plays on the desire to forget traumatic experience, trapping present subjectivity into 
fatalistic repetitions of the past in the present. In contrast, the temporality of courageous 
overcoming would require the administration to recognize both the trauma and the 
centrality of its infliction and denial to current campus operations. Only through this 
recognition and reflection would an institution dedicated to overcoming trauma be able to 
implement policies that might actually foster the continued growth and life pursuit of 
Jane Doe and others within and without academia. 
The “ambitious rhetoric” Feliciano criticized was the statement by then-university 
President Michael Gottfredson given in a press conference held in response to and amidst 
the campus uproar. There, Gottfredson falsely claimed that there were clear university 
policies in place regarding sexual violence. In fact, the university was just beginning the 
process of rewriting policies to comply with the 2013 expansion of the Clery Act and the 
Obama administration’s several “Dear Colleague Letters,” a series of federal guidelines 
for complying with civil rights statues (such as Title IX) and education statutes (such as 
the federal law protecting student privacy, FERPA).15 In his press conference, 
Gottfredson went on to invoke FERPA to defer institutional accountability in the face of 
public inquiry regarding the institution’s role in the case. He stated “we are not going to 
violate the laws that are in place to protect students’ privacy or the rights of our 
                                               
15 Gottfredson also failed in leading the conversation with these policy changes, delivering prepared 
remarks weeks later to the University Senate and departing without fielding questions or participating in the 
ensuing discussion and vote on changes to the Student Conduct Code. Some of his remarks from this 
speech are included in The Hunting Ground as a demonstration of institutional betrayal. 
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students—especially the survivor” (his emphasis).16 While Gottfredson’s response was 
frustrating then, it became tragically ironic months later after his resignation and near-
million dollar severance package17 when it was revealed that the university had utilized a 
loophole between FERPA and HIPAA, the federal law protecting the privacy of medical 
records, to seize Jane Doe’s supposedly confidential university counseling records while 
preparing its own legal defense and counter-suit against her.  
In early June, Jane Doe offered a critique of the University of Oregon Athletic 
Department and head coach Dana Altman in a local multi-part journalistic expose of 
campus sexual assault. She wrote: 
I am angry with the culture that appears to exist in our athletic department that 
prioritizes winning over safety of our students. I cannot fathom how our 
basketball coach recruited someone who was in the middle of a suspension for 
another sexual assault to come to Eugene. I think that students, faculty and other 
community members have been asking some very needed questions of our athletic 
department, and I am not satisfied with the answers they have provided. (qtd. in 
Mortensen 2014) 
 
Jane Doe filed a federal complaint against basketball Coach Dana Altman and the 
University of Oregon months later on January 8, 2015. It was poetically timed exactly 
one week after the UO football team’s New Years’ Day 2015 Rose Bowl victory over 
Florida State University.18 In her claim, she charged that: 
                                               
16 Gottfredson’s statement can be found at “The Office of the President” website here: 
http://president.uoregon.edu/content/president-gottfredsons-statement-media-regarding-sexual-violence 
(accessed November 2016). 
 Additionally, it should be noted that Gottfredson’s background is in the field of criminology. 
There, he staked out the position that crime is the product of an individual’s lack of self-control, a glaringly 
racist position when contextualized against the racist and heteronormative history of policing and 
lawmaking. See Gottfredson’s co-written book A General Theory of Crime (1990) against Michael Tonry’s 
Punishing Race: A Continuing American Dilemma (2011), Philip L. Reichel’s “Southern Slave Patrols as 
Transitional Police Type” (1988), and Joey L. Mogul, Andrea Ritchie, and Kay Whitlock’s Queer 
(In)Justice: The Criminalization of LGBT People in the United States (2011) among other scholarship 
engaging the question of racialized patriarchy alongside inquiries into criminality and justice. 
17 Gottfredson is currently employed at as a research professor at University of California, Irvine, where he 
had served as provost prior to his UO Presidency. For details regarding Gottfredson’s severance package, 
see Theen 17 July 2016. 
 
18 Florida State was itself similarly accused of covering up the 2012 sexual assault of Erica Kinsman by 
active and star-quarterback, Jameis Winston. In a colonial denial of their own university’s ongoing betrayal 
against a black co-ed, University of Oregon students and players jeered Winston for the rape of the white 
Erica Kinsman with the chant “No means no” to the tune of the University of Florida’s fight song while 
casting the team’s ‘Seminole’ tomahawk gesture (Luther 2016, 155-156). On race, coloniality, and 
mascots, see Charles Fruehling Springwood and C. Richard King, “Race, Power and Representation in 
Contemporary American Sport,” Multiculturalism in the United States: Current Issues, Contemporary 
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(1) The University of Oregon had violated Title IX when Coach Dana Altman  
  recruited Brandon Austin in January 2014; and  
(2) The University of Oregon had violated the Clery Act in its neglect to: 
(a) Follow through with her on her case; or  
(b) Notify the campus community in a timely manner (e.g., the failure to  
 record either her or her father’s police report in the campus crime log).  
Additionally, and perhaps most egregiously, she charged that: 
  (3) The University of Oregon’s legal counsel, in its preemptory legal preparation,  
  had gained illegal and unethical access to her confidential health records at 
  the University of Oregon Counseling Center exactly a month prior on  
  December 8, 2014.  
Jane Doe’s entire casefile, “including notes taken by [therapist Jennifer] Morlok during 
private therapy sessions” had been seized without the consent of either Jane Doe or her 
therapist (Read 2015). Rather, the UO Counseling Center Director, Shelly Kerr, had 
instructed her executive assistant, Karen Stokes, via email to make copies of the casefile 
without leaving a record of doing so. To repeat: violating standard protocol, the director 
of the University of Oregon Counseling Center instructed her assistant to deliberately 
seize Jane Doe’s records for distribution to the university’s legal counsel in its legal 
preparations against Jane Doe without either the consent or notification of Jane Doe or 
her therapist. This was an egregious violation of the fundamental ethical principle of 
confidentiality in therapy practice, which requires the express consent of clients to share 
their information. Confidentiality is meant to center the client’s agency. Though 
executive assistant Stokes complied with the unethical requests of administrators, she 
also informed therapist Morlok, who in turn reported the violation of ethics to the Oregon 
State Bar and the Oregon Board of Psychologist Examiners later that January (Read 
2015). 
                                               
Voices. Eds. Peter Kivisto and Georganne Rundblad (Thousand Oaks: Pine Forge Press,2000): 161-175; 
see also Jennifer Guiliano, Indian Spectacle: College Mascots and the Anxiety of Modern America, New 
Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 2015. 
 It should also be noted that the University of Oregon football team had narrowly been eligible to 
participate in the 2015 Rose Bowl due to a graduate employee strike that was resolved just days prior to the 
Heisman ceremony where University of Oregon quarterback, Marcus Mariota, would be celebrated. 
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 Administrators were swift in their retribution. The University of Oregon and 
Coach Dana Altman filed a counterclaim against Jane Doe a month later on February 9, 
2015. Not only did the University dispute Jane Doe’s allegations point-by-point, but the 
University went on to charge that Jane Doe’s accusations were defamatory and would 
therefore cause a chilling effect on other survivors coming forward (Greif 19 Feb. 2015; 
Cremer 2015).19 In other words, under the guise of protecting students, the University of 
Oregon had the audacity to counter-sue one of its own students who had unquestionably 
been victimized by three members of the university’s basketball team—one of whom had 
been recruited to the team by the university’s own negligence—and after the university’s 
seizure and consumption of her confidential therapy records. But, according to the 
University of Oregon, Jane Doe was to blame for producing a chilling effect on reporting 
sexual violence throughout the university. 
This was a clear demonstration of Freyd’s DARVO thesis: the University and 
Coach Altman continued to Deny wrongdoing and Attacked Jane Doe and Reversed the 
roles of Victim and Offender with their legal countersuit. The administration also 
retaliated against whistleblowers Morlok and Stokes.  
Internal administrators, under the leadership of Interim-President Scott Coltrane, 
thought their behavior was perfectly logical. The absolute disconnect between the 
administrators’ logic and the wisdom of survivors and their allies became apparent at a 
February 16, 2015 student forum on tuition wherein administrators offered their 
routinized recommendations for the next year’s tuition increases. Many students and 
scholars in the audience, myself included, had participated in the Spring protests, as well 
as a December graduate employee labor strike that had threatened the university football 
team’s eligibility in the 2015 Rose Bowl game. We were furious at the latest revelations 
of institutional retaliation and betrayal. Some of us used the forum on tuition as an 
opportunity to inquire about the relationship between student tuition and university 
litigation: how many tuition dollars were being utilized to counter-sue student survivors?  
Administrator Brad Shelton (then-Interim Vice President for Research and 
Innovation, Vice Provost for Budget and Planning, and Professor of Mathematics) grew 
                                               
19 The counterclaim can be accessed here: https://www.scribd.com/document/256331009/Jane-Doe-v-UO-
Counterclaim (accessed Oct. 2016). 
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flustered by the depths of our inquiries (Fontana 2015). I spoke with Shelton after the 
meeting to further inquire as to why the university had decided to lodge a counterclaim 
against Jane Doe. Exasperated and in a patronizing tone, Shelton responded, “Do the 
math, Dana.”  
He told me that ethics is mathematical and that I, a student of philosophy, should 
obviously be able to recognize and respect the soundness of his calculative, 
consequentialist logic. He continued on, saying that the University of Oregon had a 
reputation to uphold, a name to defend, and business interests to protect. According to 
him, it was in the interest of current students and future enrollments to retaliate against 
the “defamatory” claims of the student survivor. In other words, the decision to counter-
litigate was understood within the administration as a sound business move meant to 
protect the brand. The brand, of course, being integral to top-donor Phil Knight’s global 
enterprise. 
The very next day, the university reassigned executive assistant Stokes’ work 
duties.  
 Ten days later, the University of Oregon dropped their counter-claim against Jane 
Doe in the face of a petition gathering over two thousand signatures; this happened to 
coincide with the national release of The Hunting Ground documentary that included 
footage of the Spring 2014 protests and Gottfredson’s responses (Kingkade 2015; 
Woolington 27 Feb. 2015). But dropping the countersuit was not enough to heal the 
profound feeling of betrayal communally felt at home and across the nation. That the 
University of Oregon had utilized a federal legal loophole between FERPA and HIPAA 
to access a student’s therapy records in the aftermath of her sexual assault in preparation 
to counter-sue her was a horrific violation of trust and betrayal of the academic 
responsibility to care. In a March 2, 2015 article in The Chronicle of Higher Education, 
law professor Katie Rose Guest Pryal urged students and instructors against utilizing 
campus counseling resources, instead recommending students be advised to seek 
independent, off-campus counselors and therapists (Pryal 2015). In some ways, this was a 
public declaration that the academy was no longer a safe place to care for and pursue 
one’s own good life in the aftermath of trauma. 
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In an attempt to eschew further student protest, the University of Oregon 
attempted to give a quiet week’s notice to Stokes of her dismissal from the University of 
Oregon Counseling Center during Spring Break 2015. Students protested anyway. 
Administrators insisted that Stokes had not been fired and was eligible to apply for other 
jobs within the university. But her contract with the university eventually expired, 
making her dismissal a drawn-out, convoluted, and dishonest firing of retaliation.  
 It was with the hiring of President Michael Schill on July 1, 2015 that the 
University of Oregon sought to finally sweep the case of Jane Doe under the rug. A 
specialist in privacy law, Schill was previously the dean of University of Chicago Law 
prior to his University of Oregon appointment. Within a month of his presidency, Jane 
Doe “voluntarily” dismissed Coach Dana Altman from her lawsuit. Days later on August 
4, 2015, she settled with the university for $800 thousand and free tuition, roughly the 
material equivalent of former-President Gottfredson’s previous summer’s severance 
package (Read 2015). Two weeks later on August 18, 2015, the Obama administration 
issued a “Dear Colleague Letter” taking some federal responsibility in closing the 
egregious loophole and clarifying the relation between FERPA and HIPPA, but both the 
damage and the system of denial would persist.20  
Therapist Morlok resigned from the University of Oregon on October 31, 2015 
(Theen 2016). Weeks later, Schill secured a $19.2 million donation from Phil Knight for 
the Marcus Mariota Sports Performance Complex of the University of Oregon (The 
Associated Press 2015). By comparison, the University of Oregon settled a lawsuit with 
Morlok and Stokes for a combined total of $425,000 the following summer. And though 
Counseling Director Shelly Kerr received a modest slap on the wrist and fine from the 
Oregon Psychologists Board, to this day she maintains her title and position as Director 
of the University of Oregon Counseling Center (Dietz 23 July 2016).  
 Schill issued some of his first statements to the university in his new role as 
president on the same day of August 4, 2015 that the university settled with Jane Doe. In 
the statement posted to his university webpage, he briefly and vaguely acknowledged that 
                                               
20 United States Department of Education, “Dear Colleague Letter to Institutions of Higher Education: 
Protecting Student Medical Records,” 18 Aug. 2015, available at 
http://ptac.ed.gov/sites/default/files/DCL%20Final%20Signed-508.pdf (accessed Mar. 2017). 
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the “underlying incident that gave rise to the litigation is an affront to each and every one 
of us. As president I will not tolerate the victimization of any member of our community. 
Period.” Here Schill repeated the language of the district attorney: the rape was merely an 
“incident.” Neither Schill nor any administrator would publicly admit the “incident” was 
a group rape or a sexual assault, even while seeking to eliminate sexual violence from its 
campus. Denial.  
In the very next sentence of his webpage statement, Schill went on to explicitly 
deny that any university personnel had acted wrongfully in relation to Jane Doe and 
continued to issue a series of grand directives: 
As an attorney and former law school dean, I want to be very clear about what 
this settlement means and what it does not mean. I do not believe any of our 
coaches, administrators, or other university personnel acted wrongfully, nor do I 
believe that any one of them failed to live up to the high moral standards that we 
value and that they embody in their work every day. I do believe we can no longer 
afford to debate the incident and must instead move forward and implement a 
comprehensive set of policies to ensure that all of our students will feel secure in 
the knowledge that they will be free from sexual violence and feel confident 
should allegations of misconduct be brought forth they will be dealt with fairly, 
effectively, and expeditiously. […] We cannot wait for the new Title IX 
Coordinator to join us before implementing new programs on sexual violence and 
harassment. […] The University of Oregon will not tolerate sexual assault or 
sexual violence. We will teach our students to respect each other. We will teach 
them to look out for each other. We will show our students that we have zero 
tolerance for sexual violence by expeditiously investigating and taking action 
without sacrificing due process. We will not rest until we succeed.21  
 
If not evident in his explicit statement that no university personnel had committed 
wrongdoing, Schill’s characterization of continued discussion on campus regarding the 
betrayals and denials of the University of Oregon as mere “debate” over the “incident” 
belied the persisting denial of the administration despite his new leadership and abstract 
pedagogical rhetoric. Assertions that one will teach respect are not enough. While respect 
and empathy can be learned, they cannot be taught, at least not in a simple manner. 
Further, neither respect nor empathy can be learned in an environment where the very 
process of empathizing with the inner lives of persons in the community is undermined. 
Indeed, the impatient insistence that we should no longer “debate” the incident and “must 
                                               
21 Available at http://president.uoregon.edu/content/message-regarding-jane-doe-settlement (accessed Mar. 
2017). 
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instead move forward” precisely undermines the intention to “implement a 
comprehensive set of policies to ensure that all of our students will feel secure in the 
knowledge that they will be free from sexual violence and confident should allegations of 
misconduct be brought forth they will be dealt with fairly, effectively, and 
expeditiously.” The failure to take institutional responsibility for the “incident” beyond 
hand-waving and pay-offs while vociferously committing to harsher policies embroiled in 
those systems (i.e., zero tolerance) combined with the absolute refusal to support the 
individual and communal recollection of the “incident” and the systems which 
contributed to it ensures trauma’s persistence. It also supplants the very mission of the 
academy.  
Any policies that attempt to prevent or address campus sexual violence (or any 
trauma) in the present and the future are bound to fail if those policies are either 
constructed or exist within an atmosphere of denial’s refusal to recollect or support the 
recollection of past traumatic memory. For example, the particular policy of ‘zero 
tolerance’ advocated by Schill to be implemented in the institution’s rush towards the 
future persists in the racialized patriarchal logic of the carceral state and often causes 
more instances of injustice that it remedies (Kilgore, 2015; Parenti 2008; Mogul, Ritchie, 
and Whitlock 2011). The academy will never be secure from trauma until we 
institutionally support the academy’s ancient mission: to learn and grow from a careful, 
continuous study of our past. 
 Schill granted an interview with the student paper later the same day that the 
university settled with Jane Doe and that he issued his webpage statement (Jacoby 2015). 
In the interview, Schill underlined his message of institutional denial. He explicitly 
articulated that the intention for the university settlement with Jane Doe was to enable the 
institution to forget the incident and move on, persisting in the mistaken belief that 
talking about past trauma cannot change our relationship to it. He said “The reason for 
the settlement was to close the chapter and to move forward. Nothing I say about that 
matter is going to change anything” (interview in Jacoby 2015). When asked about 
institutional wrongdoing in the seizure of Jane Doe’s records or the brief counter-suit 
against her, Schill dismissively responded, “Ditto” (interview in Jacoby 2015). He 
continued to insist that no person within the institution had committed any wrongdoing, 
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including the institutional recruitment of Austin and the unethical albeit legal-by-
loophole institutional seizure of Jane Doe’s records. 
When the student reporter pressed the new president over the meaning of his 
webpage statement that the campus could “no longer afford to debate the incident and 
must instead move forward,” Schill attempted to clarify that he didn’t think discussing 
sexual violence wasn’t important but emphasized that such discussions ought to look a 
particular way. Rather than encouraging the continued discussion over the particular 
questions Jane Doe’s case raised, he said: 
What we should be talking about as a campus is how we can respect each other, 
eliminate sexual violence and the need—when sexual violence occurs—to 
investigate, be fair to both parties and resolve the issue. […] What we want to do 
is make this university the safest university we can and if we’re constantly talking 
about what happened in the past, we’re taking our eyes off the future. This has 
been an issue that’s divided the campus. You said it yourself. You were in this 
class, and people had different viewpoints. At a certain level, that’s really good. 
That’s what universities are for, to debate certain issues. When they get to the 
point where they keep people from acting in a way that is productive, then it’s 
time to end it and really move forward. We’ve had a long period to discuss what 
happened, and now is the time to move forward and fix the problem. (interview in 
Jacoby 2015) 
 
In this statement, Schill continued to characterize the campus discussion and the purpose 
of universities as “debate” of “different viewpoints” rather than the careful process of 
recollection in common pursuit of the good life. Thus, he simultaneously elided the 
institution’s culpability in Jane Doe’s trauma and persisted in the historical shift from the 
academy’s original mission. As I explore in chapter III, the original academy was not a 
place for mere eristic debate. Plato characterizes this as the play of young hunting 
puppies (Parmenides 128b-c). Academic philosophical pursuit, however, is undertaken 
by mature hunting dogs for the god (Republic V). Such wise pursuits endure through and 
constantly battle the aporetic shackles of the soul (Cratylus 413d-415c) rather than 
abandon them when such aporias “keep people from acting in a way that is productive.” 
It is true that trauma’s shackles of the soul may impede individuals from acting in a way 
that is “productive” to their own freedom, but as I discuss, denial’s hindrances of freedom 
facilitate racialized patriarchy. To endure and battle through the aporetic point of trauma 
recollection is to battle against the function of racialized patriarchy. 
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 Schill’s interview concluded with his unambiguous support for protecting the 
rights of the accused while rushing through the implementation of changes, stating “I 
think it’s important that we proceed as expeditiously as possible, while at the same time 
protecting the due process rights of the accused” (my emphasis). Now, of course due 
process is important, and we must remember that, historically, it has been black, Asian, 
and indigenous men, women, and gender-non-binary individuals who have most suffered 
the lack of their due process rights. But invocations of due process especially for the 
accused skews the picture of who is heard and who is believed, functioning only to 
reestablish the priority of perpetrators’ narration of events and their denial in racialized 
patriarchy.  
In a New York Times op-ed entitled “#MeToo Has Done What the Law Could 
Not,” feminist Catherine MacKinnon discussed the persisting role of denial in inhibiting 
due process for victims, particularly female victims of campus sexual violence, despite 
her groundbreaking work establishing sexual harassment law. To quote her at length: 
Sexual harassment law—the first law to conceive sexual violation in inequality 
terms—created the preconditions for this moment. Yet denial by abusers and 
devaluing of accusers could still be reasonably counted on by perpetrators to 
shield their actions. 
Many survivors realistically judged reporting pointless. Complaints were 
routinely passed off with some version of “she wasn’t credible” or “she wanted 
it.” I kept track of this in cases of campus sexual abuse over decades; it typically 
took three to four women testifying that they had been violated by the same man 
in the same way to even begin to make a dent in his denial. That made a woman, 
for credibility purposes, one-fourth of a person. 
Even when she was believed, nothing he did to her mattered as much as 
what would be done to him if his actions against her were taken seriously. His 
value outweighed her sexualized worthlessness. His career, reputation, mental and 
emotional serenity and assets counted. Hers didn’t. In some ways, it was even 
worse to be believed and not have what he did matter. It meant she didn’t matter. 
These dynamics of inequality have preserved the system in which the 
more power a man has, the more sexual access he can get away with compelling. 
(MacKinnon 2018)  
 
We live in a world in which women are one-fourth as credible as men, and MacKinnon’s 
study does not even begin to account for racialized problems of credibility. In order to 
concretely be “fair to both parties,” we must bear this systemic inequality in mind rather 
than persisting in the (over)protection of the “due process rights of the accused.” I am 
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reminded of Elie Wiesel wise statement, “We must take sides. Neutrality helps the 
oppressors, never the victim” (Wiesel 1986). We need to believe victims and be sure they 
receive the support and justice they need and deserve, while simultaneously supporting 
the accountability of victim-perpetrators and their own trauma histories so that the cycle 
of violence might end. Not only does our current rhetoric of protecting “due process 
rights” perniciously equivocate victims and perpetrators, but it persists in assuming that 
accusers (read: women) are liars to the advantage of hegemonic racialized patriarchy. It is 
the very rhetoric notorious abuser-in-chief President Donald Trump’s education 
secretary, billionaire Betsy DeVos, has used to roll back the important federal policies 
and guidance on campus sexual violence developed by the Obama administration.22  
The idea that our collective future security trades-off with the lengthy and 
constant process of recollection is denial, and denial only ensures the future security of 
status quo systems of domination. I call this ‘Nikian Neglect’ in the next chapter to refer 
to the denial inherent to philonikian masculinity. ‘Nikian Neglect’ is the practice of 
denying trauma to protect and uphold the future financial, political, and ontological 
power, glory, and interests of white men. ‘Nikian Neglect’ neglects caring for past 
traumatic memories in the present. Reflective deliberation is silenced and 
mischaracterized as unproductive “debate” while expeditious action is taken to further 
deny and (mis)manage the crisis. ‘Nikian Neglect’ says what the stakeholders in 
racialized patriarchy want to hear about their future glory. That “what we want to do is 
make this university the safest university we can” while “protecting the due process 
rights of the accused” so the football team and its de facto Nike owners might “become 
untouchable.”23  
“Just Do It.” 
                                               
22 The September 7, 2017 speech is available at https://www.ed.gov/news/speeches/secretary-devos-
prepared-remarks-title-ix-enforcement (accessed February 2018). On September 22, 2017, Secretary 
DeVos rescinded important Title IX guidelines established during the Obama administration, including 
raising the federal guidelines for standards of proof of evidence from the ‘preponderance of evidence 
standard’ to the ‘clear and convincing standard,’ a standard that is nearly impossible for any victim of 
sexual violence to prove in so-called ‘he-said-she-said’ cases. 
 
23 “Become untouchable” was an actual Nike ad line emblazoned over glorified college quarterbacks 
Marcus Mariota and Jameis Winston that ran during the 2015 Rose Bowl. In the ads, Mariota wore ‘Duck’ 
wings in the style of the Angel of Death or, more aptly, the ancient winged Nike while Winston, embroiled 
in accusations of sexual misconduct, was depicted encircled in fire. 
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As we will continue to explore, denial inhibits the process of overcoming, thereby 
rendering the repetitions of trauma’s infliction an inevitability. The constant process of 
recollecting rather than denying trauma strengthens the power of subjugated peoples 
against the system of racialized patriarchy’s domination. Contrary to what Schill implies, 
talking about the past does something. It changes our relation to and meaning of 
traumatic memory (van der Kolk, 191; Brison 1997, 25). Recollecting trauma precisely 
“keep[s] people from acting in a way that is productive” to systems of racialized 
patriarchy. And this process takes longer than what Schill termed a “long period” of 
eleven to fifteen months. This is not only because systems of patriarchal material and 
ontological domination have fluidly existed since time immemorial, but also because the 
process of overcoming is a constant rebirthing of the self throughout a lifetime (Beauvoir 
2010; Mann 2012; also see chapter IV of this dissertation). The process of overcoming is 
not as simple as Schill’s linear understanding wherein we might “debate” for a period of 
time and suddenly declare “now is the time to move forward and fix the problem.” 
Instead, overcoming the living death of trauma is a constant, repetitious process of 
recollection and rebirth over and again through time. Communing with one’s self and 
sharing traumatic memory with others changes our relation to and meaning of our 
individual and collective emotional memories. There is no final “fix” but only constant 
recollection, rebirth, and reconnection.  
 
The Repetitions of Denial 
As I’ve suggested, the experience of trauma ruptures the complex, ambiguous 
connection between the present and narrative temporality of the individual self. And this 
traumatic break simultaneously disrupts our relations with others. Having been betrayed 
and de-humanized in the traumatic experience, reciprocal human relations of trust, love, 
and solidarity become difficult (Stern 2010, 285). This may make it difficult to recognize 
the humanity of others or even oneself, making the domination or neglect of others all-
too-easy. Denial exacerbates and perpetuates the rupture of trauma, wringing devastating 
individual and social consequences that only prop up the system of racialized patriarchy. 
In this section, I discuss some of the contemporary science of trauma and denial to better 
understand these mechanisms and their efficiency for enforcing racialized patriarchy.  
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It is now held without much controversy in the field of psychology that the mental 
and physical survival and flourishing of infants is dependent upon a successful, trusting 
attachment to a primary caregiver and that this basic fact of human interdependency 
persists throughout our lives as we navigate the permeability between trusted 
attachments, danger, and our autonomy. 24 Psychiatrist Judith Herman and psychologist 
Jennifer Freyd both suggest that trauma usually involves a betrayal of trust. And 
psychiatrist Bessel A. van der Kolk offers that this betrayal often induces a 
neurobiological rupture between the ‘rationalizing’ prefrontal cortex and the ‘animalian’ 
limbic system, leaving our normal defense mechanisms to fear or stress running 
unconsciously on overdrive. 
While scientific research into the neurobiology of psychological trauma remains 
in its infancy, current research proves useful in informing our feminist existential-
phenomenological approach. In many ways, the nature of trauma reveals the ambiguities 
of our embodied human subjectivity. Philosophical dualism will not help us here for 
psychological trauma is neither simply a problem of the abstracted mind nor the 
animalian body, but a wound of the embodied soul. The unique, multi-dimensional 
meanings of traumatic experience can never be reduced to mere physiological 
components; however, it is important for us to understand and hold onto the embodied 
nature of trauma.  
Trauma changes us. The contemporary science of trauma theory in the fields of 
psychology, psychiatry, neurobiology and neurochemistry provide increasing evidence of 
this fact. This embodied rupture of our soul affects both our imagination and our ability 
                                               
24 Despite the patriarchal desire through the history of Western philosophy for an unencumbered, 
atomistically autonomous rational human self, the unencumbered (white male) self has a mother and, 
usually, a wife among other servants and caretakers. This caretaker position has traditionally been fulfilled 
by women in racialized patriarchy: mothers and nannies, the latter of whom have primarily been black, 
brown, or lower-class women serving white mothers and their families. Racialized patriarchy 
simultaneously lauds these feminized caretaker positions to the heights of godliness while simultaneously 
rejecting them as projects for (white) men (or, in some cases, white women), which I further discuss in 
chapter IV (Beauvoir 2010). 
On attachment, see the work of John Bowlby, Attachment and Loss, New York: Basic Books, 
1969; John Bowlby, A Secure Base: Parent-Child Attachment and Healthy Human Development, New 
York: Basic Books, 1988; Erik H. Erikson, Childhood and Society, New York: W.W. Norton and 
Company, 1950; Erik H. Erikson and Joan M. Erikson, The Life Cycle Completed: Extended Version, New 
York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1982; and Jennifer Freyd, “Violations of Power: Adaptive Blindness 
and Betrayal Trauma Theory,” SAGE: Feminism and Psychology, 7.1 (1997): 22-32. 
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to mirror and recognize the mirroring of others. Part of the self becomes unconsciously 
stuck ‘out’ of time in the repetitions of immemorialized past traumatic experience in the 
present. Meanwhile another part of the self stumbles consciously ‘in’ time dissociated 
from and confused by past traumatic memory and current behavior. This makes it 
difficult to pick up on social cues of loving assurance, trust, or solidarity or imagine 
possibilities beyond mere survival. This has a profound effect on our relationships with 
friends, loved ones, colleagues, allies, and others. We become ‘out of sync’ with others to 
the point where we may feel we are on an alien planet, ‘out’ of the narrative arc of our 
social world (van der Kolk 2015, 81). This alienation leaves traumatized people at risk of 
triggers, self-harm, re-victimization, as well as perpetration of abuse or neglect against 
others.  
 Neurobiologists explain that traumatic experience ruptures the relation between 
our prefrontal cortex and our limbic system. Van der Kolk calls the prefrontal cortex the 
“watchtower” of our brains. It is the house of reason and it is responsible for constructing 
the narrative, linear temporality of our lives. It enables us to relate both to others and our 
own selves. Van der Kolk writes that the prefrontal cortex enables us “to hover calmly 
and objectively [my emphasis] over our thoughts, feelings, and emotions” or to practice 
what he calls “mindfulness” (van der Kolk 2015, 62). This ‘objectivity’ need not be 
dismissive of subjective emotional life as it has long been thought racialized patriarchal 
Western canon of philosophy. Instead, one might think of the prefrontal cortex as 
providing our capacity to assess our own subjective, emotional needs and desires and 
then creatively meet them either ourselves or by communicating them to trusted, 
supportive others. This is a relational capacity of the mind that feminists have long 
criticized men in the Western canon of philosophy for either neglecting, disparaging, or 
conceptualizing in terms of domination rather than care. 
Practicing psychologists influenced by ‘Internal Family Systems’ theory often 
offer that the prefrontal cortex enables our capacity to ‘parent’ ourselves: we can 
unkindly discipline or abuse ourselves, neglect ourselves, or recognize, love, care, and 
nurture ourselves. As may be obvious, the limbic system is our reacting ‘child’ in the 
parental metaphor; it might alternatively be thought of as the house of memory and 
emotions or, as van der Kolk offers, the “cook” and “smoke detector” of the brain. The 
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limbic system is responsible for both housing our memories and emotions of the past as 
well as processing our present moment-to-moment encounters. Messages fire several 
milliseconds faster within the limbic system than between the limbic system and the 
prefrontal cortex, concocting our emotional response to present perceived dangers in 
relation to past, unconscious memories before we are even consciously aware of what is 
happening (van der Kolk 2015, 60). Our inner ‘child’ reacts to frightening encounters 
before our inner ‘parent’ notices or attunes to them. Stern writes that unless we have been 
trained, we “do not get to choose the way [we] will react when [we] are ‘scared to death’” 
(Stern 2010, 190). We may find ourselves responding to a threat before we are able to 
consciously process it. 
Even when signals reach the prefrontal cortex, we may struggle to put our distress 
into words. We might “instinctively” call out to our mothers or gods for help, much as we 
did to survive as infants (van der Kolk 2015, 82; Herman 1992/1997/2015, 52). But as 
our calls for help fail, our synapses become flooded and overwhelmed with 
neurotransmitters and hormones, producing an extreme chemical imbalance in the highly 
sensitive limbic systems. This sends our parasympathetic and sympathetic nervous 
systems into our “more primitive way to survive: fight or flight” (van der Kolk 2015, 82). 
But fight or flight may not be a live option due to physical or ideological power 
differentials. As Stern underscores: neither fight or flight can help teenaged girls in the 
face of a gun nor young “boys who believe themselves to be serving God by servicing 
sick priests” (Stern 2010, 190).25 And so, the human organism freezes as a last means of 
survival.  
The same chemical flood in our brain elicited by traumatic experience is 
reproduced and even magnified with subsequent triggering. Van der Kolk writes that in 
individuals with post-traumatic stress, “the critical balance between the amygdala (smoke 
detector) and the MPFC [Medial Prefrontal Cortex] (watchtower) shifts radically, which 
makes it much harder to control emotions and impulses” (van der Kolk 2015, 62). With 
                                               
25 It is worth noting that women and even children often freeze or “laugh off” their fear both because their 
strength may be to no avail against the strength of an attacker who is two times their size (or more) and also 
because the habits of survival available to women and many girls in racialized patriarchy so often 
conditions them to freeze and literally shrink themselves to take up as little space as possible (cf. Young 
1980; Mann 2012; Beauvoir 2010). But combat soldiers as well as women and children may simply go 
mute as a consequence of trauma’s imprint on the body (van der Kolk 2015, 21 and 43). 
 54 
this fundamental reorganization of the central nervous system, survivors have difficulty 
integrating new experiences into their lives. As a result, their entire present world and 
sense of self may become saturated with the horrors of the past (van der Kolk 2015, 52-
53 and 258). Each traumatic trigger releases chemical cocktail similar to the moment of 
traumatic experience, flooding the body with the same or greater intensity (D’Anniballe 
2015; Sherman 2016; Herman 1992/1997/2015, 33-34). Our animalian conditioning takes 
over and “[t]ime freezes so that the present danger feels like it will last forever” (van der 
Kolk 2015, 60).  
Even though the right side of our prefrontal cortex may receive messages from the 
limbic system, our narrative-giving language-making left side of the prefrontal cortex is 
unable to make sense of the messages leaving the limbic system to respond “as if the 
traumatic event were happening in the present” (van der Kolk 2015, 45). A client of van 
der Kolk’s speaks to this, writing that in trauma flashbacks “it is as if time is folded or 
warped, so that the past and present merge, however benign in reality, are thoroughly 
contaminated and so become objects to be hated, feared, destroyed if possible, avoided if 
not. […] I exist in a dual state” (‘Nancy’ qtd. in van der Kolk 2015, 200). Traumatic 
experience warps time in such a way that the present is experienced as the past. We feel 
fear but have difficult consciously recognizing it; instead, we feel numb (Stern 2010, 
285).  
In fact, “trauma affects the imagination,” inhibiting “the mental flexibility” 
required to let one’s mind play leaving trauma victims “trapped in frozen associations” 
and continuously “replaying an old reel” (van der Kolk 2015, 17 and 263). Constantly in 
survival mode, our basic needs are left unmet. We fight unseen enemies of the past, 
leaving “no room for nurture, care, and love […] our closest bonds are threatened, along 
with our ability to imagine, plan, play, learn, and pay attention to other people’s needs” 
(van der Kolk 2015, 76). The traumatized body in survival mode has difficulty imagining 
other people and situations encountered in the present other than threats. Combat veterans 
often report states of fearful hyperarousal when performing mundane tasks in civilian 
life, always on the look-out for the danger around the corner and ever so suspicious of 
others (see Herman 2015, 250). Van der Kolk provides the example of a group of WWII 
veterans who were unable to engage with him in group therapy until after making him an 
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honorary member of their battalion, finally gifting him a WWII army-issue watch for 
Christmas. But van der Kolk writes that “it was a sad memento of the year their lives had 
effectively stopped: 1944” (van der Kolk 2015, 52-53).  
Neuroimaging studies revealed that the frontal lobes of individuals harboring 
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) do not activate when confronted with a stranger. 
They “could not muster any curiosity about the stranger,” van der Kolk explains, “They 
just reacted with intense activation deep inside their emotional brains [generating] startle, 
hypervigilance, cowering, and other self-protective behaviors. […] In response to being 
looked at they simply went into survival mode” (van der Kolk 2015, 104). Obviously, if 
one goes into survival mode simply when someone looks at you, one lives an alienated 
existence. This isn’t mere or occasional shy introversion, instead “trauma can turn the 
whole world into a gathering of aliens” (van der Kolk 2015, 81). Bonds of trust may be 
broken and difficult to newly build with others, thus making it even more difficult for the 
traumatized individual in survival mode to get what they need: to be seen with care. 
Even when a trigger passes, traumatized people struggle to make sense of their 
emotional responses and may instead project their shame into the blame of others. 
Trauma interrupts our awareness and capacity to calm down. We may all-too-easily lose 
our temper or distance ourselves, even from those who love us (van der Kolk 2015, 45 
and 62). Neurobiologically, we all ‘need a minute’ to process our present perception. In 
many cases, taking a moment for a deep breath (or several) is enough to help reground 
ourselves in the present moment and make sense of the trigger source as well as our 
emotional reaction to it. Survivors of trauma often have difficulty with this process of 
consciously relating to their memories, emotions, and present perceptions precisely 
because the memory of their trauma has not yet been memorialized into the narrative of 
their lives.  
Thus, survivors of trauma struggle to get through their days, living each present 
moment as a potential battlefield of the past. They do not spend much time reflecting on 
the past in the present because the past is present, and the present task is to survive (van 
der Kolk, 246). Even those survivors who appear to be thriving in their careers or even 
family life often “expend a lot more energy on the everyday tasks of living than do 
ordinary mortals” (van der Kolk 2015, 248). Philosopher Susan Brison notes that this 
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“disappearance of the past” is a common symptom of posttraumatic experience, along 
with the “foreshortening of the future” (Brison 1997, 22-23). The past may be too painful 
to bear, even while the present is saturated by it. Survivors speak of what they can 
remember or withstand of their life in segments: ‘in my previous life,’ ‘my life before…,’ 
or ‘my life after….’ While the past is too overwhelming to bear, the future “stirs up such 
intense yearning and hope that [it too is] unbearable,” which eventually reduces survivors 
“to living in an endless present” (Herman 1992/1997/2015 qtd. in Brison 1997, 23 and 
22). The self-alienation from past and future is compounded by the alienation from others 
who might understand what they had survived (Brison 1997, 23). Alienated from others 
and from their very own selves, traumatized people exist in a constant “state of existential 
crisis” and may feel “that they belong more to the dead than to the living” (Herman 
1992/1997/2015, 51-52).  
To experience trauma is to experience a death of the self. A disruptive halt to life.  
Trauma radically changes a person: not only their neurobiology but also their 
experience of time. Survivors desire to forget the unnerving details of their past and move 
on with their lives, but this leaves the trauma immemorialized and ‘out’ of narrative time. 
Stern speaks to the experience of traumatic rupture in her life, writing: 
Some people’s lives seem to flow in a narrative; mine had many stops and starts. 
That’s what trauma does. It interrupts the plot. You can’t process it because it 
doesn’t fit with what came before or what comes afterward. A friend of mine, a 
soldier, put it this way. In most of our lives, most of the time, you have a sense of 
what is to come. There is a steady narrative, a feeling of ‘lights, camera, action’ 
when big events are imminent. But trauma isn’t like that. It just happens, and then 
life goes on. No one prepares you for it. (Stern 2010, 273-274) 
 
Traumatic rupture does not simply rupture the narrative of our lives, but it ruptures our 
very ability to narrate our lives. In contrast to positive memories, which can be recalled 
as a distinct event in the past with a clear, uninterrupted beginning, middle, and end, 
traumatic memories are often recalled out of sequence with some details missing (often 
the very details requested in a police investigation) and other details (like the rapist’s 
smell) are all too hauntingly vivid in the present (van der Kolk 2015, 195). The impact of 
trauma on the limbic system leaves the recall of traumatic memories “highly emotional, 
contradictory, and fragmented” (Herman 1992/1997/2015, 1-2). The extremes of the 
dialectic between absolutely forgetting the past and the sudden reliving of its 
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overwhelming character further unground the individual and make the task of 
constructive narrative memory all the more difficult (Herman 1992/1997/2015, 49-50). 
This may further undermine a survivor’s credibility if and when they choose to report to 
authorities who often expect or even require complete, detailed narratives.  
Survivors often undergo a ‘second-rape’ in the context of institutions, forced to 
retell their experience in narrative form while they are still struggling to simply survive. 
Victims are often asked “why didn’t you report the assault immediately after it 
happened?” On the view that we have developed so far, we can see the insensitivity of 
these expectations. Especially in the immediate aftermath of a trauma. Survivors need 
time to reconnect with their own selves, with their own past memories, in order to 
memorialize them into the narrative of their lives. Without this, survivors only risk 
becoming re-traumatized by their very attempts to comply with institutional demands. 
Rather than being able to retell the past trauma in narrative form, survivors often only 
manage to presently relive the past trauma in confusing and terrifying segments. When 
survivors are unable to provide a clear, convincing, linear narrative of their traumatic 
experience, they are often subjected to the scrutiny, disbelief, and harmful decision-
making of investigators or even psychiatrists (Burstow 2003). Survivors may be met with 
implicit and even explicit demands to forget or deny the trauma, allowing silence, denial, 
and the survivor’s own desire to forget to prevail. Institutional betrayal exacerbates the 
original harm. 
President Schill’s demand to the campus that we move on from the questions 
raised by the group sexual assault of Jane Doe by three university basketball players is 
one such instance of institutional betrayal and denial. Rather than protecting individuals 
within the community, the demand to forget or deny past traumatic experience results in a 
collective, systematic, embodied inability to tell the truth. This silencing amnesia 
provides perpetrators amnesty and also allows traumatic wounds to fester, greatly 
magnifying the potential to repeat the cycle of traumatic triggering, self-harm, re-
victimization, as well as perpetration. As Herman writes, “Denial, repression, and 
dissociation operate on a social as well as an individual level” (Herman 1992/1997/2015, 
1-2). In the next paragraphs, I discuss the operation of trauma’s denial at individual and 
also social levels.  
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Denial feeds on trauma’s rupture between the emotional limbic system and our 
prefrontal cortex, the very rupture that makes it difficult to narrativize past traumatic 
experience. Survivors in denial register the perception of past threats in the present or 
even very real present threats, but “their conscious minds go on as if nothing has 
happened” (van der Kolk 2015, 46). It could be said that denial perfects traumatic rupture 
into self-deception. Jennifer Freyd terms this ‘betrayal blindness’ (Freyd and Birrell 
2013). Her betrayal theory of trauma suggests that we become blind to, deny, or forget 
past and present experiences or signs of abuse and neglect especially if we are 
existentially dependent upon the persons or institutions who are harming us. Discussing 
the denial of abused children, van der Kolk writes: 
For many children it is safer to hate themselves than to risk their relationship with 
their caregivers by expressing anger or by running away. As a result, abused 
children are likely to grow up believing that they are fundamentally unlovable; 
that was the only way their young minds could explain why they were treated so 
badly. They survive by denying, ignoring, and splitting off large chunks of reality: 
They forget the abuse; they suppress their rage or despair; they numb their 
physical sensations. If you were abused as a child, you are likely to have a 
childlike part living inside you that is frozen in time, still holding fast to this kind 
of self-loathing and denial. (van der Kolk 2015, 281) 
 
Adults who were abused as children carry their childhood terror with them through their 
lives. Even adults who were not abused or neglected as children may become blind to or 
deny present abuse, again, especially if they are in a relationship of dependency to their 
abuser. We may deny the reality as a defense mechanism. We may become ensnared. 
Both Stern and van der Kolk admit that “[p]ushing away intense feelings can be 
highly adaptive in the short run” and even “result in extraordinary public service” such as 
a veteran delivery life-saving care as an EMT in civilian life or a dedicated researcher 
publishing a groundbreaking book (van der Kolk 2015, 281; Stern 2010, 234; see Herman 
1997, 41). However, while our rationalizing prefrontal cortex may become quite adept at 
ignoring messages and memories of distress, our limbic system simply “is not good at 
denial” (van der Kolk 2015, 2). Survivors become even more susceptible to triggers, 
constantly on-guard to a haunting threat while our bodies secrete massive amounts of 
stress hormones in the state of fight-flight-or-freeze. Herman calls this the ‘dialectic of 
trauma,’ which is the oscillation between the attempt to forget or deny the trauma and its 
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subsequent, inevitable retriggering: a dialectic between dissociation and reenactment 
(Herman 1992/1997/2015). Freud called it the “repetition compulsion” and later the 
“death instinct” after what might be termed his denial turn26 (Herman 1992/1997/2015, 
40-41; van der Kolk 2015, 183; cf. van der Kolk 1989). Denial festers the wound of 
trauma to the point that the ‘dialectic of trauma’ or the ‘repetitions of denial’ may 
become self-perpetuating. Feelings of terror and rage persist throughout one’s life, 
undermining our ability to understand our own emotions and the emotions of others 
(Herman 1992/1997/2015, 48-50). One can become immobilized forever (Stern 2010, 
190). And this immobilizing death can have mortal consequences. 
 The physical tolls of denial may include the following: difficulty sleeping, weight 
gain or loss, chronic body pain, irritable bowel syndrome, immune system failure, 
fibromyalgia, cysts, asthma, cancer, and stroke (Dobie et al 2004; van der Kolk 2015). 
These risk factors are exacerbated by trauma-related habits of smoking, drinking, and 
over- and under-eating that “temporarily dull or obliterate unbearable,” “incompressible 
and overwhelming” “sensations or feelings” (van der Kolk 2015, 2 and 46). Some 
survivors of rape have self-reported becoming “promiscuous in self-destructive ways” in 
the aftermath of their assault (Krakauer 2015, 61). This may become a meaningful 
adaptation, but it may also put survivors at greater risk of re-victimization (van der Kolk 
2015, 101; van der Kolk 1989; Herman 1992/1997/2015; Finkelhor et all 2007; Shumm 
et al 2004; Ford et al 2010; Gobin and Freyd 2009). Trauma victims may also become 
severely depressed and even suicidal: one in five survivors of sexual assault report 
attempting suicide (Herman 1992/1997/2015, 49-50). 
Even non-abusive loving relations with others may disintegrate, threatening 
further alienation and potential trauma. Preoccupied with our own traumas and constant 
defenses, we may unknowingly attempt to harm our partners before they have a chance to 
harm us (van der Kolk 2015, 213). As I stated previously, traumatized people may inflict 
                                               
26 Van der Kolk writes that while Freud was the first in the history of psychology to really listen to his 
traumatized ‘hysterical’ patients and thereby discovering that hysteria is often rooted in early childhood 
sexual abuse, when “faced with his own evidence of an epidemic of abuse in the best families in Vienna—
one, he noted, that would implicate his own father—he quickly began to retreat. Psychoanalysis shifted to 
an emphasis on unconscious wishes and fantasies, though Freud occasionally kept acknowledging the 
reality of sexual abuse. After the horrors of World War I confronted him with the reality of combat 
neuroses, Freud reaffirmed that the lack of verbal memory is central in trauma and that, if a person does not 
remember, he is likely to act out” (van der Kolk 2015, 183). 
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the repetitions of their trauma onto others through passive neglect or active violence. As 
van der Kolk suggests, “[p]arents who are preoccupied with their own trauma, such as 
domestic abuse or rape or the recent death of a parent or sibling, may also be too 
emotionally unstable and inconsistent to offer much comfort and protection” to their 
infants and young children (van der Kolk 2015, 120). It is difficult to be attuned to others 
when one is in a state of misattunement oneself. But the repetitions of trauma may also 
result in the active, violent infliction of trauma against others.  
We’ve previously discussed how the internal rupture of trauma and denial is 
simultaneously a rupture with others, inhibiting our ability to mirror or trust others and 
imagine new possibilities in the present. Reciprocity is difficult for people who have been 
traumatized, perhaps save for reciprocal feelings of vengeance. In the process of writing 
her memoir, Jessica Stern discovered that her own rapist was himself sexually abused by 
a priest as a young boy. In an astonishing and productive act of empathy toward her 
abuser, Stern reflects on her own desirous capacity to perpetrate vengeful violence. She 
writes: 
There is something attractive about the idea of becoming a terrorist in response to 
being terrorized. One would like to respond to terror in kind. […] I would like to 
have terrorized my perpetrator, to have returned terror for terror. […] And what if 
I, unable to terrorize my own perpetrator, turned my rage against others? What if I 
became a professional terrorist? (Stern 2010, 192) 
 
Philosopher Simone de Beauvoir explains that vengeance strives to reestablish the 
reciprocal interhuman relations that are the “metaphysical basis of the idea of justice” 
(Beauvoir 2004, 249). To be degraded to a thing is an ultimate act of evil for Beauvoir, 
and she like Stern has some empathy for ideas of vengeance as they seek to rebalance the 
scales of harm concretely in contrast to the abstract penalties imposed by legal systems 
(Beauvoir 2004, 254). But despite its metaphysical appeal, vengeance only perpetuates 
the cycle of terror. 
Stern as well as Beauvoir scholar Bonnie Mann offer that the denial of our shame 
that reproduce cycles of vengeful perpetration is tied to ideas of masculinity. Men who 
have been de-humanized through trauma often seek to reclaim their manhood, their 
humanity, by converting their shame into power by terrorizing others. Mann argues that 
“the core structure of sovereign masculinity is this shame-to-power conversion” (Mann 
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2014, 116; Mann’s emphasis). Rather than narrativizing the trauma as past experience in 
one’s life, denial ensures the past trauma and its shame become “the necessary motor for 
the realization” of the power of racialized patriarchy in the present (Mann 2014, 116).27 
In patriarchal society, traumatized (mostly white) men who are ‘out’ of sync feel entitled 
to be recognized as ‘in’ sync without doing the work of narrativizing their trauma into 
their lives. Rather, traumatized men in denial, assuming they are the pinnacle of 
humanity, seek to re-claim their humanity or manhood by elevating themselves in the de-
humanizing domination of others. Supporting Mann’s thesis on masculinity and shame, 
Stern provides her own:  
This is my hypothesis. Terrorizing others—including by raping them—is a way to 
reassert one’s manhood in the face of extreme humiliation. Feeling terrorized is 
humiliating. Having been raped is humiliating. To be treated ‘like a woman’ is 
humiliating. Thus, the lament of one of the victims of sexual torture at Abu 
Ghraib, ‘They were treating us like women.’ Rape is a perfect way to discharge 
one’s shame. But like fear, shame is contagious. The shame and fear of the rapist 
now infect the victim, who, depending on his psychological and moral resilience, 
may discharge his fear and shame into a new victim, not necessarily through rape. 
I do not mean to assert that all terrorizers have been humiliated, or that all people 
who are severely shamed will ultimately terrorize others. My hypothesis is that 
shame is an important risk factor for savagery. (Stern 2010, 195) 
 
Bringing Stern and Mann’s observations together with contemporary trauma theory, I 
submit that the temporality of denial is central to the continued, constant operation of 
shame-based inflictions of violence necessary to the operation of racialized patriarchy.  
Psychologist David Lisak’s research on serial sexual perpetration proves 
informative here. His findings provide evidence for the fact that the vast majority of 
sexual assaults are committed by serial perpetrators who are white men. Further, these 
serial perpetrators consider their behavior to be normal—many rapists do not recognize 
their behavior as rape. Frighteningly, they measure as psychologically normal according 
to contemporary rubrics (Lisak 2011; Lisak and Miller 2002). In other words, sexual 
predators are typically not textbook psychopaths. They are ‘normal’ men in a society 
riddled by racialized patriarchy’s denial. Provided institutional and ontological cover, 
                                               
27 Mann explains that “sovereign masculinity” embodies the shift from the “man of reason” paradigm of 
Enlightenment European thought towards the contemporary instantiation of masculinity in racialized 
patriarchy in light of the colonization of the Americas. See Mann 2014, 3, 46-47, and 56-66. 
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(white male) serial offenders “are constantly practicing, constantly testing the boundaries 
of potential victims” and “honing their skills” (Lisak as quoted in Krakauer 2015, 122). 
Denial inhibits our ability to relate to or be-with the shame produced by our 
fearful, humiliating memories of near-annihilation. We feel de-humanized. This de-
humanizing traumatic rupture also ruptures our ability to mirror and imagine others we 
encounter in the present as human. Or as feminist philosopher Kate Manne claims in her 
important analysis of contemporary misogyny, we may feel ourselves threatened by the 
humanity of another (Manne 2017, 133-176). White men, insecure in their own humanity, 
may feel themselves threatened by the demonstrated humanity of a supposedly 
ontologically inferior other (i.e., ‘white women,’ ‘black males,’ ‘black females’). What I 
suggest here is that his ontological entitlement to ‘put them back in place’ is exacerbated 
and even fueled by defense mechanisms of denial seeking to re-establish or re-secure 
power in the present. It is a battle of the past.  
It becomes all-too-easy to perpetrate de-humanizing harm against others when 
one cannot even recognize oneself as human, even despite all social, political, and 
ontological evidence to the contrary. So too is it easy to perpetuate violence when under 
social, political, and ontological duress. It becomes all-too-easy to blame others for one’s 
own triggers and desire for if not enactment of vengeful violence. And the behavior that 
springs forth from this collective inability in racialized patriarchy to see, accept, or 
appreciate oneself or others in the complexity of our delicate, ambiguous humanity is an 
evil. 
Reducing another human being to the status of a thing and thus subjecting them to 
the horrifying repetitions of that trauma through the rest of their lives is an evil. Beauvoir 
writes “[e]very time transcendence lapses into immanence […] is an absolute evil” 
(Beauvoir 2010, 16). In contrast to the patriarchal, Christian philosophies of medieval 
scholastic thinkers such as St. Augustine, the problem of evil is not so simple as the 
‘natural evils’ of a kind of pathological ignorance versus the agential ‘moral evils’ of free 
choice. Rather, evil stems from trauma’s denial. And this evil is the primary motor of 
racialized patriarchy. This is not to excuse perpetrators; it magnifies the individual and 
communal politico-ethical demand of holding perpetrators accountable. To recognize the 
humanity of perpetrators as individuals capable of and responsible for narrativizing their 
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lives so they might “distinguish evil from good” in the present, and to hold them 
responsible for failing to undertake this necessary, human task. “It is to will the good” 
(Beauvoir 2004, 257-258; see also Stern 2010, 281-282). 
It is the very problem of accountability and denial in racialized patriarchy that 
plagues our institutions at the highest levels. As I’ve previously stated, perpetrators 
maintain their status of dominance through enforcing silence. Perpetrators often hold 
considerable power within society and “have no interest in public truth-telling” but rather 
become “implacably committed to secrecy” in a “ferocious battle over the question of 
impunity” to maintain their power (Herman 1992/1997/2015, 242-244). This is Freyd’s 
DARVO thesis. Individual and institutional perpetrators will deny the truth of their 
crimes and undermine the credibility of if not blame the accuser in order to enjoy the 
amnesty afforded by silence and denial. This denial both maintains the power of 
perpetrators while reverberating through society. Since perpetrators of violence have 
historically constructed and maintained current policy and legal structures, is it any 
wonder that our current system is inadequate?  
Van der Kolk observes that “[d]enial of the consequences of trauma can wreak 
havoc with the social fabric of society” (van der Kolk 2015, 188-189). As evidence, he 
cites the denials of the damages of war in post-World War I Germany as contributing 
factor to the rise of scapegoating racist, patriarchal fascism and militarism in the 1930s. 
And of course, German fascism took cues from the racialized patriarchy as established 
and perpetuated in the Americas—colonization, Jim Crow, eugenics and sterilization 
programs, etc. (see Whitman 2017). The consequences of the denials of racialized 
patriarchy through history reverberate across generations and throughout communities. 
Trauma spreads through sustained second-hand exposure, termed ‘second-hand’ or 
‘vicarious’ trauma. This means that supportive friends, family, advocates, and even 
researchers may be exposed through care work to traumatic experience that is 
psychologically and neurobiologically similar to first-hand exposure (Herman 
1992/1997/2015, 2; McCann and Pearlman 1990). Group exposure to trauma can also 
constitute or create communities (K. Erickson 1995). But further, as has been found in 
Jewish, Native American, and black communities, traumatic exposure can be passed 
down through generations in a complex admixture of trauma-induced genetic mutations, 
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termed ‘epigenetic trauma,’ and situational and environmental factors (McGowan and 
Szyf 2010; Danieli 1998; Duran and Duran 1998).  
We’ve previously discussed that racialized patriarchy bifurcates human 
temporality such that to be ‘white’ is to be ‘in’ time, rational, and gendered a man or 
woman, whereas to be ‘black’ is to be ‘out’ of time, emotional or irrational, and sexed an 
animal human male or female. Isn’t it possible that racialized patriarchy seizes on the 
fragmentation of trauma and denial such that ‘white’ people are wrongly socio-
ontologically assumed to be society’s ‘rationalizing,’ narrative-giving prefrontal cortex 
and ‘black’ people are wrongly socio-ontologically assumed to be the ‘animalian,’ 
emotional, pre-narrative perceiving limbic system? That racialized patriarchy wrongly 
assigns whiteness as ‘in’ narrative time, the pinnacle of human rationality and no longer a 
mere sexed animal but a gendered man or woman? While to be black is to be ‘out’ of 
narrative time as the persisting remnant of pre-historic animal life? I submit the trauma’s 
denial efficiently reinforces this ontological system.  
To be human is to live the ambiguity of our bodies, to live the ambiguous relation 
between our rationalizing, narrative giving self and our ‘animalian’ self of embodied 
memory and present emotional perception. We all have prefrontal cortexes and limbic 
systems that must work in relation to one another. We all have emotional responses and 
we are all capable of consciously relating to them, whether that relation is one of love, 
abuse, or neglect. The task of overcoming trauma is a continuous attempt to re-relate or 
re-integrate these systems by narrativizing past traumatic experience into the story of 
one’s life so one might freely live rather than merely survive the full ambiguity of our 
human experience. Herman argues, “When the truth is finally recognized, survivors can 
begin their recovery” (Herman 1992/1997/2015, 1-2). Extended politically, when the 
truth is finally recognized, we may begin the tasks of solidarity building for our collective 
overcoming. 
 
The Repetitions of Overcoming 
While denial is a forceful mechanism fueling racialized patriarchy’s desire for 
domination (philonike, φιλονικία), there exists another love harboring a greater strength 
and courage of rebirth. No one can erase the imprint of trauma from our memory, and, as 
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we have discussed, our attempts to do so only exacerbate and perpetuate traumatic harm. 
But we can alter our relation to the imprint of trauma on our bodies and within our 
communities by narrativizing the trauma as an event in the past—to bring what was ‘out’ 
of time ‘in’—to give birth to a self who is able to be fully present with ourselves and 
others. In this section, I explore the temporality of overcoming as a constant process of 
recollection and rebirth in the aftermath of trauma.  
In my understanding, overcoming trauma entails a courageous, continuous 
process that deliberately recollects traumatic memories in order to care for the part of the 
self that remains terrorized by the past, to remind oneself that the reality of the past is real 
but also that the reality of the present is a moment of new possibility towards an open and 
uncertain future. The process of trauma recollection can be frustrating if not painful and it 
is best done with the caring support of others to ‘midwife’ the process. As I claim, the 
repetitions of overcoming give birth to an attuned ‘parent’ towards our traumatized inner 
‘child.’ The ancient Greeks termed this “eudaimonia” (“εὐδαιµονία”) or a “good divine 
spirit” to accompany oneself. In the next chapter, I interpret discussion of this process 
within Plato’s philosophy. This attuned ‘parent’ or ‘good spirit’ expands time and space 
of the present moment to listen to the fears and anxieties of the inner ‘child’ to co-ponder 
and co-enact new possibilities beyond our reactionary habits of survival. This attuned 
‘parent’ is also capable of mirroring or ‘attuning’ to the inner children or emotional lives 
of others. The power to give birth to our own selves is the power to repeat ourselves 
through time.  
I understand this repetition in contrast to the repetitions of denial. As we have 
discussed, the denial of trauma renders inevitable the repetitions of past traumas in the 
present by maintaining if not inflaming trauma’s fragmenting rupture of the self. And 
while our prefrontal cortex is good at maintaining the charade of denial, our limbic 
system is not. Survivors often become unwittingly triggered, perceiving and responding 
in survival mode to past threats in the present even if the present poses no danger. Not 
only do such repetitions render survivors to merely survive the present rather than live it, 
but they also greatly increase the potential for survivors to commit self-harm, be re-
victimized, as well as perpetrate harm against others. This is in part due to the fact that 
the repetitions of denial inhibit our imaginative capacities as well as our ability to relate 
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to ourselves and others with care, which are all necessary ingredients to building relations 
of trust, friendship, love, and political solidarity. Racialized patriarchy thrives on this 
operation of denial.  
In contrast to denial’s deadly entrapment of survivors in a frozen, alienating, 
fatalistic present, the repetitions of overcoming are aligned with the survivor’s freedom. 
Whereas denial allows the traumas of the past to fatalistically govern the present while 
inhibiting imaginative possibilities, overcoming rebuilds such capacities and opens 
possibilities in the present toward a new future. The repetitions of overcoming are a 
constant process enabling survivors of trauma to be present with themselves and others 
rather than engage in the repetitions of crisis-managing survival mode induced by denial. 
Rather than denial’s ‘crisis management,’ overcoming might be thought of as a kind of 
‘self-management’ (van der Kolk 2015, 209; Stern 2010, 287). There is no ‘cure’ to 
trauma, but, ideally, through a constant process of recollecting and narrativizing the 
imprints of past trauma on our embodied memories, one might constantly give birth to an 
integrated self that is capable of managing or being-with our embodied sensations. Stern 
writes that her goal in overcoming trauma has been one of learning to: 
[…] manage one’s symptoms—to learn techniques for remaining in the present, 
not just in one’s thoughts but also in one’s feelings—even when there is no 
danger or urgency to fix one’s gaze. […] To learn to distinguish one’s reaction to 
‘then’ from reactions to ‘now.’ To recognize triggers and one’s reactions to them, 
and to use them as clues about how to create a meaningful life. (Stern 2010, 287) 
 
One might think of this process as the building or rebuilding of muscle memory that 
musicians and athletes develop through patient, caring, persistent practice that brings 
them from the frustration of a beginner to giving self-birth to their virtuosic excellence. 
Or, as the care akin to physical therapy for the deepest wounds of the human embodied 
soul. 
There is debate within the literature among practicing psychiatrists, psychologists, 
and therapists as to the best vocabulary for naming this process, and the differences of 
opinion derive from the various disciplinary and theoretical approaches to helping 
individuals and communities in the aftermath of trauma. Medically trained psychiatrists 
Judith Herman and Bessel van der Kolk often use the term ‘healing.’ Whereas radical 
feminist psychologists such as Pamela Birrell and Bonnie Burstow insist on the term 
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‘coping’ (Burstow 2003; Birrell, Bernstein, and Freyd 2017). In a critique of Herman, 
Burstow articulates her wariness of perspectives that assume 1) the world is a 
fundamentally safe place, 2) that trauma distorts this perspective, and 3) that trauma 
survivors must therefore be ‘healed’ to a kind of epistemological normalcy. Burstow 
accurately highlights the way in which the world is not a safe place and that survivors of 
trauma have epistemological privilege to see the world as it really is. For example, the 
world really is a dangerous place for black men and women who can be shot by police 
officers, raped by university-recruited basketball players, or bound by global corporations 
to boost profits with impunity. Instead, Burstow and Birrell both offer that the task of 
therapy should be conceptualized as a process of aiding survivors to ‘cope’ with the 
ramifications of trauma in their current lives rather than seeking a ‘recovery’ or ‘healing’ 
return back to ‘normal.’ This feminist perspective underscores the necessity of socio-
political work to change the underlying factors that gave rise to traumatic experiences 
(Burstow 2003; cf. Birrell, Bernstein, and Freyd 2017). Semantics aside, Burstow’s 
criticism is important to bear in mind, especially as both Herman and van der Kolk admit 
that trauma ‘healing’ is not an individual problem but is immediately a political one 
(Herman 1992/1997/2015, 16, 32, 97, 116; van der Kolk 2015, 350).  
While I am sympathetic to the important critique of ‘healing’ offered by Burstow 
and Birrell, as a trained feminist existentialist thinker I must admit that I am unsatisfied 
with the implicit nihilism of ‘coping.’ Influenced by the existentialism of Nietzsche and 
Beauvoir, I use the term ‘overcoming’ to reflect the ambiguity between Burstow and 
Herman’s world outlook: the world is simultaneously terrifying and beautiful. An 
existentialist position offers that world is fundamentally meaningless—that there is no 
pre-determined meaning to be found in the universe. Rather, we human animals create 
meaning through our relations to nature and one another. We create meaning through our 
becoming. As we will further discuss in chapter IV, this is a constant conversion of our 
mere being, that we are breathing animals, into becoming who we are by what we do with 
others in the world through time. In contrast to some assumptions that remain latent in 
psychological literatures, I do not understand there to be an essential ‘goodness’ or 
‘badness’ to the self, an internal truth that must be located (cf. Foucault 1990). Rather the 
possibilities of the present self toward the future emerge from our relation to our past 
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experience and others present in our world. Our freedom, or ‘transcendence,’ is that of 
constantly, concretely working towards the expansion of the freedom of ourselves and 
others. Trauma and its denial hinders this capability, lapsing our freedom into immanent 
survival. And this as an “absolute evil” (Beauvoir 2010, 16). I thus understand the term 
‘overcoming’ as a becoming beyond or over the evil that is trauma and its denial.  
To be explicit: I am not saying that an individual can finally, once and for all 
‘overcome’ the problems posed by their unique trauma history, especially not in a world 
that remains plagued by the ontological, political, and material structures and denials of 
racialized patriarchy. ‘Overcoming’ is a constant process through a lifetime that only 
individuals can undertake for themselves. Though, this process is one that is ideally in 
relation to others. I also think that this constant individual process is vital to developing 
and strengthening ties of solidarity necessary to collectively overcoming racialized 
patriarchy.  
As I previously mentioned, Judith Herman proposes that the first principle of 
trauma overcoming is “the empowerment of the survivor” (Herman 1992/1997/2015, 
133). Ideally, our relationships in the aftermath of trauma provide us “physical and 
emotional safety, including safety from feeling shamed, admonished, or judged” as well 
as encouragement to face the reality of our traumatic past (van der Kolk 2015, 212). Poor 
responses to trauma survivors and their stories, such as expressions of disbelief in their 
narrative (i.e., “He’d never do that,” “It wasn’t that bad,” or “We were just playing”), 
blame (i.e., “What were you wearing?” “This always happens to you” or “You always do 
this”), or supporting the assailant rather than the victim (i.e., “This could ruin his career,” 
“But he’s such a great guy,” or “She didn’t mean it”) can significantly exacerbate 
feelings of alienation and self-loathing.  
Further, it must be understood that the process of overcoming is one only an 
individual can choose to undertake for themselves. However, it is best done in the context 
of relationships rather than in solitude—solitude only exacerbates the alienation of 
trauma. Engaging with others in the process of overcoming is vital in order to reestablish 
capabilities of “trust, autonomy, competence, identity and intimacy” damaged in the 
trauma experience (Herman 1992/1997/2015, 124; see Birrell, Bernstein, and Freyd 
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2017; also, Erikson 1963). The infliction of trauma and its denial de-humanizes victims. 
We regain our humanity not in isolation but in our reciprocal relations with others.  
Expanding on her primary principle of trauma’s overcoming, Herman proposes 
three stages for conceptualizing trauma’s overcoming. They are: 1) the establishment of 
safety, 2) memorializing the trauma, and 3) reconnecting with present ordinary life. It 
must be acknowledged that the ‘stages’ of overcoming proposed do not happen 
sequentially or neatly, but involve a constant process: steps will overlap, repeat 
themselves, and some will be more difficult than others (Herman 1992/1997/2015, 155; 
van der Kolk 2015, 206). Nevertheless, it is useful heuristic to conceptualize them as 
ordered stages. I understand these stages as the constant process of 1) re-collecting the 
beautiful capabilities of our embodied selves, 2) recollecting trauma memories harbored 
in the body and memorializing of them as past experiences rather than present threats, 
which 3) enables the re-birth of a self that is capable of relating to our own inner life and 
the inner lives of others and firmly grounded in present experience.  
One would think that the first step towards overcoming trauma’s denial is the 
acknowledgement of trauma’s reality. But this is mistaken. While it is true that the 
recognition of past trauma is necessary to overcoming denial, it is not sufficient. Both van 
der Kolk and Herman agree that the first step of overcoming is the establishment of 
safety or “finding a way to become calm and focused” (Herman 1992/1997/2015, 155-
174; van der Kolk 2015, 205). The ‘talking cure’ alone is incapable of changing our 
present embodied response to past trauma: as much as we try, “the rational brain is 
basically impotent to talk the emotional brain out of its own reality. […] For real change 
to take place, the body needs to learn that the danger has passed and to live in the reality 
of the present” (van der Kolk 2015, 47 and 21). It is not enough to cognize the fact that 
our trauma is in the past, we have to feel it in our bodies. 
The establishment of safety may include very literal self-protective measures to 
shield survivors from current harm: they may need to leave abusive relationships (or, in 
the case of children, be removed from them) and establish protective orders. But the 
establishment of safety also includes embodied practices re-associating parts of the self 
that were fragmented and dis-associated by trauma experience. As Brison offers, “one 
must first feel able to protect oneself against invasion” if one is to reestablish connection 
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to one’s past, future, and others: we cannot relate to ourselves or others if we are or feel 
we are under threat (Brison 1997, 29). That is, a sense of autonomy must be restored in 
order for survivors to undertake the process of trauma’s overcoming. Van der Kolk 
writes, “[t]rauma robs you of the feeling that you are in charge of yourself” as we have 
discussed in detail in the previously section (van der Kolk 2015, 205-207). Thus, the 
primary task of trauma’s overcoming is getting “back in touch with your body, with your 
Self” (van der Kolk 2015, 205-207, 249). Before one can fully acknowledge the reality of 
one’s trauma one must first prepare oneself to be able to be fully present with themselves 
in order to be able to bear witness to traumatic memory. We have to be physically and 
mentally prepared to encounter the embodied emotional response to traumatic memory. 
So, the first stage of trauma is a kind of re-grounding practice.  
Van der Kolk suggests beginning with mindfully meditating on present embodied 
sensations. Neuroscience suggests that “the only way we can change the way we feel is 
by becoming aware of our inner experience and learning to befriend what is going [on] 
inside ourselves” (van der Kolk 2015, 208). That is, we must learn to open ourselves to 
ourselves—to move beyond the long-built and re-enforced barriers of denial. Contrary to 
Western health practices that tend towards “some form of desensitization” from 
emotional memories with drugs28 and other institutional treatments, practices silenced in 
colonization such as Indian yoga, Chinese tai-chi, African drumming, Japanese and 
Korean martial arts, and Brazilian capoeira may be as or more important in helping 
individuals and communities in the aftermath of trauma (van der Kolk 2015, 209-210 and 
224). Rhythmic movement is also profoundly meaningful in developing the skills of 
mindfulness and self-management (van der Kolk 2015, 88 and 344). Rhythm is capable 
of raising traumatized people from the dead, tapping into the beat of our hearts and the 
flow of our breath. As van der Kolk observes, it is capable of bringing an otherwise 
“slumped over” and “frozen” rape therapy group into a community of lively dancers 
attuned with their bodies and one another (van der Kolk 2015, 216). 
                                               
28 In a study comparing survivors’ improvement on Prozac to those who received Eye Movement 
Desensitization and Reprocessing (EMDR), a contemporary therapy treatment reliant on rhythmic eye 
movement, it was found that Prozac left survivors with blunted, non-integrated memories which exposed 
them to considerable levels of anxiety whereas survivors who processed the traumatic event into the 
narrative of their lives, the task of the second stage of trauma, with the aid of EMDR were capable of 
dismissing the traumatic event as an event in the past that is now over (van der Kolk 2015, 263-264).  
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Meditative practices that focus on the breath and the body, such as yoga, have 
been found to be especially beneficial. Allowing one’s mind to focus on present, 
embodied sensations offers a contrast to “the timeless, ever-present experience of 
trauma” as we begin to recognize the transience of physical sensation in our response to 
and recognition of subtle shifts of body position, breath, and thought (van der Kolk 2015, 
210; see 265-278). Such mindfulness practice “calms down the sympathetic nervous 
system” helping to diminish the triggering of survival mode in the present (van der Kolk 
2015, 211). Whereas the infliction of trauma and its denial leaves survivors in a 
horrifying frozen present, attuning to the awareness of our bodies through yoga or rhythm 
changes our sense of time as we learn by feeling the transience of sensations in our 
bodies. And this “[a]wareness that all experience is transitory changes your perspective 
of yourself” (van der Kolk 2015, 276). The frozen present begins to thaw into a flexible, 
pliable present that leaves us open to experiencing and bearing witness to the sensations 
of past memories.  
This begins to give way to our ability to name our physical sensations as well as 
rediscover embodied, traumatic memories, offering the opportunity to both recognize and 
care for them. Once we begin to become attuned to our physical sensations, van der Kolk 
suggests that we might begin to consciously recognize the tightness we may feel in our 
chest as the embodiment of our feeling of anxiety. Continuing with the example, van der 
Kolk suggests taking another breath might release some of the tension in the chest. But 
we might begin to notice the old ache in our shoulder. Staying focused on our breath and 
conscious of the changes in our bodies as we breathe—how the air brushes our throat on 
an exhale, the growing expansion of the rib cage with each breath—we further calm 
ourselves. Perhaps with this calm, we sense a growing curiosity about that old ache in the 
shoulder. Van der Kolk writes that within this calm, mindful state, one “should not be 
surprised if a memory spontaneously arises in which that shoulder was somehow 
involved” (van der Kolk 2015, 211). He suggests we might then take this further and 
“observe the interplay between your thoughts and physical sensations” (van der Kolk 
2015, 211). How does our body register thoughts and how do thoughts register in the 
body?  
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It is easy to brush off the aches of our bodies—and denial ensures we do precisely 
that. For example, I always assumed the ache in my right shoulder was related to hours of 
practicing the piano and violin in my childhood and teenage years (privileged experiences 
to be sure and for which I am grateful). I assumed this pain had only become exacerbated 
by the long hours writing essays to maintain my straight-A student status through high 
school, college, and graduate school. But soon after reading van der Kolk’s example of 
mindfully relating to the aches of one’s chest and shoulder, I took a break from writing 
this chapter to do some mindful breathing of my own in the shower. As the water 
massaged my aches, I began to observe and listen to my shoulder. As I breathed into it, I 
began to recall a painful childhood memory involving my shoulder’s strength to hold a 
closet door closed. Curious and still mindful of the water massaging my shoulder, I 
wondered if it had something to do with my preteen memories of my parent’s linen 
closet. I imitated the motion, tensed, and was suddenly transported to the darkness of my 
parent’s linen closet battling to hold the door closed against my younger brother’s 
kitchen-knife-wielding tantrums. I had been charged to care for him alone during that 
summer. Though I had told my parents then, even begging them to hide the kitchen 
knives, it was easier to deny the scene. My parents saved money and could rest easy in 
their parenting decisions rather than grip the reality that both their children may be 
struggling—struggles that would become increasingly obvious as the years progressed.  
It was only during the writing of this dissertation nearly twenty years later that my 
mother admitted that neither she nor my father had ever believed my cries and pleas for 
help that summer. Though my trauma experience is relatively minor considering, it lives 
on within my body. I know now that the pain in my shoulder is, at least in part, an 
embodied memory of my fear, shame, and alienation experienced in childhood and 
throughout my adolescence. The pain is as real, perhaps even more acute, than the pain 
that dwells in my reconstructed knee. A few years ago, I and a graduate colleague of 
mine were struck by an SUV speeding through an alleyway while riding our bicycles near 
campus. The SUV T-boned my right knee, the impact of which shattered my tibia, 
sprained my MCL, and sent me flying into the air. Thank heavenly Sophia I was wearing 
a helmet. My flight through the air was triggering to my colleague, who happened to be a 
veteran. He immediately went into a trained and habituated state of hypervigilance, 
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fighting to provide emergency care. “It was like you were hit by an IED,” he told me. It 
was nearly a week later that he discovered he too had sustained injuries. The collision 
broke several of his ribs. I required two surgeries and months of physical therapy to heal. 
He toughed it out—what can be done about a broken rib? I was adequately compensated 
for my pain and suffering after years of legal negotiation. He was not—neither by the car 
insurance company nor by the government that had used his body as an instrument and 
witness of war. This still bothers me, even after I insisted he accept a piece of my 
settlement. 
The daily pain in my shoulder is as or more acute than the aches that today visit 
my knee. The pain of traumatic memory is as real as the pain of violent collision. Van der 
Kolk concludes that bringing awareness to the organization of emotions, memory, and 
thoughts in the body “opens up the possibility of releasing sensations and impulses you 
once blocked in order to survive” (van der Kolk 2015, 211). And the possibilities of this 
release opens new possibilities for the present. We need more of this awareness because 
we need more possibilities. 
The ability to mindfully observe and tolerate the sensations of the body is a 
prerequisite to revisiting the traumas of the past in the second stage of trauma’s 
overcoming: the recollection and memorializing narrativization of trauma. The first stage 
prepares or re-grounds us in the present, preparing us to occupy the position of a narrator 
rather than a character trapped in the untold story of the past. Without this ability to be 
present with ourselves, we risk becoming retraumatized, triggering our habits of survival, 
and thus stalling the process of overcoming. If the present is too overwhelming, then 
revisiting the traumas of the past will only result in further trauma (van der Kolk 2015, 
211). This process of memorialization builds on the work of recollecting and integrating 
the sensations of our bodies in the first stage to begin acknowledging rather than denying 
past traumas, so we might begin “putting the traumatic event into its proper place in the 
overall arc of one’s life” (van der Kolk 2015, 224). The second stage works at a 
conscious and embodied understanding that the traumatic experience happened in the 
past and is not occurring now. The second stage works to tell the story of our trauma in 
order to transform and integrate the memory into the narrative of the survivor’s life 
(Herman 1992/1997/2015, 175). Herman with Yael Danieli offers that in many cases it is 
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helpful to recollect the narrative of our lives before the trauma as a reclamation of the 
survivor’s “earlier history in order to ‘re-create the flow’ of the patient’s life and restore a 
sense of continuity with the past” (Herman 1992/1997/2015, 176; see Danieli 1988). This 
helps survivors to provide a context for their trauma, understanding that the trauma does 
not define the entirety of their lives but was an experience contextualized against loving 
relationships, dreams, and values. The survivor might then begin to approach bearing 
witness to their trauma and begin discussing the trauma in terms of a fact of their lives 
among others, pulling together fragmented pieces of embodied memory into a narrative 
(Herman 1992/1997/2015, 177). 
Our conscious and embodied revisitation and recollection of past traumatic 
memories is not to be a gratuitous endeavor to make a pornography of terrorizing 
experiences for self and others. Instead, the main purpose is to become conscious of or 
“gain conscious control over unbidden re-experiences or re-enactments” that continue to 
debilitate survivors in the present (van der Kolk 1989, 411). Feeling secure in one’s own 
body through secure relations to others, such as loved ones or therapists, as well as 
mindfulness practices prepares an individual to “explore their life experiences and to 
interrupt the inner or social isolation that keeps them stuck in repetitive patterns” (van der 
Kolk 1989, 411). In contrast to developing children, traumatized adults have the 
developmental capacity to withstand such a process and “can learn to protect themselves 
and make conscious choices about not engaging in relationships or behaviors that are 
harmful” (van der Kolk 1989, 411). Through recollection of embodied sensations and 
past memories, survivors become strong enough to bear witness to their past memories 
and the pieces of themselves that remain terrorized by them. Together, the conscious 
‘parent’ might attune to, mourn with, and care for the ‘child’ parts of the traumatized self 
that have long been fragmented, isolated, and abandoned by denial. Stage one builds this 
strength and stage two uses it to bear witness to our inner ‘child,’ bringing them from a 
place of abandonment ‘out’ of time and ‘into’ the narrative arc of the individual’s life. To 
re-humanize the self. 
We can begin to bear conscious witness to pieces of ourselves whose present, 
hyper-reactive survival mode so often mutinies and sabotages the possibilities of the 
present self. We begin to be able to identify the parts of ourselves that remain affected by 
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past traumas, the parts of ourselves persisting in survival mode erecting defensive 
barriers. We might recognize the scared inner child, the abandoned infant, the frightened 
and unheard preteen, as well as the more mature adult victim within ourselves (cf. van 
der Kolk 2015, 286). Van der Kolk suggests that the next step is to “simply ask each 
protective part as it emerges to ‘stand back’ temporarily so that we can see what it is 
protecting,” to put the emotions of survival mode “on hold” and instead make way for 
curious and “mindful self-observation” (van der Kolk 2015, 286). From the stability of 
this self-observation we can engage in “inner dialogues” with each parts of the self, 
learning from ourselves how best to take care of ourselves. 
The second stage of trauma undertakes the task of recollecting traumatic memory 
to begin to identify and dialogue with pieces of the fragmented self, integrating the parts 
of ourselves into the narrative of our lives. We recognize that the pieces are still with us, 
they are part of our story, but that their fears are rooted in events that are now past. Of 
course, we can and must invite them into dialogue regarding decisions and actions in the 
present—after all, it is their wisdom that helped us to survive this far (Stern 2010, 287). 
However, the important difference in the constant process of overcoming is that these 
parts inform us through communicative inner dialogue rather than through hijacking our 
systems into fight-flight-or-freeze.  
The third stage of trauma’s overcoming works to reconnect the self with others in 
present ordinary life towards building a beautiful future. For Brison, “[i]t is not sufficient 
for mastering the trauma to construct a narrative of it: One must (physically, publicly) say 
or write (or paint or film) the narrative, and others must see or hear it, in order for one’s 
survival as an autonomous self to be complete” (Brison 1997, 29-30). Brison emphasizes 
that “Saying something about a traumatic memory does something to it” (Brison 1997, 
25). Sharing one’s trauma story with others transforms an individual’s own relation to 
their trauma history. Survivors are able to communally acknowledge the reality of the 
traumas against an environment that would rather they deny or forget the trauma and 
move on with their lives. 
But just as we can be undone by others in traumatic betrayal, so can and must we 
be “created and sustained by others.” We are thus dependent upon and limited by “the 
extent of their ability and willingness to listen” (Brison 1997, 29-30). Stage three 
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therefore entails an element of risk. We expose ourselves to the possibility that those 
whom we are sharing our experiences may not listen to us, may not believe, and may not 
support us. An extraordinary amount of courage is thus required. However, this is a risk 
that must be taken continuously in the process of overcoming. Our human ability to 
communicate our inner experiences with others, to bring ourselves into the world and 
find ourselves recognized there, to become friends with others is the “opposite of being 
traumatized” (van der Kolk 2015, 237). It is the opposite of denial. It is freedom.  
In connecting to empathetic others, a traumatized individual grows their capacity 
to be empathetic to others and to their own self, to empathetically be with one’s own 
experience of trauma. This is not the same as “merely being in the presence of others,” 
but rather the “critical issue is reciprocity: being truly heard and seen by the people 
around us, feeling that we are held in someone else’s mind and heart. […] No doctor can 
write a prescription for friendship and love: these are complex and hard-earned 
capacities” (van der Kolk 2015, 81). Reconnection to others is not limited to an unceasing 
retelling of stories.29 Reconnection with others must also be a kind of creation or 
becoming of ourselves and our communities—a space to realize with others the extent to 
one’s own agency in concert with others. Through the encouragement of others in 
activities such as music, athletics, or theater30 we may develop resiliency and learn that 
we could and can “be better than we thought possible” (van der Kolk 2015, 357). We 
learn that we become who we are by what we do. That it is possible to be released from 
our present misery and fully live life if we decide to concretely strive for it through hours 
of practice alone and with others.  
Risking ourselves in communicating fully to and interacting with other human 
beings in the world and finding ourselves reciprocally both heard and seen is a 
precondition for freedom. For philosopher Simone de Beauvoir, freedom is a reciprocal 
relationship that might include the action of vengeance which “bites into the world” 
                                               
29 The sharing of trauma stories does “lessen the isolation of trauma” and builds capacities for empathy and 
understanding but van der Kolk also notes that stories “can also provide people with a target to blame” and 
“obscure a more important issue, namely, that trauma radically changes people” (van der Kolk 2015, 239). 
 
30 Van der Kolk speaks at length of the power of theater for treating trauma, offering that they provide 
opportunity for survivors to confront rather than hide from the painful realities of life and transform them 
symbolically “through communal action” (van der Kolk 2015, 337). 
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(Beauvoir 2004, 254). But also, and perhaps more importantly, freedom might be realized 
through the reciprocal relationship of friendship and generosity (Beauvoir 2004, 254). 
Indeed, Beauvoir writes that friendship and generosity “accomplish this recognition of 
freedoms concretely” and are our species’ “highest accomplishment” (Beauvoir 2010, 
159-160). By this she means that through our friends we recognize one another’s inner 
human subjectivity beyond and with our animalian status as objects in the world: we 
humanize one another. I return to further discuss this dependency and the risk involved in 
this social process of overcoming with Beauvoir’s philosophy in chapter IV. Put into 
political terms, the third stage offers the opportunity of solidarity building. Through the 
constant process of overcoming, we give birth to a self that is capable of attuning to itself 
as well as attuning to others. We are able to put our own feelings into words to share with 
others as well as pick up and provide subtle embodied emotional cues with activated 
mirror neurons. This enables us to risk ourselves in relations of reciprocity and care 
through the sharing of stories and development of a common language to name 
experiences. And by this, we create and sustain, or become, our best selves and our best 
communities. 
 As we have discussed, the goal of overcoming is a constant process of 
recollection and association: recollection and re-association of our embodied capabilities, 
recollection of our fragmented self into a re-associated narrative, and the recollection of 
our narratives to and re-association with others (cf. van der Kolk 2015, 182-183). It is a 
process of bringing what was ‘out’ of time ‘in’ to time, a process of bringing what was 
alienated into communion, a process of becoming human. It is the constant process of 
birthing a ‘parent’ self, a self-spirit or self-daimon if you will, to accompany the 
traumatized pieces of ourselves into the life after the death of trauma. It is a continuous 
repetition of the self in the aftermath of trauma. This is a self that is able to be with and 
attuned to past traumas, so they do not reign over the present, so that we might choose to 
repeat ourselves or become who we are freely rather than be captured in the stale misery 
of the repetitions of denial.  
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Conclusion 
The repetitions of denial entrap individuals and society into a fragmented state of 
existence leaving part of subjectivity ‘out’ of time while desperately attempting to march 
forward ‘in’ linear time towards the future. But we carry our past traumas with us no 
matter how urgently we attempt to forget them. Denial of past traumas exacerbates this 
fragmenting alienation, rendering it difficult to see or love oneself or others, and this only 
ensures the repetition of traumatic experience or infliction. Trauma shamefully de-
humanizes individuals, disrupting the narrative of their lives leaving a part ‘out’ and a 
part ‘in’ time. And I have suggested that racialized patriarchy seizes on the fragmentation 
that trauma and its denial establish and perpetuate, projecting it into a socio-political 
ontology placing colonized peoples ‘out’ of time and constructing ‘white men and 
women’ as the lead protagonists ‘in’ the narrative arc of human history (Burke 2019; 
Lugones 2007; Mignolo 2002 and 2011). The repetition of denial is a fragmented and 
warped temporality that reduces freedom into a dull and terrifying reliving of the past in 
the present. This is an evil in and of its self (Beauvoir 2010). And this evil of denial is the 
prime motor of racialized patriarchy.  
 We have discussed in detail both the psychological mechanism of the evil of 
denial as well as examined its operation upholding the benefactors of racialized 
patriarchy in the case example of the University of Oregon’s response to the group sexual 
assault of Jane Doe by three of the institution’s Nike-sponsored basketball players. Jane 
Doe was not recognized as a human whose life-narrative had been ruptured, feeding the 
racialized ontology that ‘black females’ are always already ‘out’ of time as representative 
of the always already violated primitive human female. Instead, her assault was made 
into a tragic, racialized pornography. Meanwhile, her assailants were not recognized as 
humans who had committed wrongdoing and were capable of acting otherwise, feeding 
the racialized ontology that ‘black males’ are always already ‘out’ of time as 
representative of the always already sexually aggressive primitive human male. And such 
denials only serve to project, shield, and perpetuate the violence of white men (and their 
supporters), thereby upholding their material and ontological interests. In the particular 
case of Jane Doe, the denials of the self-proclaimed ‘University of Nike’ shielded the 
violence and upheld the material and ontological interests of, namely, Phil Knight and the 
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Nike corporation as well as Coach Dana Altman, President Michael Schill, Counseling 
Director Shelly Kerr, and other highly paid administrators such as Brad Shelton. Despite 
the prevention and response efforts that have been installed since (by the work of earnest 
feminist, anti-racist activists along with administrators concerned about public relations 
and enrollment), the denials of racialized patriarchy continue to infect the social fabric of 
academia.  
 Just one year after the University of Oregon’s settlement with Jane Doe, the 
university was accused of yet another rape cover-up involving yet another high-profile 
black athlete. As Kenny Jacoby reports, the university violated the very procedures and 
infrastructure put in place in the aftermath of Jane Doe, demonstrating the precarity of 
such procedures in an institutional environment of denial (see Jacoby 21 June 2017; 
Jacoby 25 Oct. 2017; and Jacoby 7 Dec. 2017). The repetitions of denial render the 
infliction of trauma inevitable. And this is the motor maintaining the ontology of 
racialized patriarchy upon which the ‘University of Nike’ is firmly founded. 
Jane Doe accurately identified that the culture of the University of Oregon and its 
athletic department prioritizes the value of winning (and Phil Knight’s billion-dollar 
global industry dependent upon it) over the safety and flourishing of students and this 
continues to thrive at the University of Oregon and elsewhere. Which is to say that the 
many ‘University of Nike’ campuses across the nation prioritize the patriarchal, 
dominating values of ‘philonike’ over the value of ‘philosophy’ in the academy. In this 
chapter, I have discussed the manner in which the temporality of denial is a primary 
motor to the dominating values of ‘philonike’ in racialized patriarchy. I have also 
discussed the temporality of the process of trauma’s overcoming, suggesting that it is a 
crucial part of solidarity building to overcome the deep sedimentation of racialized 
patriarchy in our social institutions and individual relationships. I continue this discussion 
in my discussion of Plato and Beauvoir respectively in the next two chapters.  
In chapter III, I suggest that the insight offered herein on the operation of denial in 
current racialized systems of patriarchy and the process of its overcoming was offered by 
Plato millennia ago. Lost through history to the patriarchal rebuttal of Aristotle and 
subsequent masculine bias in scholarship and translation, I trace Plato’s criticism of the 
operation of denial to philonikian values of dominating masculinity that perpetrated the 
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traumas of the Peloponnesian War that ultimately brought democratic Athens to its ruin. I 
demonstrate this through an explication of several oft-neglected dialogues. I then offer 
my interpretation of Plato’s philosophy of overcoming through a new reading of 
Symposium and Republic. Most feminist discussions of Plato focus on these two 
dialogues, particularly the explicit inclusion of the female guardians in Book V of 
Republic. Without becoming too bogged down in these discussions of identity so as to 
thwart my focus on denial as a mechanism of patriarchy and its overcoming, I accept with 
other feminists and in light of the critique of masculinity I interpret in his works that 
Plato included females within his understanding of the human. Women, too, suffer(ed) 
trauma and are negatively affected by its denial. And women, too, are capable of the 
human process of overcoming trauma through recollection and rebirth in pursuit of the 
good. (In fact, as is in suggested by the birthing, midwifing, as well as hunting 
metaphors, women may have more epistemological insight or even wisdom in this 
regard...) Interpreting the tripartite soul of Republic in light of our discussion of the 
neurobiology of trauma, women and men are both capable of becoming courageous 
warriors capable of bringing the kingly (or queenly!), overseeing and narrative-giving 
rational prefrontal cortex in caring, loving relation with the emotional limbic system. But 
my explication goes on to particularly focus on Diotima’s speech in Symposium and the 
‘Myth of Er’ of Republic. There, I find the constant process of overcoming trauma and its 
denial as recollection and rebirth clearly articulated. This process is a ‘love of wisdom,’ a 
philosophy, that is aimed at overcoming the denials central to the ancient patriarchal 
‘love of victory,’ philonike. We would do well to return to this ancient foundation of the 
philosophic values of academy today. 
In chapter IV, I discuss Simone de Beauvoir’s own feminist existentialist 
articulation of denial, patriarchy, and the temporal becoming of human freedom. 
Arguably the proverbial mother of the contemporary feminist movement, central to 
Beauvoir’s philosophy is the idea that one must first find oneself before one is able to 
forget in becoming who one is. This is another way of saying that one must recollect and 
reground oneself before one can truly set the past aside to realize the new possibilities of 
the present. One might consider that the temporality of overcoming offers a new way of 
‘forgetting’ past traumas beyond the forgetting of denial. With Beauvoir, I navigate the 
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important distinction between the forgetting of denial and the forgetting of overcoming. 
The process of overcoming enables us to ‘forget’ or hold at bay the full force of past 
traumas in the present to hold open the possibilities available in the present toward a 
better future.  
Three survivors speak to the importance of the process of recollecting past 
memories and sensations to forget them in the present. Peter commented that “he’d spent 
his adulthood trying to let go of his past, and he remarked how ironic it was that he had to 
get closer to it in order to let it go” (van der Kolk 2015, 297). One survivor, Nancy, 
offered that the process of recollecting her embodied sensations and giving birth to an 
integrated self has freed her from the shackles of her past and allows her to live freely in 
the present. She writes, “[t]his combination of core strengthening—psychological, social, 
and physical—created a sense of personal safety and mastery, relegating my memories to 
the distant past, allowing the present and future to emerge” (van der Kolk 2015, 200-
201). And Jessica Stern writes that when, through her persistence, she and her father were 
finally able to freely talk about her and her sister’s rape as well as the premature death of 
her mother it felt like “the end of an age. The end of an age of denial. My feet can finally 
settle, safely now on the ground” (Stern 2010, 279).  
Contrary to the forgetting of denial, the forgetting of overcoming acknowledges 
and recollects past traumas. And without this acknowledgement of past trauma and 
reciprocal restitution, all of our individual, communal, and institutional relationships will 
remain poisoned by denial. And this ensures the perpetuation of racialized patriarchy. If 
anyone’s individual or social goal is to truly ‘forget’ past traumas, they would do better to 
remember them. New meanings become possible and created, replacing meanings lost or 
challenged in the traumatic experience: new meanings of trust, autonomy, competence, 
identity and intimacy (Herman 1992/1997/2015, 196). The repetitions of overcoming, the 
constant process of recollecting and associating, opens the present to new, life-sustaining 
and life-fulfilling visions of the good life.  
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CHAPTER III 
THE ANCIENT HUNTING GROUND: 
INTERPRETING PLATO’S CRITIQUE OF THE DENIALS OF NIKE-LOVING 
MANLINESS AND HIS PHILOSOPHY OF COURAGEOUS HUMAN 
OVERCOMING  
 
Our bodies are the texts that carry the memories and therefore remembering is no less 
than reincarnation. 
—Katie Cannon (quoted in van der Kolk 2015) 
 
Introduction 
Academia is a hunting ground. And it has been conceptualized as such since the 
ancient philosopher Plato established his own Academy in the early fourth century BC. 
But as I suggest here and have discussed in the previous chapter, the sexually violent 
situation on contemporary college campuses as revealed by aptly titled documentaries, 
such as The Hunting Ground (Dick and Ziering 2015), and recent feminist philosophies, 
such as Hunting Girls (Oliver 2016), is far from the vision of academic hunting the 
ancient philosopher likely had in mind. In contemporary times, the sexual harassment of 
(mostly) female undergraduate students, graduate students, faculty, and staff is rampant 
within (and without) their labor in the academy. The sexual predation of young, female 
first-year students is so prevalent in their first six weeks on campus that feminists and 
administrators refer to the vulnerable period as the ‘red zone.’  
As we’ve previously discussed, sexual assaults also tend to concentrate at 
fraternity parties, though not exclusively. Sexual assaults also spike by at least 41 percent 
during major men’s football and basketball game weekends and play-off tournaments 
(Lindo, Siminski, and Swensen 2015). Survivors are often met with institutional betrayals 
and denials of their experience. And administrators often permit accused players to 
participate in highly anticipated and financially lucrative games and play-off 
tournaments. We’ve also discussed that, due to the historical, material, and social 
circumstances of contemporary racialized patriarchy, these high-profile players are often 
black men. Because of this, the visibility of campus perpetration often has a black-face 
(Luther 2016), which further reifies the ontology of racialized patriarchy that vilifies 
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black men. This only serves to shield the violence of white men, who continue to host 
fraternity parties, maintain their jobs as tenured professors, and earn profits from 
neocolonial business empires. 
But Plato’s Academy was not to be a zone of sexual danger in which men are the 
hunters and women the hunted. Nor was it to be a revenue-generating and debt-producing 
workplace for job-training and sports spectacle balanced on the undercompensated 
intellectual labor of (mostly white and increasingly adjunct) instructors and the non-paid 
or underpaid bodies of (mostly black or brown) athletes and sweatshop laborers. Nor, 
still, was it to be an ivory tower of elite intellectuals divorced from the concerns of the 
common people.  
It was likely something more akin to the alternative Kelly Oliver proposes at the 
end of her critical account of today’s ‘hunting’ and ‘hunted’ girls (Oliver 2016). 
Harmonizing with much of our discussion in the previous chapter, in her book Oliver 
clearly argues against contemporary administrative practices of denial suggesting that we 
must instead “open up rather than close down discussions of rape culture” (Oliver 2016, 
156). She also proposes a definition of consent that “means being sensitive to each other, 
sensing and perceiving the agreement of the other” (Oliver 2016, 157). That is, consent is 
kind of voluntary, free engagement that opens rather than encroaches upon time and 
space between subjectivities in their common creation of a world together, or what 
feminist philosopher Bonnie Mann calls “flirtation” as opposed to “creeping” (Mann 
2012). I hope to contribute to these contemporary feminist accounts by suggesting that 
similar ideas might be found in the ancient, genealogical father of the Academy through a 
new feminist approach to interpreting Plato’s dialogues. I suspect my personal hope is 
that by demonstrating roots of the alternative currently being proposed by feminist 
philosophers within the ‘founding father’ of the Academy may prove, if not narrowly 
helpful to feminist efforts in persuading current academic administrators and 
traditionalists, more broadly useful to our ongoing battles for justice. 
I think Plato sought in his Academy, if not in his philosophy, a similar alternative 
to the ‘hunting’ of warring patriarchal society as that proposed by feminists such as 
Oliver. He and his Socrates, too, were on the critical hunt for and of newer, better 
Artemis figures (Oliver 2016, 163; see Republic Book I’s setting at the new Athenian 
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festival of the Thracian Artemis figure, Bendis). Rather than being governed by Nike’s 
love of victorious domination (philonikia, φιλονικία), Plato’s thought is governed by 
philosophy’s love of wisdom (philosophia, φιλοσοφία). His historical Academy was 
located in the open air of a simple garden, rather than in an expensive stadium or hall, 
where men and women joined together by their voluntary desire to pursue the good 
(Townsend 2017). Indeed, at least two women attended his academy, Axiotheia of Phlius 
and Lastheneia of Mantinea (Lynch 1972, 92-93; Reeve 2001). Rather than hunting each 
other, men and women were to freely hunt together for their own best selves. It’s possible 
and even likely that in addition to discursive intercourse that these men and women had 
various erotic sexual relations with one another. But such sexual intercourse was to be 
commonly and freely pursued in a loving search for wisdom rather than victorious sexual 
conquest or domination. More particularly, the hunt for the good consisted of individuals 
collectively and constantly creating new knowledge and meaning through the recollection 
of memory so as to give birth in beauty to eudaimonia (εὐδαιµονία), or one’s own good 
spirit. It was a nursery for hunting for and giving birth to, or becoming, good as an 
individual and a community. This, I think, was his vision of philosophy and its purpose. 
A vision that he fought hard to bring into fruition. 
Men and women did not attend Plato’s Academy to earn ‘degrees,’ certainly not 
degrees necessary for future-earnings. Money-making is not the motivation of the ancient 
Academy. Nor did attendees pay tuition or ‘invest in their future.’ Attendance was a free, 
voluntary pursuit. In fact, the Academy was funded by an endowment from a wealthy 
man, Anniceris, who had freed Plato from a temporary period of enslavement.1 On the 
view assumed here, the motivation to attend and participate in the ancient Academy was 
not monetary nor glorious victory-seeking but rather a desire to become better human 
beings. And when the dialogues are situated according to their dramatic dating within the 
timeline of ancient Greek history, we can begin to understand that the purpose of the 
Academy may have been to give space to individuals to form a community rethinking the 
violent norms of masculinity and its denials in the aftermath of the Peloponnesian War. 
                                                        
1 Roughly fifteen years after the death of Socrates, Plato was in fact sold into slavery by the tyrant 
Dionysus I for his attempts at tutoring the tyrant’s son, Dion, and the man who freed him, Anniceris, 
financed the founding of the Academy with an endowment, which Plato ensured would support the 
institution past his own death (Nails 2002, 247-250). 
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To say that Plato directly discusses the issue of psychological trauma in the direct 
manner attempted by some of today’s psychologists, neuroscientists, and decolonial and 
feminist thinkers would be misleading. What I suggest, however, is that by attending to 
the development of the discussion of the virtue of ‘andreia’ (ἀνδρεία) as it is dramatically 
and historically situated reveals that Plato, in his ironies (cf. Kofman 1998; and 
Kierkegaard 1989), offers a critique of ancient norms of masculinity that circles around 
trauma’s denial and overcoming. When traditional scholarship does focus on andreia, the 
focus is on individual acts of ‘courage’ narrowly in response to an individual’s 
experience of fear or terror.2 Most interpretations and translations of Plato fail to 
adequately translate the gendered connotations of this term. In his analysis of the Laches, 
for example, Gregory Vlastos simply translates the term as “courage” (Vlastos 1994, 
109). This leaves him to claim that the lead question of the dialogue is “What is 
courage?” However, while the word ‘andreia’ carried connotations of ‘courage,’ it more 
specifically meant ‘courageous manliness’ or, simply, ‘manliness.’ The word also 
distinguished rational human ‘men’ from their mere animal biology (anthropos, 
ἄνθρωπος). Failing to hold onto this ambiguity in interpretation has allowed interpreters 
to ignore the central discussion of gender in Plato’s works, namely, the central criticism 
of ‘manliness.’ For example, the Laches dialogue is not simply asking the question “what 
is courage?” but instead “what is manliness?” How does one become a man? And does 
becoming ‘manly’ conform with the Good? That is, is it possible to become a ‘good 
man’? And what would that mean? 
                                                        
2 See Jason Baehr, The Inquiring Mind: On Intellectual Virtues and Virtue Epistemology, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001; Michelle Brady, “The Fearlessness of Courage,” The Southern Journal of 
Philosophy, 43.2 (June 2005): 198-211; W. Scott Cleveland, “The Emotions of Courageous Activity,” Res 
Philosophica 92.4 (Oct. 2015): 855-882; Philippa Foot, Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral 
Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978; Robert Roberts, “Will Power and the Virtues,” 
Philosophical Review, 93.2 (Apr. 1984): 227-247; and Nancy Sherman, Stoic Warriors: The Ancient 
Philosophy Behind the Military Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. Even those important 
contributions who helpfully acknowledge and seek to work with the ambiguities in the translation of 
ἀνδρεία leave Plato’s critique of gender, especially in relation to trauma betrayal, rather underdeveloped. 
See Jill Gordon, Plato’s Erotic World: From Cosmic Origins to Human Death, New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012; Angela Hobbs, Plato and the Hero: Courage, Manliness and the Impersonal Good, 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000; Linda Rabieh, Plato and the Virtue of Courage, Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006; and Walter T. Schmid, On Manly Courage: A Study of Plato’s 
Laches, Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1992. 
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I see these questions pondered throughout Plato’s dialogues. In this chapter, I 
track Plato’s own tracing of the war-veteran Socrates’ lifelong pursuit of the meaning of 
andreia during and in the aftermath the Peloponnesian War. In many ways, this traces 
Socrates’ movement from victory-loving ‘manliness’ (or philonikian andreia) and its 
traumatic cost towards the so-called ‘manliness’ of loving wisdom. It is the strength and 
courage of this love, of this kind of ‘manliness,’ that Socrates seeks (Symposium 212b). It 
is a move from loving the Nike Man, such as the turbulent Achilles and Alcibiades III, to 
loving the Good Man, or Agathon (Ἀγαθόν; see Symposium), who is unified with the 
wise Sophia. That is, the discussion of ‘manliness’ in Plato is a movement towards a 
philosophy of becoming better human beings: a philosophy of the human. In some ways, 
I begin here to track Socrates’ personal ‘ladder of love,’ transitioning from a love of Nike 
towards a love of Sophia in our conceptions of what it means to become a ‘real man.’ 
I do this by tracing the inquiry into ‘andreia’ through six dialogues in order of 
their dramatic dating. I treat each dialogue within each own subsection. While this may 
risk appearing that I have given an episodic treatment to the dialogues rather than 
demonstrating the consistency and development of the discussion, I do it primarily for the 
ease of the reader’s reference (I have also included a timeline of the dramatic dating of 
the dialogues within ancient Greek history in the Appendix). The subsections are 
organized under two broader sections. In the first section, I trace the critique of 
philonikian ‘manliness’ and the emergence of a distinct alternative through four 
dialogues: Parmenides, Protagoras, Laches, and Cratylus. In the second section, I focus 
on the development of this philosophical alternative in Symposium and Republic.  
On my interpretation, the inquiry into ‘andreia’ begins in Parmenides, where the 
young Socrates is first encouraged by the ancient philosopher Parmenides not to give up 
his pursuit or ‘hunt’ of the meaning of ‘andreia’ due to difficulty or social ridicule, but 
rather to seek further understanding in dialogue on the topic with elites and commoners 
alike. In Protagoras, Socrates begins to distinguish the ‘andreia’ of his pursuit from 
philonikian war-loving conceptualizations alongside his then-lover, the notorious 
Alcibiades III whose own entitled ‘manliness’ would embroil Athens in unnecessary 
conflict (i.e., the Battle of Mantinea, the Sicilian Expedition) and, likely, poisoned his 
relationship with Socrates. It is around the time of the Protagoras dialogue that Socrates 
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would have had his first war experience in the Battle of Potidaea where his retreat 
rescued Alcibiades III. It is admitted in the dialogue that heroes of philonikian 
masculinity are not necessarily ‘good’ men, and Socrates is in pursuit of a conception of 
‘andreia’ that accords with the Good. This distinction is further pursued in the dialogue 
Laches, where Socrates begins to reveal jointly alongside his veteran comrade, the 
general Laches, that what we have thus-far termed the ‘temporality of denial’ is inherent 
philonikian understandings of ‘manliness’ in his dialogue with the general Nikias. 
Implied in this dialogue by the dramatic dating and historical figure of Nikias is the claim 
that misguided philonikian understandings of ‘manliness’ were responsible for, if not 
instituting the war, failing to end it and instead perpetuating it longer than necessary. The 
dialogue is set just prior to the brokering of the Peace of Nikias, which would prove a 
miserable failure. And despite the Cratylus being comprised nearly entirely of clever 
etymological word play, in this dialogue we find Socrates beginning to articulate that 
‘manliness’ may be a misnomer for the virtue he seeks, a virtue that engages in battle not 
for battle’s sake (i.e., philonikian andreia) but against the shackling aporias of the soul. 
Today, we might call these shackling aporias of the soul the traumatic memory, denial, 
or PTSD. 
Plato fleshes out the process of this courageous battle in the more familiar 
dialogues of Symposium and Republic. In Symposium, Plato offers his philosophy of 
overcoming through Socrates’ recitation of his own dialogue with the wise priestess 
“Diotima of Mantinea.” As I discuss, Diotima of Mantinea likely was not a historical 
figure but rather a play on words signaling Socrates’ self-reflective dialogue with the 
trauma of the Peloponnesian War, particularly the denial that led to the traumas of the 
Battle of Mantinea where Socrates’ comrade, the general Laches, lost his life. In this 
speech, Plato offers a philosophy of overcoming through a process of recollection and the 
re-birth of one’s own good-spirit (eudaimonia, εὐδαιµονία). The speech concludes with 
Socrates lauding the powerful strength and courageous ‘manliness’ of Love (Symposium 
212b). Beyond clearly stating that women were capable of this ‘manliness’ of love, 
Republic continues this philosophy of overcoming, articulating in the ‘Myth of Er’ and 
the concept of the ‘tripartite soul’ that love is the messenger between the individual 
rational and emotional pieces of our individual selves (which today we identify as the 
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prefrontal cortex and limbic system) as well as the messenger in our social relations with 
others. Plato offers a philosophy of the self that admits the ambiguity between the 
individual and social, that individuals are comprised by what they do in relation with 
others and that our social arrangements have a profound impact on individual selves. But 
further, Plato offers that love is a messenger that may help us travel through time, to help 
us bring our traumatized selves ‘in’ to time as we seek to live our best self in our journey 
in the afterlife of trauma. 
This interpretation reveals an ancient understanding of the centrality of denial to 
victory-loving manliness. Yet, his wisdom critical of patriarchal denial and its 
overcoming has largely been suppressed through millennia by masculine bias in 
academic interpretation. I suggest this began as early as Aristotle and maintained through 
the Medieval, Enlightenment, and contemporary eras, serving to reify patriarchy and its 
racialization in the modern Enlightenment era of European global conquest and today. In 
the next section, I briefly discuss the difficulty of interpretation before offering my 
discussion of the dialogues in the sections following. 
 
Interpreting Plato  
 Most interpretations of Plato and the ancients remain shrouded in the murky 
darkness of masculine bias that ignore or blatantly obscure any critical discussions of 
trauma and gender, specifically masculinity, found in the ancient texts (Townsend 2017; 
also, Bluestone 1994). You’d think they were afraid of something. Indeed, as Bluestone 
explains, fifteenth century translators of Plato declined to translate Republic out of fears 
that the discussion of women would be offensive to contemporary audiences (Bluestone 
1994, 110). That the values, customs, and purpose of contemporary institutions of higher 
education have been intentionally built upon such patriarchal interpretations by white 
men as either a mirror of Greece or a progression from it is cause for serious concern (see 
Winterer 2002; cf. Williams 1993; see also Syrett 2009). Contemporary feminist scholars 
have only begun to see through and cleanse away the dim, bewildering patriarchal 
obfuscation of Plato’s thought, revealing that we might do well to look in the mirror of 
his philosophy to see just how far the Academy has re-gressed from its original mission. 
 89 
Prior to the modern era of colonization, Europe generally operated on a neo-
Aristotelian Christian-Catholic philosophy of binary gender arrangements (see, for 
example, the medieval philosophy of Thomas Aquinas). This was largely based in an 
Aristotelian philosophy of sex, which, I believe, was a backlash to Plato’s critique. 
Aristotle’s was a deeply conservative philosophy that sought to maintain and justify the 
patriarchal practices of the ancient status quo (Elshtain 1981 and 1982).3 Daryl 
McGowan Tress argues that feminists have perhaps been too harsh on Aristotle, 
suggesting that his philosophy of generation might be resuscitated. Tress, however, 
admits that the feminist criticism is warranted (Tress 1996). While I do not spend much 
time discussing Aristotle’s philosophy of generation in this chapter, I instead focus on 
Plato’s. My main task in this chapter is to reveal Plato’s critique of the deadly denial 
inherent to philonikian ‘manliness’ and his philosophy of the constant process of 
becoming human in the aftermath of trauma, his philosophy of overcoming. Aristotle’s 
philosophy of generation, or becoming, vigorously sought to re-entrench the sex binary 
that Plato, on my interpretation, sought to undo. Socrates makes clear in Book V of 
Republic that the sexed roles of biological reproduction are not necessarily relevant to 
determining one’s social, political, or moral possibilities. That is, our human birthing in 
                                                        
3 Aristotle considered men to be the height of humanity or the natural final telos of the rational human 
animal. In human reproduction, men were thought to supply the form or “principle within itself of such a 
kind as to set up movements” of the human whereas women provided the “material alone” (Aristotle 
Generation of Animals and IV.766b8-25). Men imparted the ‘reason’ of the rational, human animal and 
women provided the ‘stuff’ of the human animal’s biology. Thus, women were considered the “first 
accident” or “first monstrosity” of the natural final telos of the rational human animal (Aristotle Generation 
of Animals IV.767b8-9). Women’s role according to Aristotle and neo-Aristotelian pre-colonial Europe was 
thereby constructed as a ‘naturally’ subservient and obedient one to the fully rational command of men.  
While he engaged in political affairs with other rational men, she was meant to carry out his will 
in her managerially dominant position over ‘natural slaves’ of the household (Aristotle Politics I and II). 
The Greek word for ‘household’ is ‘oikos’ (οἶκος), which is the etymological root of our contemporary 
‘economy.’ It is also the ontological root. Though there were slaves in ancient Greece and slave-like 
serfdom in medieval Europe, these ontological categories were not yet systematically racialized according 
to phenotype. Aristotle’s understanding of ‘natural slaves’ was instead an ableism tied to intellectual 
capacity: one was a natural slave for Aristotle if one had inhibited capacities for reason not because of the 
color of one’s skin, the texture of one’s hair, or one’s ethnic background (Aristotle was himself a foreigner 
of Athens). Aristotle pathologized the disruption of trauma into gendered and ableist identities, only 
allowing sufficiently ‘rational’ men to fully pursue a linear developmental arc of a human life. He marked 
the hysterical human inferiority of women by their physiological wombs (hystera, ὑστέρα), though his 
ableist system did not yet so easily physiologically mark the sub-rational therefore sub-human status of 
‘natural’ slaves.  
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the aftermath of trauma need not and ought not be sexed. Men, too, must give birth to 
themselves (see Symposium and Theaetetus). 
This hedges against criticisms such as Kathleen Cook’s, who defends Aristotle 
from feminist criticism with the claim that contemporary feminists are unfair to apply 
today’s standards to the ancients (Cook 1996, 66). However, I am claiming here that 
Aristotle’s problematic patriarchal philosophy was a reaction to and denial of Plato and 
Socrates’ historically-prior critique of ‘manliness.’ This is not to claim that Plato is a 
‘feminist’ by contemporary standards, an issue some contemporary scholars have debated 
(see Vlastos 1994 and Annas 1996). These debates typically center myopically on 
Republic V (cf. Annas 1996) or on the representations of women in the dialogues (cf. 
Levin 1996; Blair 20124). However, if we open our interpretation to the larger movement 
of ‘manliness’ throughout the dialogues, we discover something more in his discussion.  
 Hegemonic masculine interpretations tend to paint Plato as the misguidedly 
idealist proto-communist to his student, Aristotle, who is thought to have improved on his 
teacher’s shortcomings by offering an empiricist epistemology that took seriously the 
political and ethical importance of privacy and private-property. In fact, Aristotle likely 
attended the Academy for only a brief time and in Plato’s absence (Nails 2002, 248). 
Regardless, what Aristotle found there was likely upsetting enough to his masculine 
sensibilities to inspire him to react by establishing his own men’s-only school, the 
Lyceum, and eventually tutor the imperialist-to-be, Alexander the Great. At best, Plato 
and Aristotle are commonly held as representatives of two sides of a debate around which 
the ‘soul’ of the Western world turns. But the debate is not traditionally understood to be 
about gender.  
Arthur L. Herman is a good example of traditional, hegemonic interpretations. He 
depicts Plato’s allegory of the cave as representative of his “most fundamental idea: that 
man is destined by his creator to find a path from the dark cave of material existence to 
the light of a higher, purer, and more spiritual truth” and that wisdom is only achieved 
“when we rise above the merely human” (A. Herman 2013, ix-x). Aristotle, on the other 
hand, is depicted as dissenting by insisting “on a union between form and matter,” that 
                                                        
4 Blair, however, provides an excellent analysis of Plato’s philosophy of sex, especially in regard to the 
difficulty of Timaeus. 
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“[i]nstead of trying to rise above mundane reality, Aristotle believed the philosopher’s 
job was to explain how the world works, and how as human beings we can find our 
proper place in it. There is no cave: only a world made of things and facts” (A. Herman 
2013, ix-x). Such interpretations contribute to dangerous and misguided readings. From 
this, Aristotle is lauded as a hero of the concept of private property and the father of 
scientific empiricism. Meanwhile, Plato is understood as an ivory-tower elitist and proto-
Christian metaphysician, blatantly ignoring Socrates’ method of dialoguing with common 
people and ancient celebrities alike while misreading the theory of the forms. 
The hegemony of Aristotelian epistemology and political-economy has reigned in 
the biases of our contemporary patriarchal, scientific, and capitalist political age along 
with his suspicious reassertion of status quo heteronormative gender arrangements 
against Plato’s Republic (see Aristotle Politics Book I and II, especially; also, Generation 
of Animals I.20.729a9-11 and IV.1.766a20-30). This despite the fact that Aristotle’s 
physics have been thoroughly debunked by modern science. All the while, Plato’s 
imagery of the ladder of love in Symposium and the divided line in Republic respectfully 
bear uncanny resemblance to influential and widely-accepted contemporary 
psychological theories, such as such as Erik Erikson’s stages of psychological 
development and Kohlberg and Gilligan’s respective theories of moral development. Not 
to mention the importance of memory recollection in contemporary trauma theory, which 
we discussed in the prior chapter.  
What interpretations like Arthur Herman’s miss is that Plato’s cave is not simply 
the darkness of mere animal humanity, but the darkness of trauma with its shameful 
silence, its confusion, and the compounding shackles of betrayal and denial. What is 
poorly characterized as “ris[ing] above the merely human” is, under my reading, 
overcoming trauma humanely. The cave is the darkness of the ruptured aftermath of 
trauma from which the self must re-birthed, to overcome the shackles of trauma and live 
a good life. Those who have escaped return out of love for self and other to aid those who 
remain shackled retreat from trauma into a place of Beauty, or a safe space surrounded by 
supportive midwives of the soul, to give birth to themselves after the debilitating rupture 
to their life narrative. The method of this birth is dialoguing with others, and Socrates 
especially sought to dialogue with ordinary people as elites tend to be too concerned with 
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their own vanity to pursue the hunt honestly (Protagoras 353a-b); and, as Republic and 
Menexenus both intimate, he hunted for the truth with both men and women. He was 
interested in pursuing and aiding in the birth of the Good with whoever was willing. 
Careful, feminist attention to trauma and masculinity operating in the text reveals this 
understanding. 
Unfortunately, the reader will not approach the interpretation I offer through 
attention in the ancient Greek to the word ‘trauma’ alone. Plato uses the word ‘trauma’ 
only a handful of times throughout the dialogues.5 However, he also clouds the 
experience of trauma in the metaphors of a living death, the cave, and the need for rebirth 
in Beauty. Trauma and its denial is further signaled by Plato’s deliberate placement of the 
dialogues in the history of the Peloponnesian War. Instead of tracing the word ‘trauma’ 
in Plato, the reader is better off tracing the word ‘andreia’ (ἀνδρεία) in the ancient Greek 
alongside the historical dramatic setting of the dialogues. Such is my method. 
 Andreia was and remains a deeply politicized virtue. As I’ve briefly mentioned, it 
encapsulated a number of meanings in the Ancient Greek vernacular. Importantly, it 
signaled the coming of age, from boyhood into manhood. It was also utilized to signify 
the virtue of courage, long associated with male warriors, and was opposed to cowardly 
(deilos, δειλός) actions. Additionally, it distinguished men (andres, ἄνδρες) from women 
                                                        
5 Our contemporary word ‘trauma’ derives from the ancient Greek ‘τραῦµα’ (trauma), which means a 
‘wound’ or ‘hurt,’ the ‘damage’ to things (i.e., ships), or a ‘heavy blow’ or ‘defeat’ in war (Liddell-Scott-
Jones Greek-English Lexicon). It is hardship suffered in a kind of battle that was often assumed to be 
physical, but psychological trauma often accompanies physical trauma and, as contemporary neurological 
research demonstrates, psychologically trauma itself is a wounding of the physical and chemical structures 
of the brain affecting memory-retrieval and emotional-responses.  
However, Plato only utilizes the word ‘trauma’ a few times in his dialogues, notably in Books III 
and VIII of Republic. In Book III, when discussing the appropriate musical harmonies for the kallipolis, 
Socrates says to leave him the harmonies associated with trauma and also peaceful voluntary action (Rep. 
III.398b-399c; Grube translation). Later, Socrates makes clear that he thinks individuals should be able to 
seek and get help “for wounds [traumaton, τραυµάτων]” in comparison to those who “through idleness and 
the life-style we’ve described, one is full of gas and phlegm like a stagnant swamp;” he wants folks to be 
able to move forward with their lives rather than stagnate and are contented to watch life from the sidelines 
(Rep. III.405b-408b; cf. Laches’ Lysimachus and Melesias). Individuals who want to overcome trauma 
should be able to do so. But in Book VIII, Plato shows that even those who do wish to overcome trauma 
can be further traumatized or harmed by the undermining of their material circumstance by greedy 
oligarchs. He writes, “The money-makers, on the other hand, with their eyes on the ground, pretend not to 
see these people, and by lending money they disable [wound/traumatize τιτρώσκοντες] any of the 
remainder who resist, exact as interest many times the principal sum, and so create a considerable number 
of drones and beggars in the city (Rep. VIII.555e; Grube translation). Trauma here is not a physical wound 
in battle, but a wound of material insecurity. 
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(gunaikes, γυναῖκες) as well as rational humans (andres, ἄνδρες) from mere biological 
beings (anthropos, ἄνθρωπος). As has been unpacked through the recent history of 
feminist philosophy, ‘womanly’ behavior was and has been considered both cowardly 
and animalistically sub-human within this binaristic frame. It should be emphasized here 
that the ancient stereotypes of women differed from our own post-Victorian times: rather 
than being considered the more temperate and delicate easily victimized sex regarding 
sexuality attributed specifically to white women of the modern era, ancient women were 
considered far more intemperate, lustful, and sexually aggressive by means of their 
tempting allure in ancient times (Townsend 2017, 67-68, 77-78, and 189-190). In some 
ways, many ancient women were, by today’s standards, considered mere females rather 
than women.6 
  Andreia, therefore, was a slippery ancient signifier that enabled the elision of the 
meaning of courage, masculinity, temperance, rationality, and what it meant to be human. 
As I’ve stated, contemporary interpretations and English translations commonly and 
haphazardly translate andreia as ‘courage’ or ‘manliness,’ losing the movement of 
Plato’s critique of gender throughout the dialogues. This misses Socrates’ quest, begun in 
Parmenides, to understand whether the human animal (anthropos, ἄνθρωπος) has a form, 
that many call ‘manliness’ (andreia, ἀνδρεία), and whether that form is united with, or 
rather, is Good, Just, and Beautiful. Looking around war-torn Greece, it would be easy to 
conclude that ‘manliness’ is quite the opposite of the Good, Just, and Beautiful. Plato 
develops a conception of ‘andreia’ that moves from the love of Nike to the love of the 
Good Man, or Agathon, and his accompanying Sophia. This involves a philosophy of the 
human that includes women, that humanizes human females from and beyond their sexed 
roles in biological reproduction. If anything, Aristotle genders women establishing their 
role in the world of the human but only to re-shackle them into their inferior sexed 
position (see Politics I.2.1252a25-30, I.12.1259b10-1260a19-24, I.13.1259b35-37, 
II.3.1261b34-36, III.4.1277b20-23, VIII.4.1338b30; see also Generation of Animals, 
I.20.729a9-11 and IV.1.766a20-30). 
                                                        
6 This may help to contextualize the puzzling claims made in Timaeus. Human women, considered mere 
sexualized females, have a longer journey ahead of them than do men in becoming human. This is not due 
to inherent defects of being a woman, but rather a defect of ancient social, political, and ontological 
arrangements. Cf. Blair 2012. 
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 Traditional masculine interpretations often read Plato to discover a systematic 
logic at work, as might be appropriate for reading Aristotle. However, as Mary Townsend 
writes, “Plato’s work is not a system but a cosmos, whose competing accounts ultimately 
place the burden and the hope of dialectic on the part of the individual reader” 
(Townsend 2017, xii). Plato does not tell or teach the overcoming of trauma, but instead 
invites or provokes his reader into undertaking their own journey deciphering and 
creating meaning from the text relevant to their own personal journey of becoming 
human. Indeed, interpretations of Plato often say more about the particular interpreter 
than the text itself (and things don’t look very good for Aristotle, from my vantage point).  
Townsend continues to explain that the honest reader of Plato must immerse 
themselves into the ancient world, historical and fictional, and appreciate the three-
dimensionality of his poetics and characters. Akin to Lin-Manuel Miranda’s Hamilton, 
nearly all the characters and participants in Plato’s dialogues were historical figures. 
Under my interpretation, even the constructed character Diotima of Mantinea was created 
as a reference to the 418BC Athenian defeat at the Battle of Mantinea in which Socrates’ 
comrade in arms and philosophical argument, the general Laches, lost his life. As 
Townsend explains: 
It need hardly be said that attention must be paid to the logic of the arguments; but 
no less attention can be given to the fact that all the arguments come from the 
mouths of as three-dimensional characters as any writer for the stage has ever 
produced, themselves in turn carefully placed within the absolute specificity 
within the historical, political, and religious situations of ancient Athens and the 
Greek world. (Townsend 2017, xii)  
 
I concur with Townsend and have done my best to immerse myself in the war-torn world 
of ancient Greece and Plato’s deliberate placement of his dialogues and choice of 
characters within it: the battles, armistices, and diplomatic peace efforts; the plagues; the 
familial and pedagogical lineage, status, character, decisions, and motivations of 
important political figures including the only historical woman in the dialogues, Aspasia 
of Miletus (Menexenus), the tragic generals Laches and Nikias, and the philosophers 
Parmenides, Hermogenes, Cratylus, and Polemarchus in addition to Socrates; gods and 
goddesses, particularly the virgin Artemis, the Thracian and sexual Bendis, and the Moira 
(Fates) as each are associated with the primary Socratic themes of hunting and 
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midwifery; the anti-Aspasia sentiments and politics of peace in the comedies of 
Aristophanes; controversies and scandals, such as the accusations against Alcibiades III 
and other Socratics for sacrilegiously destroying the Hermes statues and practicing the 
Eleusinian Mysteries prior to the Sicilian Expedition; and political turmoil over gender, 
marriage, immigration, and citizenship. Plato is known for his philosophy of recollection, 
but few scholarly studies have grounded his philosophy in the actual, historical, traumatic 
memories he thought so important to recollect. Our understanding of Plato’s philosophy 
remains muddled in abstraction, when in fact it is tethered to the traumas of the then-
recent history of ancient Athens.  
In Appendix I, I have organized a historical timeline of the dramatic dates of 
Plato’s dialogues within the history of the war-torn ancient Greek world from the 
beginning of Athenian democracy ~510/507BC to Plato’s death. The process of 
organizing this timeline has greatly informed my reading of Plato; in building it, I relied 
on the narrative of Thucydides along with the historical scholarship of G.E.M. de Ste. 
Croix (1972) and Madeleine Henry (1997) as well as Debra Nails’ important work 
situating the dramatic actions of Plato’s dialogues within their historical setting. There 
may be too little detail to some moments and all too much detail for others, but the 
purpose is to highlight significant events that have informed my reading of Plato’s 
critique of masculinity in the direction of a philosophy of overcoming trauma. I focus on 
the journey of the historical and fictionalized character Socrates to discover the meaning 
of ‘manly courage’ from his twenties through his war experiences into his old age in the 
midst of Athens’ tremendous military decline through dialoguing with common and elite 
Athenians.  
I trace this journey chronologically over the next two sections. There are other 
important Platonic dialogues to include into this discussion beyond the six I have chosen. 
A future project might provide a more comprehensive reading. However, I hope and 
believe that what I provide below offers an adequate glimpse of Plato’s long-neglected 
discussion of trauma and masculinity relevant to the contemporary reader interested in 
building a better, more just world beyond patriarchy’s love of Nike.   
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The Hunt for ‘Manliness’ 
 In this section, I trace Socrates’ hunt for ‘manliness’ (andreia, ἀνδρεία) 
particularly his query of whether there is a form of ‘manliness’ united with the Good, the 
Just, and the Beautiful. The hunt begins in his twenties with the Parmenides. From there, 
I track the continuation of his hunt through Protagoras, Laches, and Cratylus, which each 
correspond in their dramatic dating to periods relevant to Socrates’ three war-combat 
experiences, Potidaea, Delium, and Amphipolis respectively. In the ancient world, manly 
courage was associated with war combat, and, indeed, Socrates’ battlefield performances 
are often referred to throughout the dialogues as credibility for Socrates’ own manly 
courage (Laches 181a-b and 188c-189b; Symposium 219e-220a). In fact, the awesome 
destructive power of philonikian manliness in war is precisely the cause for concern over 
the question: if manly courage brings so much harm and trauma, as war makes painful 
evident, can it possibly be good? Is there alternative to this philonikian manliness that is 
instead a lover of wisdom? Is there a philosophical manliness? 
 
Parmenides: Plato’s Socrates begins this journey in the year 450 at the age of twenty with 
the then-well-established foreign philosopher, Parmenides, and his partner, Zeno, both of 
Elea. The discussion takes place towards the end of the Persian and First Peloponnesian 
Wars. While Socrates would have been of age for military service at this time, it is 
unlikely he served in these wars as they had been dwindling towards a fifteen-year period 
of peace. His earliest recorded military experience would come nearly twenty years later 
at the siege of Potidaea. In the dialogue, Socrates responds to a treatise Zeno has written 
and read aloud for his audience. The treatise provides Zeno’s argument that ‘being is not 
many,’ which he explains, upon Socrates’ objections, is both distinct from yet supportive 
of Parmenides’ famous philosophy that ‘being is one.’ Zeno’s argument is meant to be a 
rebuttal defending Parmenides’ philosophy from his critics, such as Heraclitus and his 
followers. Zeno wrote the treatise when he was young and himself characterizes his 
motivation for writing the treatise as “a youth’s love of victory [philonikias, φιλονικίας]” 
rather than “an old man’s love of honor [philotimas, φιλοτιµίας]” (Parmenides 128e; my 
translation). Such begins the first lesson in the dangers of philonikian motivations. 
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 While Zeno argues that Socrates has not quite “entirely perceived the truth of my 
writing,” he characterizes Socrates as “a Spartan female hunting puppy [Lakainai 
skulakes, Λάκαιναι σκύλακες; feminine construction]” because of his ability to 
“competently run after and track [ichneueis, ἰχνεύεις; ‘to track’ or ‘hunt after’] the 
meaning [ta lechthanta, τὰ λεχθέντα]” (Parmenides 128b-c). This is the earliest 
association of hunting, particularly hunting dogs, with the practice of philosophy. Plato 
returns to the metaphor repeatedly, especially in Republic. Indeed, it is in Parmenides 
that Socrates receives a lesson, of sorts, into how to be a hunter of the good. 
Socrates accuses Parmenides and Zeno of focusing only on visible things, not on 
the intelligible forms (Parmenides 129a-e). Upon questioning by Parmenides, the young 
Socrates admits that he has a theory of the forms (the Just, the Beautiful, and the Good), 
but admits that he remains in doubt about whether there is a ‘form’ of the human being 
(anthropou, ἀνθρώπου) and whether this should be discussed in the same manner as the 
Just, the Beautiful and the Good (Parmenides, 130b-c). Though not explicitly expressed 
in this dialogue, the difficulty with defining a universal form of the human being 
(anthropou, ἀνθρώπου) is that it must either a) admit women, because they, too, are 
human, and therefore rob ‘manliness’ of its gendered privileged, or b) admit that the form 
of the human being commonly understood as ‘manliness’ (andreia, ἀνδρεία) is not 
universal and therefore is neither a form nor is it good, beautiful, and just, but rather bad, 
ugly, and unjust and therefore to be avoided. Quite the conundrum for the ancient young 
Socrates emerging into his own ‘manhood.’ 
Parmenides praises Socrates for grasping the difference between the visible and 
the invisible, that is, between the particularities of matter and the universality of 
conceptual definition; however, he is told by Zeno and Parmenides that he does not yet 
bravely hold onto the difficulties that he encounters out of concern for what others will 
think of him; that is, Socrates does not hold onto the question of the form of the human 
being yet because his query may dangerously bring into question the gendered norms of 
the ancient world. Maybe ‘manliness’ as it is commonly understood isn’t good, but 
perhaps this common understanding is wrong and there is a way in which andreia does 
conform with the Good, the Just, and the Beautiful. Parmenides comments that Socrates 
does not persist through the difficulties of his queries “because you are still young […] 
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and philosophy has not yet gripped you as, in my opinion, it will in the future, once you 
begin to consider none of the cases beneath your notice. Now though, you still care about 
what people think, because of your youth” (Parmenides 130d-e; Gill and Ryan 
translation). Plato’s Parmenides both predicts Socrates’ future philosophical vocation and 
urges him to consider nothing beneath his notice, including the mundane yet dangerous 
question of whether manliness is good. More particularly, that he should not allow the 
fear of social ridicule to hold him back. As we all know, the historical Socrates was tried 
and executed by his peers for his philosophical ‘corruption’ of young men (Apology). 
Parmenides then advises Socrates that the only method for managing the relation 
between the forms of the Good, the Beautiful, and the Just and human beings is in 
dialectical examination (dialegesthai, διαλέγεσθαι); that this knowledge cannot be 
directly taught. In a continuation of the hunting metaphor for philosophical inquiry, 
Socrates is told that he would do best in his journey if, “while you are still young (neos, 
νέος), draw yourself as a bow (helkuson de sauton, ἕλκυσον δὲ σαυτὸν) and exercise 
more (gumnasai mallon, γύµνασαι µᾶλλον) through something thought to be useless and 
most people call trivial chatter (adoleschia, ἀδολεσχία). If not, the truth (aletheia, 
ἀλήθεια) will escape you (diapheuxetai, διαφεύξεται)” (Parmenides, 135d; my 
translation). Here, Parmenides encourages Socrates to pursue his inquiry through 
dialoguing with others on seemingly trivial matters, such as thoughts and opinions on 
“what it means to be a ‘man’” (cf. Laches). And the progression of these philosophical 
dialogues can indeed sound like ‘trivial chatter,’ especially to someone in denial. For 
example, all this talk I’ve offered of the ‘fragmented self,’ the ‘inner child’, or ‘giving 
birth to one’s own good-spirit’ as a process of being and becoming human can sound like 
balderdash. It can be easier to roll one’s eyes, call it a bunch of pie-in-the-sky idealism, 
and carry on than to sincerely undertake the pursuit of one’s own good life. No one can 
make someone listen to or partake in these discussions—one must voluntarily take up the 
common pursuit. And, as Parmenides advises the young Socrates, a philosopher in 
earnest pursuit of the truth will not let such obstacles of denial deter their hunt. 
Parmenides then demonstrates the dialectical process of hypothesis testing with 
the young Aristotle who is present (this is not the philosopher Aristotle, though it may be 
an allusion to him; rather, this is a historical Athenian who would later participate in the 
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reign of the Thirty Tyrants). In their dialogue, Parmenides and Aristotle debate the nature 
of being and becoming and the curious instant of change, in which something “neither is 
nor is not, and neither comes to be nor ceases to be” (Parmenides 156d-157b; Gill and 
Ryan translation). The dialogue ends on a rather Hegelian note with Parmenides 
concluding that “whether one is or is not, it and the others both are and are not, and both 
appear and do not appear all things in all ways, both in relation to themselves and in 
relation to each other” (Parmenides 166c; Gill and Ryan translation; cf. Hegel). Thus, 
Parmenides introduces the problem of being and becoming particularly in relation to 
Socrates’ query about the form of the human being while also both introducing the 
metaphor of philosophy as a hunt and the caution against philonikian motivations. 
 
Protagoras: Set nearly twenty years after Parmenides, the next dialogue under our study 
and the second dialogue in Plato’s dramatic date chronology is Protagoras. It is in this 
dialogue that Socrates clearly distinguishes common philonikian conceptions of 
‘manliness’ from the object of his own philosophical pursuit. Socrates is joined in the 
dialogue by his then-lover, the young Alcibiades III, who would become notorious 
throughout the Greek world for his philonikian manly actions. The dialogue is set just 
prior to the two lovers’ departure and service in Potidaea. On the march back home from 
Potidaea, Socrates would rescue Alcibiades III and his expensive heavy armor while 
under surprise attack from the Spartans. Upon their return to Athens, it is said that 
Socrates stood by quietly as his beloved Alcibiades III took credit for the retreat, 
receiving laudatory war accolades.  
The dialogue takes place within the house of Callias III of Alopece, the son of 
Hipponicus II and the ex-wife of Pericles (Nails 2002, 309-310, 173, and 68). With 
Alcibiades III’s victory-loving encouragement, Socrates engages in a tête-à-tête with the 
then-famous militant sophist, Protagoras (Protagoras 359e). Socrates agrees to engage in 
dialogue with Protagoras under the condition that the conversation consist in the frank 
speech or honest disclosure of the well-educated men. He says they do not have need of 
the distractions “of flute girls (auletridas, αὐλητρίδας), dancing girls (orchestridas, 
ὀρχηστρίδας), or harp girls (ψαλτρίας)” or even “poets (ποιητῶν),” but rather should 
converse directly with one another “in their own speech and logic (ἐν τοῖς ἑαυτῶν λόγοις) 
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[…] taking to trial the truth (ἀληθείας) and our ideas of it” (Protagoras 347c-348a; my 
translation). This is in exceeding contrast to the distractions Alcibiades III would later 
rain on the participants of Symposium, a dialogue in which we find Socrates pursuing a 
new lover, the ‘Good Man’ Agathon. 
The primary question Socrates poses in Protagoras is whether wisdom (sophia, 
σοφία), temperance (sophrosyne, σωφροσύνη), manliness/courage (andreia, ἀνδρεία), 
justice (dikaisyne, δικαιοσύνη), and piety (hosiotes, ὁσιότης) are all names for the same 
thing (Protagoras, 349b): whether virtue is united in one or dispersed through many. 
Presumably after hunting for some twenty years for the truth, we see Socrates progressing 
from his query in Parmenides about whether there is a form of the human being that is 
united with the Good, the Beautiful, and the Just to claim in Protagoras that there is such 
a form, which is commonly called andreia (‘manliness’ or ‘manly courage’). From the 
options outlined in Parmenides, the Socrates of Protagoras clearly chooses option ‘a’ 
that the human being does have a definable form, commonly called ‘manliness,’ and that 
it is unified with the other forms.7  
His interlocutor Protagoras, however, insists that manliness (andreia, ἀνδρεία) is 
wholly different from the others as there are many people who are exceptionally 
courageous or manly (andreiotatous, ἀνδρειοτάτους) who do not exemplify the other 
virtues of goodness, beauty, and justice (Protagoras 349d). Thus, the virtues must be 
many and not united into one. This returns to Socrates’ own hesitation on the issue in 
Parmenides, recognizing that there are many ‘manly’ men who are not ‘good’ people—
that the ancient standards of masculinity do not conform to virtue. However, through the 
dialogue, Socrates undermines this position through a line of questioning of whether 
andreia entails confidence, strength, power, and living a good life. Protagoras dodges this 
line of reasoning, bringing Socrates to suggest that the best way to clarify the issue might 
be to ask ordinary people, people who would not be able to afford Protagoras’ teaching 
fees, about andreia in order to better learn about the virtue and its relation to the Good, 
the Just, and the Beautiful (Protagoras 353a-b). Specifically, Socrates is interested in 
                                                        
7 Plato leaves it until Republic to explicitly admit that Socrates’ vision of the form of the human being 
includes women; however, in Protagoras he admits that so-called ‘manliness’ (andreia, ἀνδρεία) is a form 
unified with the Good, the Just, and the Beautiful by means of dialoguing with the militant sophist 
Protagoras. 
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discussing with ordinary people their experience with what we might today call ‘coping 
mechanisms’: excessive food, drink, and sex (Protagoras, 353c-356e). Socrates 
concludes that the ‘salvation’ from such coping mechanisms requires an artful knowledge 
of measuring pleasure and pain, and that this cannot be taught (Protagoras 357b-358a). 
Plato leaves the details of this knowledge to Symposium. 
Socrates then returns to Protagoras’ claim that manliness (andreia, ἀνδρεία) is a 
virtue distinct from the others, asking whether manly/courageous people (andreious, 
ἀνδρείους) are prepared for the same actions as cowardly people (deiloi, δειλοί). 
Protagoras insists the two prepare for different actions: fearful cowards are inclined 
towards security while manly/courageous people are inclined toward terrifying things 
(deina, δεινά) (Protagoras 359c-d). However, this would be to characterize Socrates’ 
own future retreats in battle as cowardly rather than courageous, a position disputed by 
the generals Laches and Alcibiades III in the dialogues Laches and Symposium 
respectfully. Plato’s Socrates thus refutes this, arguing that the inclination toward bad, 
painful, or terrifying things can only be the result of ignorance (Protagoras 359e; see also 
357c-e). Rather, Socrates offers that both the manly and the cowardly are inclined 
towards that which they are confident (Protagoras 359e). Protagoras stands by his own 
claim, however, of the supposed difference between manly and cowardly men saying that 
manly men “are willing to go to war,” which he finds honorable, while “the cowardly are 
not” (Protagoras 359e). Socrates contests Protagoras’ understanding of what is honorable 
through his Socratic questioning, arriving to claim that wisdom is the knowledge of 
“what is and is not to be feared” and that the coward acts out of ignorance of this 
knowledge whereas the courageous or manly man acts with this knowledge (Protagoras 
360d). With this claim, Socrates undermines Protagoras’ original position that manliness 
is a virtue set apart from wisdom (Protagoras 360d-e). Moreover, Socrates maintains that 
this knowledge cannot be taught, which is contrary to the very profession of Protagoras, 
but can only be pursued through dialogue with others (Protagoras 361b-c). Socrates 
offers to continue searching together for the virtue of manliness with Protagoras, but 
Protagoras refuses out of embarrassment that his position has been completely 
undermined. Ironically, Socrates reigns victorious. A likely a turn-on for his lover 
Alcibiades III, but not Socrates’ main motivation. With this dialogue, Socrates affirms 
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the dialectical method taught by Parmenides and progresses to the position that 
‘manliness’ must be part of the unity of virtue, but that this ‘manliness’ is not the form 
envisioned by war-mongers such as Protagoras or, painfully, his beloved Alcibiades.  
 
Laches: We turn next to Laches.8 This dialogue directly pursues a definition of the virtue 
of andreia that further distinguishes the temporal difference between philonikian 
‘manliness’ and the philosophical ‘manliness’ of Socrates’ pursuit. In common pursuit 
with Laches, Socrates begins to reveal the temporality of denial central to philonikian 
ideas of ‘manliness’ as articulated by the general Nikias. Namely, Nikias’s understanding 
of ‘manliness’ neglects attending to the past in its narrow focus on the future. 
Historically, the generals Laches and Nikias broker a Peace Treaty shortly after the 
dramatic date of the dialogue. Short-lived, the treaty proved inept in restraining 
Alcibiades’ entitled manly desire for glory, resulting in the Battle of Mantinea. While 
Socrates saved Laches’ life just prior to the dialogue by retreating from the Athenian 
defeat at Delium (424BC), Laches would lose his life at Mantinea (418BC). In both 
battles, Athenians died by friendly fire due to their hoplites’ lack of practice marching—
Athenians died because they were literally out-of-time with one another. They were not 
harmonized. The dialogue implies that the discord of denial is inherent to philonikian 
conceptions of ‘manliness’ rendering it incapable of instituting lasting peace, as Nikias 
would have desired. Instead, philonikian ‘manliness’ with its denial is only capable of 
perpetuating war and devastating trauma.  
At the time of the dialogue, Socrates is not yet an Athenian celebrity infamous for 
his ‘corruption’ of the youth of Athens. This reputation would come a year later with the 
production of Aristophanes’ Clouds. The dialogue begins after Lysimachus and Melesias, 
both the mediocre sons of the famous Athenian public servants Aristides I ‘the Just’ and 
Thucydides (not Thucydides the historian, but a famous wrestler by trade and the primary 
                                                        
8 Following the timeline of the dramatic dates of Plato’s dialogues, we are here skipping over Charmides, 
Timaeus, and Critias, not for their want of relevance to our topic but rather for want of space and time in 
our study, Indeed, there is much material to be pondered in these dialogues relevant to our query, 
specifically Charmides’ in relation to the historical death of Pericles and Timeaus’ introduction of the 
controversial wandering wombs thesis (i.e., hysteria) as well as the gendered hierarchy of the reincarnation 
of souls. For discussion of the latter dialogue in relation to Plato’s thoughts on gender, see Elena Duvergès 
Blair’s Plato’s Dialectic on Woman: Equal, Therefore Inferior, New York: Taylor and Francis, 2012. 
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political rival of Pericles), and the generals Nikias and Laches, prominent leaders in the 
Athenian military who would broker the Peace of Nikias (421BC) a few short years after 
the actions of the dialogue, have observed an exhibitionist performance of an individual 
in heavy hoplite armor (i.e., hoplomachia). Lysimachus explains the honest reasons he 
and Melesias had invited the generals to join: the two fathers would like to know whether 
the solitary sport of hoplomachia would help their young early-twenty sons (neous, νέους 
and meirakious, µερακίους in the text), Aristides II and Thucydides II, become real men 
(andreia, ἀνδρεία) and thereby live up to the glory of their namesakes (Laches 178d-
181c). Both Lysimachus and Melesias consider themselves lesser, mediocre men and 
blame their fathers’ public service for overlooking their care and education into the 
matter (Laches 178c-d; cf. Republic’s need to bring together public service and care for 
the family, or at least question the dichotomy). They would like to learn from those they 
consider to be accomplished men (the leaders of Athens) about how to teach their sons to 
be manly so they might “become worthy of the names they bear,” belying their 
assumption that the political leaders Aristides I ‘The Just,’ Thucydides I, Laches, and 
Nikias by their military leadership themselves exhibit the virtue and therefore have an 
understanding of how to obtain it (Laches 178d). An irony often lost on readers here is 
that the dialogue poses this question to Nikias after his own manliness has been publicly 
called into question by the general Cleon, a projection of the latter’s own shame 
(Thucydides IV.27-28); Cleon’s death after his violation of the armistice at Amphipolis 
(422BC) opened the opportunity for Laches and Nikias to broker the Peace of Nikias. In 
this way, Laches returns to think through Protagoras’ claims in Protagoras that manly 
men charge into battle whereas cowardly men seek safety from it. 
 Laches insists that Lysimachus and Melesias must invite Socrates, who happened 
to be nearby, into the conversation. Speaking to the gadfly’s credibility, Laches argues 
that 1) Socrates is “always spending his time in places where the young men [neous, 
νέους] engage in any study or noble pursuit of the sort you are looking for,” and so he has 
experience in the very matter into which they are inquiring (Laches, 180c); 2) Socrates is 
from the same deme/community as Lysimachus, that indeed Lysimachus knows Socrates’ 
father, Sophroniscus, and so he is to be trusted by virtue of their communal proximity; 
and 3) Socrates demonstrated exactly the virtue under discussion, manliness (andreia, 
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ἀνδρεία), when he rescued Laches in the retreat of Delium, adding “I can tell you that if 
the rest had been willing to behave in the same manner, our city would be safe and we 
would not then have suffered a disaster of that kind” (Laches, 181a-b). Lysimachus and 
Melesias capitulate into inviting Socrates into their query, with Lysimachus adding that 
Socrates indeed has: 
…a duty to do so, because you are my friend through your father. He and I were 
always comrades and friend, and he died without our ever having a single 
difference. And this present conversation reminds me of something—when the 
boys here are talking to each other at home, they often mention Socrates and 
praise him highly, but I’ve never thought to ask if they were speaking of the son 
of Sophroniscus. Tell me, boys, is this the Socrates you spoke of on those 
occasions? [it certainly is]. I am delighted, Socrates, that you keep your father’s 
good reputation, for he was the best of men, and I am especially pleased at the 
idea of the close ties between your family and mine will be renewed.9 (Laches, 
180d-181a; translated by Rosamond Kent Sprague)  
 
Out of respect for his elders, the forty-six-year-old Socrates insists Nikias and Laches 
provide their opinions on the relevance of hoplomachia to becoming real men. 
 Nikias goes first and, true to his historic character, he does not speak frankly but 
instead strategically offers what he thinks audience wants to hear. Perhaps surmising 
from the fact that he is speaking to Lysimachus, the son of Aristides I who famously 
opposed the navy-builder, Themistocles, in politics and earned acclaim in the Athenian 
hoplite victory of the Battle of Marathon (490BC), Nikias takes a stance favorable to the 
practice of hoplomachia. His argument in its favor resembles today’s arguments in favor 
of the sport of American football. He claims that 1) hoplomachia is a fine practice that 
gets the young people off the couch for some exercise, 2) the sport of hoplomachia 
alongside the sport of horsemanship is “especially suited to a free citizen” in that both 
require wealth to participate, 3) the practice is useful on the battlefield when phalanx 
ranks are broken and “it becomes necessary for a man to fight in single combat,” and 4) 
hoplomachia might inspire young men to pursue the science and tactics of strategy 
(Laches 182a-d). The reader will note that these claims don’t respond to the suitability of 
hoplomachia aiding young men in their coming of age, but it is rather a list of potential 
                                                        
9 This would not be the last connection between their families, as Socrates likely either married or took in 
Myrto, who was either the sister or daughter of Lysimachus (Woodbury 1973; and Nails 2002, 48 and 210). 
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positive attributes the sport provides: it helps to stay in shape, it exhibits wealth, it may 
be useful when all hell breaks loose on the battlefield (as happened at Delium), and it 
might inspire a career in military strategy. These are all advantages to the practice, not 
reason why the practice itself is good. Nikias’ initial response belies his disinterest in 
hunting for the truth, but rather his warring defense of a position. 
 Laches disagrees with Nikias, speaking frankly and arguing that one must be 
discerning with how to spend one’s time and that hoplomachia simply isn’t worth the 
trade-off. If it were a worthwhile endeavor, Laches argues, one might expect the 
Spartans, who held military advantage over the Athenians in landed hoplite warfare, to 
practice it. But instead of the solitary, spectacle-driven practice of hoplomachia, the 
Spartan hoplites practice collective march formations, reflecting the Spartans’ ability to 
keep themselves together in time through collective movement in the face of and in the 
aftermath of trauma.10  
Laches then offers that he’s seen the man they just observed in the exhibition 
performance on the battlefield before, calling him ‘Stesilaus,’ armed with a combination 
scythe and spear, as singular a weapon as he was singular a man” that got caught in a 
ship’s rigging when under attack and he became a laughing stock of his comrades and 
enemies (Laches 183a-b). Though the actions of Laches occur over sixty years later, this 
is likely a reference to the Battle of Marathon in which Stesilaus, the object of desire in a 
love triangle between Themistocles and Aristides I, died.11 Laches concludes that 
                                                        
10 This strategy of marching in formation was successfully adopted by Roman legions and, as trauma 
theorist Bessel A. van der Kolk observes, by contemporary militaries after recognizing the importance of 
collective movement in confronting terrifying obstacles. Van der Kolk quotes Plutarch observing the 
Roman legions “It was once a magnificent and terrible sight, to see them march on to the tune of their 
flutes, without any disorder in their ranks, any discomposure in their minds or change in their 
countenances, calmly and cheerfully moving with music to the deadly fight” (Plutarch qtd. in van der Kolk 
2015, 336; see Plutarch Lives: Lycurgus 22.3). Van der Kolk further observes in relation to Prince Maurice 
of Orange’s use of Plutarch’s observations that “[t]his collective ritual not only provided his men with a 
sense of purpose and solidarity, but also made it possible for them to execute complicated maneuvers” (van 
der Kolk 2015, 336).  
 
11 As Plutarch identifies, the political competition between Themistocles and Aristides I began with their 
competing love for Stesilaus. Plutarch writes in Themistocles that the rivalry “had an altogether puerile 
beginning. They were both lovers of the beautiful Stesilaus, a native of Ceos, as Ariston the philosopher 
has recorded, and thenceforward they continued to be rivals in public life also” (Plutarch, Themistocles, 
3.1). Plutarch continues this theme in Aristides:  
They were both enamored of Stesilaus, who was of Ceian birth, and in beauty of person the most 
brilliant of youths; and they cherished their passion so immoderately, that not even after the boy's 
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hoplomachia only pretends to know the virtue of manliness (andreia, ἀνδρεία) and may 
only provide an individual an inflated ego and false sense of security (Laches 184c). The 
practice of hoplomachia only pretends to knowledge and might only give an individual a 
false sense of security and an inflated ego (Laches, 184c). 
 The men then turn to Socrates, who is told that he must cast the deciding vote on 
the matter. Socrates objects to this demand, arguing that the pursuit of the truth is not a 
democratic lot of the rule of the majority opinion, but rather, like gymnastic exercise, one 
should follow the advice of someone who “has been educated and exercised under a good 
trainer.” Per Plato’s dramatic timeline, Socrates has of course trained with the thinker 
Parmenides, though he does not admit it here. Socrates insists that “it is by knowledge 
that one ought to make decisions, if one is to make them well, and not by majority rule” 
(Laches 184d-e). The reader should note here that this is not an outright rejection of 
democracy, but rather an insistence that democracy be a common hunt for living well 
together rather than the rule by the hegemony of the majority.  
 With this said, Socrates proposes that the question Lysimachus and Melesias are 
truly asking is not whether hoplomachia will make their young sons ‘manly,’ as this is a 
consideration of particularities (i.e., the visible), but rather how their sons might “turn out 
to be worthwhile persons,” which involves consideration of the soul (psyche, ψυχή; 
Laches 185a). He suggests they should seek out experts who are “good themselves and 
have tended the souls of many young men” and who have “manifestly taught us” to be 
good ourselves (Laches 185e-186b), and that he has “had no teacher (didaskalos, 
διδάσκαλος) in this subject” (Laches 186c). For despite his pedagogical engagement with 
Parmenides, no teacher of the subject is possible because this is not a subject that can be 
taught. It can only be pursued through dialogue with others. Socrates suggests that the 
                                                        
beauty had faded did they lay aside their rivalry, but, as though they had merely taken preliminary 
practice and exercise in that, they presently engaged in matters of state also with passionate heat 
and opposing desires. (Plutarch, Aristides, 2.3) 
One Stesilaus, the son of Thrasylaus, is known to have died at the Battle of Marathon among chaos. It is 
unclear whether this is the same Stesilaus who bore the love interests of Themistocles and Aristides, 
however, evidence in Laches might suggest it was (contra Nails and discussed below). As Herodotus 
recounts the Battle of Marathon, “In this labor Callimachus the polemarch was slain, a brave man, and of 
the generals Stesilaus son of Thrasylaus died. Cynegirus son of Euphorion fell there, his hand cut off with 
an ax as he grabbed a ship's figurehead. Many other famous Athenians also fell there” (Herodotus, 
Histories, 6.114; cf. Plato, Laches, 183d). 
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men should search for teachers who have a reputation for making men better.12 However, 
Laches, with his military background, is uncomfortable with the absence of authority and 
expresses his exhaustion at listening to people pontificate about that which they do not 
know, especially virtue. He listens only because he witnessed Socrates display the virtue 
he himself thinks of as andreia in the retreat from Delium (Laches 188c-189b). 
 Socrates clarifies the question at hand as “the manner in which virtue might be 
added to the souls of their sons to make them better” (Laches 190b; translated by 
Rosamond Kent Sprague). Rather than taking on the difficult task of contemplating “the 
whole of virtue,” Socrates suggests the men focus on the part of virtue that seems most 
relevant to the “technique of fighting in armor,” which the men have identified as andreia 
(Laches 190c-d; translated by Rosamond Kent Sprague). Socrates offers that the men 
should first focus on defining the virtue of andreia and then think about how to add the 
virtue to the young, assuming that it can be added “through occupations and studies” 
(Laches 190e; Sprague translation).  
 Thinking the task of defining andreia an easy one, Laches hastily offers “for if 
anyone (tis, τις) is willing to stay (taxei, τάξει) in his position to ward off (amunesthai, 
ἀµύνεσθαι) the enemy (τοὺς πολεµίους) and not flee (pheugoi, φευγοι), then you know 
well that he is a manly courageous person (andreious, ἀνδρεῖος)” (Laches 190e; my 
translation). This definition, however, reveals a forgetfulness of the very example he 
himself provided of Socrates’ courage in retreat from Delium. To this, Socrates gently 
reminds him of the experience and explains that definitions must encompass all 
examples. So, Laches offers a second definition, that andreia “is sort of a patient 
endurance (karteria, καρτερία) of the soul” (Laches 192b-c; my translation). Socrates 
adds to this that this endurance must be “accompanied by or alongside thoughtful, 
practical wisdom (phroneseos, φρονήσεως)” (Laches 192c; my translation). Socrates’ 
questioning of Laches reveals that this wisdom or knowledge involved in andreia is not 
the knowledge of a future certainty as it takes more courage to face the uncertainty of 
future events (Laches 193a). 
                                                        
12 This may be an implicit reference to the heteara Aspasia who was reputed to not only influence Pericles’ 
decision making, but after his death also made a sheep man, Lysicles, into a statesman (Laches 185a; see 
Henry 1995, 43). 
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 Frustrated, Laches admits that he is motivated by a desire for victory (philonikia, 
φιλονικία) with respect to the conversation, much like the young philosophical puppies of 
Zeno when he wrote his treatise and the young Socrates when debating it, but Laches is 
annoyed that despite thinking that he knows what andreia is, it keeps “escaping 
(diephugen, διέφυγεν)” from him when he attempts to articulate it. Socrates encourages 
him with a hunting metaphor, saying that “a good hunter (τὸν ἀγαθὸν κυνηγέτην) ought 
to pursue the trail and not give up” (Laches 194b; Sprague translation). In the dead of the 
Athenian winter, Socrates then summons “Nikias here to the hunt,” adding that if Nikias 
is “strong enough or able (dynamin, δύναµιν), he should assist us beloved men out here in 
the cold (cheimazomenois, χειµαζοµένοις) in the argument (λόγῳ) and are at a loss 
(aporousin, ἀποροῦσιν)” (Laches 190b-c; my translation).  
 Again, Nikias fails to speak frankly and only says what he thinks Socrates wants 
to hear. He echoes the claims Socrates made in Protagoras, saying that 1) “every one of 
us is good with respect to that in which he is wise and bad in respect to that in which he is 
ignorant;” 2) “certainly if a man is really a good man [ὀ ἀνδρεῖος ἀγαθός], clearly then he 
is wise;” and 3) this wisdom is the “scientific knowledge (epistemen, ἐπιστήµην) of the 
fearful (deinon, δεινῶν) and the daring (tharraleon, θαρραλέων) in war and all other 
situations” (Laches 194d-195a; my translation). As scholars have observed, this is a gross 
misrepresentation of Socrates’ meaning (Rabieh 2006, 68), but it does allow Plato the 
opportunity to further clarify Socrates’ philosophy. Nikias thinks if one is manly, then 
one is wise. He confuses this wisdom with the certainty of the knowledge of what today 
we would call scientific fact; but Socrates thinks that if one is wise about that which is to 
be feared or not despite the uncertainty of the future, then one is ‘manly’ or courageous.  
Laches registers that he thinks andreia may be different from wisdom and, in 
frustration, says Nikias is “talking strangely (ἄτοπα λὲγει)” and “foolishly (ληρεῖ)” 
(Laches 195a). Nikias then clarifies that this scientific knowledge (epistemen, ἐπιστήµην) 
might mean knowing when it is best to live or die, revealing the Achilles’ heel of his 
understanding of andreia: his is only a knowledge of future factual certainty. But the 
temporality of human beings is more complicated than predicting the eclipsing of the sun: 
we are meaning making creatures who make choices, and these choices have the capacity 
to deeply harm, rupture, and undo one another as well as the capacity to deeply help, 
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bind, and recognize one another. Laches is right to be alarmed at Nikias’ suggestion that 
manliness is a kind of divination of the future: only a fortune-teller could pretend to 
exhibit this kind of manliness. Nikias only further muddies the water by saying that 
anyone should be able to judge whether or not to suffer (Laches 195e-196a). Laches 
explains his confusion and identifies Nikias’ squirming in the argument:  
It isn’t clear to me from this, Socrates, what he is trying to say. Because he 
doesn’t select either the seer or the doctor or anyone else as the man he calls 
manly [andreion, ἀνδρεῖον], unless some god is the person he means. Nicias 
appears to me unwilling to make a gentlemanly admission that he is talking 
nonsense, but he twists this way and that in an attempt to cover up his difficulty. 
Even you and I could have executed a similar twist just now if we had wanted to 
avoid the appearance of contradicting ourselves. If we were making speeches in a 
court of law, there might be some point in doing this, but as things are, why 
should anyone adorn himself senselessly with empty words in a gathering like 
this? (Laches, 196a-b; Sprague translation) 
 
Socrates is sympathetic to Laches’ confusion and agrees to take up the reins in the 
argument while affirming their bond in the hunt for andreia, saying “I have no objection, 
since the inquiry will be a joint effort on behalf of us both” (Laches, 196c; Sprague 
translation). 
 Socrates begins with the problem that Nikias has excluded too many from the 
ability to demonstrate manliness/courage including the Crommyon sow, a mythical pig 
said to ravage the area of the land bridge between Megara and Corinth that was 
eventually killed by Theseus and widely held to be ‘andreia.’ He asks whether the 
Crommyon sow is manly while the majority of humans are not? (Laches 196d-e) Nikias 
says that these animals are not manly/courageous but merely rash and lacking foresight. 
He also goes onto insult the common folk, saying that “you and the common people (οἱ 
πολλοί)” who people call courageous are, like the animals, simply “rash, whereas the 
courageous [andreia, ἀνδρεία] ones are the sensible people [phronima, φρόνιµα] I was 
talking about” (Laches 196e-197c). This anti-plebian sentiment is in direct contradiction 
to Socrates’ own, which he so clearly established in Protagoras. It also reveals the 
character exhibited by the historical Nikias, who would come to isolate himself in Sicily 
from advisors, not even trusting a messenger to relay an oral message to Athens for help 
(he unconventionally wrote a letter to the Athenians begging to be relieved of his post 
and reinforcements sent; Thucydides VII.8-18). 
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Laches exclaims his annoyance at Nikias’ self-righteous authority in deciding 
who is and is not courageous, denying the virtue of courage to “[t]hose whom everyone 
agrees to be courageous” (Laches, 197c; Sprague translation). Moreover, Laches is 
appalled that such hostile opinions for the common Athenian were held by “a man the 
city thinks worth to be its leader” (Laches 197d; Sprague translation). Socrates responds 
in irony and with a nod towards the philosopher kings of Republic that “it would be 
fitting, my good friend, for the man in charge of the greatest affairs to have the greatest 
share of wisdom” (Laches 197e; Sprague translation). He then signals to Laches, and the 
reader, to pay close attention to the following questioning as it concerns the temporality 
of human courage. 
Socrates asks Nikias to clarify his understanding of what is meant by the ‘parts of 
virtue’ and reiterates his unity of virtue theory established in Protagoras (Laches 198a). 
Nikias thinks he is in agreement, but Socrates pauses to see if they are in agreement on 
what is fearful (deina, δεινὰ) and daring (tharralea, θαρραλέα; translated as ‘hoping’ by 
some). Socrates says that he assumes these are expectations of the evils and goods of the 
future (Laches 198b). Nikias thinks these future things can be known with certainty 
(Laches 198c). There is no room for uncertainty of the future on Nikias’ account, as he 
demands security about that which is inherently insecure. Further, there is no relation 
between the future and the past and present. Socrates opposes this view, articulating that 
our relation to the future is necessarily connected to our relation to our past and present. 
Thus, we can have some courageous orientation to the uncertainty of the future by taking 
time in the present to recollect the memories of the past and learn from them together. 
This artful knowledge need not be ruled by the seer, but instead the artful knowledge will 
rule the seer’s own art of the future. Our learning and recollecting from trauma memory 
helps us to move forward into the future. Socrates explains: 
[…] there is not one kind of knowledge by which we know how things have 
happened in the past, and another by which we know how they are happening at 
the present time, and still another by which we know how what has not yet 
happened might best come to be in the future, but that the knowledge is the same 
in each case. For instance, in the case of health, there is no other art related to the 
past, the present, and the future except that of medicine, which, although it is a 
single art, surveys what is, what was, and what is likely to be in the future. […] 
And I suppose that both of you could bear witness that, in the case of the affairs of 
war, the art of generalship is that which best foresees the future and the other 
 111 
times—nor does this art consider it necessary to be ruled by the art of the seer, 
but to rule it, as being better acquainted with both present and future in the 
affairs of war. (Laches, 198d-199a; Sprague translation with my added emphasis) 
 
Nikias goes along with this, but Socrates points out that Nikias has only “set apart 
approximately a third” of what andreia entails (Laches 199c; my translation). Walter T. 
Schmid explicates the significance of this statement, of “approximately” or “about” a 
third. Nikias is only interested in the future (rather than all three: past, present, future), 
and of the future he is only interested in predictive certainty to the exclusion of 
uncertainty in the future. He writes: 
Nicias’ conception of the ‘science of the terrible and safe or opportune’ does not 
allow for this optative object, for ‘what might be.’ It allows only for what will be, 
because it presupposes the kind of Promethean science, the mastery of the future, 
that allows the man of wise courage to simply pick what is better for himself out 
of the possible futures he foresees. […] Nicias has, as it were, a strangely 
‘mathematical’ conception of courage, a conception that removes it from the 
world of real danger, fear, and uncertainty and envisages its possessor as a more 
godlike being than ordinary mortals. He believes in science but not in freedom. 
[…] The point is rather that Nicias’ knowledge of this would-be invincible, 
superhuman virtue is not based on experience, it simply is based on what he hopes 
for. [my emphasis]. (Schmid 1992, 161-162) 
 
So Nikias’ understanding of andreia gets temporality wrong. Instead of offering the 
temporality of courageous overcoming, Nikias offers us the temporality of denial. He 
neglects the past and its effects on the present, with his eyes only on the future. Denial. 
And just as we have seen in the previous chapter, denial produces a calculative hyper-
rationalization disconnected from the embodied repetition of the past in the present such 
that the repetitions of the past may fatalistically determine our present and future, 
sabotaging our freedom in the present. Nikias would limit andreia to the gods or limit the 
possibilities of the future to scientific calculation. Humans would be nothing but mere, 
determinate matter and our future actions would be as predictable as an eclipse. 
 Tragically, Nikias’ own inability to grasp his freedom or imagine possibilities of 
the future destroyed the Athenian navy fleet. In 413BC, a blood red lunar eclipse of the 
moon occurred just when the Athenians were preparing for a necessary retreat from the 
devastating Sicilian Expedition. Nikias basically froze. In contrast to Pericles’ attitude 
and scientific understanding of eclipses, Nikias relied on fortune-telling advisors and the 
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superstitious men in his ranks, who all assumed the eclipse was a sign from the moon-
goddess Selena of impending doom on their retreat. So, the Athenians stayed encamped 
on the shores of Sicily, only to suffer a gruesome attack from the Sicilians and Spartans. 
Nikias’ decision to remain in Sicily absolutely destroyed the Athenian navy fleet. 
Surviving Athenian soldiers bore witness to the gruesome suffering of dying comrades 
and carried the guilt of leaving them unburied, only to eventually be enslaved after 
enduring being thrown into a pit for several months. Nikias was executed (see Appendix I 
for discussion of the Sicilian Expedition). 
The Laches dialogue ends with Nikias in embarrassment: he, the leader of Athens, 
doesn’t know what it means to ‘be a man.’ Laches tells Lysimachus and Melesias to part 
company with him and Nikias—clearly, they don’t know the answers to the questions the 
men seek. Instead, they should “retain the services of this man Socrates” as Laches 
himself would do if his own children were old enough (Laches 200b). Nikias says he 
might do the same with his own son, Niceratus, but notes that Socrates has refused to take 
up company with him in the past. The reader will note that Niceratus is present in 
Republic. Lysimachus requests Socrates take on the education of his son, Aristides II, and 
Socrates says they will have “to join in searching for the best possible teacher, first for 
ourselves—we really need one—and then for the young [people; meirakiois, µειρακιοις is 
neutral and not masculine, as Sprague translates]” (Laches 201a; Sprague translation with 
my amendment). Lysimachus consents and invites Socrates to join him at his home 
tomorrow (Laches 201b). Socrates responds with the final sentence of the dialogue, “I 
shall do what you say, Lysimachus, and come to you tomorrow, God willing” (Laches, 
201c). Socrates likely did return to continue hunting for the good with Lysimachus and 
his son, Aristides II. However, as Theaetetus shows, things didn’t go well. Aristides II is 
listed as an example of someone whose soul Socrates tried to help midwife, but that 
Aristides II may have “set more value upon lies and phantoms than upon the truth” and 
was definitively an “ignorant fool” (Theaetetus 151a). 
The reader should take several things from Laches in understanding the 
development of Socrates’ philosophy of andreia. One would be to understand the 
mediocrity of Lysimachus and Melesias in their preference for spectatorship—they would 
rather watch a hoplomachia match and would rather watch Socrates dialogue with the 
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generals. They are merely spectators of victory-seeking ‘manliness’ and they desire their 
boys to be participants in the philonikian conception of the virtue. However, this is not 
the understanding of the virtue sought by Socrates. At best, the fathers Lysimachus and 
Melesias want them and their sons to be told what to do. However, becoming a ‘man’, or 
a courageous adult, cannot be taught, it must be undertaken by the individual with others. 
It is not a solitary enterprise, but one that the individual must desire and voluntarily 
choose to do. One must practice marching with others, practice stepping ‘in’ time with 
one’s community, else one marches to one’s own devastation. Secondly, the reader 
should note the continuation of the hunting metaphor in preference to militaristic 
metaphors, such as the strategic sparring of hoplomachia. That is, one must hunt the good 
communally with others, rather than pursue the hunt for others’ domination. Thirdly, 
Laches assumes andreia to be a part of the whole of virtue, that it is unified with the 
Good, the Just, and the Beautiful, while demonstrating the nonsense of norms of 
masculinity.  
Fourth, and most importantly, is the observation with the historical figure of 
Nikias and the failures of his Peace of Nikias that Nike-loving manliness is often 
accompanied by Nikian neglect: denial. This Nikian denial neglects the importance of 
recollection of the past for making choices in the present towards a good future. Socrates 
performs this recollection with Laches when the latter forgets about the retreat of Delium. 
He is only future-oriented, and he is worried about what others will think of him, the 
latter worry rules over decisions of the former. His failure to understand the importance 
of recollecting the past and striving through dialogue with others towards the Good meant 
at least two critical failures in his political leadership: the doomed Peace of Nikias and 
Sicilian Expedition.  
The Peace of Nikias failed for at least two related reasons. First, the city of 
Megara refused to sign onto the peace treaty in light of the decade-long, semi-annual 
invasion of Athens. Though they were no longer allies due to the stipulations of the 
Thirty Years Peace, it was the formation of the alliance between the two cities that began 
the First Peloponnesian War. Proxy wars persisted during the period of ‘peace.’ 
 Secondly, Socrates (former, possible present) lover Alcibiades III seized on this 
chaos to avenge his grudge against Nikias and increase his own socio-political position of 
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leadership. Alcibiades was upset that he wasn’t included in the peace negotiations, 
complaining that he was excluded due to his young age. He no doubt had past traumatic 
experience of his own. Alcibiades III’s father died in the Battle of Coronea in 446BC 
after renouncing the family’s historical diplomatic ties to Sparta in the advent of the 
Peloponnesian War. Alcibiades III was only six years old. He and his brother became 
wards of the leader Pericles, but they maintained their biological family affiliations and 
responsibilities (Nails 2002, 11). So, Alcibiades III felt entitled by family lineage, namely 
by the role his father and grandfather played as Athenian diplomats or proxenos to Sparta 
(Thucydides V.43-45; Nails 2002, 11). As retribution, Alcibiades III seized on the 
continued poor relations during the peace to drive a wedge between Sparta and Nikias. 
Eventually, he was elected to replace Nikias as general and at his urging, the Athenian 
allies decided to “get on with war.” This led to the Battle of Mantinea of 418BC, the first 
battle between Sparta and Athens to officially break the Peace of Nikias (Thucydides 
V.61-68; cf. Ste. Croix 1972, 180). Laches lost his life in the battle. Further, these same 
failures would bring Athens absolute ruin in the Sicilian Expedition, an expedition Nikias 
could have prevented had he spoken frankly to the citizens of Athens about what a 
terrible idea it was, as he believed then. He also had plenty of opportunity and wise 
encouragement to retreat once there. But he didn’t, and Athens experienced the most 
horrific downfall in its history.  
   
Cratylus: In Cratylus we see Socrates ambivalence of the word ‘manliness’ (andreia, 
ἀνδρεία) as a signifier for the courageous form of the human being’s becoming through a 
lifetime. That is, he raises the possibility that ‘manliness’ may obscure the philosophical 
form of the virtue he pursues. Here, he articulates that the truer form of what is 
commonly called ‘andreia’ engages not in philonikian battle for battle’s sake but rather 
battles against trauma’s shackling aporias of the soul. 
The dialogue occurs around the Battle of Amphipolis (422BC), which was 
Socrates’ last known battle. The battle was halted by a short-lived armistice, which was 
broken by the Athenian general Cleon who died in the ensuing battle. This would leave 
Nikias and Laches able to finally negotiate the Peace of Nikias a year later in 421BC. But 
this was a peace in name only, as multiple proxy wars continued. The war between 
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Athens and Sparta would officially resume in 418BC with the Battle of Mantinea. More 
specifically to the characters of the dialogue, the dramatic date is set before the death of 
the richest man in all of Greece, Hipponicus II, and the dispersion of his estate (Nails 
2002, 162). The dialogue takes place in the home of the heir of Hipponicus, Callias III. 
Callias’ half-brother, Hermogenes is present. Hermogenes was a Parmenidean 
philosopher who would come to mentor Plato for a time after Socrates’ death (see 
Appendix). Upon his own father’s soon-impending death, Hermogenes would be denied 
inheritance rights, despite being acknowledged by his father and permitted to use his 
patronymic name. He was a son in name only. Hermogenes’ mother was Pericles’ ex-
wife. Had she and Hipponicus married, Hermogenes would have been a full citizen and 
also entitled to inherited wealth. But, instead he would receive nothing (Nails 2002, 312, 
172, 162, and 69). There seems to be an implicit criticism of ancient patriarchal family 
arrangements and the unfair exclusion of Hermogenes from future material security. This 
criticism sits alongside two others: that language is malleable, and we may need new 
name-givers for the phenomenon we encounter (i.e., ‘andreia’ as ‘manliness’ may not 
appropriate name the form of the human being), as well as a criticism of Parmenidean 
and Heraclitean temporality. 
The dialogue begins with a discussion of the etymology the gods, and it is worth 
noting in our discussion what Socrates says about both Artemis and Ares. As 
background, Artemis the hunter was the twin of Apollo, daughter of Zeus and Leto. She 
was associated with the moon, ‘Selene,’ to her brother’s sun, ‘Helios.’ She was 
associated with midwifery out of her compassion for the difficulty of birth after her own 
mother was made to suffer by Hera’s jealousy through the birth of Artemis and Apollo. 
She asked her father, Zeus, to be allowed to hunt in the dappled groves rather than remain 
in the city and that she remain a virgin all her life, enabling her to be free of the rape and 
control of men (Townsend 2017, 122). Socrates discusses the etymology of her name,  
 “…Artemis appears to get her name from her healthy (ἀρτεµὲς) and ordered 
(κόσµιον) nature, and her love (ἐπιθυµιίαν) of virginity; in like manner he who 
named the goddess named her a wise judge of virtue (ἀρετῆς ἵσοτρα), or also too 
probably, as she hates the ploughing (ἄροτον µισησάσης) of man in woman; 
either for any or all of these reasons did he assign this name to the goddess. 
(Cratylus 406b; Townsend’s translation in Townsend 2017, 121) 
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To be clear: Artemis’ wise virtue is accompanied by the hatred of the rape of women by 
men and all sex, as it distracts or ruptures her from her hunt. Townsend discusses that 
Artemis represents a Greek “sublation of human desire into divine eros; rather than some 
pidgin Freudian repression, it is the very kind of transformation Socrates makes use of 
when he personifies Eros as a wondrous hunter” (Townsend 2017, 122; see Symposium 
203d). She continues to explain Socrates’ logic that to someone who is uninterested in 
sex because they are in the process of hunting for themselves, any unwanted affections, 
such as the mortal Actaeon spying on the naked Artemis, will appear ugly and lack “the 
proper fear, reverence, and shame (aidos, αἰδοὼς) he should have when witnessing the 
divine form” (Townsend 2017, 124). Artemis represents the guardian of women who will 
hunt down male perpetrators “‘so that a man may learn to touch only those loves that are 
within his power’” (Pindar qtd. in Townsend 2017, 124). 
 Ares, however, represents the very threat of this rape and returns to the discussion 
of andreia. Socrates explains the relation between the word andreia and the god is its 
‘hard and unbending’ quality, likely a humorous reference to an erect penis: 
Then, if you like, it follows that the male/masculinity (arren, ἄρρεν) and 
manliness/courage (andreion, ἀνδρεῖον) would be of the god ‘Ares’: if again it 
follows that he is hard (sklēron, σκληρόν) and unbending (amatastrophon, 
ἀµετάστροφον), which is called ‘arraton’ (ἄρρατον, or firm, solid), and it would 
be clear to call this god who is in every way warlike ‘Ares’.” (Cratylus, 407c-d; 
my translation) 
 
Through this, manliness is associated with an unbending, warring nature. But this is not 
conducive to philosophical thinking. Dialogue requires the skills of Artemis, the patience 
in pursuit and the guarding against rupturing distractions. Arriving to this problem, 
Socrates asks to move on from discussing the gods as it “frightens” him to discuss them, 
seeing as their names and characters are perhaps unhelpful for understanding the form of 
the human being. Hermogenes, however, insists on discussing one last god, Hermes, to 
see whether he is ‘of the family’ (genos, γένος) of the god Hermes because Cratylus has 
said that he is not. Socrates explains that Hermes: 
…is an interpreter (hermeneus), a messenger, a thief and a deceiver in words, a 
wheeler-dealer—and all these activities involve the power of speech. Now, as we 
mentioned before, ‘eirein’ means ‘to use words,’ and the other part of the name 
says—as Homer often does ‘emesato’ (‘he contrived’), which means ‘to devise.’ 
And it was out of these two words that the rule-setter established the name of the 
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god who devised speech (legein) and words, since ‘eirein’ means the same as 
‘legein’ (‘to speak’). It’s just as if he had told us: ‘Humans, it would be right for 
you to call the god who has contrived speech (to eirein emesato) ‘Eiremes’.’ But 
we, beautifying the name, as we suppose, call him ‘Hermes’ nowadays” (Cratylus 
408a; Reeve translation) 
 
Thus, Hermes the messenger god is the god of words, and he is a deceiver. And so, we 
might be deceived into thinking that andreia is a virtue only for men, when in fact it is a 
poor name given for the courage of the human being. Socrates continues to explain that 
Hermes has a double-natured son, Pan (‘all’), and that this messaging language god 
includes both the false and true forms. While the true form is divine, the false form of 
which “dwells below among the human masses, and is rough and goatish (tragikon); for 
it is here, in the tragic (tragikon) life, that one finds the vast majority of myths and 
falsehoods” (Cratylus 408c; Reeve translation). We might conclude that ‘andreia’ is the 
false word for human courage, and the deception of gendered manliness is where we find 
tragedy; the task is to hunt for the divine, true form of human courage, so-called 
‘manliness.’ 
 The men then turn from the gods to discussing celestial bodies and the elements 
as a progressing transition to discussing the virtues. Justice (dikaiousyne, δικαιουςύνη) is 
discussed first and is associated with the flow of light penetrating the universe (i.e., the 
flow of becoming through time). Socrates says it is often conflated with Zeus (Dia, Δία) 
or the penetration (diaionta, διαϊόντα) and burning (kaonta, κάοντα) of the sun itself. But 
Socrates thinks this is problematic for at least two reasons. First, conflating the virtue 
with the gods does not escape the Euthyphro problem. It does not confirm whether and 
why we should particularly value the virtues. And second, conflating the virtues with 
matter such as the sun reduces human freedom to fatalistic determinism—the sun 
predictably sets (Cratylus 412d-413d). Not only is the problem that the light of the sun 
does not illuminate the night and is therefore not ‘universal’ in our experience, but also 
because the sun is dictated by a temporality of future certainty. 
 Injustice is then said to be that which interrupts the penetration of the light, or it 
disrupts becoming through time. Socrates states “injustice [adikia, ἀδικία] is really 
nothing more than a hindering of that which penetrates [diaiontos, διαϊόντος]” (Cratylus 
413d; Reeve translation). It is against these disruptions that ‘andreia’ fights. The virtue 
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gets this name not because of its ‘firm’ nature, but because the “virtue was given its name 
in battle” against the ruptures of injustice on behalf of the flow of justice’s becoming 
(Cratylus 413d). Socrates continues, explaining that if we agree with Heraclitean 
philosophy that “the things that are flowing, then a battle cannot be anything but an 
opposing flow. If we remove the ‘d’ from ‘andreia’ to get ‘anreia’ (‘flowing back’), the 
name itself indicates this fact.” Of course, he admits, that “courage doesn’t oppose every 
flow, but only the one that is contrary to justice; otherwise courage wouldn’t be 
praiseworthy” (Cratylus 413d-e; Reeve translation). Without missing a beat, Socrates 
immediately ties this discussion of the ‘flows’ of andreia to the embodied material 
‘flows’ of both men and women. He says: 
Similarly, ‘male’ (‘arren’) and ‘man’ [‘aner’, ‘ἀνὴρ’] indicate upward flow [ano 
rhoe, ἄνῳ ῥοῇ]. It seems to me that [‘woman’; ‘gyne’, ‘γυνὴ’] wants to be 
[‘womb’; ‘gone’, ‘γονὴ’], that [‘female’; ‘thelu’; ‘θῆλυ’] wants to be [‘nipple’; 
‘theles’, ‘θηλῆς’], and that a nipple is so-called, Hermogenes, because it makes 
things flourish [tethelenai, τεθηλέναι] in just the way that watering makes plants 
flourish” (Cratylus, 414a; Reeve translation with my emendation) 
 
Through etymological gymnastics, Socrates clearly associates andreia with both men and 
women in their material bodies.  
 From andreia, Socrates insists on discussing its opposite, cowardice (deilia, 
δειλία). He says that cowardice is not a moral fault, but rather a debilitating ignorance 
that signifies the “bad movement” or rupture of injustice, explaining that it is “the 
strongest of the soul’s shackles” (Cratylus 415c; my translation). It is an aporia, a 
perplexing inability to move on and “a vice of the same sort, and so, it seems is 
everything else that hinders movement and motion. This makes it clear that the bad 
movement in question is a restrained or hindered motion, whose possession by a soul 
causes it to become filled with vice” (Cratylus 415c; my translation). Cowardice is thus 
the shackles of the soul in the aftermath of trauma that pauses and holds and individual’s 
life narrative, divorcing them from their past and removed from the future. It is the 
depression, drinking, drugs, promiscuity, and explosive fits of violence that are 
symptomatic of post-traumatic stress. It is the shackling of the dull present that forestalls 
the birth of the self in trauma’s aftermath (cf. Brison 1997 and 2002; also, Burke 2018). 
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 Socrates goes on to explain that this debilitating rupture of movement is called 
‘badness’ (kakia, κακία) in common speech and that ‘thriving’ or ‘excellence’ or ‘virtue’ 
(areten, ἀρετῆν) is the opposite. He explains that this virtuous thriving signifies: 
…first, ease of movement (euporian, εὐπορίαν) and second, that the flow of a 
good soul is always unimpeded, for it seems that it is given this name ‘arete’ 
(‘ἀρετή’) because it is unrestrained and unhindered and so is always flowing (aei 
hreon, ἀεὶ ῥέον). Thus, it is correct to call it ‘aeireiten’ (‘ἀειρείτην’), but this has 
been contracted, and it is called ‘arete’ ἀρετή). Now, maybe you’ll say that I’m 
inventing things again, but I think that if what I just said about ‘kakia’ (‘κακία’) is 
correct, then so is what I said about the name ‘arete’ (ἀρετὴν). (Cratylus, 415c-e; 
my translation) 
 
In other words, ‘virtue’ is the healthy, thriving becoming of the human throughout their 
lifetime. And what the Greeks called ‘manliness’ was the name for guarding this 
becoming. Later in the dialogue, Socrates returns to the appropriateness of the names of 
‘manliness’ and ‘womanliness’ for men and women (Cratylus 430c-431b). He concludes 
that it is possible that we have the wrong names for these and need a better craftsperson 
of names, a new name-giver or law-giver (nomothetes, νοµοθέτης) (Cratylus 431b-e). He 
urges his interlocutor Cratylus the Heraclitean to: 
Take courage [tharron, θαρρῶν] then and admit that one name may be well-given 
while another isn’t. Don’t insist that it have all the letters and exactly resemble the 
thing it names, but allow that an inappropriate letter may be included. But if an 
inappropriate letter may be included in a name, an inappropriate name may be 
included in a phrase. And if an inappropriate name may be included in a phrase, a 
phrase which is inappropriate to the things may be employed in a statement. 
Things are still named and described when this happens, provided the phrases 
include the pattern of the things they’re about. Remember that this is just what 
Hermogenes and I claimed earlier about the names of the elements. (Cratylus, 
430c-432e; Reeve translation) 
 
We must be brave and open to the possibility that the names we have for what we are 
trying to pursue and understand may be misleading and we may need new names for the 
virtues. 
The dialogue is often dismissed by scholars as an etymological parlor game, 
despite the presence of three philosophers with whom Plato historically studied: Socrates, 
Hermogenes the Parmenidean, and Cratylus the Heraclitean (Nails 2002, 105 and 247; cf. 
Diogenes). After the death of Socrates, Plato studied with the latter two and then he wrote 
his dialogues. The dialogue demonstrates how both Parmenidean and Heraclitean 
 120 
philosophies fall short in thinking the ontology of the human being. They each also 
justify inattention to traumatic memories. The dialogue ends with lodging such a 
criticism. The Parmenidean would hold that nothing can be changed about the memories 
and the Heraclitean would hold that knowledge could never be because it would always 
be moving (Cratylus 440b). But Socrates insists “there is always that which knows and 
that which is known” (Cratylus 440b; Reeve translation). And as we are discovering with 
increasing clarity in contemporary times, traumatic memories may rupture the self, but 
rather than departing from the body, they settle into it even despite an individual or 
community’s best efforts to deny or forget it (see Brison 1997 and 2002; also, Stern 
2010). Socrates holds a position between the Heraclitean and Parmenidean view: trauma 
histories do not disappear with time, but they rupture an individual’s path of becoming. 
Stamped into our bodies and fluttering in the recesses of our psyche (Theaetetus 190e-
200d), they persist in the present and risk shackling us to the stagnant aporia of the 
present. As I will discuss below, Plato addresses the ambiguity of this difficulty through 
the figure of Diotima of Mantinea in Symposium: because we are mortal, we move 
through time and experience rupture and forgetting, so there is need to re-collect our 
memories to produce and hold onto new knowledge, new meaning of those memories and 
thereby a new self, continuously through a lifetime. The process of this is loving care of 
the self, which is ‘manly’. Socrates encourage Cratylus to undertake this process, 
especially in regard to the difficulty of the appearances of names, saying he “must 
investigate them courageously [andreios, ἀνδρείως] and thoroughly and not accept 
anything easily—you are still young and in your prime, after all. Then after you’ve 
investigated them, if you happen to discover the truth, you can share it with me’ 
(Cratylus 440d; Reeve translation). Ironically, Cratylus the ever-flowing Heraclitean 
stubbornly stands by his position saying he has already investigated the issue: he already 
thinks he knows what ‘manliness’ is. Cratylus offers that perhaps the signifier for this 
‘manliness’ should be changed; that the appearances of ‘man’ and ‘woman’ are not 
adequate to naming the form of the human enduring this process. Today we call it 
‘courage.’ 
 In this section, I have discussed Socrates’ journey of thinking about the presumed 
‘form’ of the human being, ‘manliness’, from his twenties until late forties spanning the 
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period of his military service. As we have observed, he held skeptical ambivalence 
regarding the gendered connotations of masculinity assumed to comprise andreia. 
Socrates begins to raise doubts about the gendered nature of andreia as early as 
Parmenides; this doubt persists as he questions the militaristic assumptions of Protagoras, 
Laches, and Nikias. In Cratylus, we saw him raising the ambiguities of language and the 
appropriateness of ‘manliness’ to fully convey the meaning of the virtue of the human 
being that he seeks. Further, rather than accepting the militaristic values of domination 
presumed to define the term, Socrates defines what is called ‘andreia’ as the artful 
knowledge of “what is and is not to be feared” of the past, present and future that might 
provide “salvation” from the aftermath of trauma and its related coping mechanisms of 
excessive drinking, eating, and promiscuity; a kind of rescuing retreat of the self from 
death and danger (Protagoras 357b-360d; see also Laches, Cratylus, and Parmenides). It 
cannot be taught; it can only be obtained through the process of a voluntary hunt in 
common with free, ordinary people (Protagoras 353a-b; see also Parmenides 135d). In 
Book V of Republic, Plato’s Socrates makes clear that he thinks women are as capable 
and in need of hunting the virtue and becoming andreia as men are, despite Glaucon’s 
objections that men are stronger in everything (Republic 455d-e; see Townsend 2017). I 
agree with Townsend: Republic is concerned not only about the andreia of men 
overcoming the traumas of combat, but also the courage of women overcoming the 
traumas of rape, which is so often inflicted as a weapon of war (cf. Oliver 2007). As 
Townsend has analyzed, the concern for rape is signaled both by Plato’s framing of the 
dialogue with the festival of Bendis—the sexually active Thracian version of Artemis, the 
rape-hating goddess of hunting and midwifery—and his cloaking the women guardians 
exercising naked in ‘robes of virtue’ from the gaze of the male sex (Townsend 2017, see 
especially xix, 67-93, and 142). That is, hunting women will be cloaked in respect as they 
seek to give birth to their own best selves and as they midwife the re-birth of others. One 
might say that women will be cloaked by virtue of their pursuit of becoming their own 
best self, a task all good humans must undertake after the ruptures of trauma. In the next 
section, I explore Plato’s philosophy for undertaking such a hunt and re-birth of the 
human self.   
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The ‘Manliness’ of Love’s Overcoming 
As I analyze in this section, the strength Socrates associates with ‘manliness’ is 
not a uniquely ‘masculine’ strength, but, rather, the strength of enduring a kind of re-birth 
of the human soul in the aftermath of trauma. This is a birth each individual is capable of 
and responsible for regardless of their embodied social and political position. In an act of 
extraordinary subversion, Plato transvalues the ancient understanding of andreia from a 
patriarchal value of militant domination to a human value of birthing the self after 
trauma: that is, ‘manliness’ isn’t manly at all. To be a real ‘man’ is to engage not in 
warring but hunting, it is to take only from Ares the capacity to guard and this is a 
guarding of the activity of Artemis. Moreover, the hunt is to be a hunt towards an activity 
typically associated with women and goddesses: birth. 
 As we will see through an analysis of Symposium and Republic, to be a ‘real 
man’—to really be human—is to have the strength and courage of Love to endure and 
protect the hunt and rebirth of subjectivity in the aftermath of trauma’s living death and 
the institutional betrayals and denials that exacerbate it. This birth of self is easiest when 
done in Beauty, and more painful or thwarted altogether in situations of ugliness; and so, 
Love also demands the attempt to create a place of Beauty in which to give birth. It 
demands an attempt to create institutions that do not betray and communities that do not 
deny. This is done through engaging one another in the recollection of traumatic memory 
to create new meaning together. 
Following Angela Hobbs, I read Symposium and Republic as companion 
dialogues. Hobbs writes that:  
In the Republic, Socrates tells an unknown interlocutor that ‘I went down 
(kateben) yesterday to the Piraeus’; while in the Symposium, Apollodorus 
recounts to his—also unknown—companions how ‘the day before yesterday I 
happened to be going up to town’. The Republic descends from the realm of the 
Forms to the everyday world: at 516e4 the Philosopher-Ruler ‘goes down’ 
(katabas) from the sunlit heavens back into the cave. The Symposium moves in 
the opposite direction: it ascends from the everyday world of individual loves and 
their beautiful flesh to the vision of Beauty itself. In terms of our moral progress, 
therefore, the Symposium is prior. Socrates went down to the Piraeus yesterday; 
Apollodorus went up to town the day before. (Hobbs 2000, 223) 
 
While I agree with Hobbs’ analysis of the complementarity of the first lines and general 
philosophical action between Symposium and Republic ‘going up’ and ‘going down,’ her 
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analysis remains clouded in abstraction as it neglects the importance of the historical 
dramatic dating. Just as the dialogues we have previously discussed, Symposium and 
Republic are saturated with the trauma of the Peloponnesian War, particularly the 
absolute disaster of the Sicilian Expedition (415BC). The Symposium takes us ‘up’ to the 
dramas just prior to the departure for the Sicilian Expedition and Republic brings us back 
‘down’ to respond to the trauma and denials of the common Athenian citizens in its 
aftermath.  
The actions of the Symposium are set at 416BC, during a celebration of the 
success Agathon’s latest drama. It occurs in the aftermath of the 418BC Battle of 
Mantinea that officially broke the Peace of Nikias where the general Laches died along 
with other Athenians under friendly fire, a repetition of the Athenian hoplites’ failure at 
Delium (424BC) to march in step. As I have discussed, Alcibiades III led the Athenians 
headlong into the Battle of Mantinea to break the Peace of Nikias based in a grudge that 
brought the death of the good general Laches. It was also Alcibiades who vociferously 
supported the Sicilian Expedition. He and his Socratic companions who were accused of 
destroying the hermai and practicing the resurrection narrative of the Eleusinian 
Mysteries on the eve of the Expedition’s departure. Under my interpretation, Diotima of 
Mantinea is a figure through which Plato encourages his audience to recollect the 
tragedies of Mantinea prior to the decision to depart for the Sicilian Expedition as a 
method to resurrect, reincarnate, or re-birth themselves in the aftermath of trauma. The 
dialogue urges the audience to learn from the example of Alcibiades. The argument that 
is implied is: had the Athenians, especially Alcibiades III, undertaken the task of honestly 
recollecting the traumatic memories of the Battle of Mantinea to create new knowledge 
together, it is possible the horrors of the Sicilian Expedition would have been avoided.  
Rather, the traumatized Athenians were spinning totally out of control. As 
Thucydides writes, a power struggle in Athens had ensued since the death of Pericles 
from the plague in 429BC. Pericles was marked by his intelligence, honest integrity, and 
respect for the “liberty of the people” that earned him respect and true leadership power 
“in what was nominally a democracy [where] power was really in the hands of the first 
citizen.” He was not a war-monger but, with Aspasia of Miletus by his side, attempted 
peaceful diplomacy with Sparta. The peace failed due to Sparta’s aggressive refusal to 
 124 
negotiate with Pericles on the repeal of his modest Megarian Decree. After Pericles’ 
death, no subsequent Athenian leader stood out with the same integrity or intelligence as 
he. Instead, Cleon, Nikias, Alcibiades and others all clamored for authority, adopting 
“methods of demagogy which resulted in their losing control over the actual conduct of 
affairs […] naturally [leading] to a number of mistakes, among which was the Sicilian 
Expedition.” Thucydides concludes that “in the end it was only because they had 
destroyed themselves by their own internal strife that finally they were forced to 
surrender” (Thucydides II.65). The Sicilian Expedition was a prime example of the 
consequences of internal division not only between Athenian leadership, but also the 
strife internal to traumatized subjectivities and wounded male egos. It is worth discussing 
the history of this disaster to help contextualize my following textual analysis (see also 
Appendix I). 
Alcibiades III was responsible for breaking the Peace of Nikias, which resulted in 
Athenian defeat at the Battle of Mantinea. Immediately after, the Athenians turned their 
traumatized aggression onto the Melians, slaughtering all the men and enslaving the 
women and children. Alcibiades III was also responsible for entering the Athenians into 
the worst military venture in their history out of his and the Athenian all-male citizen’s 
desire for riches and empire. The Sicilian Expedition was prompted by the deception of 
the Sicilian city of Egesta and its appeals to the Athenians for help in its Megara-
associated Sicilian city-state of Selinus (cf. the historical destruction of the hermai and 
Alcibiades’ comparison of Socrates to the Silenus statues in Symposium). Nikias might 
have prevented the Expedition if he would have spoken honestly, but instead he over-
exaggerated the preparations necessary, which only further encouraged the eager 
Athenians and disparaged the minority who agreed with him into silence for fear of being 
unpatriotic (Thucydides VI.19-24). As a result of Nikias’ speech, the Athenians 
assembled the largest military undertaking in all of fifth-century Greece. Nikias was 
elected to lead the expedition along with Alcibiades and Lamachus.  
During the immense preparations for the voyage to Sicily, Thucydides writes that 
“it was found that in one night nearly all the stone Hermae in the city of Athens had their 
faces disfigured by being cut about.” The hermai were religious statutes of the messenger 
god, Hermes, which were a “national institution” lining the exterior of temples and the 
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porches of homes. Their destruction was a profound sacrilegious act, which the citizens 
regarded both as an omen of doom for the Sicilian Expedition as well as “evidence of a 
revolutionary conspiracy to overthrow the democracy” (Thucydides VI.27). The 
Athenians blamed Alcibiades and his cohort of young, drunken men who were also 
accused of sacrilegious “mock celebrations” of the Eleusinian Mysteries in their “private 
houses” (Thucydides VI.28). Plutarch identifies Androcles specifically as leading the 
charge against the young men (Plutarch Alcibiades, 19.1-3). 
The Eleusinian Mysteries were part of an agrarian psychedelic cult practice 
celebrating eternal life through the resurrection of Persephone and her return to her 
mother, Demeter. Similar to Christian Easter stories of Jesus Christ, the Eleusinian 
Mysteries tell the myth of Persephone’s descent into the underworld of the dead, her 
mother’s mournful search, and especially emphasizes Persephone’s miraculously divine 
ascent back to the world of the living and reunification with her mother.13 As stated, it 
was sacrilegious to practice the Mysteries in private homes, such as Alcibiades’ and his 
Socratic comrades were accused of doing at their drinking parties (symposium, 
συµποσιόν). The men faced sentences of execution, which were far harsher than Pericles’ 
modest Megarian Decree against the trespass of the Eleusinian fields (433/432BC). At 
least three of the men in Plato’s Symposium stood accused: Alcibiades III, Eryximachus, 
and Phaedrus. Both the historical Phaedrus and Alcibiades III fled to exile, but the record 
is unclear whether Eryximachus was executed or escaped.14 Under my interpretation 
provided below, Symposium explains what the young men may have really been up to: 
                                                        
13 Cf. “Eleusinian Mysteries,” Encyclopedia Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Eleusinian-
Mysteries; see also Martin P. Nilsson, Greek Popular Religion, Charleston: BiblioBazaar, 1940/2008; 
Antonia Tripolitis, Religions of the Hellenistic-Roman Age, Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans 
Publishing Company, 2001; Sergey Uvarov, Essay on the Mysteries of Eleusis, London: Rodwell and 
Martin, 1817/reprinted in 2004 by Kessinger Publishing; and R. Gordon Wassman, Albert Hoffman, and 
Carl A.P. Ruck, The Road to Eleusis: Unveiling the Secret of the Mysteries, New York City: Harcourt, 
1978/reprinted by North Atlantic Books, 2008. See also the Wikipedia entries for “Eleusinian Mysteries” 
and “Homeric Hymns.” 
 
14 For the historical details relevant to characters in Symposium discussed above and below, see Nails’ 
“Excursus 1: The Sacrilegious Crimes of 415,” 17-20; see also Nails’ entry on Symposium, 314-315; for 
Apollodorus, see Nails, 39-40; for Aristodemus, see Nails, 52-53; for Phaedrus, see Nails, 232-234; for 
Pausanias, see Nails, 222; for Eryximachus, see Nails 143-144; for Aristophanes, see Nails 54-57; for 
Agathon, see Nails 8-10; for Alcibiades III, see Nails 10-17; and for Socrates, see Nails 263-269. In her 
discussion dating Symposium, Nails says that four of the party would be implicated in the crimes (Nails, 
315), but this doesn’t seem to be supported by Excursus 1. 
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discussing human resurrection or rebirth into the world of the living, that is, the world of 
becoming, from the stagnant living death of trauma’s aftermath. 
Alcibiades denied the charges; it is possible that he was indeed framed by Nikias 
and others who dissented with the decision to embark to Sicily. Alcibiades demanded a 
trial before setting sail, fearing the impact of rumor-mongering in his absence. “His 
enemies, however,” Thucydides writes, “were afraid that if the case was brought at once, 
he would have the goodwill of the army,” as Alcibiades was very popular among the 
military, “and that the people would be lenient with him” given his popularity for 
convincing “the Argives and some of the Mantineans to join the expedition” to Sicily 
(Thucydides VI.29). Alcibiades thus set sail without trial to lead the Sicilian Expedition 
with Nikias and Lamachus. 
Nearly the entire population of Athens “went down to the Piraeus” to send the 
fleet off for the Sicilian Expedition. Thucydides writes that the Athenians were “full of 
hope and full of lamentation” (Thucydides VI.30). But after the Sicilian Expedition, the 
Athenians stood in fear that the Spartans would attack the port of Piraeus and desperately 
sought to rebuild their defenses and remaining allegiances. This is the historical 
significance of Republic’s opening line, “I went down to the Piraeus yesterday with 
Glaucon” (Republic 327a; Grube translation).  
 When the Athenians arrived at Sicily, Egesta’s deception was discovered: the 
promised riches did not exist. Alcibiades, Lamachus, and Nikias debated what to do. 
Nikias held a conservative position of continuing to sail to Selinus as planned so Egesta 
might come up with the money, and if they refused then Athens should stay and oversee 
the settlement between Selinus and Egesta and then sail home to Athens along the coast 
“making a demonstration of the power of Athens” to other cities and not “put the state in 
danger by wasting her own resources” (Thucydides VI.47). Lamachus favored a surprise 
attack, which may have been best (Thucydides VI.49; see Kagan 2003). Alcibiades, 
however, did not want to risk returning to Athens empty-handed—it was, after all, his 
enthusiasm for riches and empire that motivated the Athenians to embark on the 
extravagant expedition. He suggested diplomatically appealing to allies and await their 
arrival (Thucydides VI.48; cf. Laches). Lamachus eventually sided with Alcibiades; 
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however, the attempt to garner allies in the region did not go very well (Thucydides 
VI.50-52). 
 Meanwhile, Athens was beset by political strife and scandal (Thucydides VI.53-
60), and Alcibiades was recalled to stand trial. He was not arrested, for fear of disrupting 
Athens’ fragile alliances at Sicily, but allowed to sail himself to Sicily with an escort. He 
took this as an opportunity to flee into exile and the Athenians sentenced him to death in 
his absence; he then began to aid the Spartans plan their advancement on the city of 
Athens proper as revenge against the Athenians who had crossed him and attempt “to 
recover a country that has ceased to be mine” (Thucydides VI.61 and 92). The Spartans 
also sent a contingent under Gylippus to Sicily. 
 When Gylippus arrived at Sicily, the Athenians had been left to the sole command 
of Nikias, who had grown increasingly ill and reclusive. Lamachus had died in battle, 
battles fought according to Nikias’ original plan (Thucydides VI.62-72 and 101-103). 
Nikias maintained a defensive position rather than attacking the newly arrived Spartans 
on the shores, which only enabled the Spartans to strengthen their position (Thucydides 
VII.3). The situation grew dire, a two-front battle of the Athenians against the Sicilians 
and Spartans (Thucydides VII.16-18). Rather than retreat or attack, Nikias penned a letter 
to Athens. As Thucydides observes, he wrote the letter out of profound distrust in both 
his messenger to accurately convey the message to the Athenians and the Athenians to 
not kill the messenger for receiving his remarkably terrible news that the largest fleet 
assembled in all of fifth-century Athens was failing. He beseeched the Athenians “to 
either recall us, or else to send out another force, both naval and military, as big as the 
first, with large sums of money, and also someone to relieve me of the command, as a 
disease of the kidneys has made me unfit for service” (Thucydides VII.8-15). 
 But the city of Athens was itself under existential threat as the Spartans advanced, 
fortifying the city of Decelea under Alcibiades’ advice. The Athenians delayed in sending 
ships to Sicily and refused to relieve Nikias, but assembled a fleet under Demosthenes. 
The assembly and departure of this new fleet left Athens greatly weakened financially 
and militarily; and it was all for nothing. The Athenians suffered a debilitating defeat, 
falling into complete disorder in a nighttime attack of Epipolae led by Demosthenes. An 
enormous number of Athenians died by one another’s hands in the confusion. The 
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remaining survivors grew ill from camping in marshland. Demosthenes resolved that the 
Athenians should retreat at once and preserve the navy (Thucydides VII.44). But Nikias 
stalled the departure. He had hopes, fueled by a small party of Syracusans, that their siege 
would work. Himself undecided about what to do, he delivered a speech revealing his 
profound distrust in his fellow Athenians that refused retreat for fear of the disgrace and 
even executions they may face in Athens (Thucydides VII.48). The two disagreed and a 
decision was forestalled, and the men of the fleet began to think Nikias must be right that 
the siege would work to have stuck so firmly to his position in his speech. And so, out of 
Nikias’ fear and distrust, the Athenians remained like sitting ducks (Thucydides VII.49). 
When Sparta sent reinforcements, the Athenians realized their mistake. Nikias refused an 
open discussion of their retreat, and instead sent secret messages throughout the fleet to 
await the order. When they were just about to retreat, the moon became red under a total 
lunar eclipse. The Athenians took this as dooming sign from the gods, perhaps the moon 
goddess Selene or her affiliated Artemis, and begged the generals Nikias and 
Demosthenes to wait. The sickly Nikias was also a man who prided himself on his piety 
and Thucydides writes that he “was rather over-inclined to divination and such things.” 
At the recommendation of the soothsayers, Nikias demanded the Athenians stall their 
retreat through another moon cycle (“thrice nine days”), refusing any further discussion 
on the matter (Thucydides VII.50).  
 The Syracusans then victoriously attacked them and pursued what remained of the 
Athenian fleet at sea (Thucydides VII.53-57). Nikias delivered a speech of desperation to 
his men, telling them if they lost this battle, Athens would lose all her defenses: there 
were no more ships or hoplites on reserve. He concluded that now was the time for any 
man of special skill or good-spirit [eupsychia, εὐψυχία; also translated as ‘courage’], that 
now “is the time for him to show it” (Thucydides VII.64). Thucydides remarks that the 
men cried out for their “wives, children, [and] gods of the native land […] in the terror of 
the moment, [believing] that they will help” (Thucydides VII.69; cf. Herman 
1992/1997/2015, 52 and van der Kolk 2015, 82). Indeed, things only grew worse for the 
Athenian soldiers, and their fears for the future only grew worse (Thucydides VII.71). 
The Athenians suffered a crushing defeat. Their entire fleet was captured, and they were 
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unable to collect their dead (Thucydides VII.72-73). Thucydides writes of the horrors 
they encountered: 
 […] in the actual leaving of the camp there were sad sights for every eye, sad 
thoughts for every mind to feel. The dead were unburied, and when any man 
recognized one of his friends lying among them, he was filled with grief and fear; 
and the living who, whether sick or wounded, were being left behind caused more 
pain than did the dead to those who were left alive, and were more pitiable than 
the lost. Their prayers and their lamentations made the rest feel important and 
helpless, as they begged to be taken with them and cried out aloud to every single 
friend or relative whom they could see; as they hung about the necks of those who 
had shared tents with them and were now going, following after them as far as 
they could, and, when their bodily strength failed them, reiterated their cries to 
heaven and their lamentations as they were left behind. So, the whole army was 
filled with tears and in such distress of mind that they found it difficult to go away 
even roam this land of their enemies when sufferings too great for tears had 
befallen them already and more still, they feared, awaited them in the dark future 
ahead. There was also a profound sense of shame and deep feelings of self-
reproach […] No Hellenic army had ever suffered such a reverse. They had come 
to enslave others, and now they were going away frightened of being enslaved 
themselves; and instead of the prayers and paeans with which they had sailed out, 
the words to be heard now were directly contrary and boded evil as they started 
on their way back, sailors traveling on land, trusting in hoplites rather than in 
ships. (Thucydides VII.75) 
 
The ailing Nikias attempted to comfort the troops by touting his own privilege and 
religious optimism for the future, saying: 
I myself am physically no stronger than any one among you (in fact you see what 
my illness has done to me), nor, I think, can anyone be considered to have been 
more blessed by fortune than I have been in my private life and in other respects; 
but I am now plunged into the same perils as the meanest man here. Yet 
throughout my life I have worshipped the gods as I ought, and my conduct 
towards men as been just and without reproach. Because of this I still have a 
strong hope for the future, and these disasters do not terrify me as they well might 
do. […] In a word, soldiers, you must make up your minds that to be brave now is 
a matter of necessity, since no place exists near at hand where a coward can take 
refuge, and that, if you escape the enemy now, you will all see again the homes 
for which you long, and the Athenians among you will build up again the great 
power of Athens, fallen though it is. It is men who make the city, and not walls or 
ships with no men inside them. (Thucydides VII.77) 
 
The Athenians were captured shortly after this speech. Nikias and Demosthenes 
attempted to negotiate an agreement that the Athenians would pay war reparations, but 
this was rejected. Nikias eventually surrendered to the Spartan Gylippus, trusting him to 
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spare his life, but both he and Demosthenes were executed in 413BC. The remaining 
warriors were stored in a pit for eight months, and those that survived were enslaved. It is 
worth noting that Thucydides thought the execution of Nikias was highly unjust as he 
was “a man who, of all the Hellenes in my time, least deserved to come to so miserable 
an end, since the whole of his life had been devoted to the study and practice of virtue” 
(Thucydides VII.81-86). It is this estimation of Nikias’ virtue that I believe Plato refutes 
in Laches and throughout his oeuvre: Nikias only pretend to virtue. 
 In the aftermath of Sicily, the people at Athens were stunned. Thucydides writes 
of the intensity of their denial in the face of surviving soldiers’ accounts, writing “[w]hen 
news reached Athens, for a long time people would not believe it, even though they were 
given precise information from the very soldiers who had been present at the event and 
had escaped; still they thought that this total destruction was something that could not 
possibly be true” (Thucydides VIII.1). As stated in the epigraph by trauma survivor, 
Jessica Stern, “Denial helps the bystander” to avoid the terrors we perpetuate and 
experience at institutional and individual levels, including the moral crimes committed 
and experienced by soldiers and those committed in the privacy of the home. She writes 
that it is “bad enough” to be the victim of terrifying trauma, “to be treated as an object in 
a perpetrator’s dream, rather than the subject of your own,” but that “when observers 
become complicit in the victim’s desire to forget, they become perpetrators too.” She 
goes on to explain that this is “why traumatized groups sometimes fare better than 
traumatized individuals. When the feeling of terror is shared, victims have a harder time 
forgetting what occurred or denying their terror. […] Talking about what occurred with 
other survivors or witnesses [is] an essential part of recovery.” In place of the terror, rage, 
and pain of trauma, Stern explains that denial of trauma replaces these emotions “with 
free-floating shame. The victim will begin to wonder: What did I do? She will begin to 
believe: I must have done something bad. But the sensation of shame is shameful itself, 
so we dissociate that, too. In the end, a victim who has suffered the denial of others will 
come to see herself as a liar” (Stern 2010, 143-145). Both Jessica Stern and philosopher 
Bonnie Mann explain how this sense of shame is so easily converted into the infliction of 
trauma on others, or what Judith Herman as repetition compulsion (Stern 2010, Mann 
2014, and Herman 1992/1997/2015, 41). As Mann writes, “[s]hame is one of those 
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experiences in which I lose my way, I am exiled” from our place in the world with others 
(Mann 2014, 127-128). And to reclaim this place in the world, she writes that masculinity 
converts shame into power; a sense of one’s shame is deflected onto others to create a 
sense of power. Stern puts it this way, “[t]his is my hypothesis. Terrorizing others—
including by raping them—is a way to reassert one’s manhood in the face of extreme 
humiliation. Feeling terrorized is humiliating. Having been raped is humiliating. To be 
treated ‘like a woman’ is humiliating. […] Rape is the perfect way to discharge one’s 
shame. But like fear, shame is contagious. The shame and fear of the rapist now infect the 
victim, who, depending on his psychological and moral resilience, may discharge his fear 
and shame into a new victim, not necessarily through rape. […] [S]hame is an important 
risk factor for savagery” (Stern 2010, 195). And the Athenians did precisely this, 
converting their shame into resolve to carry on with the war—both after their defeat at 
the Battle of Mantinea, which led to the slaughter and enslavement of the Melians and the 
desire to embark on the Sicilian Expedition, as well as the resolve of the Athenians to 
persist in the war after the harrowing fall at Sicily.   
When the citizens could no longer deny the truth of the matter that they had no 
navy and were broke, they denied their own responsibility in launching the expedition 
and lashed out at the public figures, prophets, and soothsayers who had advocated it and 
who had “encouraged them to believe that they would conquer Sicily” (Thucydides 
VII.1). The Athenians experienced a profound feeling of loss, stress, fear, and anxiety. 
Not only did they as a state and community of individuals have to confront the incredible 
loss of irreplaceable lives, but also that they had lost their military position with the loss 
of their hoplite army, cavalry, navy, and finances. Despairing, anxious, and stressed, the 
Athenians “had little hope of being able to survive” thinking that the Spartans and their 
allies would immediately take the opportunity to attack the city proper by both land and 
sea. So, the Athenians resolved in their pit of anxiety to shore up their limited resources 
and “not give in;” with desperate efficiency, they sought to rebuild their navy, their 
finances, and their allegiances employing austerity measures however necessary. As I 
said, this is the historical significance of Republic’s opening line, “I went down to the 
Piraeus yesterday with Glaucon” to see how the Athenians would manage with the 
Thracians to pull off the festival of the Thracian huntress, midwife, and desirous Bendis 
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(Republic 327a; Grube translation). How will they become, hunting together and giving 
birth to their new selves? Moreover, unlike the Athenian’s sex-despising virgin Artemis, 
how might the Athenians manage to include an icon of hunting and midwifing women 
that retains her embodied, sexual desires and the desires of men for her? Mary Townsend 
explores this question in significant detail, arguing that Plato’s Republic demonstrates the 
ambiguities of this question (Townsend 2017). Moreover, this question is pondered 
through a discussion of justice at midday with young men before the evening’s more 
raucous festivities are to begin. And so, I place Republic at this period of Athenian denial 
and fearful resolve to rebuild their military and allegiances. What if the Greeks had 
paused at this moment to recollect their traumas and pursue the virtue of becoming good 
humans? The festival of Bendis would have been celebrated in the spring, corresponding 
to the period the city of Athens received word of the failure of the Sicilian Expedition and 
was experiencing their period of denial, anger, anxiety, and fearful decision to rebuild 
their navy and strengthen their remaining allegiances. Thucydides writes, “now that they 
were terrified, they were ready to put everything in order. Their decisions were carried 
out at once, and so summer came to an end” (Thucydides VIII.1). The war would rage on 
for another decade, with Alcibiades III returning to a hero’s welcome and departing again 
in exile, with more wars soon to follow. 
 It is impossible for me to read Plato’s philosophy of recollection without keeping 
in mind his recent history of incredible war trauma, the institutional betrayals of both 
Nikias and Alcibiades, and the profound denial of the people of Athens in the aftermath 
of the Sicilian Expedition. In what follows, I explain his understanding of the ‘artful 
knowledge’ of constantly becoming a good, thriving human and community in the 
aftermath of trauma along with the implication that such a process of becoming may avert 
the affliction of trauma and institutional denial in the future. This is done through his 
critical disagreement with the influential peace and gender politics of the comedian 
Aristophanes, who held that a two-state hegemony politics of peace (that is, Sparta and 
Athens should just stop fighting one another and coexist) and blamed the cause of war on 
the presence of unmanliness (anandreia, ἀνανδρεία) in the polis, lampooning Aspasia of 
Miletus and the very idea of women’s rebellion throughout his works. Plato reveals the 
way in which they were unmanly, but not for the gendered reasons most assume. As 
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Cratylus intimates, one ought not be fooled by the false underside of language. They 
were unmanly because they remained shackled to their shame (cf. deilia, δειλία in 
Cratylus 415c), bound to their seats in the cave of denial (cf. Republic Book VII). This, it 
is implied, is precisely because the Athenians failed to pursue the virtue of the human that 
is in unity with the Good, the Just, and the Beautiful: the failed to undertake a process of 
recollection and rebirth in the aftermath of trauma, thwarting their becoming good, 
strong, and courageous human beings by ensnaring them in trauma’s dialectic and 
repetition (Herman 1992/1997/2015).  
 
Symposium: The Symposium is framed with Apollodorus responding to a question, 
omitted from the dialogue, of an unnamed businessman in the year 400BC, a year prior to 
Socrates’ death. Apollodorus himself had been successful in business in his early 
adulthood until he left the money-making world to join Socrates in the philosophical hunt 
for and birth of the Good. This decision earned him a reputation among the business elite 
as being ‘mad’ or ‘soft’ (malakos, µαλακὸς) and always abusively criticizing (kakegoreis, 
κακηορεῖς) himself and others (Symposium 173d-e). The question is likely asking 
Apollodorus what he knew of Socrates’ role in his followers and former lover, Alcibiades 
III, sacrilegious private practice of the Eleusinian Mysteries15 and destruction of the 
hermai prior to the 415BC Sicilian Expedition; that is, details into whether and how 
Socrates may have corrupted the youth. Apollodorus remarks that he has been asked the 
question before and given it much thought, though he himself was too young to attend 
any drinking party prior to 415BC as he would have been roughly thirteen years old or 
younger at the time (Symposium 172a-173a). But Apollodorus decides to relate a story of 
the infamous drinking parties that he heard from a common man, Aristodemus, who had 
been philosophically hunting with Socrates at the time—reaffirming Socrates’ own stated 
method that pursuing the Good should be done with common people, rather than 
restricted to the elite—and attended the 416BC celebration of Agathon’s award-winning 
first tragedy as Socrates’ uninvited guest (Symposium 173b; Protagoras 353a-b). The 
                                                        
15 The historical private practice of the Eleusinian Mysteries by Socrates’ followers along with the themes 
of recollection and rebirth in the Symposium dialogue might be considered similar to the private 
communion celebrating themes of freedom in Jewish Passover traditions. Judith Shulevitz suggests that the 
Jewish Passover tradition is a modification of the Greek symposium literature (Shulevitz 2010). 
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dialogue de-sublimates Socrates’ hunt for ‘the Good Man,’ or the becoming of good 
human subjectivity, through his seeming erotic interest in Agathon, literally translated as 
‘the Good Man’ (agathon, ἀγαθόν). Further, at least two of those accused in 415BC for 
practicing the Eleusinian Mysteries, Phaedrus and Eryximachus, are present to provide 
speeches and hear Diotima’s philosophy of resurrection or rebirth, though both pass out 
early in the dialogue—a reference to their untimely death or exile.16 Alcibiades, who 
would soon be accused of destroying the Hermes statues, drunkenly crashes the party 
after Socrates expresses of her wisdom: he stands out as a lesson and example of the 
extraordinary capacity for destruction if one does not heed the importance of pursuing the 
recollection of traumatic memories with others to give new meaning to them so as to give 
birth to the good self.  
 The doomed Eryximachus proposes to avoid the encouragement of drinking to 
excess and instead give speeches on love. Following his understanding of proper dialogue 
among ‘real men’ expressed by Socrates in Protagoras 347c-348a, he dismisses the flute-
girl from their company to “play for herself or, if she prefers, for the women in the 
house” as she is not to be hunted this evening, but instead the men will hunt for the 
meaning of Love (Symposium 176e). Flute-girls in attendance at ancient symposium 
were, more often than not, musically trained prostitutes. Republic with Symposium 
clarifies the mistake of Eryximachus in excluding the flute-girl by virtue of her sex and 
her erotic profession. As Townsend notes, women are included in Republic’s kallipolis, 
or the good albeit luxurious city, as erotic courtesan companions or hetaeras (ἑταῖραι) as 
well as hunters (thereutai, θηρευταί), artists, musicians, poets and creators, teachers, wet 
nurses (titthon, τιτθῶν), caretakers (trophon, τροφῶν), hair stylists, chefs, and farmers 
(Rep. II.373a-c). Republic Book V explicitly states that women are to be included among 
the hunting guardian class. Townsend writes that “[i]t’s striking that hunting and women 
make an appearance in Book II as part of the same action; this is precisely the same 
conjunction that Socrates makes when in Book V he draws women into the guardian class 
and has them hunt along with the men: in both cases women and hunting arrive in the 
                                                        
16 See Nancy Evans “Diotima and Demeter as Mystagogues in Plato’s Symposium” Hypatia 21.2 (2006): 1-
27. Evans demonstrates Plato’s usage of the subversive, female-centered Eleusinian Mysteries of Demeter 
in Diotima’s speech. 
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same breath” (Townsend 2017, 75). So, the feminist reader should be hesitant to read too 
much into Eryximachus’ dismissal of the flute girl, as his action is a mistake.  
In fact, upon his entrance into Symposium, Alcibiades compares Socrates to the 
statues of Silenus playing the flute as well as the seductive flute-playing Marsyas 
(Symposium 215b-d). According to myth, the wise goddess Athena invented the flute and 
threw it away because playing it inhibited speech, or logic (logos, λόγος). Marsyas took 
the flute and dared to compete against Apollo, the musical twin of the huntress Artemis, 
and was flayed for his audacity. Silenus was the tutor to the wine god Dionysus, a 
relationship mirroring Socrates’ and Alcibiades’ early years together. Further, the reader 
may note, the statues of Silenus may also reference the accusations that Alcibiades 
destroyed the Hermes statues prior to sailing to Sicily to fight against the city of Selinus 
out of temptation for riches and empire. Further, as Socrates admits in Menexenus, he 
learned this skill of seductive oratory from the hetaera Aspasia of Miletus, a woman 
lambasted in ancient comedy for causing the Peloponnesian War through her private 
influence over her partner, Pericles, and his leadership of Athens.  
 Further, Socrates deliberately cloaks his own speech in a dialogue that he claims 
to have had with the, albeit likely fictionalized, priestess, Diotima of Mantinea. It is in 
this speech that we find Plato articulating the ‘artful knowledge’ that he has only alluded 
to, albeit while performing it, in previous dialogues. If we read her name in the register of 
puns to the ear of Plato’s audience, as we did of Socrates pursuing the meaning of the 
‘Good Man’ Agathon, this is a dialogue with the memory of Mantinea that demonstrates 
something like “you conquer (nikes, νίκης; 2nd person present) the seers of bad destiny 
(mantin, µαντιν; noun accusative) when you respect (timas, τίµας; 2nd person present or 
imperfect) justice (dio, διο; cf. Cratylus 412d-413d)” (Mantinikes Diotimas’; Μαντινικῆς 
Διοτίµας; Symposium 201d).17 Socrates speaks to the credibility of Diotima’s wisdom by 
implying she prevented war from breaking out in 440BC, which “put off the plague for 
ten years by telling the Athenians what sacrifices to make” (Symposium 201d; Nehamas 
                                                        
17 This is not a definitive translation of the pun, as one might also hear “victorious seers honor Zeus” 
among other translations. Evans translates her name as “Zeus Honor” (Evans 2006, 8), but taken with 
Cratylus, Socrates is likely speaking about justice. Nevertheless, meaning abounds with her name: 
Mantinea was a city that was known for the practice of hoplomachia, ‘mantin’ ‘nikes’ may also refer to 
Nikias’ folly of following the seers, and more. See also Laurence D. Cooper, Eros in Plato, Rousseau, and 
Nietzsche: The Politics of Infinity (University Park: Pennsylvanian State University Press, 2008): 63n14. 
 136 
and Woodruff translation). Indeed, the Greek world on the precipice of war in 440BC 
when the Spartan war hawks sought to utilize the Samian revolt against Miletus to violate 
the Thirty Years Peace and reinitiate war with Athens. Conflict was only averted through 
the diplomatic efforts of the city of Corinth, who rallied allies of the Spartan League to 
reject escalation to war (Ste. Croix 1972, 200-219; cf. Plutarch Pericles 24.1-25.7 and 
28.1-29.1). Corinth reminded Pericles of their efforts when he issued his modest 
Megarian Decree, a response to the Corinthians’ and Sparta’s own aggressive impious 
(asebeia, ἀσεβεία) cultivation of sacred land (hiera orgas, ἱερὰ ὀργάς) of the Eleusinian 
fields between the cities of Megara and Athens. Moreover, Corinth was now motivated to 
return to war, rather than prevent it, for is former colony, Potidaea, sought to revolt from 
Athens. When Pericles’ refused to rescind the modest Megarian decree and demand 
Sparta allow Athenians the freedom to enter its city, Sparta declared war (Ste. Croix 
1972, 204-205, 212, 254-256, 259-260). Hers is a wisdom that can lead traumatized men 
to desire to avoid war. 
 This was a wisdom lacking at the dissolution of the Thirty Years Peace in the 
outbreak of the Second Peloponnesian War in 432BC; it was lacking again in Alcibiades’ 
violation of the Peace of Nikias with his charge into the Battle of Mantinea and again 
charging to Sicily. Both outbreaks of conflict were motivated in the desire for the glories 
of wealth and empire and neither could be prevented by men, such as Pericles and Nikias, 
motivated to secure peace between the two hegemons. Only Diotima’s wise philosophy 
of strong and ‘manly’ Love could create or sustain peace.  
 Socrates explains that Love is a pursuer of the Beautiful, rather than the Beautiful 
itself as Agathon believed. Love exists between ignorance and understanding, mortality 
and immortality, as a messenger shuttling between and binding the two (Symposium 
201e-202e); Love is becoming. Love, or Eros (Cupid in Roman mythology), was 
conceived by the needful Penia (literally ‘need’ or ‘poverty’) and her intemperate 
cunning to have a child by the drunken, resourceful Poros18 (literally ‘means’ or 
                                                        
18 The historical Aspasia was lambasted in comedy and common gossip for seducing powerful men, and her 
own son by the sheep-farmer turned politician, Lysicles, was named Poristes (“provider”/“supplier”) 
(Henry 1995, 43). 
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‘resources’) on the day of Aphrodite’s birth (Symposium 203b-e).19 Socrates explains that 
Eros inherits the poverty or need of his mother and from his father “he is a pursuer 
(ἐπιβουλους) of the beautiful (kalois, καλοῖς) and the good (agathois, ἀγαθοῖς), he is 
courageous (or ‘manly’ andreios, ἀνδρεῖος) and eager (ites, ἴτης) and intensely earnest 
(syntonos, σύντονος), an awesome hunter (thereutes deinos, θηρευτὴς δεινός), always 
weaving (plekon, πλέκων) machinations (mechanas, µηχανάς), and resourceful and 
desiring of practical wisdom (phroneseos, φρονήσεως), a lover of wisdom (i.e., a 
philosopher, philosophon, φιλοσοφῶν) through all of his meaningful life (biou, βίου as 
opposed to biological animal life, zoe, ζωή), an awesome sorcerer (deinos goes, δεινὸς 
γόης) and druggist (pharmakeus, φαρµακεύς) and expert orator (or a sophist, sophistes, 
σοφιστής)” (Symposium 203dc-d; my translation). So, Eros lacks Beauty and wisdom, but 
has the capabilities to pursue it. 
 The dialogue between Socrates and Diotima goes on to reveal that Eros “must be 
a lover of wisdom and, as such, is in between being wise and being ignorant,” and 
further, that Eros is desire that beautiful and good things “become his own” (Symposium 
204b-d; Nehamas and Woodruff translation). And “who will that person be when the 
good has become theirs? […] He will be of good spirit (eudaimon, εὐδαίµων; commonly 
translated as ‘happy’)” (Symposium 204e-205a; my translation). Eudaimonia is often 
translated as ‘happiness,’ however, it means something far closer to ‘earned secure 
attachment’ in psychology, which is the idea of developing or giving birth to an internal 
‘parenting’ self to listen to and attend to the cries of the internal ‘infant’ or traumatized 
self. Being of good spirit, or being of eudaimonia, is not something we are born with, but 
something that we become to accompany and, in some sense, rule over our easily 
triggered traumatized selves. Plato goes on, concluding through the dialogue of Socrates 
and Diotima that this desire to be of good spirit is “common to all human beings and that 
everyone wants to have good things forever and ever […] everyone is in love” 
(Symposium 205a; Nehamas and Woodruff translation). Yet, Diotima notes, we often 
reserve the term ‘eros’ for romantic lovers, not recognizing that the pursuit of 
                                                        
19 Today, we would say Penia raped Poros, but Plato was likely invoking the ancient stereotype of women’s 
intemperate promiscuity—a stereotype that was likely used to blame women for the abuse of men. See 
Townsend 2017. 
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eudaimonia takes many forms, some of which are better than others (i.e., the pursuit of 
philosophy is far more meaningful than the pursuit of wealth) (Symposium 205b-d with 
208c-d).  
 Plato’s Diotima then takes a moment to refute “a certain story […] according to 
which lovers are those people who seek their other halves” (Symposium 205e). This is 
‘Origin of Love’ myth as told by Aristophanes only a few speeches prior, and so this is 
Plato’s moment to directly refute the ‘soulmate’ paradigm both at its romantic registers 
between individuals and its political registers between Sparta and Athens. It is in this 
refutation that Plato reveals the details of the unteachable ‘artful knowledge’ that might 
rescue traumatized subjectivity from the coping mechanisms of trauma (i.e., excessive 
eating, drinking, promiscuity, etc.) and the oscillations of trauma repetition (Protagoras 
353c-356e; cf. Herman 1992/1997/2015). This artful knowledge entails a common 
pursuit of the good (agathon, ἀγαθόν), which is the birth of a good spirit (eudaimonia, 
εὐδαιµονία) in beauty (kalon, κᾶλον), through the process of recollecting memories and 
creating new meaning from them. Far from an abstract idea, this is a philosophy 
purposefully grounded in the traumatic memories of war, plague, institutional betrayal, 
and the communal denial of the Athenians that was caused and exacerbated by illogical 
notions of andreia. Further, this philosophy, Plato implies, is capable of preventing war 
and further trauma infliction (Symposium 201d). The figure of Alcibiades looms as a 
lesson to learn from; in this part of Diotima’s speech, Socrates is, in part, explaining the 
dissolution of his erotic relationship with Alcibiades in the aftermath of the latter’s 
insecurely greedy, headlong charge into Mantinea and continued spirals into the Sicilian 
Expedition. Alcibiades was not pursuing the good; he himself says he learned the lesson 
of Socratic philosophy all too late. 
 Contrary to Aristophanes’ political vision that Sparta and Athens should 
overcome their divisions and reunify Greece with a peaceful two-state hegemony and his 
romantic vision that lovers are destined to a soulmate and must seek and reunify, 
implying that Alcibiades and Socrates ought to overcome their divisions and return to 
their erotic relationship, Diotima insists that lovers pursue the good (Symposium 205e). 
Rather than pursuing ‘wholeness,’ lovers are willing to excise the bad within themselves 
and between one another in pursuit of the good—much like the willingness of a soldier 
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(or the soldier’s medic) to amputate a gangrene limb (Symposium 205e-206a). 
Aristophanes’ philosophy is a stagnant, regressive account of re-unifying individual, 
romantic, communal, and political ruptures. This is a past-oriented becoming that is not a 
becoming at all but rather an attempt to re-find and re-become what one was. This is a 
desire common to traumatized subjectivities, but it is an impossibility. The self can never 
be the same after trauma, there is no going back to the pre-traumatized subjectivity and 
attempts to do so only thwart rebirth in the aftermath. There must be a rebirth, a 
becoming, into the future that can only be achieved through processing traumatic 
memories into new meaning. The self has been changed by trauma, it has experienced a 
kind of death, and thus the self must regenerate itself into something new. 
Rather than pursuing eudaimonia through confused notions of masculinity and 
glory-seeking, Diotima says the only way to pursue and have the good is by giving birth 
in beauty: Lovers “pursue [diokonton, διωκόντων] the good” by “giving birth [tokos, 
τόκος] in beauty [kalo, καλῶ], whether in body [soma, σῶµα] or in soul [psychen, 
ψυχήν]. […] [W]hat Love wants is not beauty […] [but] reproduction and birth in 
beauty” (Symposium 206b and 206e; Nehamas and Woodruff translation). She explains 
that each of us has the potential to give birth to our new self, but that this birth is easiest 
and best if done in Beauty. Diotima says that this Beauty is often called Moira, or the 
Fates, and Eiluthia, which is the goddess who presides along with the Fates and Artemis 
at childbirth whose name literally means “contracting” (eilei, εἰλεί) “possessed or 
inspired woman” (thuia, θυια; Feminine declension). The three Fates that comprise the 
Moira, Clotho of the present, Lachesis of the past, and Atropos of the future, return in 
Republic where it is emphasized that while each of us may be fated to our circumstance, 
we are also responsible for who it is we become. We are responsible for overcoming the 
wounds of the past, and this is easier if done in circumstances of beauty. That is, if we are 
securely supported by loved ones, our community, and institutions, our freedom to 
become our best selves will be both possible and easy. 
Diotima explains that in the absence of beauty, that is, if one is betrayed rather 
than supported by institutions and networks of care, the birth of the self after trauma will 
either painful or thwarted altogether. She explains, in the ugly absence of beauty: 
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They are foul faced and draw back in pain; they turn away and shrink back and do 
not reproduce, and because they hold on to what they carry inside them, the labor 
is painful. This is the source of the great excitement about beauty that comes to 
anyone who is pregnant and already teeming with life: beauty releases them from 
their great pain. (Symposium 206d-e; Nehamas and Woodruff translation) 
 
It is profoundly difficult to give birth to the self in the aftermath of trauma, especially if 
the trauma is inflicted or continually perpetuated by institutional betrayal and communal 
denial, such as exists in racist, sexist, and classist violence and war. Victims may 
continue to oscillate between the dialectical symptoms of reclusive depression or violent 
outbursts (Herman 1992/1997/2015). Diotima continues, explaining that this rebirth, this 
becoming, is a continual process as “reproduction goes on forever; it is what mortals have 
in the place of immortality. A lover must desire immortality along with the good, if what 
we agreed earlier was right, that Love wants to possess the good forever. It follows from 
our argument that love must desire immortality,” and so the self must constantly give 
birth to itself (Symposium 206e-207a). Diotima explains that the cause of this erotic 
pursuit of the good and its birth in the soul, the pursuit of becoming, is inspired by our 
mortal nature, by our existential and physical death. She says, “mortal nature seeks so far 
as possible to live forever and be immortal [or undying athanatos, ἀθάνατος)” 
(Symposium 207d; Nehamas and Woodruff translation). She continues, explaining that “it 
is for the sake of immortality [or not dying, athansias, ἀθανασίας] that everything shows 
this zeal, which is Love” (Symposium 208b; Nehamas and Woodruff translation). The 
reader should be cautious here not to read a proto-Christian understanding of immortality 
here; rather, this is the immortality of the self in its constant overcoming throughout a 
lifetime of the existential death that is traumatic rupture. It is a self that is capable of 
reminding oneself in moments of terror or abandonment the beauty of their relations with 
others “whether they are together or apart” (Symposium 209c). It the constant birth of the 
self-soothing self. 
Indeed, Diotima goes on to explain that, contrary to popular belief, each 
individual living being is not the same throughout a life. She says that immortality “is 
only possible through generation (genesei, γενέσει) that always leaves behind another 
new one (heteron neon, ἕτερον νέον) in place of the old” (Symposium 207d; my 
translation). And this includes the generation not only of human reproduction, but also 
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generation throughout an individual life. For contrary to what is commonly understood, 
that “each animal (zoion, ζᾠων) is said to live and be the same self—such as it is said to 
be the same self from out of boyhood (paidariou, παιδαρίου; masculine) until he becomes 
an old man (presbutes, πρεβύτης; masculine),” indeed an individual undergoes change 
and ruptures (Symposium 207d-e; my translation). Not only are these changes physical, 
but “even including the way (tropoi, τρόποι) of his soul, his character (ethe, ἤθη), 
opinions, desires (epithumiai, ἐπιθυµίαι), his pleasures (hedonai, ἡδοναί), pains, fears, 
each of them never remain in each the same, but rather on the one hand becoming, on the 
other hand being destroyed” (Symposium 207e; my translation). As we’ve discussed, 
survivors are changed by their trauma and the narrative of their lives are deeply disrupted 
(Stern 2010, 273-274). Trauma interrupts the narrative of the self that is understood to 
sustain an individual throughout a life. As contemporary psychological research has 
demonstrated, the experience of trauma significantly effects the retrieval and emotional 
response to memories. Trauma makes its imprint on us and scatters the memories in our 
neurological aviary (Theaetetus 190e-200d). In the same breath as her recognition of 
rupture and change in an individual self, Diotima notes “[s]tranger still than this is that 
even knowledge (epistemai, ἐπιστῆµαι) becomes and is being destroyed in us and we are 
never the same nor our knowledge, but that each piece of knowledge has the same [fate 
as the human in its constant becoming and destruction]” (Symposium 208a; my 
translation). She then explains that it is precisely for this reason that ‘studying’ or 
‘attentive care’ (meletan, µελετᾶν) exists. “For forgetting or escaping notice (lethe, λήθη) 
is the exodus of the knowledge (epistemes, ἐπιστήµης); attentive care or study (meletan, 
µελετᾶν) produces fresh knowledge back and over the retreating memory (mnemen, 
µνήµην), saving the knowledge inasmuch as it is to be expected to be the same” 
(Symposium 207d-208a; my translation). Thus, to live, it is necessary to reproduce the 
self throughout a lifetime because we are not the same throughout it, but instead we 
experience destructive interruptions from which we must grow. The only way to do this 
is through the attentive care of recollecting the memories of our trauma to preserve and 
create new knowledge so that the self might live rather than existentially perish. Like 
physical birth, this regeneration of self cannot be taught. It can only be undertaken, and it 
is best when undertaken among the beautiful support of others. 
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 Trauma interrupts life and memory; and the temptation to forget traumatic 
memories is facilitated not only neurobiologically, but also the denial of bystanders, the 
community, and institutional betrayal. Plato’s philosophy here is nested in the very real, 
political problem of the Athenians, especially Alcibiades, neglecting to recollect the 
traumas of war as they returned to war in the Battle of Mantinea and the Sicilian 
Expedition as well as the communal denials of the destruction in the aftermath. Not only 
does this philosophy respond to the willingness to forget that is denial, but it also offers 
survivors who cannot forget the importance of the work to transform traumatic memory 
into new knowledge: of giving birth to the self in the aftermath of trauma.  
 Diotima then goes on to explain the series of stages of becoming of the soul 
reminiscent of Erik Erikson’s stages of psychosocial development in her Ladder of Love 
(Symposium 209c-210e; cf. Erikson 1950 and 1982). The Ladder of Love provides a 
normative progression of the birth of the soul throughout a lifetime. It progresses from 
the love of an individual body, such as the trust established between an infant and a 
mother or the love between two young first lovers (cf. Erikson’s ‘Trust v. Mistrust’ stage 
repeated again in the young adult’s ‘Intimacy v. Isolation’ stage); to the love of multiple 
bodies, such as the toddler’s autonomous love of individuals beyond the mother (cf. 
Erikson’s ‘Autonomy v. Shame’ stage) or a young lover discovering the beauty of 
multiple bodies beyond their first love; to the love of the souls in others, such as the 
young child’s initiative to gain the recognition of others and the internalization of the 
social (cf. Erikson’s ‘Initiative v. Guilt’ stage) or the recognition of the inner beauty of 
others despite their appearances; to the love of customs, or the child’s attempt to 
demonstrate competency in the social world (cf. Erikson’s ‘Industry v. Inferiority’ stage) 
or the lover’s recognition that laws, ethics, or institutional requirements may trump their 
particular erotic desires (i.e., pedophilia, sexual harassment, sexual assault, etc.); to the 
love of knowledge, such as the teenager’s earnest fidelity to a political cause based in 
their research (cf. Erikson’s ‘Ego Identity v. Role Confusion’) or the lover’s recognition 
through research that there may be better practices possible than the ones available 
through customs (i.e., that our current laws and institutions are inadequate for grappling 
with the problem of sexual violence); and finally to the love of wisdom itself, such as the 
adult’s desire to become a meaningful member of society or the lover’s recognition that 
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the pursuit of becoming their best self through their engagement with others in creating 
the best community is the highest achievement (cf. Erikson’s ‘Generation v. Stagnation’ 
and ‘Ego Identity v. Despair’ stages; Symposium 209c-210e). Those who have “been thus 
far guided in matters of Love, who [have] beheld beautiful things in the right order and 
correctly, [are] coming now to the goal of Loving: all of a sudden he will catch sight of 
something wonderfully beautiful in its nature; that, Socrates, is the reason for all his 
earlier labors” (Symposium 210e-211a; Nehamas and Woodruff translation). And this 
wisdom of Love that the individual will catch glimpse of is universally beautiful, never 
waxing or waning nor relative, but Beauty in itself that stands as a goal for us all to aim 
(Symposium 211a-d). Diotima concludes, “only then will it become possible for him to 
give birth not to images of virtue (because he’s in touch with no images), but to true 
virtue (because he is in touch with true Beauty). The love of the gods belongs to anyone 
who has given birth to true virtue and nourished it, and if any human being could become 
immortal, it would be he” (Symposium 212a-b; Nehamas and Woodruff translation). So, 
lovers pursue the good in common with others, and this love of the good is becoming 
one’s best self with the beautiful support of others, which is motivated by our attempt to 
survive our own death—our own traumatic existential death as well as our inevitable 
physical death—that involves a process of attending to traumatic memories to create new 
meaning in relation to others (Symposium 208a).  
 Upon understanding this, Socrates concludes to his audience that he has made it 
his mission “to persuade others that human nature (anthropeia phusei, ἀνθρωπείᾳ φύσει) 
can find no better workmate for acquiring this [birth of virtue] than Love” (Symposium 
212b; Nehamas and Woodruff translation). Socrates then praises the “strength (dynamin, 
δύναµιν) and ‘manliness’20 (andreian, ἀνδρείαν) of Love” (Symposium 212b; my 
translation). True strength and courage, typically associated to be ‘manly’ values, are thus 
revalued into the virtues appropriate for the feminine activity of birth to explain the 
becoming of the human soul. 
 Socrates’ reenactment of the Eleusinian Mysteries through the wise philosophy of 
Diotima receives a great round of applause, during which the drunken Alcibiades and his 
                                                        
20 I place manliness in quotations because the Greek is, I think purposefully, in a feminine in declension 
here with no clear grammatical need. 
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entourage, including a flute-girl, demands admittance to the gathering. As discussed 
previously, a number of references are made in the text to Alcibiades’ destruction of the 
hermai, which became conflated with the accusations of the Socratics’ practicing of the 
Eleusinian Mysteries, as well as the Sicilian Expedition (in particular, his ironic claim 
that he never retreated from a battle he started—he did exactly this at Sicily; cf. 
Symposium 217c). But importantly, Alcibiades serves as a lesson of the miscarriage of 
the birth of the new soul: he is literally too late to the party in Symposium to hear 
Socrates’ wise words and it was too late in his own historical life at this moment to 
integrate the lessons therein. As a warning to Agathon, the ‘Good Man’, Alcibiades 
counsels him not to let Socrates fool him into thinking he himself is the beloved, as the 
roles will turn and the ‘Good Man’ will come to love Socrates. Socrates’ name is literally 
translated ‘Thy Strength.’ So, the rather than ‘Thy Strength’ loving the ‘Good man’, the 
‘Good Man’ will come to love ‘Thy Strength’ of Love and the process of undertaking the 
recollective birth of the soul towards the future. Conclusively, Alcibiades advises ‘the 
Good Man’: to “Remember our misfortunes, be guardedly discreet (eulabhthenai, 
εὐλαβηθῆναι): don’t wait like the fool in the proverb” of the Iliad XVI.32, which states 
“once a thing has been done, a fool sees it,” “to learn your lesson from your own 
misfortune” (Symposium 222b-c; my translation). Alcibiades’ own failure to cultivate this 
love brought his misguided attempt to seek glory through wealth and empire; he was 
misguided by the repetitions of his own trauma. With the end of Alcibiades’ speech, most 
of the party gets drunk. This is a performance of the fall of Alcibiades, Phaedrus, 
Eryximachus and the others’ execution or exile in 415BC and thereafter. Only Agathon, 
Aristophanes, and Socrates remain conscious (or alive) at the end of the dialogues, 
clearly referencing the present absences felt by the exile and execution of their comrades. 
Indeed, Socrates attempts to dialogue with Agathon and Aristophanes about joining him 
on his mission to bring together drama and comedy into Socratic irony to help Athens 
overcome its trauma. However, neither Agathon nor Aristophanes live up to this: both 
fall asleep. But Socrates continues with his day without rest, fighting the good fight for 
another day (Symposium 223d). 
The Symposium recollects the tragic errors of these men while offering guidance 
on the path to ‘ascend’ to the wisdom of self-love that might have saved them—not only 
 145 
them from themselves, but also from the violence of trauma’s repetition within a 
theocratic democracy at war. The Symposium’s ladder of love provides an ironic path to 
ascend towards the ‘eternal’ via the loving process of giving birth to a good spirit to 
accompany oneself after trauma—a courageous mimicry of the ‘ascent’ celebrated in the 
Eleusinian Mysteries. It is critical of the common and confused attempts to seek eternal 
life: through the religious rites of Eleusinian Mysteries, through glorious death in battle, 
or through other means to numb the pain, like sex, drugs, and ancient rock and roll (flute-
playing) at the symposia. Van der Kolk notes that drug abuse has been utilized since the 
times of the ancient Greeks to numb pain. Present statistics estimate that 1 in 3 to 1 in 2 
severely traumatized people will develop substance abuse problems to numb the pain of 
their past (van der Kolk 2015, 329). It is lovingly critical of Alcibiades, who was 
tragically too late to the party on self-love, and an ode to Laches and others who lost their 
lives after the breakdown of the Peace of Nikias with the Battle of Mantinea (418BC) and 
the subsequent disaster at Sicily (415BC). The wisdom of women, the trauma of the 
Battle of Mantinea and the impending Sicilian Expedition, and the eros of philosophy 
haunts the narrative through the figure of Diotima of Mantinea. 
 
Republic: If Symposium brings us up to the heights of overcoming trauma and the apex of 
the Athenian’s decision to follow Alcibiades into the Sicilian Expedition out of 
motivation for wealth and empire, the Republic brings us down to the denials of the 
Athenians in the aftermath and their fear the Spartans would attack the Piraeus. This is 
done in an attempt to further communicate the philosophy of overcoming trauma and its 
individual and communal requirements. That is, the lover of wisdom is compelled to 
return to the cave out of their lover for others based in their love of self: my very sense of 
self is dependent on the recognition of others. This love brings Socrates to rescue both 
Alcibiades III and Laches in retreat from doomed battles, Potidaea and Delium 
respectfully, as well as his willingness to pursue the good with others and offer support in 
their birthing of their souls in the aftermath of trauma. Judith Herman writes that this 
need of survivors of trauma to connect with and create a community of other survivors 
that work to create a new, better world is indicative of her third stage of trauma recovery 
(Herman 1992/1997/2015). 
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Republic should be properly translated as “On Citizenship” (Politeia, Πολιτεία). 
And, as I’ve discussed, I place the dialogue as likely occurring in 413/412BC in response 
to the denials of Athens and their phobic response to rebuild their military capabilities. It 
offers a contrast to what the Athenians’ might have done: rather than pursue or guard 
empire, the Athenians could and should have pursued and guarded the process of 
overcoming trauma, of becoming good. Rather than pursue the Good through the question 
of Love and Beauty, as Symposium offers, Republic pursues the Good through the 
question of Justice. The reader will remember, though, that Socrates understands the 
Good, the Beautiful, and the Just to be united, along with the philosophy of the human, or 
andreia. So, Republic carries the ‘eroticism’ of philosophy expressed in Symposium 
while contemplating it in relation to the concept of justice.  
The dialogue is framed with Socrates’ going down to the Piraeus with Glaucon to 
observe how the Athenian citizens and Thracian metics of Athens would handle the 
festival of the Thracian huntress and midwife, Bendis (cf. Oliver 2016, 163). Bendis is 
another Artemis figure, though an erotic, sexual goddess in contrast to her virginal 
Athenian counterpart. As Townsend explains, “while there are certainly rituals and 
goddesses associated with the narrative arc of women’s life, as articulated by stages of 
embodiment from virgin to wife to mother, in another sense the goddesses represent not 
so much stages as alternatives” (Townsend 2017, 109). Townsend offers the example of 
Athena, who “hardly represents an inevitable moment in the life of any given woman, but 
rather a special sort of mantle, a way of being, and a specifically female one” (Townsend 
2017, 109). The priestess of Athena was “one of the most important religious figures in 
the city,” even if she did not enjoy direct political power, her cultural power was 
significant. Further, Townsend notes that women would decide to switch between modes 
of being, providing the example of a weaver deciding to leave the mode of Athena for the 
mode of Aphrodite and sex work: the gods and goddesses offer different possible paths of 
human becoming. So, the introduction of the foreign Bendis to Athens offers an 
alternative to women who would follow Artemis in the hunt and birth of the Good while 
maintaining the eroticism of sexual relations without shunning sex altogether out of 
outrage of men’s rape of women: that is, how do we bring men and women together in a 
common pursuit of the good without shunning sexual eroticism without condoning rape? 
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It is at this register, too, that I read Plato’s roles in the city: the rulers, guardians, and the 
producers are modes of life of an individual. I agree with Townsend that Republic 
explores the possibility and requirements of including women in the hunt for the Good; 
rather than rehashing the ‘woman problem’ in Republic, as so many have done, I will 
point the reader to her work.21 Instead of dissecting Book V, my focus for the remainder 
of this section will be on the continuation of Plato’s philosophy of overcoming the trauma 
and existential death of the cave to give birth to a new self. I first briefly discuss Plato’s 
‘tripartite soul’ and education of the courageous warriors in relation to our discussion of 
trauma in the previous chapter. I then turn my attention to focus on the oft-overlooked 
Myth of Er in Book X. 
 In the books preceding the ‘woman problem’ of Republic Book V, Plato offers 
through the figure of Socrates a discussion of the ‘tripartite soul’ and the method of 
educating the warriors of the individual soul and the social city. I will not dwell long 
unpacking the ‘tripartite soul’ and the education of the warriors, as these are familiar and 
often taught concepts in today’s introductory Philosophy and Political Science 
classrooms. Plato suggests the structure of the individual soul and the social city are 
similar such that to better understand the virtue of an individual soul one might first study 
the virtue of the social city; included in this is the admission the goodness or badness of a 
social city will greatly influence or determine the goodness or badness of an individual 
living within it. The ‘tripartite soul’ suggests that the individual soul is comprised of an 
appetitive piece, a spirited piece, and a logical piece that correspond to the virtues of 
temperance (sophrosune, σωφροσύνη), courage (andreia, ‘ανδρεία), and wisdom (sophia, 
σοφία). Plato suggests these pieces of the individual soul correspond to social roles of 
money-making (as well as human reproduction), warriors, and kings. 
I suggest that we read the ‘tripartite soul’ as an ancient recognition of the 
fragmentation between the emotional and rational pieces of our soul (what today we call 
the limbic system and prefrontal cortex) and the necessity to courageously bring them 
into relation. The ‘tripartite soul’ bears resemblance to contemporary Internal Family 
Systems theory (IFS), which suggests: 
                                                        
21 I will note here my disagreement with Townsend’s interpretation of the philosopher Simone de Beauvoir, 
whose philosophy I explore in the next chapter. 
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Trauma injects parts [of the self] with beliefs and emotions that hijack them out of 
their natural valuable state. For example, we all have parts that are childlike and 
fun. When we are abused, these are the parts that re-hurt the most, and they 
become frozen, carrying the pain, terror, and betrayal of abuse. This burden 
makes them toxic—parts of ourselves that we need to deny at all costs. Because 
they are locked away inside, IFS calls them the exiles. […] Each split-off part 
holds different memories, beliefs, and physical sensations; some hold the shame, 
others the rage, some the pleasure and excitement, another the intense loneliness 
of the abject compliance. These are all aspects of the abuse experience. The 
critical insight is that all these parts have a function: to protect the self from 
feeling the full terror of annihilation. (van der Kolk 2014, 281-282) 
 
Plato seems to offer an ancient recognition of this splitting and hyper-defensive 
mechanism resulting from trauma. And his interest is to bring the fragmented, hyper-
defensive pieces into harmony with one another, rather than alienated in dangerous 
dissociation. In the previous chapter, we discussed contemporary neuroscientific 
evidence that underscores the importance of physical movement and musical rhythms for 
overcoming trauma. Plato similarly suggests that an education in physical movement and 
music help to nourish the courageous warriors, better enabling them not only to endure 
terrifying experiences in battle but also to battle the fearful aporias in the aftermath of the 
living death of traumatic experience.  
 In Book X, Plato offers the Myth of Er to capture the importance of recollecting 
the pieces of oneself, of recollecting past traumatic memory, in the aftermath of traumatic 
rupture. The myth tells the tale of a soldier badly wounded in battle who was thought to 
be dead and who came back to life on his own funeral pyre just in time before it was lit. 
Er is offered as a messenger from the afterlife, returned back to life to teach us mere 
mortals the importance of the recollection in one’s rebirth after traumatic death. Socrates 
deliberately chooses to tell this myth as a lesson of the importance of recollection instead 
of the myth that would be more familiar to his ancient audience, the tales of Odysseus to 
Alcinous regaling a series of flashbacks of the former’s epic journey home from Troy 
(Rep. 614b).22 Instead, he tells the story of a Pamphyilian man, Er, to demonstrate the 
“prizes, wages, and gifts” that await just and unjust individuals after the death of trauma 
(Rep. 613e-614b).  
                                                        
22 See Alexander Pope’s translation and commentary of Homer’s Odyssey, particularly his note on V.355. 
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 The name ‘Er’ is another purposeful play on words that brings together the love or 
‘eros’ of Symposium with courage. Commonly translated as ‘Er,’ the man’s name is 
‘Ἠρὸς’ (Eros) in the ancient Greek. This would sound a lot like the word ‘Eros’ (Ἔρως) 
to the Greek ear. It might also sound like ‘Ares’ or ‘arren’ (Ares and arren, Ἄρης and 
ἀρρεν), the etymological root of andreia identified in Cratylus. It may also sound like 
‘eirein’ for ‘to speak,’ which Cratylus also identifies as the root of “Hermes.” And, to get 
the word ‘Er,’ one only need drop the aspirated ‘h’ from either the word ‘hero’ (heros, 
ἡρως), the ancient signifier for the ultimate height of ancient manly courage, or from the 
messenger and language god ‘Hermes’ (Hermes, Ἑρµῆς). Remember, Symposium’s 
Diotima was clear that Eros was a messenger god, and courageous love continues to be 
the messenger in the Myth of Er. Love is the messenger god of the in-between, caring for 
the pieces of ourselves shackled by past traumatic memory and denial as we traverse into 
the life after trauma’s death. This traversing journey, as the myth suggests, entails a 
process of forgetting. And we would do best to heed the lesson of recollection from Er in 
order to best traverse ourselves the forgetting of becoming in the aftermath of trauma. 
 Socrates explains that, in his death, Eros discovered a place where souls come 
together from earth to recollect their sufferings and from heaven to recall the wonderful 
things they had experienced there. The description remarkably resembles a therapy group 
for victims and survivors, from which Socrates moves to discuss the just appropriation 
punishment for wrong-doing. The souls are then accompanied by the three Moira (Fates), 
the daughters of Necessity who accompany individuals at birth. These are the same Fates 
that Socrates explains Beauty is often called in Symposium, that is, the dead souls are 
accompanied by Beauty or the Moira in their process of reincarnation (Rep. 10.617c-d; 
cf. Symposium 206d). The souls must first go to Lachesis, the Fate of the past, who relays 
the following message: 
‘Ephemeral souls, this is the beginning of another cycle that will end in death. 
Your daemon or guardian spirit (daimon, δαίµων) will not be assigned to you by 
lot (lexetai, λήξεται); you will choose him. The one who has the first lot will be 
the first to choose a life to which he will then be bound by necessity. Virtue 
knows no master; each will possess it to a greater or less degree, depending on 
whether he values or disdains it. The responsibility lies with the one who makes 
the choice; the god has none.’ (Rep. 10.617d-e; Grube translation) 
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In this, the Fate of the past informs the souls who have died that their future lot in life is 
not determined by the fate of destiny. Instead, dead souls are responsible for choosing 
their life in the aftermath of trauma. Only the individual has the responsibility to choose 
and bring their good spirit, their eudaimonia. Different models of physical beings and 
their general life trajectories are presented for the dead souls to choose from, “but the 
arrangement of the soul was not included in the model because the soul is inevitably 
altered by the different lives it chooses. But all the other things were there, mixed with 
each other and with wealth, poverty, sickness, health, and the states intermediate to them” 
(Rep. 10.618b). That is, the soul is not a static entity that persists unchanged through the 
processes of rebirth and the circumstances of their total concrete situation, as Beauvoir 
would say. Rather, our subjectivities are transformed by our situation and our relations 
with others. In the aftermath of trauma, the dead soul “faces the greatest danger of all” in 
choosing how they will live (Rep.618b). Socrates advises that the pursuit of philosophy 
will best aid the dead soul in its choices. 
 Socrates tells Glaucon, because the stakes in the aftermath of death (or trauma) 
are so high:  
… each of us must neglect all other subjects and be most concerned to seek out 
[zetetes, ζητητής] and learn [mathemtes, µαθηµτής] those things that will enable 
him to distinguish the good life [chreston, χρηστόν] from the bad [poneron, 
πονηρόν; also oppressed, painful, grievous, cowardly, or base] and always to 
make the best choice possible in every possible situation. He should think over all 
the things we have mentioned and how they jointly and severally determine what 
the virtuous life is like. That way he will know what the good and bad effects of 
beauty are when it is mixed with wealth, poverty, and a particular state of the 
soul. He will know the effects of high or low birth, private life or ruling office, 
physical strength or weakness, ease or difficulty in learning, and all the things that 
are either naturally part of the soul or are acquired, and he will know what they 
achieve when mixed with one another. And from all this he will be able, by 
considering the nature of the soul, to reason out which life is better and which 
worse and to choose accordingly, calling a life worse if it leads the soul to become 
more unjust, better if it leads the soul to become more just, and ignoring 
everything else: We have seen that this is the best way to choose, whether in life 
or death. Hence, we must go down to Hades holding with adamantine 
determination to the belief that this is so, lest we be dazzled there by wealth and 
other such evils, rush into a tyranny or some other similar course of action, do 
irreparable evils, and suffer even worse ones. And we must always know how to 
choose the mean (mesos, µέσος) in such lives and how to avoid either of the 
extremes, as far as possible, both in this life and in all those beyond it. This is the 
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way that a human being becomes [blessed with a good spirit (eudaimonestatos, 
εὐδαιµονέστατος)]” (Rep. 618b-619b; Grube translation with my emendation) 
 
An example is then made of an individual who had been privileged in their previous life, 
living virtuously simply by habit rather than philosophy, and chose to become a tyrant in 
the aftermath of their death. When the life of tyranny concluded in disaster, the individual 
shirked their own responsibility, ignoring the words of Lachesis, and “blamed chance, 
daemons, [and] guardian spirits, and everything else for these evils but himself” (Rep. 
10.619c-d). It is observed that most who chose the life of tyranny “had come down from 
heaven and who were untrained in suffering as a result. The majority of those who had 
come up from the earth, on the other hand, having suffered themselves and seen others 
suffer, were in no rush to make their choices” (Rep. 10.619d). That is, those who have 
suffered traumas in life have a better insight into how the individual and, perhaps, society 
might become good. Bonnie Burstow and feminist standpoint theory supports this 
epistemological point: those who have been traumatized have the benefit of seeing the 
world without rose colored glasses, and thus might have better insight into what ought to 
be avoided and gained, what ought to be feared and hoped (Burstow 2003; cf. Laches). 
Socrates concludes that “if someone pursues philosophy in a sound manner” such as the 
manner prescribed by Diotima in Symposium and if they have modest luck in their 
circumstance, then they will have a good spirit (eudaimoneo, εὐδαιµονέω) and their 
journey overcoming their next death will be easier (Rep. 10.619d-e).  
Socrates then describes the various lives the different souls chose and the process 
of their becoming. These choices transgress gender and species boundaries, such as the 
athletic follower of Artemis, Atalanta, choosing to become a man, while other souls 
changed from animals to humans and vice versa (Rep. 10.620d). After each soul had 
chosen their lives, they went forward to Lachesis in the order of their choosing and she 
“assigned to each the daemon it had chosen as a guardian of its life and fulfiller of its 
choice” (Rep. 10.620d). From there, the soul’s chosen daemon led the soul “under the 
hand of Clotho,” the fate of the present, while she spun the spindle of life to “confirm the 
fate or destiny [moiran, µοῖραν] that the lottery and its own choice had given it” (Rep. 
10.620d-e; Grube translation with my emendation and emphasis). Again, even in the 
confirmation of the soul’s fate or destiny it is emphasized that this destiny is one that is 
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chosen in relation to circumstance: circumstance alone does not determine one’s destiny. 
From Clotho, the daemon leads the soul “to the spinning of Atropos,” the fate of the 
future, “to make what had been spun irreversible” as there is no going back in time from 
our choices (Rep. 10.620d; Grube translation). We can only go forward. Iterating this, 
Socrates says that from the irreversibility of their choices, the souls “without turning 
around […] went from there under the throne of Necessity” (Rep. 10.620e; Grube 
translation). But this necessary path forward includes traveling “to the Plain of 
Forgetfulness [tes Lethes pedion, τῆς Λήθης πεδίον] in burning, choking, terrible heat, for 
it was empty of trees and earthly vegetation. And there, beside the River of Unheeding 
[or Uncaring; Ameleta potαmon, Ἀµέλητα ποταµόν], whose water no vessel can hold, 
they camped, for night was coming on” (Rep. 10.621a; Grube translation). The reader 
will note that the ancient Greek word used for ‘Unheeding,’ ‘Ameleta’ is the precise 
antonym of Diotima’s ‘study’ or ‘care’ of retreating trauma memories (Symposium 207d-
208a). Socrates explains that each of the souls, except Er, “had to drink a certain measure 
of this water” from the River of Unheeding, but:  
…those who weren’t saved by reason drank more than that, and as each of them 
drank, he forgot everything and went to sleep. But around midnight there was a 
clap of thunder and an earthquake, and they were suddenly carried away from 
there, this way and that, up to their births (genesin, γένεσιν), like shooting stars. 
Er himself was forbidden to drink from the water. All the same, he didn’t know 
how he had come back to his body, except that in waking up suddenly he saw 
himself lying on the pyre at dawn. (Rep. 621a-b) 
 
Er did not drink from the river, because he was instructed to be a messenger of what 
happened in the afterlife of trauma. Socrates then concludes the moral of the Myth of Er 
to Glaucon, advising him that Er’s story “would save us” in the aftermath of trauma to 
“make a good crossing of the River of Forgetfulness [Lethes potamon, τῆς Λήθης 
ποταµον]” (Rep. 621b-c). Ironically, Socrates has himself ‘forgotten’ that it was the Plain 
of Forgetfulness and the River of Unheeding, but the point stands. If one undertakes the 
process of recollection in giving birth to the soul, the soul “wouldn’t be defiled” but be 
believed to be “immortal” in the aftermath of trauma “and able to endure every evil and 
every good, and we’ll always hold to the upward path, practicing justice with reason in 
every way. That way we’ll be friends both to ourselves and the gods while we remain 
here on earth and afterwards—like victors in the games who go around collecting their 
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prizes—we’ll receive our rewards. Hence, both in this life and on the thousand-year 
journey we’ve described we’ll do well [eu, εὖ]” (Rep. 10.620d-621b; Grube translation). 
The Myth of Er and the River of Unheeding/Forgetfulness reinforce the 
interpretation that Plato offers a philosophy of overcoming trauma. It requires the care to 
recollect the memories that have become stamped into our bodies and flutter in our 
neurological aviary (Theaetetus 190e-200d) as a strong and courageous Love of giving 
birth to the self. We learn that our very notion of self is ambiguously tied to our 
community, its mores, institutions, history, myths, and imagination. And this love 
produces a duty, an ethical compulsion, not only to overcome trauma as an individual in 
relation to others but also to be the helpful other, the midwife, to individuals who have 
been traumatized. It is to work to create a situation of Beauty, a safe, secure space for the 
self and others to commonly hunt and give birth to our best selves and best community. 
In this process, we would do best to recollect traumatic memories and process them into 
new knowledge as much as possible, so we might better survive the disorientation of 
trauma’s infliction as well as the forgetting of self that Plato suggests is inevitably 
entailed in becoming. Plato’s philosophy of overcoming is based in a ‘strong’ and 
‘manly’ Love modeled after the strength and courage of women in childbirth and the 
reincarnation story of Persephone rather than the masculine explosive strengths and skills 
Glaucon assumes (see Book V.451e; Townsend 2017, 37). This strength and ‘manliness’ 
of women to guardedly pursue and give birth to the good through recollection to become 
philosopher queens is further emphasized in Plato’s Menexenus through Aspasia of 
Miletus’s delivery of a proper funeral oration. Socrates says that she was his own teacher 
of oratory and that she likely wrote or significantly contributed to Pericles’ famous 
funeral oration. The difference between Aspasia’s speech as delivered by Socrates and 
the historical speech of Pericles is that Aspasia provides a far more thorough accounting 
of the history of the Greeks at war, acknowledges the city-state’s culpability in creating 
such trauma, while critically revising Pericles’ harsh prescriptions of gender roles—
namely, that the courage of women is to be least talked about—into a more sex-
egalitarian arrangement. Indeed, it is implied, the Greeks may have fared better had 
Aspasia been provided the opportunity to continue to lead the democracy of Athens. 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have traced Plato’s critical discussion of ‘manliness’ to reveal his 
critique of the dominating values and denial of philonikian ‘manliness’ and his 
philosophy of human overcoming in the aftermath of trauma throughout several of his 
dialogues. This interpretation has largely been lost to the history of philosophy in part by 
the lasting influence of Aristotle’s denial-laden rebuttal to the argument and his 
reification of the gendering of andreia. For Aristotle, one’s sex absolutely determines 
one’s ‘manliness’: men are to rule and women are to obey based in his suspect biological 
teleology (Politics I.2.1252a25-30, I.12.1259b10-1260a19-24, I.13.1259b35-37, 
II.3.1261b34-36, III.4.1277b20-23, VIII.4.1338b30; see also Generation of Animals, 
I.20.729a9-11 and IV.1.766a20-30; cf. Poetics, 15.1454a23 as well as NE III.6.1115aa10-
7.1116a15). In fact, Aristotle woefully misinterprets Plato’s philosophy that women 
should be held in common, that is, that they should be part of the community of hunters 
pursuing and giving birth to virtue, to enable him to discuss political-economy and the 
tragedy of the commons (Politics II.3.1261b34-36). Elshtain helps to explain Aristotle’s 
obfuscation of Plato’s argument as “a clue that he is fending off some idea, fear, or desire 
he finds incompatible whether with his world view of himself, his visions for society, or 
his understanding of the world” (Elshtain 1981, 19). In other words, Aristotle presents a 
philosophy of denial. There is something in Plato’s philosophy that terrifies Aristotle: 
namely, that ‘manliness’ is not what it is assumed to be and that women, too, can be 
‘manly’ warriors and ought to rule. Plato’s Academy presented a space, an outdoor 
garden, to support both men and women in their voluntary, joint and loving pursuit of the 
good life. 
Aristotle’s same fear and denial runs throughout the history of philosophy. If the 
reader will permit the nearly two-and-a-half millennia of time travel, I find this 
thematized in the feminist philosophy of Simone de Beauvoir. Largely written in the 
aftermath of World War II, Beauvoir’s twentieth-century French feminist existentialist 
philosophy both suggests denial is central to patriarchal ontology and its resulting ethics 
and political economy. She also importantly provides tools for thinking the problem of 
‘forgetting’ trauma. Patriarchy and its values of domination or philonike depend upon the 
forgetful denial of the ambiguity of human subjectivity, bifurcating them with gendered 
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destinies and later further dividing the human by constructions of race. But overcoming 
trauma also entails a kind of ‘forgetting.’ As we have discussed in this chapter, Plato’s 
Myth of Er suggests that forgetting is a necessary part of the structure of becoming in the 
aftermath of trauma, teaching us that we would do best to recollect and care for the 
lessons of our past as best we can as we traverse into our new life after trauma’s death. 
Beauvoir provides a philosophy of freedom that further delineates the difference between 
the ‘forgetting’ involved in the repetitions of denial and the ‘forgetting’ involved in the 
repetitions of overcoming. In particular, the latter entails we sacrifice the material and 
ontological comfort of patriarchy’s denial and accompanying all-too-certain future-
eclipsing gendered destinies.  
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CHAPTER IV 
BEYOND SURVIVAL: 
BEAUVOIR’S CRITIQUE OF PATRIARCHY’S DENIAL AND HER PHILOSOPHY 
OF FREEDOM’S FORGETTING  
 
Think of how much more time and energy we would have to focus on other things 
that matter if we weren’t so busy surviving. 
—Rebecca Solnit 
 
Introduction 
The obstacles survivors face in the aftermath of trauma often circle around 
capacities of forgetting. As we have discussed, while denial seeks to forget the past and 
charge forward toward the future, the immemorialized past lingers in our embodied 
emotional memory. The alienating fragmentation of denial leaves survivors caught in the 
‘dialectic of trauma,’ alienated from their own selves and from others in their community. 
The denial of institutions or bystanders magnifies survivors’ own desire to forget, making 
such institutions and bystanders complicit perpetrators of the harm and the pain of the 
memory comes to be replaced by “free-floating shame” (Stern 2010, 144-145). This 
increases the susceptibility of survivors to be triggered and re-live their past trauma in the 
present, exponentially increasing their potential to commit self-harm, be revictimized, or 
perpetrate harm against others through violent abuse or neglect. Survivors become frozen 
in time, shackled in the present by the immemorialized past. This impedes their ability to 
live their lives, to grow and become who they are.  
I’ve witnessed this operation of denial first hand in my role as an instructor of 
feminist and decolonial philosophy. I regularly receive disclosures of trauma, particularly 
traumas of sexual violence, from students who find that they are unable to focus on and 
complete their assignments. The disclosures tend to concentrate in courses that center 
critical curriculum on gender, sex, race, and class.1 The testimonials of the student-
                                               
1 I clarify to students whether I am bound by any unethical institutional ‘compelled disclosure’ (i.e., 
‘required reporting’) statuses, what that means, and how it might be navigated. It is my hope that university 
reporting policy changes shifting from blanket ‘compelled disclosure’ (i.e., ‘required reporting’) policies to 
‘survivor-directed’ policies, such as those recently implemented by the University of Oregon, will 
minimize the institutional harm to students and maximize their safety and success in their learning 
environment. See Kathryn J. Holland, Lilia M. Cortina, and Jennifer J. Freyd, “Compelled Disclosure of 
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survivors I work with resemble those provided by psychiatrists van der Kolk and Herman 
and the numerous campus survivors of sexual violence featured in the 2015 documentary, 
The Hunting Ground. Often tearfully, student-survivors disclose both their trauma 
experience and their difficulty in its aftermath: depression, anxiety, hyper-vigilance, 
under-eating, over-eating, under-sleeping, over-sleeping, over-drinking, drug abuse, 
dissociation, as well as the inability to focus on the present task at hand. Post-traumatic 
stress. Despairingly, students share that they cannot forget their trauma, even if and when 
the detailed memories of the event remain jumbled or unclear. The embodied 
psychological symptoms of their trauma and the world in which they experience them 
prevents many student-survivors from immersing themselves into their work. They need, 
often to their own surprise, an extension on an assignment.   
Even student-survivors who have sought and actively engaged every resource and 
opportunity for ‘recovery’ possible—therapy, campus and community advocates and 
agencies, campus or police reports, criminal and civil legal action, support groups, 
student and community activism groups, independent academic research, and more—
often struggle. Survivors may become unwittingly disrupted further and over again by 
triggering reminders of their trauma experience, even as they attempt to piece themselves 
together and move on with their lives in academic, career, or personal pursuits. They may 
become overwhelmed by the burden of vicarious trauma as they rebuild their sense of 
community, often with other survivors.  
                                               
College Sexual Assault” American Psychologist (22 Jan. 2018). Regardless of institutional policy, I 
nevertheless communicate that I am committed to them—to both their healing and their academic success. 
It is my hope that new survivor-centered policies, such as those recently adopted by the University of 
Oregon, will relieve the confusion, harm, and chilling effect of blanket required reporting policies.  
Though trauma disclosures tend to cluster around empathetic instructors with whom survivors 
identify who often teach courses with curricula relevant to survivors’ experience, studies demonstrate that 
at least one in five women on college campuses have been sexually violated, making it statistically likely to 
have at least six female survivors enrolled in a standard classroom of thirty enrolled students. Many 
LGBTQ students are also likely to be victims of sexual violence, some of whom identify as women, some 
of whom identify as men, and many of whom identify as transgender or gender non-binary. Additionally, 
and often neglected in part by their statistical rarity, heterosexual male survivors of sexual assault may also 
be present in the classroom. And, of course, there are students who are survivors of traumas of child abuse, 
war, poverty, or legacies of racist, colonial violence—sometimes inclusive of sexual violence, sometimes 
not. It is important here to bear in mind Bessel van der Kolk and Bonnie Burstow’s respective suggestions 
that there is a spectrum of severity of trauma and that traumas are often layered according to one’s ‘total 
concrete situation,’ as Beauvoir writes, within racist patriarchal society.  
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Many of my students (and colleagues) have been re-traumatized by institutional 
betrayal and denial. The university institution upon which student-survivors depend upon 
to provide a safe and accessible learning environment may and often does perpetuate 
trauma by failing “to prevent or respond to wrongdoings by individuals (e.g. sexual 
assault) committed within the context of the institution” (Freyd 2017). In chapter II, we 
detailed the institutional betrayal and denial committed by the University of Oregon in 
the case of Jane Doe. In this example and others, I have witnessed university institutions 
betray student-survivors and deny the reality of their vulnerability in a myriad of ways: 
by failing to offer or publicize campus resources and reporting options for survivors of 
trauma; by neglecting to adequately train faculty, staff, and students on issues of trauma 
and the intertwined legacies of sexism and racism; by failing to hire or fairly pay survivor 
advocates internal and external to the university; by turning a blind-eye to fraternity and 
sorority parties and their ritual practices of sexual violence for fear of losing both the 
Greek system as a university housing subsidy and present and future alumni donations; 
by active recruitment and retention of sexual predators not only on university athletic 
teams but also within academic faculty positions; by seizing the supposedly confidential 
campus counseling records of survivors assaulted by said recruited predators to fortify 
legal defenses and anti-defamation suits in order to protect the institution’s commercial 
‘brand’; by adhering to compelled disclosure (i.e., ‘required reporting’) policies as legal 
insurance for the institution, even though such policies undermine survivors’ agency, 
impede relationships of trust with instructors, mentors, supervisors, and colleagues on 
campus thereby producing a ‘chilling effect’ on reporting (Holland, Cortina, and Freyd 
2018); by invoking tired legal distinctions and hiring outside legal firms rather than 
listening to and heeding the scholarly advice of feminist and anti-racist faculty and 
students internal to the university; by neglecting to follow-up with survivors’ reports in a 
timely and confidential manner; and by failing to hold perpetrators accountable and 
instead generally enabling them to continue attending or teaching classes, playing in 
NCAA March Madness or Bowl games, or earning and retaining tenure, thus providing 
amnesty for perpetrators to continue inflicting harm. And this is only to name a few 
examples of the denial that defends and maintains the material, political, and ontological 
interests of the love of Nike.  
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The trauma experience, the perpetrator, and society’s institutional complicity 
haunts survivors real and imagined in nightmares, while walking to class, at work, in 
emails, on the pages of course readings, and in the abyss of the blank Word document of 
an essay that was due yesterday. Over and again, students express to me who it is that 
they aspired to be—doctors, lawyers, scientists, philosophers, parents—and the profound 
disruption their trauma and the subsequent effect traumatic betrayals have wrought on 
their life plan. The temporality of their life project has been ruptured. Their “world [has] 
burn[ed] and crash[ed]” and they are “at the end of [their] rope” (Lady Gaga, “Til it 
Happens to You,” The Hunting Ground 2015).2 Denial blocks not only the individual 
survivor’s path of recovery, but hinders their educational project: it disrupts their ability 
to participate in their human capacity to create a meaningful world in which to live with 
others.  
As we have discussed, the effort to overcome trauma is not an individual task nor 
does it reach a stage of ‘completion,’ such thinking would be to move from one stage of a 
living death to another. Rather, overcoming trauma is a collective process of building 
safety, memorializing trauma memories, and reconnecting with others (Herman 
1992/1997/2015). Significantly, overcoming trauma requires the continuous, 
encouraging, empathetic recognition and support of others—even political change. I tell 
students I am glad to be part of this important undertaking with them, that speaking the 
truth of their trauma and its aftermath to another individual is a vital, courageous step in 
their life: it is to take a step from their place of self-ruptured vulnerability towards 
building a place of self-assurance with others in their community, precarious as this may 
be, so they might become who they aspire to be. So, they might not merely survive, but 
live. Not merely be (potentially on the precarious edge of suicidal not-being) but become. 
                                               
2 Celebrity pop-artist and sexual assault survivor Stefani Joanne Angelina Germanotta, aka Lady Gaga, 
posted the following message to her Twitter account on September 18, 2017 as part of an explanation to 
fans for the postponement of the European leg of her 2017 Joanne world tour: “I’m a fighter. I use the word 
suffer not only because trauma and chronic pain have changed my life, but because they are keeping me 
from living a normal life.” Exactly two years earlier, Lady Gaga released her single “Til it Happens to 
You,” written for the 2015 documentary on campus sexual violence, The Hunting Ground. Gaga won an 
Emmy and was nominated for a Grammy, an Oscar, and other awards for her single. She was joined on 
stage at the 2016 Academy Awards by other survivors in an emotional performance of the song, which 
received a tear-filled standing ovation. 
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Sometimes students are ashamed to admit their need for accommodation, others 
have already grown frustrated by it. Their inability to forget interferes with their ability to 
live their own life. And they cannot forget precisely because they have not yet found 
something to forget: their subjectivity has been ruptured, their self-assurance 
undermined, resulting in a seemingly perpetual, painful, and potentially deadly life pause.  
Philosopher Simone de Beauvoir provides a feminist philosophy of freedom that 
recognizes that forgetting oneself is vital to one’s ability to become who one might be, to 
become the person one aspires to be. But this forgetting must be distinguished from the 
forgetting of denial. It is instead a forgetting associated with overcoming, which we have 
thus far associated with the ability to listen to and set the emotions of our past self aside 
to focus instead on what it is we are doing in the present to become who we are (cf. van 
der Kolk 2015, 211 and 286; also, van der Kolk 1989, 411). This forgetting of 
overcoming is an affirmation of freedom, the freedom to become the greatest possible 
version of oneself. This notion of freedom is based in a temporality of repetition that 
Beauvoir inherits from the nineteenth-century ‘father’ of existentialism, Søren 
Kierkegaard.3 It is a structure she explores in her novel The Mandarins, which is 
motivated by her experience of the traumatic horror of World War II and a “basic 
confrontation of being and nothingness” that she writes she “pursued through all my 
books and never resolved” (Beauvoir 1965, 270-271). 
Beauvoir articulates the structure of repetition as follows: “to truly possess 
something,” such as one’s self, “one must have lost it and found it again” (Beauvoir 
1965, 270-271). This loss of self is a rupture, the experience of which Beauvoir describes 
as “a time when all […] hopes had died” (Beauvoir 1965, 270). However, the individual 
                                               
3 Beauvoir is clear in her personal writings about the stunning influence of Kierkegaard on her own 
feminist existentialist ethics. For the progression of her reading of Hegel and Kierkegaard and her deep 
personal wrestling between the two, see her Thursday 21 March 1940 letter to Sartre; her 6 July and 17 July 
1940 wartime diary entries; her December 21, 23, and 25, 1940 and January 3 and 9, 1941 letters to Sartre; 
her 9 January wartime diary entry; and chapter seven of her 1962 autobiography, The Prime of Life. In 
Beauvoir’s Letters to Sartre. Trans. Quintin Hoare. (New York: Arcade Publishing, 1990): 304, 355, 357, 
363, 366-67; The Prime of Life. Trans. Peter Green. (New York: The World Publishing Company, 1962): 
373; Wartime Diary. Trans. Anne Deing Cordero. Ed. Margaret A. Simons and Sylvie Le Bon de Beauvoir. 
(Chicago: University of Illinois Press): 313, 319-320. See also Ronald M Green and Mary Jean Green’s 
bibliographical and conceptual review of Beauvoir’s critical uptake of Kierkegaard in “Simone de 
Beauvoir: A Founding Feminist’s Appreciation of Kierkegaard,” Kierkegaard and Existentialism, ed. Jon 
Stewart, vol. 9 (New York: Ashgate Publishing, 2011): 1-22. 
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may either succumb to their ruptured loss of self, perpetually caught in an icy present, or 
overcome and re-possess their self again in the aftermath. To do the latter requires losing 
oneself by seeking oneself through one’s projects, though Beauvoir observes that women 
are particularly susceptible to the former within a social, material, and ontological 
structure of patriarchy.  
To overcome rather than succumb to this ruptured loss of self, one must be able to 
choose to ‘lose’ oneself again in one’s projects, seeking oneself there. One must ‘lose 
oneself’ in what one is doing in order to find oneself again, to truly immerse oneself in 
one’s projects as a seeking one’s own self again. Or, in the poetry of rapper Eminem, 
“You better lose yourself in the music, the moment / You own it, you better never let it 
go” (Eminem, “Lose Yourself,” 8 Mile 2002). Beauvoir understands this losing oneself as 
a forgetting of self. But, contrary to the forgetting of denial, Beauvoir emphasizes that 
one must have first found oneself, one must be self-assured, in order to forget oneself so 
one might truly possess oneself by actively pursuing themselves in their aims and 
projects. Beauvoir writes in The Second Sex: 
The greatest failure a lack of self-assurance brings about is that the subject cannot 
forget himself. He does not generously aim for a goal: he tries to prove he is 
worth what is demanded of him. Throwing oneself boldly toward goals risks 
setbacks: but one also attains unexpected results; prudence necessarily leads to 
mediocrity. […] To do great things, today’s woman needs above all forgetfulness 
of self: but to forget oneself one must first be solidly sure that one has already 
found oneself. Newly arrived in the world of men, barely supported by them, the 
woman is still much too busy looking for herself. (Beauvoir 2010, 740-41; my 
emphasis) 
 
Beauvoir recognizes a relation between the ‘forgetting’ of betrayal blindness and the 
forgetting of freedom’s repetition, providing tools for thinking the delineation between 
the ‘forgetting’ of denial and the forgetting of overcoming. The forgetting involved in 
overcoming requires having found something to forget, having found self-assurance and 
being willing to sacrifice the security of marching towards one’s future destiny in order 
to re-find oneself in the projects of becoming one’s greatest self. Denial distances one 
from the task of finding that something. The defense mechanism of denial, or what Freyd 
terms ‘betrayal blindness,’ is a defense from the reality that one is not self-assured. 
Denial facilitates an abstracted, mythical feeling of self-assurance that denies one’s place 
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in the world; it is in fact a succumbing to a dull survival, to mere being, to nothingness. 
However, succumbing to one’s loss of self is not a finality. Tomorrow is uncertain: one 
might persist in succumbing to life, one may even succumb to death, but the choice to 
overcome life is also a possibility.  
 Beauvoir’s project throughout The Second Sex is to provide a feminist 
existentialist account of the constitution of patriarchal ontology (i.e., the ‘world of men’) 
women’s experience within it, revealing the denials at the heart of patriarchal ontology 
and how we might overcome them. She wants to understand why and how it is that 
women have lost themselves in the ‘world of men’ without finding themselves again? 
What is and has been denied in patriarchal ontology? At what cost? And what we might 
collectively do about it? Why is it that women struggle to become their own greatest 
selves? Why are women prone to succumbing to their loss of self, their self-rupture, 
rather than overcoming and re-possessing themselves again? Why are we not yet self-
assured enough to forget or lose ourselves in our projects to be re-found again? What 
mechanism, be it internal or external, freezes our potential? Beauvoir finds that women’s 
ontological position, her destiny, in the ‘world of men’ is an anticipation of traumatic 
rupture and loss of self never to be regained; her destiny is to abdicate or abandon her 
subjectivity and succumb to life as an object for another, for man. Her destiny has an 
anticipated target of completion, a stultifying telos that ruptures her subjectivity, of 
becoming an object for man as his wife, mother, or mistress—an object to be dominated 
and consumed, to be raped, rather than a reciprocally recognized subject to be generously 
gifted back (McWeeny 2017). She is left disconnected from her childhood past and 
condemned to a loss of her own world-making possibilities, destined to a traumatically 
foreclosed future. The pervasive threat and number of traumatic sexual assaults force her 
complicity by fear, intimidation, abuse, and neglect. Her anticipation and experience of 
the self-rupture of sexual violence saps her self-assurance, if she possessed any to begin 
with in the ‘world of men,’ leaving her paradoxically all-too-self-conscious to forget 
herself in overcoming her loss in her projects and aims. Time is warped such that 
possibilities of the present are reduced to experiencing or reliving traumatic rupture. And 
the structure of patriarchy depends on the operation of the denial to maintain the 
subordinate destiny of femininity and the dominate destiny of masculinity now and into 
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the future. We’ve discussed previously in chapter II that Beauvoir’s existentialist 
morality holds that this lapse of “transcendence,” or freedom, into “immanence” is an 
“absolute evil” (Beauvoir 2010, 16). This existentialist morality of freedom guides 
Beauvoir’s inquiry throughout The Second Sex, enabling her to make critical ethical 
delineations without falling into the meanings or justifications of ‘happiness’ provided by 
patriarchal ontology. Setting aside the patriarchal fears of what might be lost in a new 
world of sex equality, Beauvoir demands an openness to what is to be gained by the rise 
of women from their historical and personal traumas.  
The infliction of traumatic harm and its perpetuation by denial is utilized as a 
mechanism to enforce both norms of feminine becoming as well as masculine becoming, 
delineating the boundaries of patriarchal gendered destinies or what it means to become a 
‘man’ or a ‘woman’ (see Katz 2006; Kimmel 2008; Mann 2014). In this chapter, I 
explain Beauvoir’s position that living an authentic human life requires the reciprocal 
recognition of others and entails a constant conversion, or repetitious repetition, from 
being to becoming. That is, we gain recognition through overcoming our bare immanent 
survival to become who we are through our projects, or what it is we do to make our lives 
meaningful, in the world with others. But garnering recognition is not guaranteed, and 
this uncertainty may fill one with fear and trembling. Patriarchy denies the fact that 
becoming requires this constant conversion, instead providing easier, tempting avenues of 
gendered destiny to evade and soothe the existential anguish that is our freedom. 
Patriarchal ontology bifurcates the ambiguity of human subjectivity such that men are to 
become invulnerable actors of domination once and for all while women are to become 
vulnerable, self-abandoned objects for his domination and consumption. The infliction of 
traumatic rupture both facilitates the temptation to flee freedom and enforces it: rape is its 
central logic.  
I the next sections, I first discuss Beauvoir's concepts of repetition, freedom, and 
gendered destiny as she explores them in her post-war novel, The Mandarins to better 
prepare our understanding of these concepts in her philosophy. I then turn to excerpts 
from the ‘History’ and ‘Myths’ chapters of Volume I of The Second Sex to explain her 
existentialist critique of the forgetting of patriarchy, her critique of patriarchy’s denial. 
Denial functions to protect the all-too-certain future gendered destinies of patriarchy, and 
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this false certainty must be sacrificed if we are to embrace a philosophy of freedom. That 
is, we must sacrifice the comforts of denial and re-collect the immemorialized 
traumatized self, to become self-assured, in order to truly be able to forget ourselves in 
our present projects of freedom and become who we are. This is demonstrated through a 
close reading of excerpts from the last two chapters of Volume II of The Second Sex, 
‘The Independent Woman’ and the ‘Conclusion.’ Beauvoir does not provide a roadmap 
to freedom, but she does explore freedom’s repetitious structure throughout her works.  
I find Beauvoir’s philosophy of overcoming patriarchal ontology and its traumas 
entails continuing to build a political, economic, and social world in which women, 
gender-non-conforming individuals, and trauma survivors generally might find self-
assurance. Moreover, it necessitates the sacrifice of our gendered destinies, so the future 
may be left open for the uncertain possibility of our becoming rather than foreclosed by 
the seemingly natural facts of life: so that we might not merely survive our traumas in 
alienated isolation, but so we might meaningfully live in reciprocity together. 
 
Repetition and Freedom in The Mandarins 
 Beauvoir does not provide a feminist roadmap to freedom and out of patriarchy. 
Instead, she thinks through the structure of freedom’s repetition throughout her works. 
She particularly explores the concept in her novel The Mandarins, a novel published 
some five years after The Second Sex and nearly ten years after the conclusion of World 
War II. The novel is set in the aftermath of the war’s destruction, that is, the same 
historical Beauvoir herself lived and experienced. The characters even bear striking 
resemblance to Beauvoir, her life-partner Jean-Paul Sartre, their friend Albert Camus, as 
well as Beauvoir’s American lover, Nelson Algren to whom the novel is dedicated. The 
novel is narrated from the point of two characters, the novelist Henri Perron and the 
psychoanalyst Anne Dubreuilh. It is through these characters that Beauvoir explores the 
difficulty of freedom’s repetition in the situation of patriarchal denial in the aftermath of 
World War II. Beauvoir lends her own voice to both of these characters. She makes this 
clear in her memoir, The Force of Circumstance. 
As I’ve indicated previously, Beauvoir clearly explains in The Force of 
Circumstance that her concept of repetition is inherited from Kierkegaard and that she 
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understands the concept to mean “to truly possess something, one must have lost it and 
found it again” (Beauvoir 1965, 270-271). This loss is a rupture that is experienced as “a 
time when all […] hopes had died” Beauvoir 1965, 270). In the memoir, Beauvoir 
explains that she deliberately explores this concept in The Mandarins. It is in the male 
characters of Henri Perron and Robert Dubreuilh, who are said to resemble Albert Camus 
and Jean-Paul Sartre respectively, that Beauvoir explores the moment of loss as a 
moment from which they are no longer “content with a facile optimism” (Beauvoir 1965, 
270). This loss is no longer content with the illusions of denial. Instead, they sacrifice this 
secure, easy contentment and instead choose to “take upon themselves all the difficulties, 
the failures, the scandal implied in any undertaking. Their old enthusiastic adherences are 
replaced by austere preferences” (Beauvoir 1965, 270). These characters sacrifice their 
preferences, forget or lose themselves again in their undertakings, rediscovering 
themselves through their projects. This attitude, however, is not guaranteed. “One might 
predict that in the future their hesitations may return” (Beauvoir 1965, 270). They might 
lose their self-assurance and succumb, either by consent or force, to their loss and live 
the remainder of their lives as a body-object overcome by the dialectical symptoms of 
trauma. Such is the plight of each of Beauvoir’s female characters in The Mandarins.  
Beauvoir is “unrepentant” in her choice not to portray “positive heroine[s]” of 
exceptional women who “assumed an equal role with men in the realm of professional 
and political responsibilities” in The Mandarins; she instead depicts “women as, for the 
most part, I saw them, and as I still see them today: divided” (Beauvoir 1965, 266). This 
is to say that in her writing, Beauvoir describes the fragmented state of women in a 
situation of patriarchal denial. She does so in order to highlight the situation of most 
women in the ‘world of men’: as divided between the possibility of their free potential 
and their succumbing to their loss of self, their abdication to men. Rather than finding 
self-assurance in the 'world of men' of their own capacities to actively create the world, 
women remain in a place of divided rupture. They are unable to forget themselves; they 
are self-conscious rather than self-assured.  
By the end of the novel, the adolescent daughter of Robert and Anne Dubreuilh, 
Nadine Dubreuilh “manages neither to accept her femininity nor to transcend it,” 
succumbing to a dull life living not for herself as a promising chemist, but rather half-
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heartedly living for her husband, Henri, and their child (Beauvoir 1965, 266). After 
abandoning her singing career, the aging character Paula Mareuil, “clings to feminine 
values” by investing her entire being into her then-lover Henri, but these values “are not 
enough” tearing her “to the point of madness” (Beauvoir 1965, 266). Sally Scholz writes 
that Paula has “literally lost her self by failing to seek herself in her own projects” 
(Scholz 2017, 378). Paula is particularly consumed by betrayal blindness and denial. She 
does everything in her power to ‘forget’ the reality of her situation—that Henri no longer 
loves her, that her ontological dependency on his success is both draining and a flight 
from both their freedom, and that he would prefer to run off with Nadine. She fools 
herself into a pseudo-self-assurance, that everything is “fine.” She becomes so alienated 
and abstracted from her life that she is institutionalized. With the truth of her reality too 
much to bear, she lives instead in a dream. In a similar, though less drastic fashion, the 
psychoanalyst and main character Anne Dubreuilh also abandons herself by failing to 
“succeed in finding fulfillment in her own undertakings” (Beauvoir 1965, 266). The 
women have not yet found themselves self-assured in their world, a world constructed by 
men, in order to lose themselves in what they do so as to seek or re-find themselves in 
their aims and projects.  
Beauvoir distinguishes herself from these women. She takes particular care to 
distinguish herself from Anne, who is often assumed to be Beauvoir’s own representative 
in the novel. Beauvoir admits that Anne “comes nearer than the others to true freedom” 
and is lent Beauvoir’s very own “tastes, feelings, reactions and memories that were 
mine”4 to the point that Beauvoir often speaking “through her mouth” (Beauvoir 1965, 
268). However, Anne remains a secondary being to the men in her life. She occupies the 
‘second sex’, rather than a being who embraces her autonomy to create a world to live 
with others. Beauvoir writes that Anne: 
[…] has neither my appetites, nor my insistences, nor, above all, has she the 
autonomy that has been bestowed on me by a profession which means so much to 
me. Her relations with a man [Robert Dubreuilh] almost twenty years older than 
herself are almost like those of a daughter and, despite the couple’s deep 
understanding, leave her solitary; she has only tentatively committed herself to her 
profession. Because she does not have aims and projects of her own, she lives the 
                                               
4 In particular, Beauvoir lends her own experience of her transatlantic love affair with Nelson Algren to the 
character of Anne in her relationship to Lewis Brogan. 
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‘relative’ life of a ‘secondary’ being. It was mainly the negative aspects of my 
experience that I expressed through her: the fear of dying and the panic of 
nothingness, the vanity of earthly diversions, the shame of forgetting, the scandal 
of living. The joy of existence, the gaiety of activity, the pleasure of writing, all 
those I bestowed on Henri. He resembles me at least as much as Anne does, 
perhaps more. (Beauvoir 1965, 268; my emphasis) 
 
Anne lives a life not for herself by rather vicariously through her traumatized clients, her 
(sometimes abusive) lovers, her dispassionate daughter, and, most prominently, her 
father-like husband. She succumbs to life. In her work with survivors, she feels guilty that 
she has not experienced enough trauma to be “able to give counsel from the heights of 
[her] good health.” Her own concerns feel trite and she is compelled “to help these men 
and women to forget,” though she doubts her abilities to do so (Beauvoir 1954, 177; my 
emphasis). She sees clients cope with their nightmares by turning to “too many lovers” 
and “drinking immoderately” (Beauvoir 1954, 184-85). The novel ends with Anne’s 
contemplation of suicide. However, she “is not made of the stuff of suicides” and returns 
to her life to help raise her new granddaughter, Nadine and Henri’s child. But “her return 
to an acceptance of the everyday world seems more like a defeat than a triumph […] she 
[…] is betraying something. And then, tomorrow, for her as well as for Henri, is 
uncertain” (Beauvoir 1965, 271). Anne betrays her own self in her life lived not for 
herself but for others. She is not self-assured but rather in denial. Today, as in Beauvoir’s 
time, our task is to sacrifice the ease and allure of denial’s forgetting. Instead, we must 
undertake the work to find ourselves so that we might have something to forget. So that 
we might become who we are. 
 
The Forgetting of Patriarchy is Denial 
Ontology is the study of what is. Or, rather, for our existential study, it is the 
study of which identities are allowed to be and which identities are allowed to become 
within what Beauvoir calls their ‘total concrete situation,’ that is, in their particular 
historical, material, psychological, social, and political place, within a world where life’s 
meaning is more important than life itself. A world where it is not enough to merely 
survive: one must have reasons for living. Which lives are recognized? What meaning is 
given to individual lives, to who they are, not just by their own self but by the many other 
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selves with whom they live? Who has a past that is remembered and a future worth 
living? Who has the opportunity to make meaning and who doesn’t? Is the meaning 
provided, found, or created livable? In this manner, an existential study of ontology is a 
study of life and death. And a feminist existentialist study pays particular attention to the 
role, or ‘weight’ (Mann 2014), of gender in pursuing an inquiry into being and becoming: 
it is a study of patriarchal ontology.  
Patriarchal ontology is built upon an ancient perceived binary that prescribes 
heterosexist social destinies of becoming recognizable from the bifurcated biological 
‘destinies’ necessary for natural human reproduction. This patriarchal ontology is the 
foundation of contemporary racialized patriarchy, which I discussed in detail in chapter 
II. Phenotypical categories of race were created and incorporated into the scurrilous logic 
of ancient patriarchy during the modern-era of European colonization. Gender and its 
destinies have shifted through time and place, and, in our era, gender is undoubtedly 
racialized.5 What hasn’t changed, as Bonnie Mann demonstrates, is that patriarchal 
ontology provides ready-made and enforced avenues of gendered destiny to justify 
human flights from our freedom to become our greatest selves. These destinies include 
what it means to become a ‘man’ or a ‘woman,’ or, with the advent of modern colonial 
racism, a ‘white man,’ a ‘white woman,’ a ‘black male,’ or a ‘black female,’ in 
patriarchal society. Patriarchal destiny prescribes (or destroys) a future, which must be 
defended by denial. These gendered destinies in turn provide justification for the 
“absolute evil” of denial’s lapse of transcendence into immanence (Beauvoir 2010, 16). 
They provide flimsy recognition and justification for our tempting flights from our 
                                               
5 I refer to ‘patriarchal ontology’ throughout this paper, though it may be appropriate to substitute the term 
‘racist heteropatriarchal ontology.’ Scholars of race and gender largely agree the ontology of patriarchy 
took on a significant transformation in the Modern colonial era, incorporating phenotypical markers into its 
structure of naturalized sexual domination with the creation of race and systems of racism to legitimize 
economic practices of slavery. Scholars such as María Lugones and Andrea Smith have articulated that 
contemporary conceptions of race were built upon an ancient heterosexist patriarchal ontology which 
facilitated European colonial political, material, and ontological expansion while decimating non-Western 
modes of thinking, being, and becoming—some of which were not built upon a binaristic system of sex 
domination. See María Lugones, “Heterosexualism and the Colonial/Modern Era Gender System,” Hypatia 
22.1 (Winter, 2007): 186-209; and Andrea Smith, “Heteropatriarchy and the Three Pillars of White 
Supremacy: Rethinking Women of Color Organizing,” Color of Violence: INCITE! Anthology (Cambridge: 
Duke University Press, 2016): 66-73.  
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freedom: it is a way of thinking and building our world that alienates us from the task of 
becoming who we are with others in a world of meaning that we make together. 
In her book, Sovereign Masculinity, Bonnie Mann explains Beauvoir’s 
philosophical position that receiving recognition from others is essential to living a 
human life. Mann writes, “What is certain is that, for Beauvoir, a life that does not seek 
recognition of some kind, on some level, is not a human life” (Mann 2014, 40). Mann 
notes that Beauvoir’s philosophy is distinct from a Hegelian philosophy of recognition in 
that, in her theory, recognition does not necessitate conflict (i.e., Hegel’s master-slave 
dialectic). Instead, Beauvoir offers that recognition “also comes through reciprocity, 
friendship and generosity” (Mann 2014, 40; see also Bergoffen 1997; Scarth 2004, 123-
127; Beauvoir 2010, 159-160). But the recognition of others, be it in conflict or 
friendship, is not guaranteed as this recognition must be freely given: our freedom to 
become who we are by our actions depends on the freedom of others to offer us 
recognition or not (Mann 2014, 40). Mann continues to explain that how we receive 
recognition shifts throughout a lifetime. When we are infants and children, we require 
recognition simply by virtue of being. At least if we are to survive. We need the care of a 
mother, father, or caretaker to ensure our feeding, cleaning, and housing so we might live 
rather than perish from malnourishment, disease, or exposure. We need the recognition of 
another to ensure our safety, our survival, and our happiness. As I’ve mentioned in 
chapter II, attachment theory psychologists have demonstrated how vitally important it is 
to us as infants to receive recognition from our primary care-providers: if not 
immediately fatal, failures of early infant attachment traumatically echo throughout that 
individual infant’s lifetime (Ainsworth and Bell 1970; Bowlby 1969 and 1988; Main and 
Solomon 1986).  
As we grow into adulthood, we not only encounter our responsibilities to work 
with others to ensure our own survival (if we are so able) but also the disappointment that 
simply surviving, simply being, is no longer enough to receive the recognition of others 
we so desperately need to provide meaning in our lives, to provide reasons for living. 
Rather, we receive this recognition by virtue of what it is we do in the world, who is it 
that we become by our actions. Is this person recognized, valued, and accepted by the 
community? Or is this person misrecognized, devalued, or exiled? Is this person visible 
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as a person within the meaning made by others in the world, within the ontological 
schema? Is this person self-assured?  
Living an ‘authentic’ human life requires a constant conversion from being to 
becoming. Beauvoir writes: 
Man attains an authentically moral attitude when he renounces being in order to 
assume his existence: through this conversion he also renounces all possession, 
because possession is a way of searching for being; but the conversion by which 
he attains true wisdom is never finished, it has to be made ceaselessly, it demands 
constant effort. (Beauvoir 2010, 160; qtd. in Mann 2014, 41).  
 
That is, an authentic life that affirms its freedom must renounce the mere fact of their 
being as deserving of recognition and instead ‘lose’ possession of their own self in their 
actions to become who they are within a community. The individual must risk 
themselves, generously giving themselves to others through their projects with no 
guarantee of reciprocity. In this way, an individual might ‘truly’ possess themselves as a 
meaning-making, free individual whose own humanity is in relation to the recognition 
they receive from others who also must risk themselves in like manner. And this process 
is never complete, but is rather a constant conversion, or a repeated repetition, 
throughout a lifetime. It is constant rebirth. And in order to undertake such a conversion, 
repetition, or rebirth we must first find ourselves grounded. We must be self-assured. One 
must possess one’s being in order to renounce it: we must recollect our immemorialized 
past in order to firmly place it in the past and renounce its grip in the present moment and 
the present moments to come. One must have found oneself in order to forget or lose 
oneself. 
 The uncertainty of receiving recognition for who one becomes by what one does 
is terrifying, filling a subject with existential fear and trembling. One risks one’s very 
own self, one’s identity, and one’s potential. There is thus a “fundamental human 
tendency to flee freedom,” Mann writes, which “[m]ost often […] takes the form of self-
alienation. One alienates one’s meaning-making and value-establishing capacities into a 
god, or a political party, or an object […] or biology […] or a social role.” Under Mann’s 
interpretation of Beauvoir, patriarchal ontology uses gender as “ready-made avenues for” 
justifying our “self-alienation” (Mann 2014, 29 and 42). These are ready-made avenues 
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for denial. These gendered destinies provide both an escape from freedom as well as a 
barrier to building the self-assurance necessary to affirm one’s freedom.  
Patriarchal ontology operates according to a logic that evades uncertainty by 
bifurcating the ambiguity of freedom. We have discussed in detail that we are embodied 
human animals that must live the ambiguous relation of the emotional memories of our 
limbic systems and the rationalizing of our prefrontal cortex, that of being a reactionary if 
passive object and a creatively active subject. As I’ve previously stated, patriarchal 
ontology splits this ambiguity of human subjectivity along an ancient perceived natural 
binary of sex difference. This is to say that the heart of patriarchal ontology is a denial 
that men and women are both human animals: both ambiguously passive and active 
creatures and both capable of and in need of learning to live this ambiguity in harmony. 
Instead, patriarchal ontology imbues the perceived natural binary with social meaning 
that prescribes, or assures, ‘men’ that they are destined for invulnerable conquest: that 
the world and its peoples, particularly its women, are his oyster. These values of 
dominating masculinity are the values of ‘philonike’ or the ‘love of victory’ that we have 
discussed previously in this dissertation. Women, on the other hand, are destined in this 
patriarchal ontology to fulfilling her ‘biological destiny’ by becoming an object for man 
as his wife, his mother, and his earth-mediator (i.e., his mother’s child, his cook, and his 
home manager or even slave). She is both prize and object of his conquering. To become 
a woman is to become an object for men (McWeeny 2017). In other words, patriarchal 
ontology is an ontology with masculine dominance (i.e., rape) as its central logic, a logic 
which provides ready-made avenues for identity recognition: the male dominator and the 
female dominated. But this recognition recognizes a subject only insofar as they are 
perceived to adhere to their particular gendered destiny within an ontology: the individual 
is not recognized for what they do as an individual among a plurality of peers, rather they 
are recognized for their adherence to performing masculinity or femininity as judged by 
their peers of so-called ‘men’ and ‘women.’ Of course, men are offered the opportunity in 
the world they built to individuate themselves, but even this may be closely monitored or 
motivated by expectations of gendered destiny.  
As Mann demonstrates, gender provides ready-made justifications to flee the 
ambiguity, uncertainty, and terror that is our human freedom. In the guise of ‘destiny,’ 
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gender as justification facilitates our temptation to flee our freedom, which is to say our 
denial. This ontology bifurcates and ruptures the temporality and responsibilities of 
human freedom, settling individuals into easy, but often dissatisfying and even violent, 
pre-given social roles to eschew the risks of becoming recognized for who they are 
through their actions in a world of meaning. To better understand the gendered 
bifurcation of freedom, it is helpful to carefully examine Beauvoir’s critical recollection 
of the seemingly ‘natural’ origins of masculine domination and the constitution of 
patriarchal ontology. Namely, an excerpt from her first of five ‘History’ chapters of The 
Second Sex.6  
Beauvoir notes that children were a burden rather than a blessing in prehistoric 
and nomadic ‘hordes,’ who were not-yet stabilized into a constructed world of meaning-
making. Infants and children were born into “a climate of total indifference” and often 
died of infanticide or disease. Beauvoir speculates that a mother in such climates did “not 
take pride in her creation” but instead “feels like the passive plaything of obscure forces, 
and painful childbirth is a useless and even bothersome accident,” if not deadly (Beauvoir 
2010, 73). Childbirth ruptures her own personal survival. However, as these hordes 
began to establish themselves into societies, “more value was attached to children.” 
Nevertheless, Beauvoir continues writing, “to give birth and to breast-feed are not 
activities but natural functions.” That is, the mother’s basic tasks of ensuring the bare 
survival of her infant are not meaning-making activities unique to the human-animal, but 
rather tasks shared by all mammals for the purposes of reproductive survival. “They do 
not involve a project, which is why the woman finds no motive there to claim higher 
meaning for her existence; she passively submits to her biological destiny” (Beauvoir 
2010, 73).  
Childbirth thus ruptures her own life project of seeking herself in what she does; 
her becoming a mother is not an active conversion or repetition of being to becoming, but 
                                               
6 Her ‘History’ chapters constitute Part Two of Volume I of The Second Sex; it is in Volume I that Beauvoir 
critically explores the masculine establishment of, perspective within, and insufficient reasoning for 
patriarchal ontology. She seeks to understand how and why it is that “[t]his world has always belonged to 
males” despite insufficient reasoning by “reviewing prehistoric and ethnographic data in the light of 
existentialist philosophy” in order to understand “how the hierarchy of the sexes came to be” (Beauvoir 
2010, 71). In Volume II, which will be further explored in the next section, Beauvoir discusses women’s 
multiple perspectives on patriarchal ontology, her difficulties within it, as well as her overcoming. 
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rather a passive submission to being, to her role as a reproducing female mammal, to her 
role as a reproductive object in the world of men. She submits to her growing uterus, her 
water breaking, her painful birth experience, her lactating breasts, and the instinctual 
cries of her infant. And in the ontology created for her by men in their freedom from the 
biological burdens of human reproduction, her biological destiny becomes her social 
destiny. Her biological role in human reproduction (pregnancy, birth, lactation) becomes 
tied to her social role as a caretaker of her children and her household, “[b]ecause 
housework alone is compatible with the duties of motherhood, she is condemned to 
domestic labor, which locks her into repetition and immanence; day after day it repeats 
itself in identical form from century to century; it produces nothing” (Beauvoir 2010, 73). 
That is, her biological destiny confines her to a temporality of maintaining biological 
human life. In contrast, men’s biological destiny in human reproduction is not 
experienced as a passivity but rather as an activity. His activity is experienced in light of a 
denial of his own passivity, projecting this piece of himself onto woman. His role in 
human reproduction alleviates him from viscerally experiencing himself as a passivity. 
He is relieved from the burdens of pregnancy, birth, and lactation. This leaves him self-
assured in his own active agency to create a world in which his procreative progeny 
might live: not only does he have the time and space for creativity, his ‘active’ rather than 
‘passive’ role in reproduction assures him of his existential capabilities to create. Her 
experience of passivity in pro-creation facilitates his experience of activity not only in the 
sex act but in his world-creation.  
His creation flows from his ‘active’ potential in reproduction to the value of 
risking his own life, particularly and historically through his hunting activities (Beauvoir 
2010, 73; see also Mann 2014, 37). Beauvoir notes that the male human does not serve 
his society “in the way that worker bees do” by simply acting as a cog in a natural 
machine to provide sustenance for the horde. He has already confined women to this role 
in accordance with biological destiny. Rather, man provides for his human community 
“by acts that transcend his animal condition,” by acts that go beyond mere repetition of 
biological life and survival into acts that create a meaningful world in which to live. In 
early societies, these activities, such as hunting and hunting parties, were often 
dangerous, “endow[ing] him with supreme dignity” (Beauvoir 2010, 73). That is, man at 
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his earliest moment in patriarchal ontology enjoyed the privileged cover of danger: man 
risked his life in order to kill in the hunt. Hunting, Beauvoir notes, is not a mere provision 
for survival in the way a mother’s lactating body provides sustenance for her infant. “If 
blood were only a food,” Beauvoir writes, “it would not be worth more than milk.” 
Instead, the blood of others entails risk. Hunting is not merely a passive process of 
survival, but it demands a willingness to sacrifice one’s own life. Beauvoir continues, 
“the hunter is not a butcher: he runs risks in the struggle against wild animals.” Similarly, 
human freedom entails risking oneself, sacrificing one’s safety and self-assurance, in the 
struggle for recognition. Beyond mere food-stuffs and bare survival, the hunter-warrior’s 
contribution to his community is a contribution of meaning making: his risk brings honor 
to his society. Beauvoir writes, “[t]he warrior risks his own life to raise the prestige of the 
horde—his clan.” In this manner, “he brilliantly proves that life is not the supreme value 
for man but that it must serve ends far greater than itself” (Beauvoir 2010, 73-74). The 
warrior demonstrates that it is not enough for a human to merely survive, there must be 
reasons for living: life must be meaningful.  
Beauvoir continues to explain that “[t]he worst curse on woman is her exclusion 
from warrior expeditions” (Beauvoir 2010, 74). At an early stage in human society 
according to received masculine theorizing, the woman was barred according to her 
biological ‘destiny’ of passivity from the opportunity to actively risk her life and 
participate in her human proclivity for meaning-making. That is to say, she was barred 
from realizing the extent of her active agency, which today’s psychologists recognize as 
important to developing resiliency in the face and aftermath of trauma (cf. van der Kolk 
2015, 357). Instead, woman was confined to the mere repetition of giving life to human 
animals. Her giving of life is merely a participation in the bare survival and perpetuation 
of the human-animal species. It is not a transcendence from mere survival to a 
meaningful life. Beauvoir writes, “it is not in giving life but in risking his life that man 
raises himself above the animal; this is why throughout humanity, superiority has been 
granted not to the sex that gives birth but to the one that kills” (Beauvoir 2010, 73-74). 
She is here critically examining the historical reasons provided by patriarchal ontology 
that ground masculine domination in biology or nature in order to better understand our 
contemporary state of existential affairs. She is not providing an endorsement of 
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patriarchy’s devaluation of life-giving.7 Rather, she is offering an existential 
understanding of the foundation upon which patriarchy stands. Through her analysis, 
Beauvoir both demonstrates the ‘origin’ of the devaluation of life-giving through 
women’s confinement to generic species survival as well as highlighting the importance 
not only of risk but of risking one’s own life to make meaning. It must be underscored 
that the meanings patriarchal ontology provides to life-giving and life-risking activities 
are perversions of human freedom for Beauvoir. Her existential examination of 
patriarchal ontology reveals the meanings provided by patriarchal ontology are 
abstractions of human freedom, they abstract and bifurcate the task of repetition.  
The sexed split between life-giving and life-risking endeavors in early patriarchal 
human societies holds for Beauvoir “the key to the whole mystery” not only of the 
origins of masculine domination but also women’s historical acquiescence to it (rather 
than struggle against it, as in recent times) that proves revealing for the structure of free, 
human intersubjectivity. Biologically, Beauvoir writes, “a species maintains itself only by 
re-creating itself; but this creation is nothing but a repetition of the same Life in different 
forms” (Beauvoir 2010, 74). That is, the species is perpetuated through procreation, 
which does not meaningfully individuate members of the species but rather re-produces 
more of the same.8 The infant is rather a copy (though a complicated copy!) of the 
                                               
7 See Margery Collins and Christine Pierce, “Holes and Slime: Sexism in Sartre’s Psychoanalysis,” 
In Women and Philosophy: Toward a Theory of Liberation, edited by Carol Gould and M. Wartofsky, New 
York: Putnam, 1976; Moira Gatens, Feminism and Philosophy: Perspectives on Difference and Equality. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991; Moira Gatens, “Toward a Feminist Philosophy of the Body.” 
In Crossing Boundaries: Feminisms and the Critique of Knowledges, edited by E. Caine, E. Grosz, and M. 
de Lepervanche, Sydney: Allen & Unwin,1988; Naomi Greens, “Sartre, Sexuality and The Second 
Sex,” Philosophy and Literature 4.2 (1980); Alice Jardin, “Death Sentences: Writing Couples and 
Ideology,” In The Female Body in Western Culture, edited by Susan Rubin Suleimen, Cambridge: Harvard 
University, 1986; Genevieve Lloyd, Man of Reason: Male and Female in Western Philosophy, London: 
Routledge, 1993; Elizabeth Spelman, “Woman as Body: Ancient and Contemporary Views,” Feminist 
Studies 8.1 (1982); Elizabeth Spelman, Inessential Woman: Problems of Exclusion in Feminist Thought, 
Boston: Beacon Press, 1988; Bonelle Strickling, “Simone de Beauvoir and the Value of 
Immanence,” Atlantis 13.2 (1988); and Susan Suleiman, editor, The Female Body in Western Culture, 
Boston: Harvard University Press, 1986. 
 
8 Despite our perceived embodied differences within the human species (i.e., sex and phenotype), scientists 
have found that the human species is one of the least genetically diverse species on the planet: there is on 
average only .1% to .4% genetic difference between any two humans that have ever graced the earth. In this 
light, human reproduction is a rather boring affair: there is no creativity or originality in the infant 
byproduct of reproduction. See Lynn B. Jorde and Stephen P. Wooding, “Genetic Variation, Classification, 
and ‘Race,’” Nature Genetics 36.11s (2004): S28-33; and Joseph L. Graves, “How Biology Refutes our 
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human-animals that have come before its birth, and a copy that may (or may not) produce 
another iteration of itself in the future. 
Freed from the burdens of being a biological Xerox machine and confident in his 
capabilities for action and creativity, man is able to transcend his species mere biological 
survival and instead live, to risk himself and create meaning within his world. And this 
meaning-making guarantees the biological perpetuation of the human species. Beauvoir 
writes, “[b]y transcending Life through Existence, man guarantees the repetition of Life: 
by this surpassing, he creates values that deny any value to pure repetition” (Beauvoir 
2010, 74). Surpassing towards the future, individuating oneself, denies value to the 
repetition of reproductive labor. Through his participation in activities that demand he 
risk his life (i.e., hunting), he not only individuates himself within the species but creates 
a meaningful world in which to give human birth: he brings honor to his family, to his 
clan. He creates values that exceed and therefore de-value the value of mere species 
survival: he gives value to living and thereby to his existence. His service to the species is 
not simply in providing meat from his hunt; his sacrificial risk of his own life through 
hunting activities creates a meaningful world, the ‘world of man.’  
 In his risk-filled service to the species, “the human male shapes the face of the 
earth, creates new instruments, and forges the future.” Grasping the world, he creates the 
life-world in which the species not only survives, but lives. This “guarantees the 
repetition of Life” because the human infant is no longer a mere biological accident 
befalling a horde of human-animals, but rather a precious new member—progeny, 
even—of a world where the reasons for living “are more important than life itself” 
(Beauvoir 2010, 73; also, McWeeny 2017). Moreover, this meaning “guarantees” life by 
ensuring a default caretaker for the new infant members of the clan by assigning the role 
to women in accordance with her biological destiny: she is not simply a mother, she 
becomes Mom.  
In more recent times, woman is the conduit for the meaning of the ‘world of men’ 
with the bedtime stories she tells their (read: his) children, or in the Disney movies she 
lets their (read: his) children watch. These are not her stories but rather tales of man’s 
                                               
Racial Myths,” The Race Myth: Why We Pretend Race Exists in America (New York: Plume Publishing, 
2005): 1-18. 
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grandeur. This has, of course, begun to change in recent history with the slow, hesitant, 
advance of the women’s and civil rights movements. Even so, alternative fairy tales, 
alternative myths and their authors, remain exceptional; they face harsh judgment, 
condemnation even. 
Women have historically acquiesced to the meaning men have made, which is a 
central puzzle for Beauvoir. But the ‘key’ that an existential examination of the biological 
explanation for masculine domination reveals is that woman has been complicit not 
because she is somehow incapable of resisting, but rather because part of her respects the 
risk of his struggle precisely because she recognizes the importance of risk and active 
transcendence within herself, within her own subjectivity. Beauvoir writes, “[p]ositing 
himself as sovereign, he encounters the complicity of woman herself: because she herself 
is also an existent, because transcendence also inhabits her and her project is not 
repetition but surpassing herself toward another future, she finds the confirmation of 
masculine claims in the core of her being” (Beauvoir 2010, 74). Because woman is also a 
human with a subjectivity that is ambiguous and free, she recognizes that the ‘pure 
repetition’ of procreation to which she has been confined is not satisfying for a 
meaningful human life: the repetition of animal procreation is not the repetition of human 
freedom. Mere biology can never surpass the animal condition because biology always 
dwells at the biological level. An ovary is an ovary; an ovary is not a woman nor a 
woman an ovary. She becomes complicit by both her denial of her own active, world-
making capacities, instead projecting them and finding the projection confirmed by men.  
The very structure of her human subjectivity confirms that risk is involved in 
receiving recognition as a human, in creating meaning. Thus, she respects his risks and 
sacrificially denies her own active capacity, even when these human sacrifices are 
abstracted into a religion, a political party, or social roles (Mann 2014, 29 and 42). 
Woman thus “participates with men in festivals that celebrate the success and victories of 
males,” for such celebration of human success, even if it is only male success, provides 
meaning in her world.  
Still today, in an era after Billy Jean King, women flock to men’s sporting events 
and tailgating festivals; often the women play host. Sometimes the women are rendered 
tragically rape-able prize objects. Beauvoir explains that women’s “misfortune is to have 
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been biologically destined to repeat Life.” She has been socially destined to her passive 
role in the mere ‘pure repetition’ of maintaining the Life of the species (i.e., birthing 
babies, cheerleading on the sidelines, or preparing Totino’s for her guys9) by the 
biological division of procreative labor. All the while, “in her own eyes Life in itself does 
not provide her reasons for being, and these reasons are more important than life itself” 
(Beauvoir 2010, 74). Human life needs meaning. It is not enough to bring a child into a 
world if that world does not have reasons for living. Woman’s ‘misfortune’ is that she is 
“originally an existent who gives Life and does not risk her life,” she gives life to the 
generic species rather than risking her own individuated self. This is why, historically, 
“there has never been combat between male and her” in the manner of a Hegelian master-
slave struggle. She has always-already given herself over to men (Beauvoir 2010, 74).  
On this historical, biological explanation, Beauvoir finds the existential 
explanation for patriarchal domination: “it is the male who opens up the future toward 
which she also transcends; in reality, women have never pitted female values against 
male ones: it is men wanting to maintain masculine prerogatives who invented this 
division; they wanted to create a feminine domain—a rule of life, of immanence—only to 
lock woman in it” (Beauvoir 2010, 74). Indeed, to pit ‘feminine values’ like mothering 
care against ‘masculine values’ like warrior courage only concedes the debate: ‘feminine 
values’ are themselves a creation of men made to lock women into passive domesticity. 
Further, to pit ‘feminine values’ against ‘masculine values’ would be a disavowal of her 
own subjectivity, a disavowal of her respect for the risking of self that is required to make 
meaning. To pit ‘feminine values’ is to succumb to them; it is to blind oneself to the 
denials and betrayals of gendered destiny. It is to seek a place of self-assurance in a 
destiny that is not self-assured. Adhering to gendered destiny is to blindly dwell in a false 
sense of security.10 These ‘feminine values,’ which so many women (such as Beauvoir’s 
                                               
9 For a delightful and satirical laugh, see Saturday Night Live’s “Totino’s Super Bowl Commercial.” 
 
10 This is akin to the false sense of security many battered women and victims of intimate partner violence 
experience before coming to the realization that they are being abused. Leslie Morgan Steiner addresses 
questions of why so many women stay in their abusive relationships and why they don’t leave with her own 
experience in a Ted Talk about her memoir, Crazy Love:  
I didn’t know he was abusing me. Even though he had held those loaded guns to my head, pushed 
me down stairs, threatened to kill our dog, pulled the key out of the car ignition as I drove down 
the highway, poured coffee grinds on my head as I dressed for a job interview, I never once 
thought of myself as a battered wife. Instead I was a very strong woman in love with a deeply 
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character Paula) and sex-difference feminists (such Beauvoir’s wannabe protégé turned 
critic, Luce Irigaray11) have sought to ‘re-claim’ are simply values given by men to 
justify women’s existence, to soothe her and make her content with her lot.  
                                               
troubled man, and I was the only person on earth who could help Connor face his demons. The 
other question everybody asks is: why doesn’t she just leave? Why didn’t I walk out? I could have 
left any time. To me, this is the saddest and most painful question that people ask, because we 
victims know something you usually don’t: It’s incredibly dangerous to leave an abuser, because 
the final step in the domestic abuse pattern is kill her. Over 70 percent of domestic violence 
murders happen after the victim has ended the relationship, after she has gotten out, because then 
the abuser has nothing left to lose. Other outcomes include long-term stalking, even after the 
abuser remarries; denial of financial resources; and manipulation of the family court system to 
terrify the victim and her children, who are regularly forced by family court judges to spend 
unsupervised time with the man who beat their mother. And still we ask, why doesn’t she just 
leave? I was able to leave, because of one final, sadistic beating that broke through my denial. I 
realized the man who I loved so much was going to kill me if I let him. So, I broke the silence. I 
told everyone: the police, my neighbors, my friends and family, total strangers, and I am here 
today because you all helped me. […] Abuse thrives in silence. […] Recast survivors as 
wonderful, lovable people with full futures. Recognize the early signs of violence and 
conscientiously intervene, deescalate it, show victims a safe way out. Together we can make our 
beds, our dinner tables and our families the safe and peaceful oases the should be. (Leslie Morgan 
Steiner, “Why Domestic Violence Victims Don’t Leave,” Ted Talk, (Nov. 2012), 
https://www.ted.com/talks/leslie_morgan_steiner_why_domestic_violence_victims_don_t_leave#t
-758565; my emphasis) 
 
11 See Luce Irigaray, “A Personal Note: Equal or Different?,” Je, Tu, Nous: Toward a Culture of 
Difference, Trans. by Alison Martin, New York: Routledge, 1993. Beauvoir had the following to say about 
Irigaray in two separate interviews: 
I've found very interesting things in Irigaray, but I find her too ready to adopt the Freudian notion 
of the inferiority of women. She's too influenced by that. Although I admire Freud on a great many 
points, I find that in the case of women, as he said himself, there's a dark continent; he understood 
nothing of what women want. Anyone who wants to work on women has to break completely with 
Freud.... But all of them, even Irigaray, they've always begun with Freud's postulates. […] Freud 
puts woman in an inferior position, which really astonishes me on the part of feminists. (in Hélène 
V. Wenzel, “Interview with Simone de Beauvoir,” Yale French Studies, no. 72 (1986): 12.) 
And: 
S.B.: Yes, that "we want to be just like men," that is, men as they are today, when in truth we need 
to change the society itself, men as well as women, to change everything. It is very striking in 
Betty Friedan: What she wants is for women to have as much power as men do. Obviously, if you 
are truly on the left, if you reject ideas of power and hierarchy, what you want is equality. 
Otherwise, it won't work at all. […] 
S.B.: That's it, Irigaray ... she is trying to do something. She hasn't gone quite far enough, in my 
opinion. But she is trying to construct a psychoanalysis which would be feminist.  
A.J.: What do you think of her book, Speculum de l'autre femme?  
S.B.: I found it laborious to read because of the Lacanian style, which persists in spite of 
everything ... but I read her second book with far greater pleasure, Ce sexe qui n'en est pas un. It's 
written in a much simpler style, much more direct, without a "scholastic" vocabulary- 
psychoanalysts have fallen into a kind of horrifying, almost Aristotelian, scholasticism. On the 
whole, however, I am interested in the kind of work she is doing and I found her book very 
interesting. Still, she seems to lack audacity, which is necessary to demolish the ideas of Freud on 
feminine psychoanalysis. (in Alice Jardine, “Interview with Simone de Beauvoir,” Signs 5.2 
(Winter, 1979): 227-228). 
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Woman has historically submitted to her man-made place of domesticity precisely 
because she is an existent, a human subjectivity, that “seeks self-justification in the 
movement of [her] transcendence” (Beauvoir 2010, 74). She ‘transcends’ through his 
transcendence, through the meaning he has made for her to dwell in. Beauvoir succinctly 
explains this in the “Introduction” to The Second Sex. Patriarchal ontology not only 
ensures that “Lord-man will materially protect liege-woman” concretely in his economic 
position in the ‘world of men,’ but that he also: 
…will be in charge of justifying her existence: along with the economic risk, she 
eludes the metaphysical risk of a freedom that must invent its goals without help 
[my emphasis]. Indeed, beside every individual’s claim to assert himself as 
subject—an ethical claim—lies the temptation to flee freedom and to make 
himself into a thing: it is a pernicious path because the individual, passive, 
alienated, and lost, is prey to a foreign will, cut off from his transcendence, 
robbed of all worth. But it is an easy path: the anguish and stress of authentically 
assumed existence is thus avoided. The man who sets the woman up as an Other 
will thus find in her a deep complicity [Beauvoir’s emphasis]. Hence woman 
makes no claim for herself as subject because she lacks the concrete means, 
because she senses the necessary link connecting her to man without positing its 
reciprocity, and because she often derives satisfaction for her role as Other 
[Beauvoir’s emphasis]. (Beauvoir 2010, 10) 
 
Patriarchal ontology provides her a risk-free ‘transcendence’ and ready-made justification 
to avoid risking her own life and instead submit to her biological destiny and rest 
contented as a loving wife, a doting mother, and a dutiful daughter. In many ways, we 
might consider the femininity of philonikian patriarchy a survival mechanism. We’ve 
discussed Freyd’s thesis that survivors who are dependent upon the individuals or 
institutions who are harming them will often become blind to their betrayal, left to live a 
life of self-hatred and the repetitions of denial. Patriarchy renders woman materially and 
ontologically dependent on man: she succumbs to his denial in order to survive the world 
he has made. And this can provide her satisfaction: her relationship to man gives her life 
meaning. 
But today, as in Beauvoir’s day, women claim “to be recognized as existents just 
like men, not to subordinate existence to life” (Beauvoir 2010, 74-75). Women today 
simply strive to be recognized as their own individuated human selves rather than 
through the relations to the men in their lives (fathers, husbands, sons). This doesn’t 
mean today’s women seek the subordination of men to species life, we simply refuse to 
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subordinate our own life potential to the survival of the species any longer. We no longer 
wish to deny our free human subjectivity. We are no longer satisfied by merely surviving. 
We desire and pursue a life beyond survival. A life worth living. We wish to guarantee 
human life not through our role in the mere repetition of the species but through 
assuming our own existence to create meaning in our collective world. 
 Beauvoir writes that it is precisely because humanity “values reasons for living 
over life” that has enabled man to “set himself as master over woman” because his 
“project is not to repeat himself in time: it is to reign over the instant and to forge the 
future” (Beauvoir 2010, 75). He wishes to be invulnerable Subject once-and-for-all. 
While Beauvoir’s existential examination of patriarchal ontology’s historico-biological 
explanation for masculine domination is useful for understanding the importance of risk 
in creating human meaning, Beauvoir finds this sovereign reign of man highly 
problematic as it does not allow for an intersubjective relation (Mann 2014, 44). It is a 
surpassing toward the future that denies value to self-reproductive labor. It devalues the 
importance of the process of recollection and birthing oneself in time.  
In chapter II, we discussed at length an example of this future-forging patriarchal 
mentality in the words of President Schill, who claimed “if we’re constantly talking about 
what happened in the past, we’re taking our eyes off the future” (interview in Jacoby, 
2015). In the attempt to transcend and “reign over the instant to forge the future,” man 
denies the value of overcoming: his very attempt to live his freedom undermines it. Mann 
explains that patriarchal ontology seeks to rupture the very structure of intersubjective 
relation in favor of an easy, riskless, abstracted relation to his constructed Other. She 
writes: 
Masculine justification, then, seeks to rupture or break [my emphasis] the 
intersubjective structure of human existence in favor of a mystified form of this 
same structure, in which the existential and material risks of our dependence on 
one another are put out of play. Imagining himself to be both the origin and 
finality of ‘his’ woman, her freedom is a tamed and docile freedom (2010, 160; 
161). ‘He does not like difficulty, he is afraid of danger,’ Beauvoir writes (160), 
he is most fearful of all of reminders [sic] of that infantile helplessness that 
characterized his original relation with the woman/other. ‘He would have liked to 
have emerged, like Athena, into the adult world, armed from head to toe, 
invulnerable’ (165). In other words, his fantasy is to emerge into manhood 
without dependence and without risk, without the intersubjective vulnerability 
that structures the human condition.’ […] [P]lurality, distinction, is here 
 182 
repressed, disguised and mystified as the difference of the feminine other (a 
masculinist creation) [Mann’s emphasis].  
The kind of conversion that is at issue in masculinity formation then, at 
least the kind of masculinity formation that Beauvoir is concerned with, is a 
conversion from vulnerability to sovereignty. This is a perversion and disruption, 
even a reversal, of the constant conversion from being to becoming that is 
fundamental to adult human existence, even as it is a mystification and repression 
of the embodied vulnerability of childhood. (Mann 2014, 44) 
 
The meaning-making of patriarchal ontology is a perversion of human freedom in that it 
eliminates the risks involved in being with another human freedom through its 
subordination of women. Denial is central to the patriarchal masculine conversion from 
vulnerability to dominating sovereignty: it is to deny our fundamental human 
vulnerability to and dependency on others.  
Rather than relate with woman in her individuality, rather than respectfully 
flirting with her and providing her the opportunity to refuse his advances,12 he projects 
his own distinct individuality onto her as sexually differentiated Other that he has made 
her to be, that is, as his object for the taking: in every woman he reads only her potential 
to be his object for sexual pleasure, his vessel for his progeny, or his housekeeper. The 
external object of his domination. Beauvoir makes this clear in the beginning of Part 
Three of Volume I entitled “Myths,” which we must now also explicate.  
As I stated above, Beauvoir does not think the masculine devaluation of giving in 
favor of only risking is a good one. The dominating ‘love of victory’ of patriarchal 
masculinity leaves him lonely, isolated, and solitary. In seeking only the possession of his 
hunting trophy, his trophy wife, his trophy car, or his trophy house, man eliminates the 
freedom of others to provide him reciprocal intersubjective recognition. His seeking of 
possession short-circuits the becoming involved in freedom and instead leaves him 
searching for possession, for being, for safety and certainty now and in the future. It is 
not an intersubjective relation of recognition, which requires both a giving and a risking 
of self in a plurality of other subjects; his is rather a sovereign subjectivity of taking or 
consumption. Thinking himself an entitled, invulnerable, infinite sovereign, he takes from 
                                               
12 See Bonnie Mann’s thesis on ‘Flirts’ in “Creepers, Heroes, Flirts, and Allies: Four Theses on Sexual 
Harassment,” APA Newsletter on Feminism 11.2 (Spring 2012): 24-31. 
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others and Nature for himself without giving himself. There is no reciprocity. Only 
domination. 
With the historical subordination of woman as Other, she is projected as man’s 
limit and negative definition of himself. Her mere presence as Other confirms to him that 
he exists: “he attains himself only through the reality that he is not” (Beauvoir 2010, 
159). In the “Introduction” to The Second Sex, Beauvoir quotes Plato as an example of 
this, writing “[a]mong the blessings Plato thanked the gods for was, first, being born free 
and not a slave and, second, a man and not a woman” (Beauvoir 2010, 10-11). Beauvoir 
then brings the deliberate echoes of Plato by nineteenth-century existentialists 
Kierkegaard13 and Nietzsche into her “Myths” chapter. She does so to reiterate her point 
that ‘Woman’ is a mythical, abstract creation of men who invented her to be an object 
confirming the reasons for his being; her reasons for being are reduced to being-for-him. 
She writes, quoting Kierkegaard: 
It is always difficult to describe a myth; it does not lend itself to being grasped or 
defined; it haunts consciousnesses without ever being posited opposite them as a 
fixed object. The object fluctuates so much and is so contradictory that its unity is 
not at first discerned: Delilah and Judith, Aspasia and Lucretia, Pandora and 
Athena, woman is both Eve and the Virgin Mary. She is an idol, a servant, source 
of life, power of darkness; she is the elementary silence of truth, she is artifice, 
gossip, and lies; she is the medicine woman and witch; she is man’s prey; she is 
his downfall, she is everything he is not and wants to have, his negation and his 
raison d’être.  
‘To be a woman,’ says Kierkegaard, ‘is something so strange, so confused, 
and so complicated that no one predicate can express it, and the multiple 
predicates that might be used contradict each other in such a way that only a 
woman could put up with it.’ This comes from being considered not positively, as 
she is for herself, but negatively, such as she appears to man. Because if there are 
Others than the woman, she is still always defined as Other. And her ambiguity is 
that of the very idea of Other: it is that of the human condition as defined in 
relation with the Other. (Beauvoir 2010, 162-163; see Kierkegaard Stages on 
Life’s Way 1988, 56). 
 
                                               
13 Though she writes in her diaries and letters to Sartre of the influence of Kierkegaard’s Fear and 
Trembling on her thinking, in The Second Sex Beauvoir solely quotes from Kierkegaard’s Victor Eremita 
character in the ‘In Vino Veritas’ section of Stages on Life’s Way. ‘In Vino Veritas’ is Kierkegaard’s 
deliberate nineteenth-century ‘repetition’ of Plato’s Symposium, and Victor Eremita is the pseudonymous 
author (or publisher, rather) of Kierkegaard’s Either/Or. Victor Eremita invokes the attribution to Plato in 
his ‘In Vino Veritas’ speech; his speech may well be the origin of Beauvoir’s own use of Plato in the 
‘Introduction’ to The Second Sex. 
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In patriarchal ontology, woman is constructed as man’s limit, his negation, his Other. She 
confirms his reason for being not in her own self, as her own person, but in her negative 
relation to him; her generalized passivity confirms his individual activity. Moreover, his 
relation to her mimics the encounter with another freedom while eliminating the risks 
involved: rather than being posited as another, concrete, human freedom to be 
encountered with risk, care, and potential solidarity, woman is posited as an absolute, 
mystical Other to idolize, consume, and subordinate.  
We’ve discussed previously in chapter II that denial inhibits relations of 
reciprocity because we have difficulty recognizing the human subjectivity of others. And 
patriarchy seizes on this fragmentation, constructing women (and other others) as objects 
onto which man’s vulnerability is projected. Beauvoir writes, “They did invent her” and 
footnotes Nietzsche’s Twilight of the Idols, “Man created woman—but what out of? Out 
of a rib of his God, of his ideal” (Beauvoir 2010, 203; qtd. Nietzsche Twilight of the Idols 
2003, 33). Beauvoir continues, quoting Kierkegaard: 
‘Through woman,’ wrote Kierkegaard, ‘ideality enters into life and what would 
man be without her? Many a man has become a genius through a young girl…but 
none has become a genius through the young woman he married…It is only by a 
negative relation to her that man is rendered productive in his ideal endeavors. 
Negative relations with woman can make us infinite…positive relations with 
woman make the man finite to a far greater extent.’ (Beauvoir 2010, 203 Myths 
chapter I; SK In Vino Veritas p 59-61) 
 
Woman constructed as men’s limit provides him assurance of his invulnerability, of his 
infinitude. Rather than a mere human fleshy freedom encountering the fleshy freedom of 
another human subjectivity, he is a ‘Man’ in relation to an always-already subordinated 
‘Woman.’ He transcends to his invulnerable infinitude through her, his invention, 
because her negative presence reassures himself that he is not a mere cog in Life because 
she is, thus he must be something more: his life is not a safe “plentitude and rest” as he 
has invented hers to be, but rather his is a life of “lack and movement, it is combat” 
(Beauvoir 2010, 159).  
But even the ‘manliest’ of human men are still animals, and his encounter with his 
own self undermines his fantasies of sovereignty. Beauvoir writes, “[f]acing himself, man 
encounters Nature.” But his relation to his own animal nature is not one of care: it is 
internal self-domination, projection, and neglect. St. Augustine’s philosophy of the will 
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of the flesh and will of the spirit exemplifies this thought. The part of his fleshy nature 
that he cannot dominate himself he projects externally onto Woman as an external object 
of domination. Beauvoir writes, “he has a hold on it, he tries to appropriate it for himself” 
(Beauvoir 2010, 159). He strives for the generalized, mythical Woman to bring himself 
honor: through her rescue, through her capture. She is Liege and he is her Lord (Beauvoir 
2010, 10). She is both his victim to rape and to save. 
But his attempts of domination over nature “cannot satisfy him” because 
dominated objects cannot provide him the recognition he so desperately needs. 
Dominated objects are not subjects, they cannot freely grant recognition. Thus, his 
dominating relation to his own passive animality characterizes his relation to life. He 
encounters Nature: 
[…] as a purely abstract opposition—it is an obstacle and remains foreign—or it 
passively submits to man’s desire and allows itself to be assimilated by him; he 
possess it only in consuming it, that is, in destroying it. In both cases, he remains 
alone; he is alone when touching a stone, alone when digesting a piece of fruit. 
The other is present only if the other is himself present to himself; that is, true 
alterity is a consciousness separated from my own and identical to it. (Beauvoir 
2010, 159) 
 
However, men’s very rising above his animality and projecting his relation of nature onto 
women makes intersubjective relation between the two impossible by both denying his 
own animality and denying women their own humanity: that is, man’s sovereignty is a 
perversion or mimicry of ‘true alterity’ because rather than him relating to himself, other 
subjects, and nature in his ambiguity as simultaneously both a passive object and an 
active subject he instead thinks of himself as a pure Subject and woman as pure Object.  
Within patriarchal ontology, woman is not yet ‘present’ to herself and is thus not 
yet a conscious subject that is both ‘separated’ and ‘identical’ to man’s subjectivity: she 
is Other. She does not yet exist as human, but only as a vessel for life: she is sub-human 
animal. This undermines the freedom of men, for “[i]t is the existence of other men that 
wrests each man from his immanence and enables him to accomplish the truth of his 
being, to accomplish himself as transcendence, as flight toward the object, as a project” 
(Beauvoir 2010, 159). Women do not yet exist as human and men find themselves all-
too-human, all-too-subject: he is sovereign, but not free. In an ironic but ultimate 
avoidance of risk, man seeks to eliminate the uncertainty of his status, of his being, with 
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ideas of destiny; women’s complicity in her self-abdication has historically facilitated his 
cowardice. In patriarchal ontology, man does not seek a constant conversion of being to 
becoming, but rather a single conversion from being to invulnerable, sovereign, Subject, 
which ruptures him from his freedom (see Mann 2014, 43-45). Single conversions, 
however, are impossible because we constantly need recognition. It is not enough to be 
recognized for what one does or who one is only once in one’s life: we would hardly 
learn to recognize ourselves. Mann recognizes this and offers that masculinity operates 
under a continuous ‘shame-to-power’ conversion, discussed in chapter II, that seeks to 
eschew the possibility of failure, the possibility of shame, through rage thus converting 
his shame into his power (Mann 2014, 116 and 145). This mortal fear of uncertainty 
ruptures him from the possibilities of his future becoming, from the temporality of his 
own freedom. His is a desperate fight against the possibility of his future vulnerability, to 
convert the reality of his future uncertainty into the myth of his eternal, everlasting 
certitude.  
Woman’s conversion is also a rupture, or series thereof, from her freedom which 
converts her from being to becoming Object, particularly an object for men, which is 
consistently enforced both by threat of violence and her own complicity in performing 
her passive role (McWeeny 2017). Confined either through force or her own complicity 
(often ambiguously both) to the role of passive object, she is not self-assured in her own 
active, creative potential. She and her peers in the ‘world of men’ doubt and hinder her 
world-making capacities; it is difficult for her to forget this. 
As I’ve stated, the anticipation, threat, and experience of sexual violence and its 
temporal rupture comprises the lived experience of becoming a ‘woman’ as a becoming 
object for man (McWeeny 2017). Women, and trauma survivors more generally, so often 
lack self-assurance in the ‘world of men’ because they cannot yet find a meaningful life 
to create for their own selves within it; the ‘world of men’ is built to undermine 
intersubjective human relations necessary to freedom’s world-making capacity. Survivors 
find that their world is, quite literally, not built for them.14 To this point, Judith Herman’s 
                                               
14 Rebecca Solnit speaks to the subtlety of this realization in her book Men Explain Things to Me, “Every 
woman knows what I’m talking about. It’s the presumption that makes it hard, at times, for any woman in 
any field; that keeps women from speaking up and from being heard when they dare; that crushes young 
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account of trauma’s recent history has shown that the meanings women and trauma 
victims have found in the ‘world of men’ often constitute one another and trade in 
debilitating sexist, racist, and ableist stereotypes: the pathological hysteric, the demon-
possessed damsel, the drug-abusing welfare queen, the shameful slut, among others. 
These stereotypes legitimize and justify the abuses of masculine domination. In the 
aftermath of trauma, many survivors are unable to lose or forget themselves precisely 
because they have not yet found themselves to begin with: most women and many 
victims of trauma have not had such an opportunity. Sexism, racism, and poverty all 
present traumatic barriers to developing a personal sense of security in the ‘world of 
men,’ which unjustly hinders self-assurance. Survivors of trauma, particularly women, 
are unable to be self-assured not simply because the experience of trauma undermines 
their trust in others and neurobiologically hinders their ability to live their lives but also 
because they live in a world that is not yet meant for them. Women are “[n]ewly arrived 
in the world of men” and “barely supported by them;” often, women are abused by men. 
Though our world is slowly changing, historical meanings given to her person and to her 
trauma experience linger; they are sedimented into our material, social, political, and 
psychological institutions and practices as well as our own bodies and personal 
behaviors.  
Part of the problem of forgetting for many of my student survivors, and, indeed, 
most survivors of trauma, whether it be traumas of rape, war, or legacies of racist colonial 
violence, is that they are situated in a ‘world of men’ that not only does not recognize 
them as human subjects, but, as the examples of institutional denial discussed throughout 
this dissertation demonstrate, prefers and is invested in their ‘forgetting,’ their silence, 
and their blind carrying on. But this is a will to silence, a ‘forgetting’ of denial. It is not a 
forgetting of overcoming, at least not as we will understand the term throughout the 
remainder of this chapter. This will to silence is an active institutional barrier to survivors 
finding, remembering, and possessing themselves (i.e., finding self-assurance), so that 
they might forget or lose themselves in their studies and life pursuits. These barriers to 
building self-assurance constitute a ‘hostile learning environment’ par excellance.  
                                               
women into silence by indicating, the way harassment on the street does, that this is not their world” (Solnit 
2014, 4). 
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But this succumbing need not be final, for the future is uncertain. To become 
assured in oneself requires a sense of trust and positive recognition by others as well as 
by one’s own self—to find oneself recognized as a meaningful, capable person within 
one’s community. But trauma is a self-rupturing event of betrayal that undermines these 
capacities of trust in others and in one’s own self, so even when one receives positive 
recognition and encouragement from others, a traumatized subjectivity may still struggle 
to feel self-assured enough in order to forget. 
But philonikian patriarchal domination need not be the only way to pursue the 
conversion of subjectivity; indeed, it is a perversion of it. Thus far I have offered the 
insight that we must return to our animalian needs of immemorialized past memory in 
order to transcend them (cf. van der Kolk 2015, 297). Beauvoir offers an alternative to 
simply dominating or neglecting these needs and instead care for them, so they might be 
forgotten in the moment of becoming. She writes that the constant combat required of 
masculinity in patriarchal ontology “can be overcome by the free recognition of each 
individual in the other, each one positing both itself and the other as object and as subject 
in a reciprocal movement” (Beauvoir 2010, 159). There is an alternative to the conflict 
between men pitted against each other as sovereign subjects as well as conflict between 
men and women in the former’s domination of the latter: domination is not the only 
means to achieve recognition. In fact, for Beauvoir, there are better avenues to receiving 
the recognition we humans so desperately need: friendship and generosity. Friendship 
and generosity entail a reciprocal risky gift of self to a self that is not them; it is 
reciprocal because both subjects recognize in the other the ambiguous internal structure 
of their human animality, their transcendence over nature and their immanent place 
within it. Friends give themselves to each other and receive themselves back in return: 
they give you meals and company when you have been injured or provide encouragement 
when you are frustrated in your projects, and they receive themselves back as your friend 
in the grateful thanks you provide, knowing that you would do the same if and when the 
situations are reversed. There is reciprocity between friends, and they thus “accomplish 
this recognition of freedoms concretely” (Beauvoir 2010, 159).  
This makes the virtue of friendship and generosity difficult virtues, even “man’s 
highest achievement,” because this business of reciprocal risky giving “is a struggle 
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endlessly begun, endlessly abolished. It demands that man surpass himself at each 
instant” (Beauvoir 2010, 159-160). Beauvoir explains the difficulty:  
Put into words, man attains an authentically moral attitude when he renounces 
being in order to assume his existence; through this conversion he also renounces 
all possession, because possession is a way of searching for being, but the 
conversion by which he attains true wisdom is never finished, it has to be made 
ceaselessly, it demands constant effort. So much so that, unable to accomplish 
himself in solitude, man is ceaselessly in jeopardy in his relations with his peers: 
his life is a difficult enterprise whose success is never assured. (Beauvoir 2010, 
160) 
 
That is, the friend becomes a friend by a constant conversion, or a repeated repetition, 
that must constantly overcome his own being, his own individual concerns, his own 
sovereign possession of himself to give himself to another and so he might receive 
himself back again as that which he performed himself: a good friend. And in order to 
remain a good friend, one must repeat this process of converting from being to becoming 
ceaselessly and through doing the actions of a good friend. It is a constant effort to be a 
good friend, to show up when your friend needs you or to initiate phone calls to remain in 
touch. Friendship and generosity embrace the ambiguity of our human freedom, that we 
are both vulnerable, passive body-objects and that we are also creative, active body-
subjects.  
The virtues of friendship and generosity, especially between men and women, are 
made ever more difficult in patriarchal ontology because men consider themselves in 
possession of themselves into eternity while women have not yet possessed themselves to 
begin with. Men evade and suppress their vulnerability and she considers herself 
mythically self-assured through his protection, his mythical invulnerability. She is his 
absolute Other, between which there can be no reciprocity, no possible friendship. Only 
consumption. In patriarchal ontology, woman “emerged as the inessential who never 
returned to the essential, as the absolute Other, without reciprocity.” She became an 
inessential, a nothing, an object, that never received the respect of herself back from her 
community in the ‘world of men’ as an essential, as a being, as a subject. So, in some 
sense, her historical human task of assuming an authentic moral and ontological attitude 
is the reverse of man’s: she must come to first possess herself, to become a being once 
again so that she might possess something to renounce or forget in order to become a 
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friend, a philosopher, a partner; she must possess herself so she might lose herself and 
receive herself back again (Beauvoir 2010, 159-160). She must find her self-assurance in 
her own human, active capabilities so she might lose herself in exercising them, so she 
might re-find herself by seeking herself in her projects. 
To briefly review, patriarchal ontology has created two distinct destinies, two 
historically sedimented rutted paths to follow that have enabled ‘men’ and ‘women’ to 
eschew the fundamental uncertainties and ambiguities of their human freedom (Mann 
2014, 83). This is the ‘light’ side of racialized patriarchy, though Beauvoir’s analysis is 
also relevant for thinking the ‘dark’ underside as well (Burke 2019). She includes the 
problem of American racism in the very same breath as patriarchy in the epigraph to this 
dissertation. “The beauty of flowers” in the quote “[t]he beauty of flowers and women’s 
charms can be appreciated for what they are worth; if these treasures are paid for with 
blood or misery, one must be willing to sacrifice them” refers to the legacy of American 
slavery (Beauvoir 2010, 764).  
Man’s destiny is to convert his being into an always-already invulnerable, 
consumptively possessing, infinite, sovereign subject with total control to forge or create 
the meaning of his future. Woman’s destiny is to convert her being into an always-
already vulnerable, possess-able object for men, “abandoned” in and abdicated to an ever 
repeating “icy present” of maintaining life (Beauvoir 2010, 487; Burke 2018). And those 
humans who are either placed outside or seek to step outside these patriarchal destinies, 
such as ‘black males’ and ‘black females’ as well as genderqueer people or outspoken 
trauma survivors risk ontological if not mortal erasure. Overcoming the long-rutted 
destinies of patriarchal ontology is precisely what we most need to overcome the self-
shattering of traumatic rupture and affirm our freedom, and this begins with sacrificing 
the comforting certainty that the destinies of gender provide.   
 
The Forgetting of Freedom is Overcoming 
In the previous sections, we have discussed the Beauvoir’s feminist existential 
reading of the history and ontological structure of patriarchy. Denial of the ambiguity of 
our human subjectivity is the motor of this structure, demanding men disavow their 
animalian passivity and women to disavow their human activity. This dictates the 
 191 
gendered destinies of men and women, undermining the temporality of free overcoming 
for both men and women. The temporality of these temporal destinies is a temporality of 
denial, seizing on and producing a rupture from the constant conversion or repeated 
repetition required to become reciprocally recognized by others for what one does. Denial 
and the gendered destinies it enables within patriarchy provide easy, tempting paths to 
flee our freedom. Denial demands and feeds into an urgent desire that we forget 
ourselves. But this is a forgetting that undermines our freedom. It short-circuits our 
ability to find the self-assurance necessary to overcome the ruptured loss of self. 
Individuals become doomed to a dull present, oscillating between the ‘dialectic of 
trauma.’ And this exacerbates to the point of fatalistic inevitability the potential for self-
harm, re-victimization, and perpetration.  
I’ve suggested that forgetting is a structural component to the repetitious process 
of becoming. But denial does not forget in a manner conducive to freedom. In this 
section, I discuss Beauvoir’s conception of the forgetting of free overcoming and the 
sacrifice it entails. We must sacrifice the ease and comforts of the well-worn paths of 
gendered destiny in order to overcome patriarchal ontology so that we might at long last 
affirm the freedom of women, trauma survivors, those who resist the confines of gender 
categorization, as well as men to create meaning in our shared world. Or, as Beauvoir 
writes in her concluding sentences of The Second Sex, “Within the given world, it is up to 
man to make the reign of freedom triumph; to carry off this supreme victory, men and 
women must, among other things and beyond their natural differentiations, 
unequivocally affirm their fraternité15” (Beauvoir 2010, 766; my emphasis and inclusion 
of the original French). 
Beauvoir’s philosophy of freedom’s repetition in The Second Sex is and has been 
a philosophy of the future. Her 1949 text not only provides a feminist philosophy for our 
                                               
15 ‘Fraternité’ is Beauvoir’s original French. Borde and Malovany-Chevallier translate this term as 
‘brotherhood.’ There is much to say about the translation of fraternité and Beauvoir’s choice to end her 
work on the ‘second sex’ with it. During a post-presentation conversation with Borde and Malovany-
Chevallier at the 2011 Beauvoir Society Conference held in Eugene, Oregon, Debra Bergoffen insisted that 
Beauvoir’s meaning here does not intend a masculine connotation but rather draws on the tradition of the 
French revolution motto “liberté, egalité, fraternité.” I agree and also read Beauvoir as ironically invoking 
the ‘world of men’ in her philosophy of overcoming patriarchal ontology. See Bergoffen’s The Philosophy 
of Simone de Beauvoir. See also Toril Moi, “The Adulteress Wife,” London Review of Books 32.3 (11 Feb. 
2010): 3-6. 
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present overcoming into the future, but throughout The Second Sex Beauvoir draws 
attention to the manner in which patriarchal ontology seeks to solidify the meanings of 
the past and present into the future through an attempt to eliminate the uncertain potential 
of the future by insisting the future has been pre-determined by the brute fact of natural 
biology (i.e., the fallacy that a woman is a woman by virtue of her ovaries). That is, rather 
than narrativizing past human history as events that occurred in the past, patriarchy seizes 
on the fatalistic repetitions of denial to shore up and naturalize the perpetual re-living of 
traumatic experience in the present and into the future. That is, patriarchy thrives on 
denial’s foreclosure of the future in order to ensure its sovereign domination. Gendered 
destinies provide an easy naturalization of the fatalistic repetitions of denial. Clouded as 
natural facts, gendered destiny provides soothing justification to ultimately evasively 
foreclose the open possibilities of the uncertain future.  
The future is the realm of uncertain potential as much as it is the realm of factual, 
scientific predictive certainty. For example, today, we can determine the factual certainty 
of solar and lunar eclipses that have happened thousands of years in the past and will 
happen thousands of years in the future with an astonishing level of accuracy. Accounting 
for the drift between the earth and the moon, we can even predict that the last solar 
eclipse will occur “about 600 million years from now.”16 Humans, however, are not 
simply mere matter swirling about in the abyss of the universe. We are that, true, but we 
are also meaning-making creatures in that universe: we gather together in awe at the 
eclipse’s spectacular, revelatory reminder of our place of possibility on an orbiting rock 
among other celestial bodies. We have agency and imagination. We play music and 
converse together not out of confusion, as the birds’ all-too-early evening songs, but to 
create meaning together while observing the eclipsed sun. Doing so, we remind ourselves 
that we are something more than mere orbiting matter. That we humans are not just mere 
being, mere surviving specks of dust (Nietzsche Gay Science, aphorism 341), but that we 
are free and we become who we are as free subjects in relation to other free subjects. We 
become good friends and lovers of wisdom together and through one another, creating 
our world together. This freedom imbues the future with the character of our uncertain 
                                               
16 NASA lunar scientist Richard Vondrak in a statement quoted by Samantha Mawson in “Earth Will Have 
Its Last Solar Eclipse in 600 Million Years,” Space.com, 31 July 2017. 
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potential, with the sense that it is the realm of what could or might be. As Mann writes, 
despite the sedimentation of patriarchal ontology in our life world, this world of meaning 
“is never finally closed, never resolves into brute necessity” as the prediction of an 
eclipse might (Mann 2014, 83). We don’t know with whom we might share the next 
eclipse because our friends are both as free and as vulnerable in life as we are. They may 
live their lives apart from us or succumb to death, disease, or disaster. This future 
uncertainty makes the moment of experiencing the awe of a present eclipse with those 
whom you love so very special.17 
Denial undermines our capacity for both imaginatively relating with others and 
realizing the extent of our agency. We feel ourselves helpless and determined by forces 
beyond our control—forces such as the eclipse of the sun or moon. In denial, we may 
displace our agency to the superstitious will of the gods. Such was the case of the 
Athenian general Nikias in the face of the 413BC eclipse. As we discussed in chapter III, 
Nikias differed from the wisdom of his predecessor, Pericles, on the matter of eclipses.18 
At the Athenians’ most desperate hour, Nikias notoriously went along with the 
superstitious, religious fortune-tellers and terrified soldiers in his company to interpret the 
eclipse of 413BC as a sign from the gods that they should post-pone their retreat from 
Epipolae after their stunning defeat in the ill-advised Sicilian Expedition. In truth, Nikias 
was himself in denial regarding how terrible their plight was and was terrified of 
returning to the city of Athens in shameful defeat. He froze. And the defeated and sickly 
Athenian warriors created notions of their destiny from the mere matter of nature to 
evade their vulnerability and the uncertainty of their future. In denial over their own 
agency to retreat, they projected their notions of invulnerability to the gods. Surely the 
gods would preserve their glory. They refused to grapple with their present failure and 
the possibility of their future reproach upon their return to the city. Rather than risking 
                                               
17 I thank my friend Sierra Deutsch for making this point as we observed the August 21, 2017 total solar 
eclipse from the path of totality in Philomath, OR together with our chosen graduate school family of 
friends. 
 
18 Plutarch reports of tales by philosophers praising Pericles’ sophisticated astronomical understanding 
when encountering the annular solar eclipse of 431BC before setting sail for Epidaurus, just before his 
untimely death in the plague. While assuring a fearful crew, Pericles explained that eclipses were simply 
the result of one body covering over another body, like a cloak covering a hand, and were nothing to fear or 
derive ‘destiny’ out of (Plutarch Pericles, XXXV). 
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the sacrifice of their manly pride in returning home to the uncertain, though likely, 
possibility of their shame, they sacrificed their rationality and, unwittingly, their city to 
the gods. Their delay exponentially doomed Athens. Nikias and many others lost their 
lives, the dead went unburied, survivors were enslaved, and the men of Athens lost their 
naval fleet along with any potential of winning the Peloponnesian War (Thucydides 7.50-
75). You’d think the ‘West’ would have learned this important lesson of the ‘illusions of 
nature’ then. However, as we have discussed, patriarchal ontology has persisted in 
creating human destiny from mere nature so as to shore up myths of masculine 
invulnerability and evade the possibility of future failure to devastating consequence: 
ubiquitous rape, domestic and intimate partner violence, sexual harassment, feminized 
poverty, not to mention the traumatic effects of coloniality, racism, genocide, and war.  
Beauvoir charges us in her time and today to sacrifice this Man-made creation of 
destiny out of ‘nature’ so that the future might be made open for the possibility of 
women’s world-making in reciprocal human harmony with their community of free 
subjects (Beauvoir 2010, 764-65). In her Ethics of Ambiguity, Beauvoir makes clear that 
an existential ethics must embrace the uncertain possibility of future failure rather than 
eliminate it. She writes, “without failure, no ethics […] One does not offer an ethics to a 
God” (Beauvoir 1976, 10). Beauvoir offers us a philosophy of freedom’s authentic 
repetition or constant conversion that embraces rather than eschews the possibility of 
future failure and uncertainty that requires sacrificing the comforts of our denial and 
gendered destinies that have so long justified our tempting flights from becoming who we 
are. Pace Kierkegaard, Beauvoir offers an atheistic existentialism that assumes we live in 
a world of human meaning-making, and that ‘gods’ are only mythical creations that 
abstractly mimic the structure of human freedom. She develops his philosophy of 
repetition, recognizing that the repeated repetition (or constant conversion) of one’s 
freedom takes faith and sacrifice. In order for women and trauma survivors to overcome 
their loss of self rather than succumb to it, we must collectively sacrifice the denial’s will 
to forget and the accompanying all-too-certain gendered destinies of patriarchal ontology. 
Instead, we must do our best to recollect ourselves as we cross the Plain of Forgetfulness 
as we emerge into our life after trauma’s deadly rupture. This requires continuing to build 
a world in which women and trauma survivors might find self-assurance that they might 
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forget, seeking themselves not in their status as survivors or women but rather in their 
generous pursuit of their projects. So, they might not simply complete their homework 
assignment, but create a meaningful contribution to their society. We must decide to risk 
ourselves by sacrificing the myth of the certainty and the false sense of self-assurance of 
our identities as provided by the destinies of gender.  
As Rebecca Solnit puts it, “certainty that the future will be a lot like the present or 
will decline from it” whether it be the certainty of despair or optimism carries with it 
“grounds for not acting.” Rather than certainty, Solnit offers an ethos of hope, writing 
“[hope] can be the knowledge that we don’t have that memory [of the future] and that 
reality doesn’t necessarily match our plans” (Solnit 2014, 94). It is this orientation that 
can and must be taken towards categories of gendered destiny, and this sacrifice of 
gendered destiny will “have meaning in light of a human aim” (Beauvoir 2010, 228), the 
aim being reciprocal, free, ambiguous, intersubjective human relations of meaning-
making.   
Beauvoir opens Volume II of The Second Sex on women’s ‘lived experience’ with 
an epigraph from Søren Kierkegaard, “What a curse to be a woman! And yet the very 
worst curse when one is a woman is, in fact, not to understand that it is one” 
(Kierkegaard qtd. in Beauvoir 2010, 278 and 75619; Kierkegaard 1988, 62). Throughout 
Volume II, Beauvoir seeks to describe the world of men “from woman’s point of view 
such as it is offered to her, and we will see the difficulties women are up against just 
when, trying to escape the sphere they have been assigned until now, they seek to be part 
of the human Mitsein” (Beauvoir 2010, 17). Today’s woman is caught in a constructed 
ambiguity between the world of men with the destinies it has assigned her and its 
overcoming towards a world of freedom. And she is only abandoned, abdicated, or 
shackled to the World of Men by patriarchal ontology’s illusions of natural destiny.  
                                               
19 So reads Borde and Malovany-Chevallier’s translation. Beauvoir’s original French reads “Quel malheur 
que d’être femme! Et pourtant le pire malheur quand on est femme est au fond de ne pas comprendre que 
c’en est un.” The Hong and Hong English translation of Kierkegaard reads, “If I had become a woman and 
could not understand what I now understand—how terrible! If I had become a woman and consequently 
could not even understand that—how much more terrible!” While the translation project of sourcing 
Beauvoir’s own text of Kierkegaard exceeds the bounds of this chapter, I understand Beauvoir to be 
invoking Kierkegaard to effectively say “What greater misfortune than to be a woman! And yet the very 
worst misfortune when one is woman is fundamentally to not understand that one is a woman, a 
misfortune.” I thank Meryl Altman, Jacob Barto, Marco Esters, André Wilson, and Verónica Zebadúa for 
their time and patience sharing their language expertise regarding this translation. 
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Beauvoir returns to Kierkegaard’s epigraph quote in the “Conclusion” to The 
Second Sex, providing this quote of his in an additional footnote: 
Gallantry is essentially woman’s due; and the fact that she unconsciously accepts 
it may be explained by the solicitude of nature for the weak and the 
disadvantaged, those who feel more than recompensed by an illusion. But this 
illusion is precisely fatal…It is not an even worse mockery to feel freed from 
misery—thanks to one’s imagination, to be the dupe of imagination? Woman 
certainly is far from being verwahrlost [abandoned]; but inasmuch as she never 
can free herself from the illusion with which nature consoles her, she is. 
(Kierkegaard qtd. in Beauvoir 2010, 756n1; Kierkegaard 1988, 56 and 62; my 
emphasis) 
 
That is, patriarchal ontology prescribes the lordman-liegewoman system which entitles 
her to his ‘gallantry’ precisely because he needs her as an object towards which to 
demonstrate his courage and glory in the ‘world of men.’ This is based only in “the 
illusions of nature” as we have outlined above and in the previous section: that her human 
destiny is bound by her natural biology. Kierkegaard writes “this illusion is precisely 
fatal” and Beauvoir does not let us forget the manner in which it has been existentially 
and mortally fatal for woman.  
To demonstrate his gallantry requires an object towards which to express it. This 
requires placing woman in danger and in need of rescue: his gallantry requires her 
traumatic rupture. Further, the denial of patriarchy ensures someone (read: some man) 
will perpetrate harm against her. We’ve discussed that the repetitions of denial facilitate 
what Mann calls the shame-to-power conversion of patriarchal sovereign masculinity. 
This operation of masculinity bars both men from overcoming the repetitions of their past 
trauma as well as barring women from becoming who they are. Concrete economic, 
political, and social inequality facilitates if not prescribes the ubiquitous and often deadly 
violence against women: rape, sexual assault, sexual harassment, domestic or intimate 
partner violence, psychological and emotional abuse, suicide, and murder. The statistics 
remain dismal. Research estimates that: 
1) At least 23% of female undergraduates in the U.S. have experienced sexual 
assault or sexual misconduct (UN Women figures based on the 2015 AAU 
Survey);  
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2) More than 1 in 4 women in Washington, D.C. have experienced sexual 
harassment on the street or public transportation (UN Women figures based in a 
survey by Washington Metropolitan Transit Authority);  
3) Up to 70% of women worldwide have experienced domestic violence in their 
lives (UN Women figures based in WHO studies);  
4) 82% of women lawmakers have experienced harassing psychological violence 
while serving their terms, mostly through social media in the form of “death, rape, 
assault, or abduction threats towards them and their families” (UN Women figures 
based in a study by the Inter-Parliamentary Union);  
5) Women suffer major depression at nearly twice the rate of men (UN Women 
figures based in WHO studies; also, Seedat et al 2009);  
6) Women attempt suicide nearly four times more frequently than men, though 
women are far less likely to complete their suicide than men due to differences in 
lethality of method (Chang et al 2011; Spicer and Miller 2000);  
7) Half of all global homicides against women are committed by her intimate 
partner or a family member, compared to only 6% rate of fatal intimate partner or 
family violence among male murder victims (UN Women figures based in UN 
Office on Drugs and Crime study).20  
These are very real figures of the violence faced by women in patriarchal ontology. With 
rare exception, each instance is a tragic product of the illusion of nature: we have been 
‘duped’ by our collective lack of imagination. On an existential view, the world of men is 
violent, even in the most mundane ways, because the denial of patriarchal ontology 
seductively fools men and women into their gendered destinies and the repetitions of 
denial maintain this division. He must become and remain invulnerable, virile, and 
                                               
20 UN Women has a compilation of contemporary research on violence against women at “Facts and 
Figures: Ending Violence Against Women,” UN Women, last updated August 2017 
http://www.unwomen.org/en/what-we-do/ending-violence-against-women/facts-and-figures#notes accessed 
September 2017. For research into rates of depression by gender, see Soraya Seedat, Kate Margaret Scott, 
Matthias C. Angermeyer, et al. “Cross-national associations between gender and mental disorders in the 
World Health Organization World Mental Health Surveys.” Archives of General Psychiatry 66.7 (July 
2009): 785-795. For research on rates of suicide by gender, see Bernard Chang, David Gitlin, Ronak Patel, 
“The Depressed Patient and Suicidal Patient in the Emergency Department: Evidence-Based Management 
and Treatment Strategies,” Emergency Medicine Practice, 13.9 (Sept 2011): 1-24; Rebecca S. Spicer and 
Ted R. Miller, “Suicide Acts in 8 States: Incidence and Case Fatality Rates by Demographics and Method,” 
American Journal of Public Health 90.12 (Dec. 2000): 1885-1891. 
 198 
aggressive activity and that she must become and remain his passive object for the taking 
(or giving, as in the case of many arranged child and adult marriages historical and 
contemporary21). Beauvoir writes:  
…it must not be concluded that her ovaries condemn her to living on her knees 
eternally. Virile aggressiveness is a lordly privilege only within a system where 
everything conspires to affirm masculine sovereignty; and woman feels so deeply 
passive in the love act only because she already thinks of herself that way. 
(Beauvoir 2010, 763) 
 
This may sound harsh or even victim-blaming to contemporary readers, but Beauvoir’s 
point is that patriarchal ontology and its concrete manifestations in political, economic, 
social, and institutional practices conspire to affirm sexual violence. Said another way, 
the denials of patriarchy bring women to think and experience themselves as victims, 
leaving them prone to future re-victimization. It is in sexual ‘combat’ that men and 
women “are fighting their own self, projecting onto their partner the part of themselves 
they repudiate”—the man projecting his own passivity and flesh onto her and the woman, 
even in the very act of her frozen helplessness, projects her own activity into him 
(Beauvoir 2010, 763). Often, he facilitates her passivity with drugs, demands it with 
emotional abuse, forces it physically—he takes her world-making capacities.22  
But woman is only lost, or abandoned, in so much as we remain shackled by our 
denial to the patriarchal illusions of nature.  
Beauvoir admits that these illusions of nature are alluring, as they must be in 
order to tempt us from our freedom. Though The Second Sex is a study of gender, 
Beauvoir understands that patriarchal ontology’s fallacy of nature has wrought other 
oppressions through history: racist American slavery and religiously sanctioned child 
mutilation. The harms of these two oppressions seemed clear and publicly acknowledged, 
at least from her perspective as a French woman writing in the 1940s, and she invokes 
them as comparison to the harms and beauty of ‘feminine charm’ in a spirit of coalition-
                                               
21 See Gayle Rubin, “The Traffic in Women: Notes on the ‘Political Economy’ of Sex,” Toward an 
Anthropology of Women, ed. Rayna R. Reiter (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1975): 157-210. Also, 
Chris Baynes, “More than 200,000 Children Married in US over the Last 15 Years,” Independent 8 July 
2017. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/200000-children-married-us-15-years-child-
marriage-child-brides-new-jersey-chris-christie-a7830266.html (accessed September 2015). 
 
22 He takes her world-making capacity rendering her passive and frozen even in the most mundane creepy 
and seemingly heroic ways as explored by Bonnie Mann in “Creepers, Heroes, Flirts, and Allies.” 
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building. She grants to adherents of patriarchal ontology that the world of men has 
created an enticing ‘beauty,’ but that like the charms of the plantation or the Sistine 
castrati, these charms must be sacrificed. She writes: 
It is true that by doing away with slave markets, we destroyed those great 
plantations lined with azaleas and camellias, we dismantled the whole delicate 
Southern civilization; old lace was put away in the attics of time along with the 
pure timbres of the Sistine castrati, and there is a certain ‘feminine charm’ that 
risks turning to dust as well. I grant that only a barbarian would not appreciate 
rare flowers, lace, the crystal clear voice of a eunuch, or feminine charm. When 
shown in her splendor, the ‘charming woman’ is a far more exalting object than 
‘the idiotic paintings, over-doors, decors, circus backdrops, sideboards, or popular 
illuminations’ that maddened Rimbaud; adorned with the most modern artifices, 
worked on with the newest techniques, she comes from the remotest ages, from 
Thebes, Minos, Chichén Itzá23; and she is also the totem planted in the heart of 
the African jungle; she is a helicopter and she is a bird; and here is the greatest 
wonder: beneath her painted hair, the rustling of leaves becomes a thought and 
words escape from her breasts. Men reach out their eager hands to the marvel; but 
as soon as they grasp it, it vanishes; the wife and the mistress speak like everyone 
else, with their mouths: their words are worth exactly what they are worth: their 
breasts as well. Does such a fleeting miracle—and one so rare—justify 
perpetuating a situation that is so damaging for both sexes? The beauty of flowers 
and women’s charms can be appreciated for what they are worth; if these 
treasures are paid for with blood or misery, one must be willing to sacrifice them. 
(Beauvoir 2010, 764; my emphasis) 
 
The azaleas of the ante-bellum South and women’s charms, along with today’s New Jim 
Crow prison-made and women-worn Victoria’s Secret underwear, are “fleeting 
miracle[s]” that do not justify the “situation that is so damaging for both sexes” and for 
all constructed races. Woman’s thoughts and words betray her present, albeit stifled, 
subjectivity beneath her pretty, objectified veneer. She is just like everyone else, not a 
singular, unique Venus but rather a generic copy of Woman. It would be one thing to live 
in a world of beautiful women, but we live in a world that demands she pay for beauty in 
                                               
23 Above, I noted in the previous section, María Lugones’ research in decolonial theory highlights some 
pre-colonial indigenous cultures were not based on the same violent binaries of sex as the Western 
colonizers. Of the Mayan culture, she writes that they recognized homosexuals in positive terms and 
practiced ritualized sodomy (Lugones 2007, 200 and 201). Though Beauvoir’s own information is likely 
filtered through Spanish colonial records, she is here referencing the Mayan practice of sacrificing young 
women by throwing them into sinkhole wells so the Mayans’ water resource would be blessed and ensured 
by the gods. Today, we have archeological evidence of the practice. See “Chichén Itzá” in National 
Geographic 15 November 2012 http://www.nationalgeographic.com/travel/world-heritage/chichen-itza/ 
(accessed September 2017). 
 200 
the World of Men with her blood and misery. This is unacceptable. We must be willing to 
sacrifice the dangerous, albeit temptingly beautiful, illusions of nature: the illusions of 
race, the illusions of the child, the illusions of sex. 
However, sacrifices (as well as a woman’s historical self-renunciation) only have 
meaning towards a future human goal. In her “Myths” chapter, Beauvoir writes, 
“Sacrifice and renunciations have meaning only in the light of an aim, a human aim, and 
aims that go beyond singular love or personal happiness can only exist in a world that 
recognizes the price of both love and happiness” (Beauvoir 2010, 227-228). As I stated 
previously, this aim Beauvoir seeks is reciprocal, free, ambiguous, intersubjective human 
relations of meaning-making. This meaning-making process is, in many ways, the 
process of bringing immemorialized trauma ‘in’ to the narrative arc of our lives. It is to 
share stories and reconnect with others. The snares of patriarchal ontology, however, 
inhibit women from the self-assurance necessary for generously aiming for that goal, the 
goal of her own freedom and fulfilling her human, world-making potential.  
In the introduction to this chapter, I briefly discussed Beauvoir’s diagnosis that 
women of today do not possess the self-assurance necessary to forget themselves in order 
to generously aim for their becoming. I reviewed three female characters in The 
Mandarins, Nadine, Paula, and Anne. Nadine occupies the misfortunate place of not 
understanding she is a woman and behaves in a manner similar to what Nancy Bauer 
terms the ‘Lady Power’ of today’s young women24: making themselves alluringly 
feminine objects available for men while staunchly demanding human respect. Nadine 
neither accepts her femininity nor pursues her transcendence, eventually succumbing to 
her feminine role as wife and mother, even if somewhat rebelliously. Paula completely 
loses herself to the illusions of nature, the illusions of the virtues of femininity. And Anne 
fails to find fulfillment in her personal and professional undertakings. Along with many 
of today’s trauma survivors, these female protagonists share in common a lack of self-
assurance. It is now prudent to return to the quote from Beauvoir’s “Independent 
Woman” chapter quoted in the introduction to this chapter in greater length:   
                                               
24 Nancy Bauer offers this analysis through a critique of the early Lady Gaga in “Lady Power,” The New 
York Times Opinionator Blogs: The Stone (20 June 2010) 
https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/06/20/lady-power/ (accessed October 2017). 
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The greatest failure a lack of self-assurance brings about is that the subject 
cannot forget himself. He does not generously aim for a goal: he tries to prove he 
is worth what is demanded of him. Throwing oneself boldly toward goals risks 
setbacks: but one also attains unexpected results; prudence necessarily leads to 
mediocrity. It is rare to see in the woman a taste for adventure, gratuitous 
experience, or disinterested curiousity; she seeks ‘to build a career’ the way others 
construct a happy life; she remains dominated, invested by the male universe, she 
lacks the audacity to break through the ceiling, she does not passionately lose 
herself in her projects; she still considers her life an immanent enterprise: she 
aims not for an object, but through an object for her subjective success. […] They 
constantly look back to see how far they have come: this curbs their drive. They 
can have honorable careers with such methods, but will not accomplish great 
things. It should be said that many men too are only able to build mediocre 
careers. It is only in relation to the best of them that the woman—with very rare 
exceptions—seems to us still to be bringing up the rear. The reasons I have given 
sufficiently explain this and do not in any way compromise the future. To do great 
things, today’s woman needs above all forgetfulness of self: but to forget oneself 
one must first be solidly sure that one has already found oneself. Newly arrived in 
the world of men, barely supported by them, the woman is still much too busy 
looking for herself. […] The desire for a feminine destiny—a husband, a home, 
children—and the spell of love are not always easily reconcilable with the desire 
to succeed. (Beauvoir 2010, 739-41; my emphasis) 
 
At long last, newly emerging into the world of men as subjects, women face tremendous 
challenges of self-assurance necessary to generously aim for the goal of freedom that can 
only give meaning to the sacrifice of gendered destiny. She hesitates to sacrifice because 
she is not self-assured, she is not yet confident in what she will receive back—she does 
not have faith in herself that she will receive herself back (cf. Kierkegaard’s ‘knight of 
faith’ in Fear and Trembling). She does not yet understand authentic faith realizes “the 
present is not a potential past” but rather “the moment of choice and action” and “one 
always projects himself toward something, toward the future.” Instead, she remains 
tempted by bad faith, “to put [herself] ‘outside’” of the world of meaning-making, which 
“is still a way of living the inescapable fact that one is inside” (Beauvoir 1976, 76). 
Perhaps she remains blind to her betrayal or trembles in withdrawn solitude at the all-too-
present memories of her trauma. Perhaps she just tries to get through her day. Rather than 
utilizing her career, if she has one, as a means to build her world, she instead views it as a 
means to simply survive. Her trepidation of having faith in herself toward her future is 
not baseless: patriarchal ontology has taken her without giving her back. She does not 
enjoy reciprocal relations because she is a human animal whose active human agency has 
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been denied, leaving her an animal entrapped in her own passivity. Through millennia, 
she has renounced her world-making capacities to man for his world and he never 
reciprocally recognized her as human, only as his woman, his object to dominate and 
consume. As his object, she does not yet possess herself to be able to renounce the 
satisfaction of her mere being by losing herself in her projects. For her, today as in 
Beauvoir’s day, it is a great material and psychological achievement to simply be. 
Barred so long from the ability to carve out her own life, she is grateful for the 
mere opportunity and seeks to protect her own private personal love and happiness rather 
than affirm her freedom by creating a public world with others. She does not yet risk 
herself generously but is instead stuck by an inferiority complex of mediocrity in her 
career and enticed by her desire for her ‘feminine destiny’ of a husband, child, and white-
picket fence. Greatness is not necessarily incompatible with her family life, but the 
remaining sedimented patriarchal structure of contemporary family life often presents a 
significant hindrance that must be overcome. She tries to prove she is worthy of her new 
status, rather than striving beyond it. Even if finally recognized in the world of men as a 
singular woman, she may dwell in her own vanity (i.e., Kim Kardashian or Elizabeth 
Taylor). Constantly reminded of her historical inferiority, she may be unable to forget 
herself. It is not enough for a single, exceptional woman—such as Beyoncé, Lady Gaga, 
or Hillary Clinton—to sacrifice her gendered destiny and go beyond it. The exceptional 
woman is often reproached, resented, and harassed for her achievements. Her sacrifice 
alone is not enough. It must be accompanied by the sacrifices of men, women, everyone. 
There must be a collective sacrifice of the certainties of gendered destiny that eschew the 
fear and trembling of becoming so that traumatized women do not remain bound by the 
illusions of nature and may instead enter into the ‘normal’25 repetitious cycle of human 
freedom: possessing herself, losing herself, and possessing herself again.  
As Beauvoir has demonstrated, patriarchal ontology presents a fallacious 
definition of woman that binds her destiny to her biology and her mystery as a 
constructed Other. In the “Conclusion” to The Second Sex, Beauvoir emphasizes that 
woman is human, like men, and she is thus defined “by the way she grasps, through 
foreign consciousnesses, her body and her relation to the world.” The difference that 
                                               
25 Cf. the first epigraph quotation of this chapter by Lady Gaga. 
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separates young men and women is a constructed one “purposely dug out from early 
infancy; later it would be impossible to keep woman from being what she was made, and 
she will always trail this past behind her.” Understanding that woman was made by 
human men makes it “obvious that her destiny is not fixed in eternity” even if it remains 
difficult to pinpoint the origins of her historical subordination (Beauvoir 2010, 761). In 
addition to acknowledging rather than denying her human potential, the weight of the 
history of patriarchal ontology must be acknowledged in her overcoming.  
Beauvoir writes that while modifications to her economic status are necessary to 
her freedom, they are not sufficient. She must continue to pursue her rise, a rise provided 
by the free revolt of those who came before her and the changes they fostered, to 
contribute to building a world where she does not face impediments to her freedom due 
to her gender (Beauvoir 2010, 764). She must work to ensure the changes to her 
economic situation “brings about the moral, social, and cultural consequences it heralds 
and requires” so that “the new woman” may “appear” (Beauvoir 2010, 761). Her rise 
must herald her creation of a new ontology that allows her to Exist beyond her mere 
survival. She must “shed her own skin,” sacrifice the destiny imposed on her and “cut her 
own clothes.” She, however, cannot do this alone: 
She will only be able to do this if there is a collective change. No one teacher can 
today shape a ‘female human being’ that would be an exact homologue to the 
‘male human being’: if raised like a boy, the young girl feels she is an exception, 
and that subjects her to a new kind of specification. Stendahl understood this, 
saying: ‘The forest must be planted all at once.’ But if we suppose, by contrast, a 
society where sexual equality is concretely realized, this equality would newly 
assert itself in each individual. (Beauvoir 2010, 761) 
 
Beauvoir continues to write that such a society of concretely realized sexual equality 
would treat the little girl from her very first moments with “the same demands and 
honors, the same severity and freedom, as her brothers, taking part in the same studies 
and games, promised the same future, surrounded by women and men who are 
unambiguously equal to her;” in which case her psychology would be profoundly 
modified. She would not envy the boy for his penis nor be soothed by a promise of her 
future child; she would not develop “an ‘inferiority complex’; correlatively, the boy 
would not have a natural ‘superiority complex’ if it were not instilled in him and if he 
held women in the same esteem as men.” She would not desire to be an object for her 
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father, but rather seek to emulate him as well as her mother. “The mother would enjoy 
the same lasting prestige as the father if she assumed equal material and moral 
responsibility for the couple; the child would feel an androgynous world around her and 
not a masculine world.” She would feel that her sex does not doom her to passivity and 
inactivity, but she would instead feel in her very body a capacity to grasp and shape the 
world. Rather than succumbing to “the brutal descent into femininity” in puberty, she 
would ‘surpass’ it “toward a free adult future.” She would embrace her eroticism rather 
than feeling it to be a crisis. Moreover, she should be educated with boys so that “the 
august mystery of Man,” that is ‘Woman,’ “would have no occasion to arise.” Little boys 
and little girls would come to know one another in each other’s humanity. And the young 
heterosexual woman might seek a partner, rather than a “male demigod.” Such a society 
can be created not simply by “abolishing the contingencies and miseries of the human 
condition but of giving her the means to go beyond them” (Beauvoir 2010, 761-762). 
There must be a collective world-building that facilitates her “favorable development” so 
that her sacrifice of gendered destiny may be justified. The revolt of her ancestors has 
brought “men, in their own interest […] to partially emancipate women.” He must go 
beyond these measures and sacrifice the all-too-soothing-certainty of the destiny of 
invulnerability that his myth of Woman provides him. So too must today’s women 
continue to sacrifice the meaning provided by the world of men.  
Today’s courageous and faithful women “need only pursue their rise, and the 
success they obtain encourages them; it seems most certain that they will sooner or later 
attain perfect economic and social equality, which will bring about an inner 
metamorphosis” (Beauvoir 2010, 764). Her economic and political rise will create a 
world in which she can be recognized as in her own humanity because she will live with 
others who are willing to recognize her for what she does and who she becomes. She will 
be self-assured and capable of losing herself to become great. 
 
Conclusion 
 Despite changes brought by the feminist movement between Beauvoir’s 1940s 
France and our location in today’s present-day America, “today’s woman is [and 
remains] torn between the past and the present” (Beauvoir 2010, 761). She is caught 
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between the tempting, habitual, and historically sedimented familiarity of patriarchal 
ontology and affirming her present freedom into the future. She is caught in an ambiguity 
between her destiny of self-abdication in a frozen present and her becoming human 
through repetitious repetition, through constant conversion. She is caught between the 
fatalistic repetitions of denial and the free repetitions of overcoming. Only the latter can 
offer the ‘forgetting’ that she most needs.   
 Her courage to affirm her freedom must not only grapple with the fear the element 
of future uncertainty her generous risk and sacrifice brings, but she must also overcome 
the very real and present violence toward her that seeks to enforce her gendered destiny 
in the world of men. Assertively, Beauvoir writes, “We will not let ourselves be 
intimidated by the number and violence of attacks against women; nor be fooled by the 
self-serving praise showered on the ‘real woman’; nor be won over by men’s enthusiasm 
for her destiny, a destiny they would not for the world want to share” (Beauvoir 2010, 15; 
my emphasis). We must not be intimidated by the ubiquity of sexual violence on our 
campuses and in our greater world. We must not be lured by the temptation to stay in the 
place carved for us by the World of Men. We must fight against his over-gratuitous 
gestures to rescue us in his seemingly benevolent ‘compelled disclosure’ (i.e., required 
reporting policies). We must persevere in our creation of a world that allows women and 
those traumatized by patriarchal ontology to ‘cut our own clothes,’ to become who we 
are. To have space and time to develop trust in the recognition we receive from others, to 
do the work of trauma healing in order to become secure in our self-assurance so that we 
may lose ourselves in the doing of our projects and come to possess ourselves by it.  
Men too must sacrifice. Courageous women must also be met by the courage of 
men who are willing to “sacrifice all the benefits they derive from the myth” of Woman. 
This requires accepting the risk of freedom’s vulnerable uncertainty so that men too 
might affirm their freedom in authentic, intersubjective human reciprocal recognition. 
Even the most progressive men, such as campus administrators and policymakers, may be 
unwilling to make such a sacrifice because “they know what they lose by relinquishing 
the woman of their dreams,” they would lose their privileged destiny of invulnerability, 
“but they do not know what the woman of tomorrow will bring them” (Beauvoir 2010, 
14). We need to relinquish the comfort of denial and the illusions bestowed by gendered 
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destinies to instead accept, even embrace, the open, uncertain future of humanity. 
Beauvoir is confident, that if men and women of today “assumed” the ambiguity of their 
human condition “with lucid modesty, as the correlate of authentic pride, they would 
recognize each other as peers and live [even their] erotic drama in harmony” (Beauvoir 
2010, 763). They would recognize that: 
The fact of being human is infinitely more important than all the singularities that 
distinguish human beings; it is never the given that confers superiority: ‘virtue,’ 
as the ancients called it, is defined at the level of ‘what depends on us.’ The same 
drama of the flesh and spirit, and of finitude and transcendence, plays itself out in 
both sexes; both are eaten away by time, stalked by death, they have the same 
essential need of the other; and they can take the same glory from their freedom; 
if they knew how to savor it, they would no longer be tempted to contend for false 
privileges, and fraternity could then be born between them” (Beauvoir 2010, 763). 
 
Their sacrifice of gender destiny would be justified through the creation of a world of 
intersubjective reciprocal reciprocity. This new world would not do away with desire or 
love: it would replace the fleeting fabrications of Man’s Woman with authentic, 
reciprocal, intersubjective generous recognition.  
The bodies and pleasures of women and her eroticism will not cease to exist; they 
will exist both for herself and for him as well. Beauvoir writes: 
First of all, certain differences between man and woman will always exist; her 
eroticism, and thus her sexual world, possessing a singular form, cannot fail to 
engender in her a sensuality, a singular sensitivity, her relation to her body, to the 
male body, and to the child will never be the same as those man has with his 
body, with the female body, and with the child; those who talk so much about 
‘equality in difference’ would be hard put not to grant me that there are 
differences in equality. […] restoring woman’s singular sovereignty will not 
remove the emotional value from amorous embraces. […] To emancipate woman 
is to refuse to enclose her in the relations she sustains with man, but not to deny 
them; while she posits herself for herself, she will nonetheless continue to exist for 
him as well: recognizing each other as subject, each will remain an other for the 
other; reciprocity in their relations will not do away with the miracles that the 
division of human beings into two separate categories engenders… (Beauvoir 
2010, 765-66) 
 
Sacrificing the destinies of gender will not eliminate the ‘miracles’ of sex difference, 
rather we will receive these miracles back. Through history and into today’s present, we 
have possessed meanings of human freedom in the abstract form of patriarchal ontology. 
Forgetting, in our era, must entail the risky individual and collective sacrifice of the 
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destinies of gender to overcome patriarchal ontology. We must lose ourselves and the 
meanings given to our identities in our present moment, forget them through our 
sacrifice, so we might then truly and concretely possess our human freedom. Together 
through our own activity, we will build a world not only for future generations but also 
for ourselves. We will become excellent. 
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CHAPTER V 
 CONCLUSION:  
REPEATING THE STRENGTH AND COURAGE OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 I have said before that this dissertation is about trauma’s denial and it’s 
overcoming. But this dissertation has also been a speech on love. I’ve told the ancient 
story of a bad relationship with Nike and how this ‘love of victory’ brings out the worst 
in us. Domination and denial. I have provided a feminist recollection of Plato’s ancient 
critique of this philonikian ‘manliness’ of patriarchy and the denials inherent to it. 
Racialized in the modern era, we have discussed that denial remains a central motor to 
the contemporary iteration of racialized patriarchy. Denial warps time such that past 
traumas are relived in the present without our conscious awareness—we literally “Just Do 
It” whether we freeze, fight, or flee in response to traumatic triggers or even, possibly, in 
seeking rage-filled vengeance. The self-defensive denial of institutions and bystanders 
only feeds into the “desire to forget” and denials of victims (Stern 2010, 144-145). 
Individual and institutional denial results in a repetition of the past in the present 
magnifying the risk of traumatic triggering, self-harm, re-victimization, and active and 
passive perpetration. We discussed that denial remains a central motor to the operation of 
what Bonnie Mann terms “sovereign masculinity” in the era of racialized patriarchy, 
perpetuating colonial patriarchal ontologies placing ‘white men’ and ‘white women’ ‘in’ 
time and ‘black males’ and ‘black females’ ‘out’ of time (cf. Burke 2019 and Lugones 
2007). And we have discussed the operation of the repetitions of denial upholding 
racialized patriarchy in the case example of Jane Doe and the institutional betrayals of the 
‘University of Nike’ par excellance. These denials continue to reverberate throughout the 
institution. 
 Be we have also discussed the possibilities of a different lover: wise Sophia. In 
addition to Plato’s ancient critique of philonikian ‘manliness,’ I also offered his 
philosophy of the temporality of human overcoming. This ‘love of wisdom’ is a ‘strong’ 
and ‘courageous,’ or ‘manly,’ love that is able to care for the pieces of our soul that 
remain traumatized by past memory. It is the birth of a good-spirit (eudaimonia, 
εὐδαµονία) to accompany our past traumatized selves in order to ‘forget’ or table them as 
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we traverse into our life in the aftermath of trauma. His philosophy and, likely, his 
original Academy was guided by a pursuit of the truth with others motivated by love 
rather than desire to win an argument or competition. While the contemporary American 
academy was built by men of the nineteenth century to ‘mirror’ and ‘progress’ from the 
ancient Greeks, I suspect that if our contemporary universities actually strove to mirror 
rather than distort with racialized patriarchal bias the philosophy of Plato’s ancient 
academy, the institutional betrayals and denials observed in the case of Jane Doe would 
not have happened (see Winterer 2002; Syrett 2009; Bluestone 1994; and Townsend 
2017). This is not to romanticize the ancient past or claim a final fixed interpretation of 
its philosophy. Rather, it is to observe the value of Plato’s original academy that was 
itself produced in response to the traumas of war, sexual violence, migration, and disease 
that brought the patriarchal, xenophobic, democracy of Athens to its knees. It is this 
ancient patriarchal, xenophobic, democratic society in denial that our own society has 
romanticized and laid as its foundation. Both democracies were and are mired in the 
traumas of war, sexual violence, migration, and disease while teetering on and 
occasionally plunging over the brink into oligarchical tyranny. 
We further delineated the ‘forgetting’ of the repetitions of denial from the 
‘forgetting’ of the repetitions of overcoming with Simone de Beauvoir’s twentieth-
century French feminist existentialist philosophy of freedom. The former is a ‘forgetting’ 
that flees the ambiguities of our human freedom, abandoning the traumatized self in its 
ruptured, fragmented, and alienated state in favor of the all-too-comforting gendered 
destinies of patriarchal ontology. The latter, however, sacrifices the comfort of 
patriarchy’s denial and gendered destinies. This includes the sacrifice of the calculating 
certainty of the future, a sacrifice of the “Just Do It” that refuses to recollect the past for 
fear doing so might mean “taking our eyes off the future” (Schill interview in Jacoby 
2015). Beauvoir offers a philosophy of freedom as a repetitious repetition or constant 
conversion of possessing self-assurance of oneself, losing or forgetting oneself in one’s 
projects, and finding oneself thereby recognized by others for what one does in those 
projects. This is a constant process and we very likely might fail. But she also admits that 
one must first find or recollect one’s self in order to ‘forget’ or ‘lose’ oneself, and so her 
philosophy of freedom and overcoming entails both a sacrifice and the process of 
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recollection. From this sacrifice and recollection, we might begin to make new meaning 
in the present towards an open future. 
 While written in vastly different time periods, the philosophies of both Plato and 
Beauvoir both emerge in the aftermath of tremendous traumatic horror. Written in the 
aftermath of the horrors of the Peloponnesian War and World War II respectively, both 
observe the problem of the denial inherent to patriarchal ideals of manly victorious 
domination. They also both offer a philosophy of overcoming this patriarchal denial that 
entails a process of recollection and loving rebirth in order to best ‘forget’ ourselves in 
becoming who we are. It is also my hope that I have demonstrated the resonance of these 
philosophies not only with theories of trauma in the field of psychology, but also 
critiques of racialized patriarchy in operation within and without the contemporary 
academy as well as efforts of solidarity to overcome them. 
 So, what would it mean to sacrifice the comforts of philonikian racialized 
patriarchy and its denials? Well, it is for us to mindfully and imaginatively pursue this 
idea together as we go forward. But I do have a few thoughts, which I have organized 
along Judith Herman’s useful rubrics of trauma’s overcoming. The guiding principle as 
we go forward must be centering the agency of survivors; to be good, supportive 
midwives to a process that only the individual survive can undertake for themselves. Due 
to concerted efforts by campus feminist and decolonial thinkers along with ambivalent 
administrators, the University of Oregon implemented policies shifting from a “required 
reporting” policy that essentially compelled university faculty and employees to report 
disclosures of sexual and racist violence to administrators regardless of the disclosing 
survivors’ wishes to a “responsible reporting” policy making the majority of faculty and 
employees bound by the survivor’s decision-making (Holland, Cortina, Freyd 2018). But 
we have also witnessed the precarity of even the most well-intentioned policies in the 
repetition of the institutional denial of contemporary racialized patriarchy in the 
institutional response to the 2016 investigation of another University basketball player for 
sexual assault (see Jacoby 21 June 2017; Jacoby 25 Oct. 2017; and Jacoby 7 Dec. 2017). 
 It seems clear to me that in order to establish safety on our college campuses, we 
have to do our best to get out of the toxic co-dependent love relationship with Nike. 
Academia has become a shrine to the worship of Nike and her values of victorious 
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domination, resulting in a co-dependency between the academic institution and the 
corporate powers that bear her name. We must do our best to sever this dependency on 
the love of Nike and the denials inherent to its operation. This would include materially 
restructuring the academy to be properly funded through public investment rather than 
private, money-making donors. It might be easy to look to the contemporary European 
model that publicly funds academic institutions so they may be attended for little-to-no 
fee and places high-stakes athletic competition outside of the realms of academia, where 
players may be compensated and even unionized in their athletic labor. However, I fear 
that this suggestion is in danger of replicating coloniality. That sexual and racial violence 
continue to permeate the halls of academia and sports stadiums in Europe should give us 
pause as we consider possibilities in the American environment. Eliminating sports from 
academia, as the European model does, only places philonikian masculinity ‘out’ of step 
with academic pursuit rather than a phenomenon of values to be transcended ‘within’ it. 
And it may only have the material effect in the American context of eliminating 
possibilities of a kind of ‘Robin Hood’ effect whereby scholars and advocates utilize the 
monies of corporate global oppressors, such as Phil Knight, to advance critical 
curriculum on race, gender, and class as well as administer crucial social services to 
students and the community.  
 We need boundaries in our relationship with Nike and other top university donors 
to protect the overall philosophical value and mission of academia from the money-
making, philonikian desires of white male oligarchs. Today, oligarchs beholden to 
racialized patriarchy rule in the city of academia as well as Washington, D.C. We must 
change this so that we might have more public funding in academia, so we need not be as 
dependent upon the private interests of top independent donors. In the meantime, we need 
to take pragmatic precautions in our relationship with Nike and top donors to protect the 
value and mission of academia, which is the voluntary pursuit in common with others of 
the good life through discerning and loving recollection of the past and the birthing of the 
good-spirit. Historically marginalized voices must be given the space, resources, and 
opportunity to take the lead in these discussion as we go forward.  
 We must also cultivate the ability to patiently listen to our corporal and social 
body. We must learn to endure listening to the conversations, fears, and questions raised 
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by traumatic events and their triggering, rather than hushing them in our rush to preserve 
the destinies of the future. We must take time building our strength to be able to listen to 
and recollect the parts of ourselves that remain terrorized by the past; to take time to 
narrativize our trauma rather than abandoning it so it may only haunt us. This includes 
taking the time to acknowledge the history of racist, decolonial, patriarchal, and ableist 
violence and placing these many traumas in history. This is why curriculum that teaches 
the history and lasting implications of racialized patriarchy is so important. 
 And finally, we must continue to reconnect with others through storytelling and 
creative communal action. We must “open up rather than close down discussions of rape 
culture” and critically approach the “systematic policies of disavowal and denial” that 
contribute to it (Oliver 2016, 156 and 150). Such discussion and approaches occurred in a 
tidal wave at the University of Oregon campus and elsewhere in the years 2014 and 2015. 
And the wave continues to surge with the continuation of the 2014 #BlackLivesMatter 
movement as well as the #MeToo, #TimesUp, and #MarchForOurLives movements 
newly emergent in the wake of the election of Donald J. Trump to the Presidency of the 
United States. As we continue to march forward in time across the Plains of Forgetting 
and the River of Uncaring, we would do best to remember these lessons of the 
entrapment of philonike’s repetitions of trauma’s denial and the free possibilities of 
philosophy’s repetitions of overcoming. 
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APPENDIX 
THE DRAMATIC DATES OF PLATO’S DIALOGUES WITHIN THE HISTORICAL 
TIMELINE OF THE GREEKS AT WAR 
 
This timeline contextualizes the dramatic actions of Plato’s dialogues within the 
history of the ancient Greeks at war. I begin with the introduction of democracy in 
Athens, just prior to the Persian war so readers might better contextualize Plato’s 
concerns about democracy and references to Aristides I ‘The Just’ as well as his 
underlying criticism of Aristophanes’ conceptualization of peace. I continue through the 
periods of peace and the ‘First’ and ‘Second’ Peloponnesian Wars to Plato’s founding of 
the Academy and the conclusion of the Corinthian War. In assembling this timeline, I 
have relied on the narrative of Thucydides with the historical scholarship of G.E.M. de 
Ste. Croix (1972) and Madeleine Henry (1997) as well as Debra Nails’ important work 
situating the dramatic actions of Plato’s dialogues within their historical setting. The 
reader will note that Gorgias is set throughout the Peloponnesian War, though there are a 
variety of date indicators as Nails observes. Laws and Philebus have no particular 
dramatic date within or without the Peloponnesian War. I have excluded works in which 
there is dispute about Plato’s primary authorship. The timeline is by no means 
exhaustive, for example, not every battle during the wars is listed here as I have 
highlighted only those events I have found vital to understanding what memories Plato 
may be ‘recollecting’ in relation to his critique of traumatizing masculinity and his 
philosophy of becoming good, or overcoming, in the aftermath.  
 
~510/507BC Athens transitions to democratic rule. 
 
499BC  Beginning of the Persian War: The Greek hegemonic city-states of Athens 
  and Sparta form an alliance to protect Greece from the advancing imperial  
  attacks of the Persians. The alliance between Athens and Sparta would  
  splinter and devolve into the First Peloponnesian War before the end of  
  the Greco-Persian conflict. 
 
490BC Battle of Marathon: This legendary land battle demonstrated the triumph 
of the Greeks fighting in heavy hoplite armor (hoplomachia, ὁπλοµαχία) 
against the artillery of the Persian archers. Stesilaus, the lover of political 
rivals Aristides I ‘The Just’ and Themistocles, dies in this battle.  
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While Themistocles was an embezzler and friend of oligarchs, 
Aristides I ‘The Just’ was known an honest, humble public servant, as 
some would say to a fault as his resulting independent poverty upon his 
death left his children dependent on the city-state of Athens, with the 
financial support of Alcibiades II.   
In Plato’s Laches, set in the winter of 424BC, the mediocre son of 
Aristides I, Lysimachus, asks whether hoplomachia would help his own 
son, Aristides II, become a real man. The then-generals Nikias and Laches 
says yes and no respectively, and Laches invokes the image of one hoplite 
‘Stesilaus’ struggling in actual warfare. Socrates transforms the question 
from whether hoplomachia will help young men become ‘manly’ to 
contemplating how to add virtue to the soul. Both the inquiry into the 
glory of hoplomachia as contributing to the virtues associated with ‘real 
men’ and the reference to Stesilaus might reasonably be interpreted as 
references to the Battle of Marathon. 
 
472/1BC Themistocles, the navy-builder of Athens and political rival of Aristides 
‘The Just,’ is ostracized for anti-Spartan activities. 
 
470BC  The midwife, Phaenarete, gives birth to Socrates of Alopece with her  
  husband, Sophroniscus the sculptor. 
 
463/2BC Cimon, the leader of Athens, is audited, prosecuted by the so-elected 
Pericles for bribery, and acquitted (Nails 2002, 225). 
 
462BC Cimon continues to pursue a two-state hegemony between Athens and 
Sparta (Ste. Croix 1972, 172-178).  
 
460BC Beginning of the First Peloponnesian War: The Spartan-allied city of 
Megara turns to Athens for aid defending itself from the aggression of 
fellow Sparta-allied Corinth. Corinth and Megara were located on opposite 
sides of the geographic land-bridge between Sparta and Athens 
respectively, with the sacred Eleusinian Fields separating Megara from 
Athens. This territorial and allegiant shift in the balance of power between 
the two hegemonic city-states was “one of the main immediate causes of 
the First Peloponnesian War” (Ste. Croix 1972, 100 and 181). 
 
458BC  Allegiance between Athens and the Sicilian city-state of Egesta is formed. 
 
450s BC Aspasia, the beautiful and well-educated heteara from Miletus, travels 
from her home coast of now-Asia Minor to the city of Athens with her 
sister and her sister’s new Athenian husband, Alcibiades II. 
 
450/1BC The Citizenship Law of Athens: The city of Athens breaks out in plague 
due to overcrowding as an influx of war refugees and new immigrants, 
such as Aspasia and her sister, seek safety with its city walls. In response, 
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Pericles limits Athenian citizenship to individuals whose parents were 
both Athenian citizens, barring from citizenship the children born between 
Athenian citizens out of wedlock (i.e., bastards) and the children of metics 
or foreigners, regardless of parental marital status. 
 
August  Dramatic date of Plato’s Parmenides, the earliest in dramatic dating of his  
450BC dialogues, where a twenty-year old Socrates defends his theory of the 
forms against the then-well-established philosopher, Parmenides. 
 
450/446BC Aspasia and Pericles I begin their intimate relationship. 
 
449BC  End of the Persian War. 
 
447-438/2BC Construction of the Parthenon. 
 
446BC End of the First Peloponnesian War and beginning of the Thirty Years’ 
Peace: This included the stipulation that Megara be returned to Spartan 
allegiance. The Thirty Years Peace lasts 15 years. 
 
445BC  Aspasia gives birth to Pericles II with Pericles I. 
 
~443BC  Cratinus, the Old Comedian, debuts Cherions, in which he satirizes 
or 430BC Pericles I and Aspasia and begins the tradition of blaming the presence of  
  anandreia (unmanliness) in public for the war (Henry,1995, 20-21; also  
  see Nicole Loraux, 1985). 
 
441BC  Production of Sophocles’ Antigone. 
 
440BC Samian Revolt: The island-city of Samos attacks the city of Miletus, home 
of Aspasia, over the territory of Priene. Despite its support from the 
Persians, the island-city of Samos appeals to Sparta for aid. This would 
constitute a breach of the peace, which was forestalled by the city of 
Corinth and its diplomacy rallying Spartan-allied rejection of the 
escalation of war.  
 
433/432BC Megarian Decree: Pericles I issues the Megarian decree in response to the 
impious (asebeia, ἀσεβεία) cultivation of the Eleusinian Fields, land 
sacred to the goddesses Demeter and Persephone, located between Megara 
and Athens. Ste. Croix speculates the cultivation of the Eleusinian Fields 
was sponsored by oligarchical Spartan hawks and some Corinthians to 
provoke Athenian reaction and justification to escalate war. Nevertheless, 
the city of Corinth reminds Athens of its diplomacy internal to the Spartan 
alliance in de-escalating conflict during the Samian Revolt of 440BC. 
Considering the sacrilegious trespass, Pericles’ Megarian Decree was a 
mild, defensive compromise erring on the side of preserving peace: 
Athens could not win a war, though it could hold its own if attacked (Ste. 
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Croix 1972, 207-210). Rather than military or economic sanction, 
Pericles’ retribution was that of a symbolic political gesture barring 
Megarians from Athens’ political activities in the agora (Ste. Croix 1972, 
254-60). 
 
432BC The Revolt of Potidaea: The former colony of Corinth, the city of 
Potidaea, threatens revolt against its allegiance to Athens. Pericles 
demands all Corinthian magistrates leave the city of Potidaea, fearing their 
influence. He sends Athenian troops to the city and revolt breaks out soon 
after. Pericles institutes a siege on the city, leaving its citizens to resort to 
cannibalism. The siege ends with the stipulation that the Potidaeans 
abandon their city and live in exile. Seizing the opportunity to regain its 
colony, the city of Corinth reverses its anti-war stance and convinces 
Sparta to launch an offensive. Sparta attacks the Athenian troops, 
including Socrates and Alcibiades III, on their way home from the 
concluded siege of Potidaea. It is here that the poor, middle-aged, and 
infamously ugly Socrates saves the young, rich, and famously handsome 
Alcibiades III along with his heavy hoplite armor. Despite this, Alcibiades 
rather than Socrates received recognition and Athenian military honor for 
his brave actions while under Spartan attack (Nails 2002, 265 and 13; see 
Symposium 219e-221b). 
 
~433/432BC Dramatic date of Plato’s Protagoras, where Socrates criticizes traditional 
kinship and inheritance arrangements and their unjust deficiencies in 
providing either recognition or material care for children and young 
adults. The dialogue ends with Plato’s budding criticism of unwise and 
rash ancient norms of ‘manliness’ (andreia, ἀνδρεία; see Protagoras 
349b-360e).   
 
431BC Beginning of the Second Peloponnesian War: Sparta declares war after 
refusing to negotiate with Pericles I of Athens over the repeal of the 
Megarian Decree. Pericles I offered to repeal the Decree on the modest 
condition that Sparta ceased expelling Athenian citizens from the city of 
Sparta. 
 
August 3,  Annular solar eclipse lasting roughly 1:05 minutes. Plutarch reports that  
431BC  Pericles I provided a scientific explanation of the eclipse to his fearful  
  troops, instructing them not to interpret the passing of objects as a sign  
  from the gods regarding the success of their military mission. 
 
431/0BC Athens institutes semiannual attacks on Megara. 
 
Winter  Pericles delivers his Funeral Oration in which he lauds bravery of the dead  
430BC  and urges Athenians to honor the courageous manliness (ἀνδρεία) of the  
  dead with restrained grieving practices. This included the explicit   
  articulation of gender norms for both men and women. To the women, he  
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  urged that “the greatest glory of a woman is to be least talked about by  
  men, whether they are praising you or criticizing you” (Thucydides  
  II.45.2-II46.1). 
 
429BC  Socrates returns to Athens from Potidaea and the battle of Spartalos with  
  Alcibiades and the remaining Athenian army. 
 
429-427BC Spartan siege of Plataea. 
 
~429BC With the debut of his first play, Prospaltians, the Old Comedian Eupolis 
  continues, if not plagiarizes, the tradition of the comedian Cratinus in his  
  criticism of Aspasia and the presence of anandreia in public for the war,  
  referencing her mythological sexual allure (Henry 1995, 22-24). 
 
429/8BC Athens enjoys military success in various campaigns. 
 
~429/423BC Perictone gives birth to Plato with her husband, Ariston the aristocrat.  
  Perictone was the sister of Charmides and the niece of Socrates’ student  
  Critias, both Charmides and Critias would become leaders in the Thirty  
  Tyrants. 
 
May   Dramatic date of Plato’s Charmides. Socrates discusses the virtue of  
429BC  temperance or moderation with a beautiful young man.  
 
August  Dramatic date of Plato’s Timeaus and Critias. Nails notes the difficulty of  
429BC  dating both dialogues, especially in relation to the assumed connection  
  between Timaeus and Republic. Timeaus offers the metaphysical   
  reincarnation mythology of the soul as descendent from the stars in  
  heaven, being rebirthed through bodies in accordance with the virtue  
  demonstrated in previous life. The concept of hysteria (ὑστέρα) is also  
  discussed (Timaeus 91b-c). Critias explores the story of Athens being able 
  to withstand the attacks of Atlantis due to its well-ordered society. 
 
Autumn  Pericles I Dies: After witnessing the horrible deaths by plague1 of his own  
                                                        
1 Thucydides details the symptoms and devastating contagiousness of the disease:  
People in perfect health suddenly began to have burning feelings in the head; their eyes became 
red and inflamed; inside their mouths there was bleeding from the throat and tongue, and the 
breath became unnatural and unpleasant. The next symptoms were sneezing and hoarseness of 
voice, and before long the pain settled on the chest and was accompanied by coughing. Next the 
stomach was affected with stomach-aches and with vomitings of every kind of bile that has been 
given a name by the medical profession, all this being accompanied by great pain and difficulty. In 
most cases there were attacks of ineffectual retching, producing violent spasms; this sometimes 
ended with this stage of the disease, but sometimes continued long afterwards. Externally the body 
was not very hot to the touch, nor was there any pallor: the skin was rather reddish and livid, 
breaking out into small pustules and ulcers. But inside there was a feeling of burning, so that 
people could not bear the touch even of the lightest linen clothing, but wanted to be completely 
naked, and indeed most of all would have liked to plunge into cold water. Many of the sick who 
were uncared for actually did so, plunging into the water-tanks in an effort to relieve a thirst which 
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429BC legitimate children, Paralus and Xanthippus, Pericles I himself succumbed 
to the disease, but not before requesting and receiving special exemption 
from his own citizenship laws to naturalize and legitimate his son by 
Aspasia, Pericles II.  
With the death of Pericles I, a power-vacuum between the 
aggressive Cleon, the pious Nikias, and the money-seeking Alcibiades III 
ensues while Aspasia loses her influence on political affairs. According to 
Thucydides, Cleon, Nikias, and Alcibiades III reverse Pericles’ restrained 
foreign policy of “bid[ing] her time and [taking] care of her navy, and 
[doing] nothing to risk the safety of the city itself.” Rather than exhibiting 
restraint and honest leadership, the three generals became demagogues 
driven by their own desires and fears (Thucydides II.65). 
 
~429-428BC Aspasia engages in an intimate relationship with Lysicles, a sheep-dealer,  
  who became a prominent Athenian statesman before his death in 428BC.  
  Aspasia may have borne a second son, Poristes (‘supplier’), with Lysicles 
  (cf. Henry 1995, 43; and Nails 2002, 61). Henry comments that Lysicles 
                                                        
was unquenchable; for it was just the same with them whether they drank much or little. Then all 
the time they were afflicted with insomnia and the desperate feeling of not being able to keep still. 
In the period when the disease was at its height, the body, so far from wasting away, 
showed surprising powers of resistance to all the agony, so that there was still some strength left 
on the seventh or eighth day, which was the time when, in most cases, death came from the 
internal fever. But if people survived this critical period, then the disease descended to the bowels, 
producing violent ulceration and uncontrollable diarrhea, so that most of them died later as a result 
of the weakness caused by this. For the disease, first settling in the head, when on to affect every 
part of the body in turn, and even when people escaped its worst effects, it still left its trace on 
them by fastening upon the extremities of the body. It affected the genitals, the fingers, and the 
toes, and many of those who recovered lost the use of these members; some, too, went blind. 
There were some also who, when they first began to get better, suffered from a total loss of 
memory, not knowing who they were themselves and being unable to recognize their friends. 
[…] though there were many dead bodies lying about unburied, the birds and animals that 
eat human flesh either did not come near them or, if they did taste the flesh, died of it afterwards. 
[…]  
[…] The most terrible thing of all was the despair into which people fell when they 
realized that they had caught the plague; for they would immediately adopt an attitude of utter 
hopelessness, and, by giving in in this way, would lose their powers of resistance. Terrible, too, 
was the sight of people dying like sheep through having caught the disease as a result of nursing 
others. This indeed caused more deaths than anything else. For when people were afraid to visit 
the sick, then they died with no one to look after them; indeed, there were many houses in which 
all the inhabitants perished through lack of any attention. When, on the other hand, they did visit 
the sick, they lost their own lives, and this was particularly true of those who made it a point of 
honour to act properly. Such people felt ashamed to think of their own safety and went into their 
friends’ houses at times when even the members of the household were so overwhelmed by the 
weight of their calamities that they had actually given up the usual practice of making laments for 
the dead. Yet still the ones who felt most pity for the sick and dying were those who had had the 
plague themselves and had recovered from it. They knew what it was like and at the same time felt 
themselves to be safe, for no one caught the disease twice, or, if he did, the second attack was 
never fatal. Such people were congratulated on all sides, and they themselves were so elated at the 
time of their recovery that they fondly imagined that they could never die of any other disease in 
the future” (Thucydides II.49-51). 
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  may have been taken as evidence for her ‘gift’ in making any man into a  
  successful, ‘real’ man (Henry 1995, 43; see especially 43n48). 
 
427BC  Nikias captures the Megarian island of Minoa. 
 
Autumn  Cleon Insults Nikias: Ashamed of his rash and unpopular decision to  
425BC forego peace with Sparta in favor of his desire to capture Megara, leaving 
his troops destitute at Pylos, Cleon insults Nikias’ masculinity saying “if 
only the generals were real men [andres, ἄνδρες]” it would have been easy 
to capture the city and that he might be able to do it better himself. To this, 
Nikias calls Cleon’s bluff and hands the command over to him. And “[t]he 
result was that Cleon, finding that there was no longer any possibility of 
going back on what he had said, undertook to go on the voyage” 
(Thucydides IV.27-28). Despite his own internal shame and reluctance, 
the aggressive, ‘manly’ Cleon enjoyed some success. 
 
425BC  Athens Enjoys Continued Military Success: Under Cleon’s leadership,  
  Athens defeats Sparta at Pylos. Athens enjoys some  military success,  
  including capturing the islands and city of Megara, but this success would  
  be short-lived. 
 
425BC  Aristophanes debuts The Archarnians and continues the tradition of Old  
  Comedy blaming Aspasia and anandreia for the war. He blames both the  
  Megarian Decree and Aspasia for the war and, through the character  
  Dikaeopolis, articulates his politics of resolving the war with a two-state  
  hegemony. He calls Aspasia a prostitute and accuses her of ‘procuring’  
  others into the trade. Henry writes, “Once she is defined as the keeper of  
  whores, Aspasia is a woman near the center of government who controls  
  men’s access to women and whose displeasure could bring on war; at the  
  end of the play, order is restored and Dikaeopolis revels with two whores  
  (Ach. Lines 1199 to the end).” This trope of the comedic crisis of women  
  at the center of Athenian Politics courses throughout work of Aristophanes 
  as well as other ancient comedians (Ste. Croix 1972, 363-368; Henry  
  1995, 25-27). 
 
424BC  Aristophanes debuts The Knights. 
 
424/423BC The comedian Eupolis debuts Philoi, in which he mentions Aspasia’s  
  sexual allure and compares her to myth (Henry 1995, 24).  
 
March 21, Annular solar eclipse lasting 4:39 minutes (see Thucydides IV.52). 
424BC 
 
Summer Athens’ Military Luck Turns: Though Nikias leads a successful expedition  
424BC  to Cythera, Athens begins to suffer a series of defeats at Megara and  
  Boetia. 
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Autumn  The Battle of Delium: This battle featured the first deaths by ‘friendly fire’ 
424BC recorded in human history. These deaths were caused by confusion among 
Athenian hoplites while marching. These deaths may have been prevented 
had Athenian troops trained communally, as the Spartans did, rather than 
furnishing its troops with independently trained citizens. It is at this battle 
that the middle-aged Socrates saves the general Laches by retreating from 
the chaotic bloodbath (Symposium, 221a). This loss would mark a turning 
point in the war: Athens had enjoyed some success under Pericles, Nikias, 
and Cleon until this point. Athens’ luck begins to end. 
 
Winter  Dramatic dating of Plato’s Laches. 
424BC 
 
~424/3BC Thucydides (the historian) is exiled for twenty years for his failure to  
  prevent the Spartan capture of the city of Amphipolis while a general of  
  Athens with substantial political, military, and economic influence in the  
  region. It is during this time that he wrote his History of the Peloponnesian 
  War, generally regarded as one of the first written histories in human  
  history (Thucydides IV. 118-120 and V.26-27). 
 
424-422BC The Battle of Amphipolis: This battle experienced a period of armistice in  
  423BC, foolishly broken by Cleon. He dies. 
 
~424/3BC Socrates marries Xanthippe (dates uncertain, though Nails gives reason to 
believe may have married and bore a son before Aristophanes’ Clouds). 
Xanthippe bears him Lamprocles II, perhaps after her own father bucking 
ancient custom. Lamprocles II is in late adolescence at Socrates’ death in 
399BC. It is possible that either Xanthippe or Myrto, the grand/daughter 
of Aristides I rumored to have married Socrates, bore Socrates’ younger 
two children, Sophroniscus II and Menexenus, who is an infant or toddler 
at Socrates’ death. Nails rejects the marriage between Socrates and Myrto, 
accepting instead the possibility that Myrto was simply taken under 
Socrates’ guardianship. Laches may reference this bind when Lysimachus 
tells Socrates that he has a duty to the family of Aristides I. If the 
historical Socrates did either wed Myrto or simply take her into his home, 
this would have occurred after the dramatic date of Laches in Winter 
424BC as Lysimachus would not have needed reminder of who Socrates 
was. In light of the decline in the male population due to war, a marriage 
decree may have been passed in the late fifth century and soon repealed 
that would have permitted a bigamous marital arrangement between 
Socrates, Xanthippe, and Myrto (Nails 2002, 209-210; and Woodbury 
1973). 
 
423BC  Aristophanes debuts Clouds, a satire that brings Socrates infamy.  
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~ 422BC Dramatic dating of Plato’s Cratylus. 
 
422BC  Aristophanes debuts Wasps, in which he echoes the claim of the poet  
  Callias that Aspasia taught Pericles to speak (Henry 1995, 27-28). 
 
421BC Aristophanes debuts Peace, which also echoes the poet Callias’ claim that 
Aspasia taught Pericles to speak. He also returns to Pericles’ Megarian 
Embargo.  
To great success, Eupolis debuts Marikas, in which he calls 
Aspasia the mother of a bastard, referencing her son, Pericles II. Henry 
notes that in his second version of Clouds, Aristophanes accuses Eupolis 
of plagiarism (Henry 1995, 27-28 and 23-24). 
 
421BC The Peace of Nikias: With the death of the hawkish Cleon, the Athenian 
generals Nikias and Laches are able to negotiate a peace treaty with the 
Spartan King Pleistoanax. The Peace of Nikias stipulated that Athens and 
Sparta would refrain from armed conflict and instead submit important 
differences to arbitration (Ste. Croix 1972, 259). The city of Megara 
refused to sign the peace treaty after years of persistent Athenian attack 
(Ste. Croix 1972, 244). The peace was hardly successful. Thucydides 
writes, it “is hardly possible to use the word ‘peace’ of a situation in which 
neither side gave back or received what had been promised; and apart 
from this there were breaches of the treaty on both sides” (Thucydides 
V.25-26). Further, Alcibiades was upset that he wasn’t included in the 
peace dealings, complaining that he was excluded because of his age and 
that he ought to have been included due to his family’s monetary 
connections to Sparta (Thucydides V.43-45). As retribution, Alcibiades 
seized on the continued poor relations to drive a wedge between Sparta 
and Nikias.  
 
420BC  Alcibiades is elected to replace Nikias as lead general.  
 
418BC The Battle of Mantinea: At Alcibiades’ urging, the Athenian allies decided 
to “get on with the war” leading soon to the first battle between Sparta and 
Athens to officially break the Peace of Nikias (Thucydides V.61-68; Ste. 
Croix 1972, 180). The Battle of Mantinea was another hoplite-marching 
disaster for Athens, and, without Socrates there to rescue him in retreat, 
the general Laches lost his life. The Athenians became outflanked due to 
their failure to march as a coherent unit. Thucydides writes that the 
Athenians advanced “with great violence and fury,” whereas the Spartans: 
…came on slowly and to the music of many flute-players in their 
ranks. This custom of theirs has nothing to do with religion; it is 
designed to make them keep in step and move forward steadily 
without breaking their ranks, as large armies so often do when they 
are just about to join battle (Thucydides V.70-71). 
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418-416BC Dramatic date of Plato’s Phaedrus. 
 
February Dramatic date of Plato’s Symposium. 
416BC 
 
Summer The Melian Dialogue: In the aftermath of the devastating loss at Mantinea, 
Athens 
416BC laid siege to the island of Melos. Upon the Melians’ eventual 
unconditional surrender, Thucydides writes that the Athenians “put to 
death all the men of military age whom they took, and sold the women and 
children as slaves. Melos itself they took over for themselves, sending out 
later a colony of 500 men” (Thucydides V.116). 
 
Spring The Sicilian Expedition and the Destruction of the Hermae: Nikias’ plan  
415BC to dissuade Athenians from the Sicilian Expedition by overstating the 
preparations needed backfires. The Athenians were so swept up with 
Alcibiades’ enthusiasm to respond to the city of Egesta’s appeal for aid in 
defense of the Megara-allied city of Selinus that Nikias’ attempt at 
rhetorical irony was lost on them. Nikias was elected to lead the 
expedition alongside Alcibiades and Lamachus. The Sicilian Expedition 
became the largest Athenian military venture in the fifth century. One 
evening before the expedition was to embark, it was discovered that nearly 
all the statues of the messenger god, Hermes, in the city of Athens had 
been destroyed. This act of sacrilege was considered not only as a bad 
omen for the Sicilian Expedition, but also “as evidence of a revolutionary 
conspiracy to overthrow the democracy.” Alcibiades and his friends who 
practiced illegal, mocking “celebrations of the [Eleusinian] mysteries […] 
in private houses” were accused and framed for the affair. Alcibiades 
denied the charges, demanding a trial before setting sail for Sicily. 
However, his enemies delayed the trial (Thucydides VI.27-28). 
 
Summer/ Arrival to Sicily and the Recall of Alcibiades: Upon arriving to Sicily, the  
Fall  Athenians discovered that the city of Egesta had deceived them: the  
415BC  money they had promised to Athens did not exist. Nikias, Alcibiades, and  
  Lamachus disputed about how to respond. Nikias suggested continuing  
  with their previous plans and provide Egesta the opportunity to provide  
  the money; if the money was not provided, then the Athenians would stay  
  to oversee the settlement between Egesta and Selinus and then   
  demonstrate the power of Athens to other cities along the route home.  
  Lamachus suggested orchestrating a surprise attack on Syracuse, which  
  historian Donald Kagan observes may have been the most successful  
  strategy. Lamachus would eventually capitulate to the plan of Alcibiades  
  to appeal and wait for the aid of allies, a plan motivated out of fear for  
  returning to the city of Athens empty-handed despite assembling an  
  extravagant naval force (Thucydides VI.47-52; see Kagan 2003).   
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  Alcibiades sets sail to build alliances with nearby cities. He successfully  
  recruits the city of Catana. 
Meanwhile, the city of Athens was besieged by dictatorship and 
the plots of a destructively dramatic homoerotic love triangle. Many 
Athenians thought such plots were connected to the sacrilegious 
destruction of the Hermae and private practice of the mysteries as “part of 
a plot aiming at setting up an oligarchy or a dictatorship.” Thus, the 
Athenians recalled Alcibiades back to Athens to stand trial. They did not 
arrest Alcibiades for fear of disrupting the Athenian troops and the 
alliance with the Mantineans and Argives, an alliance for which they 
thought Alcibiades responsible. So instead, Alcibiades set sail for Athens 
with his own ship while escorted by another, the Salaminia. But instead of 
continuing to Athens, Alcibiades parted with the Salaminia at Thurii and 
went into hiding for fear of the fomented prejudice he would meet in 
Athens. The Athenians sentenced Alcibiades to death in his absence, while 
the exiled Alcibiades made his way to Sparta (Thucydides VI.53-61).  
 
Winter  The Battle of Syracuse: Nikias and Lamachus enjoy some success,  
415BC  eventually wintering at Catana. However, after Lamachus dies in a ditch in 
  battle and with Alcibiades exiled in Sparta, the ill and increasingly   
  reclusive Nikias is left as the sole commander of the Expedition. A force  
  of Athenians take Epipolae, where Nikias had been left behind due to his  
  failing health (Thucydides VI.62-72, VI.101-103). 
At Sparta, Alcibiades III shares Athenian war secrets in an attempt 
to avenge himself against those Athenians who he felt had destroyed 
Athens from the inside, saying “The country that I am attacking does not 
seem to me to be mine any longer; it is rather that I am trying to recover a 
country that has ceased to be mine” (Thucydides VI.92). Sparta then sent 
Gylippus to attack the Athenians at Sicily. 
    
414BC  Gylippus and Spartan forces arrive in Sicily and Syracuse. To the   
  Athenians’ detriment, Nikias maintains a defensive position rather than  
  launching a preemptory land and sea offensive that would have played to  
  the Athenians’ strengths and then-superior positioning. 
 
414BC  Aristophanes debuts The Birds. 
 
414-413BC Letter of Nikias: Desperate and untrusting of messengers, Nikias writes a 
letter to Athens beseeching the city to recall him and his troops or to send 
reinforcements along with “someone to relieve me of the command, as a 
disease of the kidneys has made me unfit for service.” The Athenians 
refused to either recall or relieve Nikias and delays sending reinforcements 
due to the immediate threat to the city of Athens posed by advancing 
Spartan forces (Thucydides VII.8-18) 
 
413BC  Dramatic dating of Plato’s Ion. 
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Spring- Sparta Fortifies Decelea: With Alcibiades III’s traitorous insight, Sparta  
Summer invades Attica and fortifies Decelea, an area just miles from the city of 
413BC  Athens. Meanwhile in Sicily, the Spartan Gylippus helps build a 
Syracusan navy, which engages in a series of skirmishes with the Athenian 
navy. The Athenian Demosthenes builds a force to relieve the Athenians at 
Sicily, despite the advancement of the Spartans near Athens proper. 
Athens is greatly weakened financially and militarily. 
  Demosthenes faces a series of battles en route to Sicily, while the 
Syracusans force Nikias and the Athenians to retreat into anchored and 
worn naval and merchant ships in the harbor. 
 
Summer Athenian Defeat at Epipolae: Demosthenes arrives to the harbor of  
413BC Epipolae and launches a moonlight offensive against the Syracusans. 
Thucydides notes that this was the only night battle between the Athenians 
and the Spartans in the entire war, and it was a disaster for the Athenians. 
The Syracusans, joined by their allies and Sparta’s Gylippus contingent, 
caught onto the Athenian troops’ call-and-response and began singing it 
themselves. This caused anxiety and confusion among the Athenians, 
leading to many deaths by friendly fire. Of the Athenians that lived, most 
had grown sick from anchoring in the marshy harbor.  Demosthenes 
demands the Athenians should retreat immediately. Under the advisement 
of several Syracusans that the siege of Epipolae may be yet be successful, 
Nikias delivers a speech refusing to retreat and cites fears of the mortal 
disgrace they may be met with upon their return to the city of Athens. 
Despite Demosthenes’ vocal disagreement, the Athenians remained in 
position, convinced that Nikias must have some special information to 
stick so firmly to his point. All the while, Nikias himself was undecided 
about the best course of action (Thucydides VII.42-49). 
  More Spartan reinforcements arrive and the Athenians, including 
Nikias, regret their decision not to retreat. The Athenians prepare for 
retreat in secret. 
 
August 28,  Total Lunar Eclipse and Conclusion of the Athenian Defeat at Epipolae:  
413BC  Just as the Athenians were about to embark in retreat, the full moon turned 
blood red with a total lunar eclipse. The superstitious Athenians took this 
as a sign of impending doom in retreat and urged the generals to wait. 
Upon the advice of soothsayers, Nikias, “who was rather over-inclined to 
divination and such things,” insisted the Athenian forces wait a moon 
cycle (“thrice nine days”) before he was willing to entertain discussion on 
the matter of retreat. The Syracusans and Spartans took advantage of this 
decision motivated by superstitious fortune-telling and victoriously 
attacked the Athenians by sea (Thucydides VII.53-57). Nikias attempts to 
rouse the courageous spirits (eupsychia, εὐψυχία) of the remaining 
Athenian troops for one last-ditch effort, who cried out for their gods and 
family in terror as the Syracusans captured the entirety of the Athenian 
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naval force. Thucydides writes, the Athenian “fears for the future were 
like nothing they had ever experienced” (Thucydides VII.64-71; cf. 
Herman 1992/1997/2015, 52). 
 
Fall- The Athenians Failed Retreat by Land and the Execution of Nikias: After  
Winter  suffering the crushing defeat at Epipolae and the loss of their ships, the  
413BC  Athenians attempt to retreat by land where they encounter the incredible, 
traumatizing, carnage of their brethren, enduring the cries of the living 
mortally wounded. Deeply ashamed, tearful, and hopeless, the Athenians 
feared what: 
…awaited them in the dark future ahead. […] No Hellenic army 
had ever suffered such a reverse. They had come to enslave others, 
and now they were going away frightened of being enslaved 
themselves; and instead of the prayers and paeans with which they 
had sailed out, the words to be heard now were directly contrary 
and boded evil as they started on their way back, sailors traveling 
on land, trusting in hoplites rather than in ships (Thucydides 
VII.72-75). 
 The ailing Nikias attempted to comfort the troops with religious optimism 
for the future: 
I myself am physically no stronger than any one among you (in 
fact you see what my illness has done to me), nor, I think, can 
anyone be considered to have been more blessed by fortune than I 
have been in my private life and in other respects; but I am now 
plunged into the same perils as the meanest man here. Yet 
throughout my life I have worshipped the gods as I ought, and my 
conduct towards men as been just and without reproach. Because 
of this I still have a strong hope for the future, and these disasters 
do not terrify me as they well might do. […] In a word, soldiers, 
you must make up your minds that to be brave now is a matter of 
necessity, since no place exists near at hand where a coward can 
take refuge, and that, if you escape the enemy now, you will all see 
again the homes for which you long, and the Athenians among you 
will build up again the great power of Athens, fallen though it is. It 
is men who make the city, and not walls or ships with no men 
inside them (Thucydides VII.77)  
  Soon after his speech, the Athenians were captured by the Syracusans.  
  Nikias  failed in his attempts to negotiate a peace agreement and   
  surrendered to Gylippus, trusting that his own life would be spared. But  
  mistrust among the Spartans and Syracusans pressured Gylippus into  
  executing both the overly-pious Nikias and the mis-appreciated   
  Demosthenes (after all, their lives may have been spared had the   
  Athenians heeded Demosthenes insistence in immediate retreat). The  
  remaining Athenian warriors were put into a pit for eight months, and  
  those who survived such an ordeal were enslaved. Though the war would  
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  rage on for another decade, the defeat of the Sicilian Expedition was one  
  from which Athens would not recover (Thucydides VII.79-87). 
 
Winter  Athenian Denial: Thucydides writes of the denial of people in Athens  
413/412  upon learning of the absolute devastation to their navy and the enormous  
  death toll. When the Athenians did finally come to recognize the present  
  absence of so many lives and their fleet, their absolute terror of the threat  
  to their survival prompted them to rebuild a fleet. The war would continue 
  for nearly another decade. It is worth quoting Thucydides at length: 
When the news reached Athens, for a long time people would not 
believe it, even though they were given precise information from 
the very soldiers who had been present at the event and had 
escaped; still they thought that this total destruction was something 
that could not possibly be true. And when they did recognize the 
facts, they turned against the public speakers who had been in 
favour of the expedition, as though they themselves had not voted 
for it, and also became angry with the prophets and soothsayers 
and all who at the time had, by various methods of divination, 
encouraged them to believe that they would conquer Sicily. They 
were feeling the stress in every department and on every front, and 
now, after this last blow, great indeed was the fear that beset them 
and the consternation. Not only was the state as a whole and the 
mind of every man weighed down by the thought of the loss of so 
many hoplites, cavalry, and men of military age who, they saw, 
could not be replaced; they saw, too, that the numbers of ships in 
the docks were inadequate, as was the money in the treasury, and 
that there were no crews for the ships. So at the moment they had 
little hope of being able to survive; they thought that their enemies 
in Sicily, after their great victory, would set sail immediately with 
their fleet for Piraeus, that their enemies at home would now most 
certainly redouble their efforts and attack them with all their might 
by land and sea, and that their own allies would revolt and join in 
the attack. Nevertheless, with their limited resources, it was 
decided that they must not give in; they would equip a fleet, 
getting the timber from wherever they could; they would raise 
money, and see their allies, particularly Euboea, remained loyal; 
and in Athens itself they would take measures of economy and 
reform, appointing a body of older men to give their advice on the 
situation, whenever the occasion arose. In fact, like all 
democracies, now that they were terrified, they were ready to put 
everything in order. Their decisions were carried out at once, and 
so summer came to an end. (Thucydides 8.1) 
 
Spring  Possible dramatic dating of Plato’s Republic, set at the festival of Bendis.2 
                                                        
2 There is dispute in the literature as to the entry of the worship of Bendis into Athens. Böckh 1874 places 
the dating at 411BC.  Nails argues Republic is set over the duration of the Peloponnesian War. Planeaux 
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413/411BC 
 
411BC  Continuing the comedic trope of women in politics, Aristophanes debuts  
  Lysistrata and Thesmophoriazusae, both parodies of Athenian gender  
  norms. In Lysistrata, women stage a sex strike protesting the war. In  
  Thesmophoriazusae features cross-dressing sexual role-reversals where  
  the women attempt to hold Euripides accountable for his misogynistic  
  plays. 
   Eupolis also debuts Demes, in which “Solon, Militiades, Aristides,  
  and Pericles are brought back from the dead in order to advise the city”  
  and he  outright calls Aspasia a whore (Henry 1995, 23-24). 
 
Summer  The Four-Hundred Oligarchical Coup of Athens: The reign of the Four- 
411BC  Hundred was a result of a deal negotiated by Alcibiades III between Persia 
  and Sparta that took advantage of the Athenian fiscal crisis. This was a  
  return to oligarchical rule of the ‘old days’ after a one-hundred-year  
  democracy in Athens. It would implode through internal division within a  
  year, descending into the Five-Thousand. Before its own dissolution, the  
  Five-Thousand recalls Alcibiades to Athens. 
 
410BC  Democracy restored to Athens. 
 
409BC  Alcibiades III fights a series of battles on behalf of the Athenians. 
 
409/408BC The city of Megara recaptures the island of Nisea and the Athenians  
  retaliate. Plato’s brothers, Glaucon and Adeimantus, may have died in this 
  battle (Nails 2002, 245). 
 
Spring  Dramatic dating of Plato’s Lysis. 
~409 
                                                        
2000/2001 discusses the possibilities of dating the inauguration of the cult of Bendis in Athens in 429BC, 
413BC, and 411BC. Under my interpretation, 429BC would be too early to set Republic in relation to 
Symposium (cf. Hobbs 2000). Moreover, Nikias’ son, Niceratus, is present in the dialogue. We know from 
Laches, set in 424BC, that Socrates refused to educate the son of Nikias prior to that moment, though the 
dialogue ends with Socrates willing to entertain future discussion. So 429BC likely does not do for at least 
two reasons of philosophical interpretation. Given the events within Laches, it is unlikely Nikias would 
have the academic courage to continue to dialogue with Socrates and he is notably absent from Republic 
while his son, Niceratus, is present. Both Planeaux 2000/2001 and Townsend 2017 admit that Plato’s 
creative license does not bind him to hard and fast dating in relation to the inauguration of Bendis, 
however, I think there is good reason to place Republic in relation to Symposium. If Symposium brings us to 
the precipice of the Sicilian Expedition, Republic may well follow the decline of Athens in the disasters of 
Nikias’ leadership in the Sicilian Expedition thinking through how Athenians might move on politically 
and ethically in the aftermath of the disaster. The absence of Nikias from the dialogue may be due to his 
absence from Athens in the failed Sicilian Expedition and/or his resulting death. More specifically, I think 
Republic may be placed in relation to the Athenian denial and decision to rebuild their allegiances and 
military in the aftermath of the Sicilian Expedition’s failure. That Republic may also be read as an 
anticipatory rebuttal to Aristophanes’ mockery of women in public in Lysistrata, performed in 411BC. 
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May/   Alcibiades III returns to Athens with a full naval garrison to a hero’s  
June  welcome at the Piraeus on the day of the Plynteria, the festival day of  
407BC  washing the statue of Athena. Many, including Alcibiades III, took this as  
  a bad omen as it was considered unlucky to celebrate anything of   
  importance other than Athena on that day (Kagan 1987, 290). The   
  Athenians dropped the charges of blasphemy against Alcibiades III,  
  restored his land and finances, and permitted him to lead the first   
  procession in the Eleusinian fields since the Spartan occupation of   
  Decelea.  
 
~407  Dramatic dating of Plato’s Euthydemus. 
 
406-404BC The Exile of Alcibiades III: After suffering military defeat, Alcibiades III  
  imposes self-exile to take responsibility. He dies in exile be 404BC,  
  though the details are disputed. 
 
406BC  Athenian Victory at Arginusae: The Athenian navy wins a celebrated  
  victory after a series of crushing defeats; however, a storm prevents the  
  Athenians from rescuing troops from damaged and sunken ships. 
 
October Socrates Serves in the Boule: Socrates of Alopece is elected by lot to  
406BC  preside over a trial and sentencing against six generals charged with  
  “failing to collect the wounded and dead after the sea battle at Arginusae.” 
  Socrates disagreed with the methods of procedure, arguing that capital  
  cases should be adjudicated on an individual basis and that, at minimum,  
  the trial ought to last longer than the one day allotted for the trial and  
  subsequent execution of the six generals. Socrates only won some   
  additional time for the defense speech of Euryptolemus III. All six   
  generals were executed (Nails 2002, 265). 
 
February Athenians regret failing to heed Socrates’ objections in their haste to  
406BC  execute the six generals for their failure to collect the wounded and dead  
  at the Athenian victory of Arginusae (Nails 2002, 265). 
 
405BC  Aristophanes debuts The Frogs, in which he continues his conservative  
  position advocating for the ‘good ole days’ of Athens.  
 
404BC  End of the Second Peloponnesian War and reign of the pro-Spartan,  
  oligarchical Thirty Tyrants lead by Critias, a former student of Socrates,  
  and Theramenes. The Thirty Tyrants instituted a reign of terror over the  
  Athenians, executing, murdering, and exiling hundreds if not thousands of  
  pro-democratic Athenian citizens. This included the execution of the  
  philosopher Polemarchus, memorialized in Plato’s Republic. 
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   In Letter 7, Plato indicates the reign of the Thirty was congruent  
  with his own coming of age and possibilities of entering public affairs  
  (Nails 2002, 245-46) 
 
403BC  Democracy restored in Athens. 
 
402BC  Dramatic date of Plato’s Meno. 
 
401-399BC March of the Ten Thousand: Hired Athenian mercenaries, including  
  Socrates’ student, Xenophon, embark on a failed campaign to seize the  
  Persian throne for Cyrus the Younger (see Xenophon’s Anabasis). 
 
Winter  Dramatic dating of Plato’s Menexenus. 
401/0 
 
Spring  This is the dramatic date of a series of Plato’s dialogues leading up to the  
399BC  trial and death of Socrates, beginning with Theaetetus. Euthyphro is set  
  later that same day. Sophist follows next day with Statesman later that  
  same day. 
 
May-June The Trial of Socrates and the dramatic date of Plato’s Apology: Socrates is  
399BC  tried for crimes of impiety and corruption of the youth. He is found guilty  
  and sentenced to death by hemlock. 
 
June-July Dramatic date of Plato’s Crito, set twenty-eight or twenty-nine days after  
399BC  the trial of Socrates. Here, Socrates refuses the offer of escape from death  
  into exile. The dramatic date of Phaedo is set a day or two later where  
  Socrates drinks his lethal sentence of death by hemlock.    
 
~399-396BC Plato studies with Cratylus, a Herclitean, and Hermogenes, a Parmenidean 
  (Nails 2002, 105 and 247; cf. Diogenes). 
 
~396BC Plato travels to Megara to study with other Socratics (Nails 2002, 247; cf.  
  Diogenes). 
 
395BC  Sparta and Athens resume hostilities with the beginning of the Corinthian  
  War. 
 
392BC  Aristophanes debuts Ecclesiasuzae, another satire of the idea of women in  
  politics. 
 
388BC  Aristophanes debuts Plutus, a satire of wealth distribution. 
    
386BC  The Corinthian War ends. 
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384/3BC Plato goes to Syracuse where he tutors Dion until angering the tyrant  
  Dionysus I by “speaking frankly.” Dionysus I sells him into slavery. He is  
  set free by Anniceris and receives land upon which he creates the garden  
  of the Academy (Nails 2002, 248). 
 
383BC  Plato founds the tuition-free and reportedly sex-inclusive Academy (Nails  
  2002, 248 argues for the 383 date over the conventionally accepted 387BC 
  date). 
 
367BC  Aristotle attends Plato’s Academy, possibly in Plato’s absence (Nails  
  2002, 248). 
 
367/366BC Plato travels to Sicily to reconcile Dionysus II, who had succeeded his  
  father,  with Dion, the counselor-fallen-out-of-favor to Dionysus II and the 
  former-student of Plato (Nails 2002, 248). 
 
361-360BC Plato returns to Sicily, but Dionysus II, now a despiser of philosophy, kept 
  him “a virtual prisoner, putting his life in jeopardy outside the fortress,  
  forcing Plato to appeal to friends in Tarentum to be rescued. He was able  
  to return to Athens only with the intercession of Archytas” (Nails 2002,  
  248). 
 
354BC  Plato’s Sicilian student, Dion, is assassinated by Dionysus II (Nails 2002,  
  248-249). 
 
~348/347BC Plato dies. 
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